TORTINI

For your delectation and delight, desultory dicta on the law of delicts.

Collegium Ramazzini & Its Fellows – The Lobby

November 19th, 2023

Back in 1997, Francis Douglas Kelly Liddell, a real scientist in the area of asbestos and disease, had had enough of the insinuations, slanders, and bad science from the minions of Irving John Selikoff.[1] Liddell broke with the norms of science and called out his detractors for what they were doing:

 “[A]n anti-asbestos lobby, based in the Mount Sinai School of Medicine of the City University of New York, promoted the fiction that asbestos was an all-pervading menace, and trumped up a number of asbestos myths for widespread dissemination, through media eager for bad news.”[2]

What Liddell did not realize is that the Lobby had become institutionalized in the form of an organization, the Collegium Ramazzini, started by Selikoff under false pretenses.[3] Although the Collegium operates with some degree of secrecy, the open and sketchy conduct of its members suggest that we could use the terms “the Lobby” and “the Collegium Ramazzini,” interchangeably.

Ramazzini founder Irving Selikoff had an unfortunate track record for perverting the course of justice. Selikoff conspired with Ron Motley and others to bend judges with active asbestos litigation dockets by inviting them to a one-sided conference on asbestos science, and to pay for their travel and lodging. Presenters included key expert witnesses for plaintiffs; defense expert witnesses were conspicuously not invited to the conference. In his invitation to this ex parte soirée, Selikoff failed to mention that the funding came from plaintiffs’ counsel. Selikoff’s shenanigans led to the humiliation and disqualification of James M. Kelly,[4] the federal judge in charge of the asbestos school property damage litigation,

Neither Selikoff nor the co-conspirator counsel for plaintiffs ever apologized for their ruse. The disqualification did lead to a belated disclosure and mea culpa from the late Judge Jack Weinstein. Because of a trial in progress, Judge Weinstein did not attend the plaintiffs’ dog-and-pony show, Selikoff’s so-called “Third Wave” conference, but Judge Weinstein and a New York state trial judge, Justice Helen Freedman, attended an ex parte private luncheon meeting with Dr. Selikoff. Here is how Judge Weinstein described the event:

“But what I did may have been even worse [than Judge Kelly’s conduct that led to his disqualification]. A state judge and I were attempting to settle large numbers of asbestos cases. We had a private meeting with Dr. Irwin [sic] J. Selikoff at his hospital office to discuss the nature of his research. He had never testified and would never testify. Nevertheless, I now think that it was a mistake not to have informed all counsel in advance and, perhaps, to have had a court reporter present and to have put that meeting on the record.”[5]

Judge Weinstein’s false statement that Selikoff “had never testified”[6] not only reflects an incredible and uncharacteristic naiveté by a distinguished evidence law scholar, but the false statement was in a journal, Judicature, which was, and is, widely circulated to state and federal judges. The source of the lie appears to have been Selikoff himself in the ethically dodgy ex parte meeting with judges actively presiding over asbestos personal injury cases.

The point apparently weighed on Judge Weinstein’s conscience. He repeated his mea culpa almost verbatim, along with the false statement about Selikoff’s having never testified, in a law review article in 1994, and then incorporated the misrepresentation into a full-length book.[7] I have no doubt that Judge Weinstein did not intend to mislead anyone; like many others, he had been duped by Selikoff’s deception.

There is no evidence that Selikoff was acting as an authorized agent for the Collegium Ramazzini in conspiring to influence trial judges, or in lying to Judge Weinstein and Justice Freedman, but Selikoff was the founder of the Collegium, and his conduct seems to have set a norm for the organization. Furthermore, the Third-Wave Conference was sponsored by the Collegium. Two years later, the Collegium created an award in Selikoff’s name, in 1993, not long after the Third Wave misconduct.[8] Perhaps the award was the Collegium’s ratification of Selikoff’s misdeeds. Two of the recipients, Stephen M. Levin, and Yasunosuke Suzuki, were “regulars,” as expert witnesses for plaintiffs in asbestos litigation. The Selikoff Award is funded by the Irving J. Selikoff Endowment of the Collegium Ramazzini. The Collegium can fairly be said to be the continuation of Selikoff’s work in the form of advocacy organization.

Selikoff’s Third-Wave Conference and his lies to two key judges would not be the last of efforts to pervert the course of justice. With the Selikoff imprimatur and template in hand, Fellows of the Collegium have carried on, by carrying on. Collegium Fellows Carl F. Cranor and Thomas Smith Martyn Thomas served as partisan paid expert witnesses in the notorious Milward case.[9]

After the trial court excluded the proffered opinions of Cranor and Smith, plaintiff appealed, with the help of an amicus brief filed by The Council for Education and Research on Toxics (CERT). The plaintiffs’ counsel, Cranor and Smith, CERT, and counsel for CERT all failed to disclose that CERT was founded by the two witnesses, Cranor and Smith, whose exclusion was at the heart of the appeal.[10] Among the 27 signatories to the CERT amicus brief, a majority (15) were fellows of the Collegium Ramazzini. Others may have been members but not fellows. Many of the signatories, whether or not members or fellows of the Collegium, were frequent testifiers for plaintiffs’ counsel.

None raised any ethical qualms about the obvious conflict of interest on how scrupulous gatekeeping might hurt their testimonial income, or their (witting or unwitting) participation in CERT’s conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.[11]

The CERT amici signatories are listed below. The bold  names are identified as Collegium fellows at its current website. Others may have been members but not fellows. The asterisks indicate those who have testified in tort litigation; please accept my apologies if I missed anyone.

Nicholas A. Ashford,
Nachman Brautbar,*
David C. Christiani,*
Richard W. Clapp,*
James Dahlgren,*
Devra Lee Davis,
Malin Roy Dollinger,*
Brian G. Durie,
David A. Eastmond,
Arthur L. Frank,*
Frank H. Gardner,
Peter L. Greenberg,
Robert J. Harrison,
Peter F. Infante,*
Philip J. Landrigan,
Barry S. Levy,*
Melissa A. McDiarmid,
Myron Mehlman,
Ronald L. Melnick,*
Mark Nicas,*
David Ozonoff,*
Stephen M. Rappaport,
David Rosner,*
Allan H. Smith,*
Daniel Thau Teitelbaum,*
Janet Weiss,* and
Luoping Zhang

This D & C (deception and charade) was repeated on other occasions when Collegium fellows and members signed amicus briefs without any disclosures of conflicts of interest. In Rost v. Ford Motor Co.,[12] for instance, an amicus brief was filed by by “58 physicians and scientists,” many of whom were Collegium fellows.[13]

Ramazzini Fellows David Michaels and Celeste Monforton were both involved in the notorious Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy (SKAPP) organization, which consistently misrepresented its funding from plaintiffs’ lawyers as having come from a “court fund.”[14]

Despite Selikoff’s palaver about how the Collegium would seek consensus and open discussions, it has become an echo-chamber for the rent-seeking mass-tort lawsuit industry, for the hyperbolic critics of any industry position, and for the credulous shills for any pro-labor position. In its statement about membership, the Collegium warns that

“Persons who have any type of links which may compromise the authenticity of their commitment to the mission of the Collegium Ramazzini do not qualify for Fellowship. Likewise, persons who have any conflict of interest that may negatively affect his or her impartiality as a researcher should not be nominated for Fellowship.”

This exclusionary criterion ensures lack of viewpoint diversity, and makes the Collegium an effective proxy for the law industry in the United States.

Among the Collegium’s current and past fellows, we can find many familiar names from the annals of tort litigation, all expert witnesses for plaintiffs, and virtually always only for plaintiffs. After over 40 years at the bar, I do not recognize a single name of anyone who has ever testified on behalf of a defendant in a tort case.

Henry A. Anderson

Barry I. Castleman      

Martin Cherniack

David Christiani 

Arthur Frank

Lennart Hardell 

David G. Hoel

Stephen M. Levin

Ronald L. Melnick

David Michaels

Celeste Monforton

Albert Miller

Brautbar Nachman

Christopher Portier

Steven B. Markowitz

Christine Oliver                 

Colin L, Soskolne

Yasunosuke Suzuki

Daniel Thau Teitelbaum

Laura Welch


[1]The Lobby – Cut on the Bias” (July 6, 2020).

[2] F.D.K. Liddell, “Magic, Menace, Myth and Malice,” 41 Ann. Occup. Hyg. 3, 3 (1997).

[3] SeeThe Dodgy Origins of the Collegium Ramazzini” (Nov. 15, 2023).

[4] In re School Asbestos Litigation, 977 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1992). See Cathleen M. Devlin, “Disqualification of Federal Judges – Third Circuit Orders District Judge James McGirr Kelly to Disqualify Himself So As To Preserve ‘The Appearance of Justice’ Under 28 U.S.C. § 455 – In re School Asbestos Litigation (1992),” 38 Villanova L. Rev. 1219 (1993); Bruce A. Green, “May Judges Attend Privately Funded Educational Programs? Should Judicial Education Be Privatized?: Questions of Judicial Ethics and Policy,” 29 Fordham Urb. L.J. 941, 996-98 (2002).

[5] Jack B. Weinstein, “Learning, Speaking, and Acting: What Are the Limits for Judges?” 77 Judicature 322, 326 (May-June 1994) (emphasis added).

[6]Selikoff and the Mystery of the Disappearing Testimony” (Dec. 3, 2010).

[7] See Jack B. Weinstein, “Limits on Judges’ Learning, Speaking and Acting – Part I- Tentative First Thoughts: How May Judges Learn?” 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 539, 560 (1994) (“He [Selikoff] had never testified and would   never testify.”); Jack B. Weinstein, Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation: The Effect of Class Actions, Consolidations, and other Multi-Party Devices 117 (1995) (“A court should not coerce independent eminent scientists, such as the late Dr. Irving Selikoff, to testify if, like he, they prefer to publish their results only in scientific journals.”).

[8] See also “The Selikoff – Castleman Conspiracy” (Mar. 13, 2011).

[9] Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products Group, Inc., 664 F.Supp.2d 137, 140 (D.Mass.2009), rev’d, 639 F. 3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1002 (2012).

[10]  See “The Council for Education and Research on Toxics” (July 9, 2013).

[11]Carl Cranor’s Inference to the Best Explanation” (Dec. 12, 2021).

[12] Rost v. Ford Motor Co., 151 A.3d 1032, 1052 (Pa. 2016).

[13]The Amicus Curious Brief” (Jan. 4, 2018).

[14] See, e.g., “SKAPP A LOT” (April 30, 2010); “Manufacturing Certainty” (Oct. 25, 2011); “David Michaels’ Public Relations Problem” (Dec. 2, 2011); “Conflicted Public Interest Groups” (Nov. 3, 2013).

The Dodgy Origins of the Collegium Ramazzini

November 15th, 2023

Or How Irving Selikoff and His Lobby (the Collegium Ramazzini) Fooled the Monsanto Corporation

Anyone who litigates occupational or environmental disease cases has heard of the Collegium Ramazzini. The group is named after a 17th century Italian physician, Bernardino Ramazzini, who is sometimes referred to as the father of occupational medicine.[1] His children have been an unruly lot. In Ramazzini’s honor, the Collegium was founded just over 40 years old, to acclaim and promises of neutrality and consensus.

Back in May 1983, a United Press International reporter chronicled the high aspirations and the bipartisan origins of the Collegium.[2] The UPI reporter noted that the group was founded by the late Irving Selikoff, who is also well known in litigation circles. Selikoff held himself out as an authority on occupational and environmental medicine, but his actual training in medicine was dodgy. His training in epidemiology and statistics was non-existent.

Selikoff was, however, masterful at marketing and prosyletizing. Selikoff would become known for misrepresenting his training, and creating a mythology that he did not participate in litigation, that crocidolite was not used in products in the United State, and that asbestos would become a major cause of cancer in the United States, among other things.[3] It is thus no surprise that Selikoff successfully masked the intentions of the Ramazzini group, and was thus able to capture the support of two key legislators, Senators Charles Mathias (Rep., Maryland) and Frank Lautenberg (Dem., New Jersey), along with officials from both organized labor and industry.

Selikoff was able to snooker the Senators and officials with empty talk of a new organization that would work to obtain scientific consensus on occupational and environmental issues. It did not take long after its founding in 1983 for the Collegium to become a conclave of advocates and zealots.

The formation of the Collegium may have been one of Selikoff’s greatest deceptions. According to the UPI news report, Selikoff represented that the Collegium would not lobby or seek to initiate legislation, but rather would interpret scientific findings in accessible language, show the policy implications of these findings, and make recommendations. This representation was falsified fairly quickly, but certainly by 1999, when the Collegium called for legislation banning the use of asbestos.  Selikoff had promised that the Collegium

“will advise on the adequacy of a standard, but will not lobby to have a standard set. Our function is not to condemn, but rather to be a conscience among scientists in occupational and environmental health.”

The Adventures of Pinocchio (1883); artwork by Enrico Mazzanti

Senator Mathias proclaimed the group to be “dedicated to the improvement of the human condition.” Perhaps no one was more snookered than the Monsanto Corporation, which helped fund the Collegium back in 1983. Monte Throdahl, a Monsanto senior vice president, reportedly expressed his hopes that the group would emphasize the considered judgments of disinterested scientists and not the advocacy and rent seeking of “reporters or public interests groups” on occupational medical issues. Forty years in, those hopes are long since gone. Recent Collegium meetings have been sponsored and funded by the National Institute for Environmental Sciences, Centers for Disease Control, National Cancer Institute, and Environmental Protection Agency. The time has come to cut off funding.


[1] Giuliano Franco & Francesca Franco, “Bernardino Ramazzini: The Father of Occupational Medicine,” 91 Am. J. Public Health 1382 (2001).

[2] Drew Von Bergen, “A group of international scientists, backed by two senators,” United Press International (May 10, 1983).

[3]Selikoff Timeline & Asbestos Litigation History” (Feb. 26, 2023); “The Lobby – Cut on the Bias” (July 6, 2020); “The Legacy of Irving Selikoff & Wicked Wikipedia” (Mar. 1, 2015). See also “Hagiography of Selikoff” (Sept. 26, 2015);  “Scientific Prestige, Reputation, Authority & The Creation of Scientific Dogmas” (Oct. 4, 2014); “Irving Selikoff – Media Plodder to Media Zealot” (Sept. 9, 2014).; “Historians Should Verify Not Vilify or Abilify – The Difficult Case of Irving Selikoff” (Jan. 4, 2014); “Selikoff and the Mystery of the Disappearing Amphiboles” (Dec. 10, 2010); “Selikoff and the Mystery of the Disappearing Testimony” (Dec. 3, 2010).

The Rise of Agnothology as Conspiracy Theory

July 19th, 2022

A few egregious articles in the biomedical literature have begun to endorse explicitly asymmetrical standards for inferring causation in the context of environmental or occupational exposures. Very little if anything is needed for inferring causation, and nothing counts against causation.  If authors refuse to infer causation, then they are agents of “industry,” epidemiologic malfeasors, and doubt mongers.

For an example of this genre, take the recent article, entitled “Toolkit for detecting misused epidemiological methods.”[1] [Toolkit] Please.

The asymmetry begins with Trump-like projection of the authors’ own foibles. The principal hammer in the authors’ toolkit for detecting misused epidemiologic methods is personal, financial bias. And yet, somehow, in an article that calls out other scientists for having received money from “industry,” the authors overlooked the business of disclosing their receipt of monies from one of the biggest industries around – the lawsuit industry.

Under the heading “competing interests,” the authors state that “they have no competing interests.”[2]  Lead author, Colin L. Soskolne, was, however, an active, partisan expert witness for plaintiffs’ counsel in diacetyl litigation.[3] In an asbestos case before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Rost v. Ford Motor Co., Soskolne signed on to an amicus brief, supporting the plaintiff, using his science credentials, without disclosing his expert witness work for plaintiffs, or his long-standing anti-asbestos advocacy.[4]

Author Shira Kramer signed on to Toolkit, without disclosing any conflicts, but with an even more impressive résumé of pro-plaintiff litigation experience.[5] Kramer is the owner of Epidemiology International, in Cockeysville, Maryland, where she services the lawsuit industry. She too was an “amicus” in Rost, without disclosing her extensive plaintiff-side litigation consulting and testifying.

Carl Cranor, another author of Toolkit, takes first place for hypocrisy on conflicts of interest. As a founder of Council for Education and Research on Toxics (CERT), he has sterling credentials for monetizing the bounty hunt against “carcinogens,” most recently against coffee.[6] He has testified in denture cream and benzene litigation, for plaintiffs. When he was excluded under Rule 702 from the Milward case, CERT filed an amicus brief on his behalf, without disclosing that Cranor was a founder of that organization.[7], [8]

The title seems reasonably fair-minded but the virulent bias of the authors is soon revealed. The Toolkit is presented as a Table in the middle of the article, but the actual “tools” are for the most part not seriously discussed, other than advice to “follow the money” to identify financial conflicts of interest.

The authors acknowledge that epidemiology provides critical knowledge of risk factors and causation of disease, but they quickly transition to an effort to silence any industry commentator on any specific epidemiologic issue. As we will see, the lawsuit industry is given a complete pass. Not surprisingly, several of the authors (Kramer, Cranor, Soskolne) have worked closely in tandem with the lawsuit industry, and have derived financial rewards for their efforts.

Repeatedly, the authors tell us that epidemiologic methods and language are misused by “powerful interests,” which have financial stakes in the outcome of research. Agents of these interests foment uncertainty and doubt about causal relationships through “disinformation,” “malfeasance,” and “doubt mongering.” There is no correlative concern about false claiming or claim mongering..

Who are these agents who plot to sabotage “social justice” and “truth”? Clearly, they are scientists with whom the Toolkit authors disagree. The Toolkit gang cites several papers as exemplifying “malfeasance,”[9] but they never explain what was wrong with them, or how the malfeasors went astray.  The Toolkit tactics seem worthy of Twitter smear and run.

The Toolkit

The authors’ chart of “tools” used by industry might have been an interesting taxonomy of error, but mostly they are ad hominem attack on scientists with whom they disagree. Channeling Putin on Ukraine, those scientists who would impose discipline and rigor on epidemiologic science are derided as not “real epidemiologists,” and, to boot, they are guilty of ethical lapses in failing to advance “social justice.”

Mostly the authors give us a toolkit for silencing those who would get in the way of the situational science deployed at the beck and call of the lawsuit industry.[10] Indeed, the Toolkit authors are not shy about identifying their litigation goals; they tell us that the toolkit can be deployed in depositions and in cross-examinations to pursue “social justice.” These authors also outline a social agenda that greatly resembles the goals of cancel culture: expose the perpetrators who stand in the way of the authors’preferred policy choices, diminish their adversaries’ their influence on journals, and galvanize peer reviewers to reject their adversaries’ scientific publications. The Toolkit authors tell us that “[t] he scientific community should engage by recognizing and professionally calling out common practices used to distort and misapply epidemiological and other health-related sciences.”[11] What this advice translates into are covert and open ad hominem campaigns as peer reviewers to block publications, to deny adversaries tenure and promotions, and to use social and other media outlets to attack adversaries’ motives, good faith, and competence.

None of this is really new. Twenty-five years ago, the late F. Douglas K. Liddell railed at the Mt. Sinai mob, and the phenomenon was hardly new then.[12] The Toolkit’s call to arms is, however, quite open, and raises the question whether its authors and adherents can be fair journal editors and peer reviewers of journal submissions.

Much of the Toolkit is the implementation of a strategy developed by lawsuit industry expert witnesses to demonize their adversaries by accusing them of manufacturing doubt or ignorance or uncertainty. This strategy has gained a label used to deride those who disagree with litigation overclaiming: agnotology or the creation of ignorance. According to Professor Robert Proctor, a regular testifying historian for tobacco plaintiffs, a linguist, Iain Boal, coined the term agnotology, in 1992, to describe the study of the production of ignorance.[13]

The Rise of “Agnotology” in Ngram

Agnotology has become a cottage sub-industry of the lawsuit industry, although lawsuits (or claim mongering if you like), of course, remain their main product. Naomi Oreskes[14] and David Michaels[15] gave the agnotology field greater visibility with their publications, using the less erudite but catchier phrase “manufacturing doubt.” Although the study of ignorance and uncertainty has a legitimate role in epistemology[16] and sociology,[17] much of the current literature is dominated by those who use agnotology as propaganda in support of their own litigation and regulatory agendas.[18] One lone author, however, appears to have taken agnotology study seriously enough to see that it is largely a conspiracy theory that reduces complex historical or scientific theory, evidence, opinion, and conclusions to a clash between truth and a demonic ideology.[19]

Is there any substance to the Toolkit?

The Toolkit is not entirely empty of substantive issues. The authors note that “statistical methods are a critical component of the epidemiologist’s toolkit,”[20] and they cite some articles about common statistical mistakes missed by peer reviewers. Curiously, the Toolkit omits any meaningful discussion of statistical mistakes that increase the risk of false positive results, such as multiple comparisons or dichotomizing continuous confounder variables. As for the Toolkit’s number one identified “inappropriate” technique used by its authors’ adversaries, we have:

“A1. Relying on statistical hypothesis testing; Using ‘statistical significance’ at the 0.05 level of probability as a strict decision criterion to determine the interpretation of statistical results and drawing conclusions.”

Peer into the hearings of any federal court so-called Daubert motion, and you will see the lawsuit industry, and its hired expert witnesses, rail at statistical significance, unless of course, there is some subgroup that has nominal significance, in which case, they are all in for endorsing the finding as “conclusive.” 

Welcome to asymmetric, situational science.


[1] Colin L. Soskolne, Shira Kramer, Juan Pablo Ramos-Bonilla, Daniele Mandrioli, Jennifer Sass, Michael Gochfeld, Carl F. Cranor, Shailesh Advani & Lisa A. Bero, “Toolkit for detecting misused epidemiological methods,” 20(90) Envt’l Health (2021) [Toolkit].

[2] Toolkit at 12.

[3] Watson v. Dillon Co., 797 F.Supp. 2d 1138 (D. Colo. 2011).

[4] Rost v. Ford Motor Co., 151 A.3d 1032 (Pa. 2016). See “The Amicus Curious Brief” (Jan. 4, 2018).

[5] See, e.g., Sean v. BMW of North Am., LLC, 26 N.Y.3d 801, 48 N.E.3d 937, 28 N.Y.S.3d 656 (2016) (affirming exclusion of Kramer); The Little Hocking Water Ass’n v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 90 F.Supp.3d 746 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (excluding Kramer); Luther v. John W. Stone Oil Distributor, LLC, No. 14-30891 (5th Cir. April 30, 2015) (mentioning Kramer as litigation consultant); Clair v. Monsanto Co., 412 S.W.3d 295 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013 (mentioning Kramer as plaintiffs’ expert witness); In re Chantix (Varenicline) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:09-CV-2039-IPJ, MDL No. 2092, 2012 WL 3871562 (N.D.Ala. 2012) (excluding Kramer’s opinions in part); Frischhertz v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181507, Civ. No. 10-2125 (E.D. La. Dec. 21, 2012) (excluding Kramer); Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 199 Ill. 2d 63, 767 N.E.2d 314 (2002) (affirming admissibility of Kramer’s opinions in absence of Rule 702 standards).

[6]  “The Council for Education & Research on Toxics” (July 9, 2013) (CERT amicus brief filed without any disclosure of conflict of interest). Among the fellow travelers who wittingly or unwittingly supported CERT’s scheme to pervert the course of justice were lawsuit industry stalwarts, Arthur L. Frank, Peter F. Infante, Philip J. Landrigan, Barry S. Levy, Ronald L. Melnick, David Ozonoff, and David Rosner. See also NAS, “Carl Cranor’s Conflicted Jeremiad Against Daubert” (Sept. 23, 2018); Carl Cranor, “Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products: How the First Circuit Opened Courthouse Doors for Wronged Parties to Present Wider Range of Scientific Evidence” (July 25, 2011).

[7] Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products Group, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 137, 148 (D. Mass. 2009), rev’d, 639 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. den. sub nom. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Milward, 565 U.S. 1111 (2012), on remand, Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products Group, Inc., 969 F.Supp. 2d 101 (D. Mass. 2013) (excluding specific causation opinions as invalid; granting summary judgment), aff’d, 820 F.3d 469 (1st Cir. 2016).

[8] To put this effort into a sociology of science perspective, the Toolkit article is published in a journal, Environmental Health, an Editor in Chief of which is David Ozonoff, a long-time pro-plaintiff partisan in the asbestos litigation. The journal has an “ombudsman,”Anthony Robbins, who was one of the movers-and-shakers in forming SKAPP, The Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy, a group that plotted to undermine the application of federal evidence law of expert witness opinion testimony. SKAPP itself now defunct, but its spirit of subverting law lives on with efforts such as the Toolkit. “More Antic Proposals for Expert Witness Testimony – Including My Own Antic Proposals” (Dec. 30, 2014). Robbins is also affiliated with an effort, led by historian and plaintiffs’ expert witness David Rosner, to perpetuate misleading historical narratives of environmental and occupational health. “ToxicHistorians Sponsor ToxicDocs” (Feb. 1, 2018); “Creators of ToxicDocs Show Off Their Biases” (June 7, 2019); Anthony Robbins & Phyllis Freeman, “ToxicDocs (www.ToxicDocs.org) goes live: A giant step toward leveling the playing field for efforts to combat toxic exposures,” 39 J. Public Health Pol’y 1 (2018).

[9] The exemplars cited were Paolo Boffetta, MD, MPH; Hans Olov Adami, Philip Cole, Dimitrios Trichopoulos, Jack Mandel, “Epidemiologic studies of styrene and cancer: a review of the literature,” 51 J. Occup. & Envt’l Med. 1275 (2009); Carlo LaVecchia & Paolo Boffetta, “Role of stopping exposure and recent exposure to asbestos in the risk of mesothelioma,” 21 Eur. J. Cancer Prev. 227 (2012); John Acquavella, David Garabrant, Gary Marsh G, Thomas Sorahan and Douglas L. Weed, “Glyphosate epidemiology expert panel review: a weight of evidence systematic review of the relationship between glyphosate exposure and non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma or multiple myeloma,” 46 Crit. Rev. Toxicol. S28 (2016); Catalina Ciocan, Nicolò Franco, Enrico Pira, Ihab Mansour, Alessandro Godono, and Paolo Boffetta, “Methodological issues in descriptive environmental epidemiology. The example of study Sentieri,” 112 La Medicina del Lavoro 15 (2021).

[10] The Toolkit authors acknowledge that their identification of “tools” was drawn from previous publications of the same ilk, in the same journal. Rebecca F. Goldberg & Laura N. Vandenberg, “The science of spin: targeted strategies to manufacture doubt with detrimental effects on environmental and public health,” 20:33 Envt’l Health (2021).

[11] Toolkit at 11.

[12] F.D.K. Liddell, “Magic, Menace, Myth and Malice,” 41 Ann. Occup. Hyg. 3, 3 (1997). SeeThe Lobby – Cut on the Bias” (July 6, 2020).

[13] Robert N. Proctor & Londa Schiebinger, Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance (2008).

[14] Naomi Oreskes & Erik M. Conway, Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming (2010); Naomi Oreskes & Erik M. Conway, “Defeating the merchants of doubt,” 465 Nature 686 (2010).

[15] David Michaels, The Triumph of Doubt: Dark Money and the Science of Deception (2020); David Michaels, Doubt is Their Product: How Industry’s Assault on Science Threatens Your Health (2008); David Michaels, “Science for Sale,” Boston Rev. 2020; David Michaels, “Corporate Campaigns Manufacture Scientific Doubt,” 174 Science News 32 (2008); David Michaels, “Manufactured Uncertainty: Protecting Public Health in the Age of Contested Science and Product Defense,” 1076 Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 149 (2006); David Michaels, “Scientific Evidence and Public Policy,” 95 Am. J. Public Health s1 (2005); David Michaels & Celeste Monforton, “Manufacturing Uncertainty: Contested Science and the Protection of the Public’s Health and Environment,” 95 Am. J. Pub. Health S39 (2005); David Michaels & Celeste Monforton, “Scientific Evidence in the Regulatory System: Manufacturing Uncertainty and the Demise of the Formal Regulatory Ssytem,” 13 J. L. & Policy 17 (2005); David Michaels, “Doubt is Their Product,” Sci. Am. 96 (June 2005); David Michaels, “The Art of ‘Manufacturing Uncertainty’,” L.A. Times (June 24, 2005).

[16] See, e.g., Sibilla Cantarini, Werner Abraham, and Elisabeth Leiss, eds., Certainty-uncertainty – and the Attitudinal Space in Between (2014); Roger M. Cooke, Experts in Uncertainty: Opinion and Subjective Probability in Science (1991).

[17] See, e.g., Ralph Hertwig & Christoph Engel, eds., Deliberate Ignorance: Choosing Not to Know (2021); Linsey McGoey, The Unknowers: How Strategic Ignorance Rules the World (2019); Michael Smithson, “Toward a Social Theory of Ignorance,” 15 J. Theory Social Behavior 151 (1985).

[18] See Janet Kourany & Martin Carrier, eds., Science and the Production of Ignorance: When the Quest for Knowledge Is Thwarted (2020); John Launer, “The production of ignorance,” 96 Postgraduate Med. J. 179 (2020); David S. Egilman, “The Production of Corporate Research to Manufacture Doubt About the Health Hazards of Products: An Overview of the Exponent BakeliteVR Simulation Study,” 28 New Solutions 179 (2018); Larry Dossey, “Agnotology: on the varieties of ignorance, criminal negligence, and crimes against humanity,” 10 Explore 331 (2014); Gerald Markowitz & David Rosner, Deceit and Denial: The Deadly Politics of Industrial Revolution (2002).

[19] See Enea Bianchi, “Agnotology: a Conspiracy Theory of Ignorance?” Ágalma: Rivista di studi culturali e di estetica 41 (2021).

[20] Toolkit at 4.

Scientists Suing Scientists, and Behaving Badly

June 2nd, 2021

In his 1994 Nobel Prize acceptance speech, the Hungarian born chemist George Andrew Olah acknowledged an aspect of science that rarely is noted in popular discussions:

“[One] way of dealing with errors is to have friends who are willing to spend the time necessary to carry out a critical examination of the experimental design beforehand and the results after the experiments have been completed. An even better way is to have an enemy. An enemy is willing to devote a vast amount of time and brain power to ferreting out errors both large and small, and this without any compensation. The trouble is that really capable enemies are scarce; most of them are only ordinary. Another trouble with enemies is that they sometimes develop into friends and lose a good deal of their zeal. It was in this way the writer lost his three best enemies. Everyone, not just scientists, need a few good enemies!”[1]

If you take science seriously, you must take error as something for which we should always be vigilant, and something we are committed to eliminate. As Olah and Von Békésy have acknowledged, sometimes an enemy is required. It would thus seem to be quite unscientific to complain that an enemy was harassing you, when she was criticizing your data, study design, methods, or motives.

Elisabeth Margaretha Harbers-Bik would be a good enemy to have. Trained in the Netherlands in microbiology, Dr. Bik came to the United States, where for some years she conducted research at Stanford University. In 2018, Bik began in earnest a new career in analyzing published scientific studies for image duplication and manipulation, and other dubious practices.[2]

Her blog, Scientific Integrity Digest, should be on the reading list of every lawyer who labors in the muck of science repurposed for litigation. You never know when your adversary’s expert witness will be featured in the pages of the Digest!

Dr. Bik is not a lone ranger; there are other scientists who have committed to cleaning up the scientific literature. After an illustrious career as an editor of prestigious journals, and a director of the Rockefeller University Press, Dr. Mike Rossner founded Image Data Integrity, Inc., to stamp out image fraud and error in scientific publications.

On March 16, 2020, a gaggle of French authors, including Dr. Didier Raoult, uploaded a pre-print of a paper to medRxiv, reporting on hydroxychloroquine (HCQ) and azithromycin in Covid-19 patients. The authors submitted their manuscript that same day to the International Journal of Antimicrobial Agents, which accepted it in 24 hours or less, on March 17, 2020. The journal published the paper online, three days after acceptance, on March 20th. Peer-review, to the extent it took place, was abridged.[3]

The misleading title of the paper, “Hydroxychloroquine and azithromycin as a treatment of COVID-19: results of an open-label non-randomized clinical trial,” may have led some untutored observers into thinking the paper reported a study high in the hierachy of evidence. Instead the paper was a rather flawed observational study, or perhaps just a concatenation of anecdotes. In any event, the authors reported that patients who had received both medications cleared the SARS-CoV2 the fastest.

Four days after publication online at a supposedly peer-reviewed journal, Elisabeth Bik posted an insightful analysis of the Raoult paper.[4] If peer review it were, her blog post pointed out the review’s failure by identifying an apparent conflict of interest and various methodological flaws, including missing data on six (out of 26) patients, including one patient who died, and three whose conditions worsened on therapy.

Raoult’s paper, and his overly zealous advocacy for HCQ did not go unnoticed in the world of kooks, speculators, and fraudfeasors. Elon Musk tweeted about Raoult’s paper; and Fox News amplified Musk’s tweet, which made it into the swamp of misinformation, Trump’s mind and his twitterverse.[5]

In the wake of the hoopla over Raoult’s paper, the journal owner admitted that the paper did not live up to the society’s standards. The publisher, Elsevier, called for an independent investigation. The French Infectious Diseases Society accused Raoult of spreading false information about hydroxychloroquine’s efficacy in Covid-19 patients. To date, there has been no further official discussions of disciplinary actions or proceedings at the Society.

Raoult apparently stewed over Bik’s criticisms and debunking of his over-interpretation of his flawed HCQ study.  Last month, Raoult filed a complaint with a French prosecutor, which marked the commencement of legal proceedings against Bik for harassment and “extortion.” The extortion charge is based upon nothing more than Bik’s having a Patreon account to support her search for fraud and error in the published medical literature.[6]

The initial expression of outrage over Marseille Raoult’s bad behavior came from Citizen4Science, a French not-for-profit organization that works to promote scientific integrity. According to Dr. Fabienne Blum, president of Citizen4Science, the organization issued its press release on May 5, 2021, to call on authorities to investigate and to intervene in Raoult’s harassment of scientists. Their press release about “the French scandal” was signed by scientists and non-scientists from around the world; it currently remains open for signatures, which number well over 4,000. “Harassment of scientific spokespersons and defenders of scientific integrity: Citizen4Science calls on the authorities to intervene urgently” (May 5, 2021). Dr. Blum and Citizen4Science are now harassed on Twitter, where they have been labeled “Bik’s gang.” Inevitably, they will be sued as well.

On June 1st, Dr. Raoult posted his self-serving take on the controversy on that scholarly forum known as YouTube. An English translation of Raoult’s diatribe can be found at Citizen4Science’s website. Perhaps others have noted that Raoult refers to Bik as “Madame” (or Mrs.) Bik, rather than as Dr. Bik, which leads to some speculation that Raoult has trouble taking criticism from intelligent women.

Having projected his worst characteristics onto adversaries, Raoult lodged accusations against Bik, which actually reflected his own behaviors closely. Haven’t we seen someone in public life who operates just like this? Raoult has criticized Bik in the lay media, and he released personal information about her, including her residential address. Raoult’s intemperate and inappropriate personal attacks on Bik have led several hundred scientists to sign an open letter in support of Bik.[7]

This scientist doth protest too much, methinks.


[1] George Andrew Olah Nobel Prize Speech (1994) (quoting from George Von Békésy, Experiments in Hearing 8 (1960).

[2] Elisabeth M. Bik, Arturo Casadevall, and Ferric C. Fang, “The Prevalence of Inappropriate Image Duplication in Biomedical Research Publications,” 7 mBio e00809 (2016); Daniele Fanelli, Rodrigo Costas, Ferric C. Fang, Arturo Casadevall, Elisabeth M. Bik, “Testing Hypotheses on Risk Factors for Scientific Misconduct via Matched-Control Analysis of Papers Containing Problematic Image Duplications,” 25 Science & Engineering Ethics 771 (2019); see also Jayashree Rajagopalan, “I have found about 2,000 problematic papers, says Dr. Elisabeth Bik,” Editage Insights (Aug 08, 2019).

[3] Philippe Gautret, Jean-Christophe Lagier, Philippe Parola, Van Thuan Hoang, Line Meddeb, Morgane Mailhe, Barbara Doudier, Johan Courjon, Valérie Giordanengo, Vera Esteves Vieira, Hervé Tissot Dupont, Stéphane Honoré, Philippe Colson, Eric Chabrière, Bernard La Scola, Jean-Marc Rolain, Philippe Brouqui, and Didier Raoult, “Hydroxychloroquine and azithromycin as a treatment of COVID-19: results of an open-label non-randomized clinical trial,” 56 Clinical Trial Internat’l J. Antimicrob. Agents e105949 (2020).

[4] Bik, “Thoughts on the Gautret et al. paper about Hydroxychloroquine and Azithromycin treatment of COVID-19 infections,” Scientific Integrity Digest (March 24, 2020).

[5] Charles Piller, “‘This is insane!’ Many scientists lament Trump’s embrace of risky malaria drugs for coronavirus,” Science Mag. (Mar. 26, 2020).

[6] Melissa Davey, “World expert in scientific misconduct faces legal action for challenging integrity of hydroxychloroquine study,” The Guardian (May 22, 2021); Kristina Fiore, “HCQ Doc Sues Critic,” MedPage Today (May 26, 2021).

[7] Lonni Besançon, Alexander Samuel, Thibault Sana, Mathieu Rebeaud, Anthony Guihur, Marc Robinson-Rechavi, Nicolas Le Berre, Matthieu Mulot, Gideon Meyerowitz-Katz, Maisonneuve, Brian A. Nosek, “Open Letter: Scientists stand up to protect academic whistleblowers and post-publication peer review,” (May 18, 2021).

Disqualifying Expert Witnesses for Conflicts of Interest

March 30th, 2021

Some notes on vexing issue, which fortunately has never serious issue for me. I do recall a former partner, who with great exuberance, called every potential expert witness and then felt hurt when some of them showed up as trial witnesses on the other side. Of course, these turncoats bragged of having been approached by, and having rejected work for, the defense.

Side Switching

Opportunism or carelessness can sometimes affect expert witness retention in a way that results in “side switching.” Some lawyers may think it wonderful to snag the other side’s expert witness, who comes with a credibility credit for having been first identified by the other side. Although no rule or statute prohibits side switching, state and federal courts have exercised what they have called an inherent power to supervise and control ethical breaches by lawyers and expert witnesses.[1]

The Wang Test

Although certainly not the first case on side-switching, the decision of a federal trial court, in Wang Laboratories, Inc. v Toshiba Corp., has become a key precedent on disqualification of expert witnesses.[2] The test spelled out in the Wang case has generally been followed in federal courts,[3] as well as in state courts.[4] Given that most of the side-switching cases are quite fact sensitive, it is instructive to detail the facts that lead to an expert witness’s disqualification in this frequently cited case.

The Wang case, as far disqualification is concerned, began with a telephone call from Wang’s lawyer to a computer consultant. From Wang’s lawyer’s perspective, the call resulted in “retention.” The consultant denied that he was retained; as far as he was concerned, he agreed only to examine the patents at issue in the litigation, and to serve as an expert witness only if he were convinced of the patents’ validity.

After their telephone conference, Wang’s lawyer sent the consultant copies of the disputed patents, some materials suggesting an infringement, and the lawyer’s memorandum discussing the history of the prosecution of the patents. A short while later, the lawyer sent another memorandum, labeled “Confidential Attorney-Work Product,” which discussed potential defenses in the suit.

After providing these written materials, Wang’s lawyer had further conversations with the consultant about technical aspects of the case, and disclosed additional confidential information. The lawyer recounted that he had told the consultant that the conversations were confidential. The consultant denied receipt of any confidential information, and stated that he had not referred to the confidential memorandum because he had first to determine the validity of the patent. Working at a preliminary, investigatory stage, the consultant did not see himself as retained unless and until he concluded that the patents were valid.

Upon completed his preliminary investigation, the consultant concluded that the patents were not valid. The consultant informed Wang’s lawyer of his conclusion, and his decision to decline serving as an expert witness for Wang. Wang’s lawyer requested a short report from the consultant, who sent the requested report, which documented that he had read the patents and the “Work-Product” information.

After this interaction between Wang and the consultant, one of Wang’s adversaries, NEC approached the consultant and retained him as an expert witness. When NEC designated the consultant as an expert witness to be called at trial, Wang moved promptly to disqualify the consultant.

The Wang court recognized that if a retained expert witness receives confidential information and then switches sides, he or she is out. In Wang, both retention and receipt of confidential information were contested. The court held that both conditions were required for disqualification. Hence we have the two-prong Wang Test:

  1. A Confidential Relationship. This prong requires an inquiry into whether the party that claimed to have made the retention was objectively reasonable in concluding that a confidential relationship had been created between the party and the consultant. This fact-sensitive inquiry will typically turn on all the facts and circumstances surrounding the lawyer-consultant interaction, such as:
  • an agreement that contemplates sharing of confidential materials,
  • the lawyer’s having provided the consultant with confidential documents,
  • the existence of an agreement about retention,
  • the extent of the lawyer-consultant communications and meetings,
  • the payment of consideration for the consultant’s work, and
  • the extent of the consultant’s work and whether he or she formed any opinions about the issues in the case
  1. Secrets Shared. The second Wang prong inquires into whether confidential or privileged material had been shared with the consultant. The sharing of such information is evidence of a confidential relationship, but it is also required as an independent basis to satisfy the Wang court’s test. One party’s secret is another party’s commonplace, and the moving party must show that:
  • the information in question was specifically related to the case,
  • the information was privileged or confidential,
  • the information was not evidence that would have been discovered inevitably by the adversary, independent of the consultant’s side-switching
  • the information was not purely technical or otherwise in the public domain

In Wang, as in many similar cases, the lawyer and the consultant gave rather wildly inconsistent accounts of their interactions. The disputatious nature of disqualification motions is sadly all too common. The burden of proving both prongs of the Wang test is on the moving party, and in the Wang case, the court found that Wang’s lawyer had prevailed on both prongs. The consultant was disqualified.

The Wang two-prong test is the majority rule; both prongs must be satisfied. A minority of courts have disqualified expert witnesses “even if no disclosures occur,” in the name of the judicial process integrity.[5]

Public Policy Limits on Wang

Although the Wang test is sometimes characterized as a “bright-line” test, the Wang court itself was sensitive to potential abuse by lawyers who wished to silence certain expert witnesses by creating what appears to be a confidential relationship without actually sharing confidential information. After Wang, some courts moved beyond the two-part test to consider the policy implications of the requested disqualification.[6] Some of the policy considerations that have been advanced and been factored into judicial decisions whether to disqualify an expert witness include:

  • protecting freedom of contract, and the consultant’s right to pursue a livelihood,
  • preventing “sham” retentions to set up later disqualification, especially when there is a limited availability of qualified expert witnesses on the issues, and
  • preventing prejudice to the innocent second party that approached the consultant.

Procedural Issues

Burden of Proof. The case law clearly places the burden of proving the elements of disqualification on the moving party.

Timeliness of Objections. The case law also makes clear that a party must move promptly to object to an expert witness’s conflict of interest.[7]

Not the same product, but similar product, in a later case

When the expert witness in question testified for an adversary in a different case, the analysis of confidential aspect of the shared information becomes more difficult.

Mass Tort Cases

In mass tort cases, many individual plaintiffs have typically sued a single or limited group of defendants. Such litigation can take decades to resolve, or may even become a perpetual motion litigation machine, such as asbestos personal injury cases. Such litigation creates a great need for expert witnesses on various topics, and the duration of the litigation may lead to innocent or deliberate recruitment of the other side’s former expert witnesses.

In one Fen-Phen case, one plaintiff sought to retain an expert witness previously retained by Wyeth to testify about the same diet drug (fenfluramine) in a case brought by a different plaintiff. The trial court readily concluded that there was clear overlap, with sufficient evidence that Wyeth had shared its confidential case strategies and confidential information related to the same drug.[8]

In some instances of side switching, the allegedly defective product may have been similar but not the same. Determining how much overlap makes the sharing harmful of confidential information has proceeded on a case-by-case basis. One thing, however, is clear: there is no overarching duty of loyalty. In one case, a federal court allowed expert witnesses to testify for and against the same defendant in concurrent patent litigation.[9] The court reasoned that the expert witnesses’ testimony in each case addressed only the specific, different patents in the case, and there was no overall sharing of general litigation strategy common to both cases. The testimony in each case did not overlap with the testimony in the other case. The challenge failed to show that confidences were shared that affected both cases.

One New Jersey appellate court upheld the disqualification of an expert witness who had worked for the State of New Jersey on a case that involved confidential disclosures by the State’s lawyers and its agencies, which disclosures were necessarily involved in the expert witness’s subsequent retention by the State’s adversary in a different case.[10] This decision, like most in this area, turned on a close analysis of the facts and circumstances of the retentions and consultations of the expert witness.

Practice Considerations

Obviously, lawyers must research consultants before approaching them. After making contact with a consultant, it is incumbent upon counsel to ask the consultant specifically about past and current engagements and any confidentiality limitations.[11]

Lawyers should clearly communicate their intention to create a confidential relationship that will permit candid exchange of views and information; consultants should similarly express their reservations and doubts about entering into such the proposed working relationship.[12]

In entertaining motions for disqualification, courts generally want to see confirmation of retention in writing.[13] Such writings should recite agreements on fees, billing, payment, as well as an explanation of the nature of the consulting relationship and the anticipation of shared confidences. Some commentators have suggested, imprudently in my view, that the agreement specifically prohibit side switching.

After the consultancy has begun, lawyers should clearly label their work-product communications. The 2010 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure protect such communications from discovery in the litigation process.[14] The 2010 amendments did not, however, protect communications relating to compensation, or the lawyer’s identification of facts or data, which the expert witness then considered in forming opinions, or the lawyer’s identification of assumptions to be made by the expert witness in reaching opinions.[15]  Lawyers must exercise great care in navigating the relevant state and federal rules to protect their work-product that has been shared with expert witnesses who will be disclosed as trial witnesses.

Role and Relationship Conflict

Managerial Employees

A company’s former executives or former high-level employees who had access to internal, deliberative and confidential communications, such as communications with legal counsel, are off limits to an adversary that wishes to engage the former employees as expert witnesses in litigation involving the confidences.

Treating Physicians

Treating physicians act in a role of sharing confidences and trust with their patients. Generally, courts have disallowed parties from engaging physicians as expert witnesses in litigation against the physicians’ patients. In mass tort litigation, however, courts have been willing to permit physicians to serve as expert witnesses, even when some of their patients are plaintiffs, as long as they serve as expert witnesses only in cases brought by non-patients.

Physicians frequently have important factual testimony that bears on litigation, and courts have rejected disqualification of physicians as fact witnesses. In Ngo v. Standard Tools & Equip. Co., Inc., 197 F.R.D. 263 (D. Md. 2000), the court rejected plaintiff’s attempt to disqualify his own treating physician as a defense witness. The plaintiff claimed that he and his counsel had engaged the physician as an expert witness, but the court found that no confidential relationship had been formed. The physician was allowed to testify as a fact witness for the defense. It would be extremely unlikely that an engagement of the physician as a consulting expert witness would have prevented the adverse party from calling the physician as a fact witness, in any event.

Treating Psychotherapists

The psychotherapy-patient relationship is one in which the very nature of the relationship may disqualify the psychotherapist from acting as an expert witness in support of a patient’s claim. The psychiatric profession generally recognizes that providing therapy to a patient and forensic services in support of the patient’s legal claims can adversely affect the therapeutic relationship and impair the therapist’s objectivity as an expert witness.[16] Interestingly, there is not much case law on this potential source of disqualification. In one uncelebrated case, a motion to disqualify a treating psychiatrist from serving as an expert witness was filed, but the case was dismissed on other grounds.[17]

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[1] Grant Thornton, LLP v. Fed. Deposit lnsur. Corp., 297 F. Supp. 2d 880, 881-82 (S.D. W.Va. 2004); Wang Lab., lnc. v. Toshiba Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (E.D. Va. 1991) (“protect the integrity of the adversary process and promote public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the legal process”).

[2] 762 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Va. 1991); see also Vershuta, “New Rules of War in the Battle of the Experts: Amending the Expert Witness Disqualification Test for Conflicts of Interest,” 81 Brooklyn L. Rev. 733 (2016); Brian Hooven, “The Science Behind Expert Disqualification: A Guide,” 12 Expert Witnesses 13 (Fall 2016); Lynne Bernabei, Matthew Radler & Lauren R. S. Mendonsa “Ethical Duties and Standards in Disqualifying, Retaining, and Communicating with Expert Witnesses,” 43 Brief 1 (2013); Maya M. Eckstein & Paul Nyffeler, “The Expert of My Enemy Is My Expert: Conflicts of Interests Amongst Expert Witnesses,” 17 Litig. News 1 (Summer 2012); Douglas R. Widin & Francis J. Maloney III, “Conflicts of Interest and Litigation Experts,” chap. 4, in Cynthia H. Cwik, ed., Scientific Evidence Review: Current Issues at the Crossroads of Science, Technology and the Law, Monograph No. 7 (2006); Cathy Altman & Dena Denooyer Stroh, “Keeping It Confidential: Disqualifying Experts,” Commerical & Bus. Litig. J. 10 (Spring 2005); Kendall Coffey, “Inherent judicial Authority and the Expert Disqualification Doctrine,” 56 Fla. L. Rev. 195 (2004); Douglas R. Richmond, “Regulating Expert Testimony,” 62 Mo. L. Rev. 485 (1997).

[3] See, e.g., Greene, Tweed of Delaware, Inc. v. DuPont Dow Elastomers, LLC, 202 F.R.D. 426, 429 (E.D. Pa. 2001); In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prod. Liab. Litig., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21526 at *8 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. EMC Corp., 330 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1092-093 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Crenshawv. Mony Life Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1026 (S.D. Cal. 2004); Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 2004 WL 2223252 at *2, No. 02-1331-SLR (D. Del Sept. 27, 2004); Mays v. Reassure America Life Ins. Co., 293 F. Supp. 2d 954, 957 (E.D. Ark. 2003); Cordy v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 156 F.RD. 575, 580 (D.N.J. 1994); English Feedlot, Inc. v. Norden Lab., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1498, 1452 (D. Colo. 1993).

[4] See, e.g., Mitchell v. Wilmore, 981 P.2d 172, 175 (Colo. 1999); Formosa Plastics Corp., U.S.A. v. Kajima Internat’l, Inc., 2004 WL 2534207 at *2 (Tex. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2004), rev. denied, 15 S.W.3d 289 (Tex. 2004); Turner v. Thiel, 553 S.E.2d 765, 768 (Va. 2001).

[5] City of Springfield v. RHI Holdings, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 2d 71, 74 (D. Mass. 2000).

[6] See, e.g., Cordy v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 156 F.R.D. 575 (D.N.J. 1994).

[7] See Popular, Inc. v. Popular Staffing Services. Corp., 239 F. Supp. 2d 150, 153 (D. Puerto Rico 2003).

[8] Righetti v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 07-20144, 2009 WL 1886131 (E.D. Pa. 2009). See also Rhodes v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 558 F. Supp. 2d 660 (2008).

[9] Bone Care Internat’l, LLC v. Pentech Pharms, Inc., 2009 WL 249386, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 2009).

[10] Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. Div. of Bldg. & Constr., 405 A.2d 487 (N.J. Super. Ct., L. Div. 1979) (noting that the court’s “decision should in no way be read to indicate that an expert who has traditionally been hired by one attorney in a particular type of litigation would be precluded from offering his services to that particular attorney’s adversary in an unrelated matter”).

[11] English Feedlot, Inc. v. Norden Lab., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1498, 1505 (D. Colo. 1993) (“[C)ounsel seeking to retain a consultant should inquire specifically whether the consultant’s past employment presents any confidentiality roblems.”).

[12] Wang Lab., lnc. v. Toshiba Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1246, 1246, 1248-49 (E.D. Va. 1991) (noting that fairness require that lawyers bear a burden to communicate to consultants that they desire and intend to create a confidential relationship, and that consultants express their doubts unequivocally and decline any disclosures until their doubts are resolved).

[13] See, e.g., id. at 1249-50; Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 2004 WL 2223252 at *2 (D. Del. Sept. 27, 2004); See also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. EMC Corp., 330 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (discussing the practical importance of written retention agreements).

[14] Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B), (C).

[15] Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C)(i)-(iii).

[16] Psychiatrists’ Program, “Can a Treating Psychiatrist Double As Expert Witness for Same Patient?” 39 Psychiatric News at 16 (Aug. 20, 2004); “Assuming Conflicting Roles Can Be Risky,” 36 Psychiatric News at 25 (Oct. 19, 2001); see also Larry H. Strasburger, Thomas G. Gutheil & Archie Brodsky, “On Wearing Two Hats: Role Conflict in Serving as Both Psychotherapist and Expert Witness,” 154 Am. J. Psychiatry 448 (1997).

[17] Conant v. Tru-Test Manufacturing Co., N.J. Law Div., Burlington Cty. No. L-03214-97 (Oct. 25, 2002).

Larding Up the Literature

February 20th, 2021

Another bio-medical journal?

In October 2019, The Journal of Scientific Practice and Integrity published its inaugural volume one, number one issue, online. This journal purports to cover scientific integrity issues, which may well not be adequately covered in the major biomedical journals. There are reasons to believe, however, that this journal may be more of a threat to scientific integrity than a defender.

Thenew journal describes itself as:

“an interdisciplinary, peer-reviewed journal that publishes scholarly debate and original research on scientific practices that impact human and environmental health.”

The editorial board reads like a Who’s Who’s list of “political scientists” who testify a LOT for claimants, and who, when not working for the lawsuit industry, practice occupational and environmental medicine for the redistribution of wealth.

David Egilman, contemnor and frequent plaintiffs’ expert witness in personal injury litigation is editor in chief. Tess Bird, an Egilman protégé, is managing editor. Another Egilman protégé, Susana Rankin Bohme, an associate Director of Research at Corporate Accountability International, also sits on the editorial board. You may be forgiven for believing that this journal will be an Egilman vanity press. The editorial board also includes some high-volume testifying plaintiffs expert witnesses:

Peter Infante, of Peter F. Infante Consulting, LLC, Virginia

Adriane Fugh-Berman, of PharmedOut

Barry Castleman,

William E. Longo, President, MAS, LLC

David Madigan,

Michael R. Harbut,

David Rosner, and

Gerald Markowitz

The journal identifies the Collegium Ramazzini as one of its “partners.” Cue the “Интернационал”!

The first issue of this new journal features a letter[1] from the chief and managing editors, Egilman and Bird, which states wonderfully aspirational goals. The trick will be whether the journal can apply its ethical microscope to all actors in the world of scientific publishing, or whether this new journal is just not another lawsuit industry propaganda outlet.

Egilman’s previous editorial perch was at the International Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health, which was published by Maney Publishing. In 2015, the British company, the Taylor & Francis Group, acquired the IJOEH, with Maney’s other journals, and installed a new editor-in-chief, Andrew Maier. Egilman was cast out; hence the new journal.

Egilman’s new journal will feature among other types of articles, “reviews of legal testimony,” as a scholarly subject. It will be interesting to see whether such reviews assess the testimony of lawsuit industry witnesses, as well as manufacturing industry witnesses.

The new journal requires the use of the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) conflict-of-interest and funding disclosure rules, and the use of the ICMJE form. Accordingly, authors “should” report all conflicts, including:

“[a]ny financial contributions, payments, or funding for the present work;

relevant financial activities outside of the submitted work;

any patents or copyrights broadly relevant to the work; and

any relationships that readers could perceive to influence the submitted work.”

There have been only two issues of Egilman’s new journal so far, but I decided to spot check compliance. The first article[2] I saw was by Colin Soskolne, who has testified for the lawsuit industry in a diacetyl case.[3] Oops; no disclosure.

Does Soskolne’s bias show? In the spot-checked article, authors Sokolne and Baur reprise a publication previously part of a 2018 Collegium Ramazzini convocation entitled “Corporate Influence Threatens the Public Health.” The aim of the convocation speakers was to press their claims that [manufacturing] corporate influence undermines scientific integrity through discernible methods, all by “those in the pay of industry”:

  • infiltrating journal editorial boards by scientists, with the resulting publication of poorly designed, biased research that foments doubt;
  • interfering with “the independent activities of IARC” and similar agencies;
  • blocking “much needed” regulation of “hazardous agents,” such as pesticides and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS); and
  • promulgating causal criteria, which are baseless and which “block workers’ access to legal remedies for occupational illness and premature death.”[4]

There can be little doubt that Soskolne is not interested in messing with “those in the pay of the lawsuit industry.” Soskolne’s biases are fairly clear, clear enough for us to complain that he has not disclosed that he has been compensated by the lawsuit industry, and that he has deep positional conflicts as well. Ironically, he is writing in a journal that itself appears to lack “balance.” The editorial board of the journal for which Soskolne was writing is composed of many of “those in the pay of the lawsuit industry.”

Soskolne is keen to preserve the independence of IARC, but that perceived independence has become a sad, sick joke, with the exclusion of most anyone who has had any working relationship with manufacturing industry, while engaging many with deep ties to the lawsuit industry. Soskolne’s assessment of “much needed” regulation ultimately must be evaluated on the facts and data of each putative toxic substance. If the claim of harmful effects is correct, then regulation may well be “much needed.” If the claim is not correct, then regulation will be much “unneeded.” As for promulgating causal criteria, there is no doubt that the Soskolne, along with the editorial board of this new journal, would like to see the abrogation of causal criteria, so that workers have legal remedies ad libitum.

Soskolne and Baur provide their hit list of the methods of obfuscation or of techniques used to undermine science and policy.[5] There is precious little in their list, however, that is not common place among all journals that publish occupational and environmental epidemiology, including the journals that have been captured by the lawsuit industry’s scientists. Soskolne and Baur also provide a catalogue of how lawsuit industry scientists would subvert science and lock in their biased and selective interpretation of data:

  • elevate biological plausibility into sufficient basis for causal inference
  • conflate species and ignore species differences in order to allow animal studies to suffice for causal inference for humans
  • ignore substantial, relevant biological differences in even slight structural differences among various molecules to enable assertions of harm based upon similar molecular structure of a putative toxic substance

Soskolne ends with a quote from the “pink panthers,” two radical, labor historians, both editorial board members of this new journal, and who both have testified many times for the lawsuit industry:

“[A]s a society, we cannot entrust those with self-interest to be the judge and jury of what is and what is not a danger[;] … that can only lead to compromised science, a questionable decisionmaking process, and a potentially polluted world.”[6]

The pink panthers are, of course, correct, but we must understand that self-interest and conflict of interest can be, and are, both ideological, positional, as well as economic.


[1]  Tess Bird & David Egilman, “Letter from the Editors: An Introduction to the Journal of Scientific Practice and Integrity,” 1 J. Sci. Practice & Integrity 1 (2019).

[2]  Colin Soskolne & Xaver Baur, “How Corporate Influence Continues to Undermine the Public’s Health,” 1 J. Sci. Practice & Integrity 1 (2019), available at DOI: 10.35122/jospi.2019.878137 [cited as Soskolne & Baur]

[3]  See Watson v. Dillon Companies, 797 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (D. Colo. 2011) (addressing Soskolne’s testimony).
[4]  Soskolne & Baur at 1-2.

[5]  Soskolne & Baur at 3.

[6]  Soskolne & Baur at 4, quoting from Gerald Markowitz & David Rosner, “Monsanto, PCBs, and the creation of a ‘world-wide ecological problem’,” 39 J. Pub. Health Policy 463 (2018).

Carl Cranor’s Inference to the Best Explanation

February 12th, 2021

Carl Cranor pays me the dubious honor of quoting my assessment of weight of the evidence (WOE) pseudo-methodology as used by lawsuit industry expert witnesses, in one of his recent publications:

“Take all the evidence, throw it into the hopper, close your eyes, open your heart, and guess the weight. You could be a lucky winner! The weight of the evidence suggests that the weight-of-the-evidence (WOE) method is little more than subjective opinion, but why care if it helps you to get to a verdict!”[1]

Cranor’s intent was to deride my comments, but they hold up fairly well. I have always maintained that if were wrong, I would eat my words, but that they will be quite digestible. Nothing to eat here, though.

In his essay in the Public Affairs Quarterly, Cranor attempts to explain and support his advocacy of WOE in the notorious case, Milward, in which Cranor, along with his friend and business partner, Martyn Smith, served as partisan, paid expert witnesss.[2] Not disclosed in this article is that after the trial court excluded the opinions of Cranor and Smith under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and plaintiff appealed, the lawsuit industry, acting through The Council for Education and Research on Toxics (CERT) filed an amicus brief to persuade the Court of Appeals to reverse the exclusion. The plaintiffs’ counsel, Cranor and Smith, and CERT failed to disclose that CERT was founded by the two witnesses, Cranor and Smith, whose exclusion was at issue.[3] Many of the lawsuit industry’s regular testifiers were signatories, and none raised any ethical qualms about the obvious conflict of interest, or the conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.[4]

Cranor equates WOE to “inference to the best explanation,” which reductively strips science of its predictive and reproducible nature. Readers may get the sense he is operating in the realm of narrative, not science, and they would be correct. Cranor goes on to conflate WOE methodology with “diagnostic induction,” and “differential diagnosis.”[5] The latter term is well understood in both medicine and in law to involve the assessment of an individual patient’s condition, based upon what is already known upon good and sufficient bases. The term has no accepted or justifiable meaning for assessing general causation. Cranor’s approach would pretermit the determination of general causation by making the disputed cause a differential.

Cranor offers several considerations in support of his WOE-ful methodology. First, he notes that the arguments for causal claims are not deductive. True, but indifferent as to his advocacy for WOE and inference to the best explanation.

Second, Cranor describes a search for relevant evidence once the scientific issue (hypothesis?) is formulated. Again, there is nothing unique about this described step, but Cranor intentionally leaves out considerations of validity, as in extrapolations between high and low dose, or between species. Similarly, he leaves out considerations of validity of study designs (such as whether any weight would be given to case studies, cross-sectional, or ecological studies) or of validity of individual studies.

Cranor’s third step is the formulation of a “sufficiently complete range of reasonable and plausible explanations to account for the evidence.” Again, nothing unique here about WOE, except that Cranor’s WOE abridges the process by ignoring the very real possibility that we do not have the correct plausible explanation available.

Fourth, according to Cranor, scientists rank, explicitly or implicitly, the putative “explanations” by plausibility and persuasiveness, based upon the evidence at hand, in view of general toxicological and background knowledge.[6] Note the absence of consideration of the predictive abilities of the competing explanations, or any felt need to assess the quality of evidence or the validity of study design.

For Cranor, the fifth consideration is to use the initial plausibility assessments, made on incomplete understanding of the phenomena, and on incomplete evidence, to direct “additionally relevant /available evidence to separate founded explanations from less well-founded ones.” Obviously missing from Cranor’s scheme is the idea of trying to challenge or test hypotheses severely to see whether withstand such challenges.

Sixth, Cranor suggests that “all scientifically relevant information” should be considered in moving to the “best supported” explanation. Because “best” is determined based upon what is available, regardless of the quality of the data, or the validity of the inference, Cranor rigs his WOE-ful methodology in favor of eliminating “indeterminate” as a possible conclusion.

In a seventh step, Cranor points to the need to “integrate, synthesize, and assess or evaluate,” all lines of “available relevant evidence.” There is nothing truly remarkable about this step, which clearly requires judgment. Cranor notes that there can be convergence of disparate lines of evidence, or divergence, and that some selection of “lines” of evidence may be endorsed as supporting the “more persuasive conclusion” of causality.[7] In other words, a grand gemish.

Cranor’s WOE-ful approach leaves out any consideration of random error, or systematic bias, or data quality, or study design. The words “bias” and “confounding” do not appear in Cranor’s essay, and he erroneously discusses “error” and “error rates,” only to disparage them as the machinations of defense lawyers in litigation. Similarly, Cranor omits any serious mention of reproducibility, or of the need to formulate predictions that have the ability to falsify tentative conclusions.

Quite stridently, Cranor insists that there is no room for any actual weighting of study types or designs. In apparent earnest, Cranor writes that:

“this conclusion is in accordance with a National Cancer Institute (NCI) recommendation that ‘there should be no hierarchy [among different types of scientific methods to determine cancer causation]. Epidemiology, animal, tissue culture and molecular pathology should be seen as integrating evidences in the determination of human carcinogenicity.”[8]

There is much whining and special pleading about the difficulty, expense, and lack of statistical power of epidemiologic studies, even though the last point is a curious backdoor endorsement of statistical significance. The first two points ignore the availability of large administrative databases from which large cohorts can be identified and studied, with tremendous statistical power. Case-control studies can in some instances be assembled quickly as studies nested in existing cohorts.

As I have noted elsewhere,[9] Cranor’s attempt to level all types of evidence starkly misrepresents the cited “NCI” source, which is not at all an NCI recommendation, but rather a “meeting report” of a workshop of non-epidemiologists.[10] The cited source is not an official pronouncement of the NCI, the authors were not NCI scientists, and the NCI did not sponsored the meeting. The meeting report appeared in the journal Cancer Research as a paid advertisement, not in the NCI’s Journal of the National Cancer Institute as a scholarly article:

“The costs of publication of this article were defrayed in part by the payment of page charges. This article must therefore be hereby marked advertisement in accordance with 18 U.S.C. Section 1734 solely to indicate this fact.”[11]

Tellingly, Cranor’s deception was relied upon and cited by the First Circuit, in its Milward, decision.[12] The scholarly fraud hit its mark. As a result of Cranor’s own dubious actions, the Milward decision has both both ethical and scholarship black clouds hovering over it.  The First Circuit should withdraw the decision as improvidently decided.

The article ends with Cranor’s triumphant view of Milward,[13] which he published previously, along with the plaintiffs’ lawyer who hired him.[14] What Cranor leaves out is that the First Circuit’s holding is now suspect because of the court’s uncritical acceptance of Cranor’s own misrepresentations and CERT’s omissions of conflict-of-interest disclosures, as well as the subsequent procedural history of the case. After the Circuit reversed the Rule 702 exclusions, and the Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari, the case returned to the federal district court, where the defense lodged a Rule 702 challenge to expert witness opinion that attributed plaintiff’s acute promyelocytic leukemia to benzene exposure. This specific causation issue was not previously addressed in the earlier proceedings. The trial court sustained the challenge, which left the plaintiff unable to show specific causation. The result was summary judgment for the defense, which the First Circuit affirmed on appeal.[15] The upshot of the subsequent proceedings, with their dispositive ruling in favor of the defense on specific causation, is that the earlier ruling on general causation is no longer necessary to the final judgment, and not the holding of the case when all the proceedings are considered.

In the end, Cranor’s WOE leaves us with a misdirected search for an “explanation of causation,” rather than a testable, tested, reproducible, and valid “inference of causation.” Cranor’s attempt to invoke the liberalization of the Federal Rules of Evidence ignores the true meaning of “liberal” in being free from dogma and authority. Evidence does not equal eminence, and expert witnesses in court must show their data and defend their inferences, whatever their explanations may be.

——————————————————————————————————–

[1]  Carl F. Cranor, “How Courts’ Reviews of Science in Toxic Tort Cases Have Changed and Why That’s a Good Thing,” 31 Public Affairs Q. 280 (2017), quoting from Schachtman, “WOE-fully Inadequate Methodology – An Ipse Dixit by Another Name” (May 1, 2012).

[2]  Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products Group, Inc., 639 F. 3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1002 (2012).

[3]  SeeThe Council for Education and Research on Toxics” (July 9, 2013).

[4] Among the signatures were Nachman Brautbar, David C. Christiani, Richard W. Clapp, James Dahlgren, Arthur L. Frank, Peter F. Infante, Philip J. Landrigan, Barry S. Levy, David Ozonoff, David Rosner, Allan H. Smith, and Daniel Thau Teitelbaum.

[5]  Cranor at 286-87.

[6]  Cranor at 287.

[7]  Cranor at 287-88.

[8]  Cranor at 290.

[9]  “Cranor’s Defense of Milward at the CPR’s Celebration” (May 12, 2013).

[10]  Michelle Carbone, Jack Gruber, and May Wong, “Modern criteria to establish human cancer etiology,” 14 Semin. Cancer Biol. 397 (2004).

[11]  Michele Carbone, George Klein, Jack Gruber and May Wong, “Modern Criteria to Establish Human Cancer Etiology,” 64 Cancer Research 5518 (2004).

[12]  Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products Group, Inc., 639 F. 3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2011) (“when a group from the National Cancer Institute was asked to rank the different types of evidence, it concluded that ‘[t]here should be no such hierarchy’.”), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1002 (2012).

[13]  Cranor at 292.

[14]  SeeWake Forest Publishes the Litigation Industry’s Views on Milward” (April 20, 2013).

[15]  Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products Group, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 2d 101 (D. Mass. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Milward v. Rust-Oleum Corp., 820 F.3d 469 (1st Cir. 2016).

The Lobby – Cut on the Bias

July 6th, 2020

When ordinary citizens hear about lobbies, they think about highly paid former elected officials pressing the interests of manufacturing and service industries in the federal and various state capitals. Of course, there are such lobbyists, but the description misses one of the most powerful groups, the plaintiffs’ mass tort trial bar, the largest rent-seeking group in the United States. When the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ interests are aligned with a group of scientists and physicians who have for decades pressed the interests of labor unions for more and more compensation, and have delivered scientific studies calculated to support their pro-compensation goals, the lobby deserves special attention as “The Lobby.”

Francis Douglas Kelly Liddell was the anti-Selikoff, and he frequently drew the ire, wrath, and barbs of The Lobby. Unlike Selikoff, Liddell had a first-rate education in mathematics (B.A., M.A., Trinity College, Cambridge University), and he had 21 years of hands-on pneumoconiosis research as a Scientific Officer and then Director of the Statistics Department of the National Coal Board, and then Head of the Medical Service’s Medical Statistics Branch.[1]

McGill University recruited Liddell in 1969 to its Medical School’s Department of Epidemiology. In Montreal, Liddell led the statistical analyses for epidemiologic studies of the Quebec chrysotile miners and millers. He helped develop the methodology that underlies the ILO system for evaluating chest radiographs for pneumoconiosis. Although Liddell retired in 1992, as an Emeritus Professor, he remained active in lecturing and publishing, and in his professional associations, Royal Statistical Society and later in the American Statistical Association. Liddell’s careful statistical work, and the much lower risks found in the Canadian chrysotile mining cohorts put him at odds with Selikoff and The Lobby.

In 1997, Liddell had had enough of The Lobby’s insinuations, slanders, and bent science. He did what rarely happens in the scientific world; he called them out for what they were doing:

“[A]n anti-asbestos lobby, based in the Mount Sinai School of Medicine of the City University of New York, promoted the fiction that asbestos was an all-pervading menace, and trumped up a number of asbestos myths for widespread dissemination, through media eager for bad news.”[2]

Since Liddell wrote in 1997, The Lobby has grown and insinuated itself into the International Agency for Research on Cancer, and into a variety of domestic advisory boards to regulatory agencies. The Lobby has learned to use the language and hand waving of the “moral panic,” whenever an expert who has had any connections to regulated industries. Members of The Lobby, however, seem to think that they have no conflicts of interest, despite their deep positional and financial connections to the unregulated lawsuit industry. Asserting conflicts of interest thus becomes an asymmetric weapon to advance pro-compensation and environmental “friendly” conclusions.

Early last month, a group of admittedly pro-manufacturing industry organizations[3] submitted their counter to The Lobby’s purity tests that keep defense expert witnesses and consultants from serving on advisory boards. The organizations wrote to the EPA Administrator, to object to the asymmetry of interest alignments among the Ad Hoc Peer Reviewers for the March 2020 Draft Risk Evaluation for Asbestos, from the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) Science Advisory Committee on Chemicals (SACC).

While the assertion of conflicts of interest for actual research tends to be overwrought, at least when the methods and data are transparent, the conflicts identified in the letter to the EPA have the real potential to skew an opinion-laden, policy document. The reality is that any such EPA risk assessment will be used as a cudgel in tort and environmental litigation, restrictive regulations, and legislative campaigns to “ban” asbestos. The organizations’ complaints are well justified.

The three committee members at issue are Henry Anderson, Steven Markowitz, and Marty Kanarek. All three are card-carrying members of The Lobby.  Markowitz and Anderson are tied to a lobby group, the Asbestos Disease Awareness Organization (ADAO), which advocates a universal ban on asbestos, notwithstanding that this may require relocating 7+ billion people to another planet. Markowitz, Anderson, and Kanarek all testify for the asbestos lawsuit industry. Anderson has been testifying in asbestos personal injury cases, for over 35 years, after he served a brief training in the Mt. Sinai catechism, on New York’s Upper East Side. Indeed, in the mid-1980s, New Jersey plaintiffs’ lawyers regularly called Anderson as an expert witness to give the party line. Markowitz has also trained in the Mt. Sinai catechism, but now is at Queens College, in Queens, New York. Markowitz has not testified for as long as Anderson, but then he has not lived as long. In any event, Markowitz has almost certainly made up in volume for what he has lost in time.

The organizations complaining about Anderson, Markowitz, and Kanarek as peer reviewers correctly point out that these physicians are advocates and highly compensated expert witnesses for the asbestos lawsuit industry. The letter to the EPA also points out that they have been purveyors of dubious opinions on “each and every exposure,” which have been found to be unreliable and not well supported.[4] Certainly less biased experts could be found, and if not, then the Peer Review committee could be balanced with experts who have more balanced views. Inquiring minds wonder how the peer review committee ever became so unbalanced, but I suspect that asymmetrical evaluation of conflicts of interest had a lot to do with it.[5]


[1]  James Hanley, Corbett McDonald, and Margaret R. Becklake, “In Memoriam 2003: Francis Douglas Kelly Liddell.”

[2]  F.D.K. Liddell, “Magic, Menace, Myth and Malice,” 41 Ann. Occup. Hyg. 3, 3 (1997).

[3]  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, American Property Casualty Insurance Association, American Tort Reform Association, Aerospace Industries Association, Coalition for Litigation Justice, International Association of Defense Counsel, National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center, Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., and Washington Legal Foundation.

[4]  See, e.g., In re W.R. Grace & Co., 355 B.R. 462, 482 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (“Dr. Anderson’s analysis is unreliable. Dr. Anderson’s opinion, therefore, does not satisfy Daubert and its progeny and is not admissible. We exclude this evidence.”), appeal den., 2007 WL 1074094 (D. Del. Mar. 26, 2007); In re Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig., 48 Misc. 3d 460, 483-484 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2015) (“For all of these reasons, Markowitz’s opinions, either individually or collectively, do not establish that asbestos contained in friction products can cause mesothelioma, and as he conceded, he could identify no study to support his proposition that there is an increased risk of contracting mesothelioma from exposure to auto brakes, clutches, or gaskets or that there is an increased risk of mesothelioma from the use of friction products or work on friction materials in the automobile industry…. Markowitz not only cited no study to support his opinion, but he also conceded that numerous studies contradict it.”), aff’d sub nom., Juni v. A.O. Smith Water Prods. Co., 32 N.Y.3d 1116, 116 N.E.3d 75 91 N.Y.S.3d 784 (2018).

[5]  “Disappearing Conflicts of Interest” (Oct. 29, 2017) (discussing Steven Markowitz); “The Mt. Sinai Catechism” (June 7, 2013) (discussing Markowitz’ s publications that followed up on Selikoff’s insulator cohort).

Ingham v. Johnson & Johnson – Passing Talc Off As Asbestos

June 26th, 2020

In talc exposure litigation of ovarian cancer claims, plaintiffs were struggling to show that cosmetic talc use caused ovarian cancer, despite missteps by the defense.[1] And then lawsuit industrialist Mark Lanier entered the fray and offered a meretriciously beguiling move: Stop trying talc cases and start trying asbestos cases.

The Ingham appellate decision this week from the Missouri Court of Appeals appears to be a superficial affirmation of the Lanier strategy.[2] The court gave defendants some relief on jurisdictional issues, but largely affirmed the admissibility of Lanier’s expert witnesses on medical causation, both general and specific.[3]

After all, asbestos is an established cause of ovarian cancer. Or is it?

In 2006, the Institute of Medicine (now the National Academy of Medicine) addressed extra-pulmonary cancers caused by asbestos, without ever mentioning ovarian carcinoma.[4] Many textbooks and reviews found themselves unable to conclude that asbestos of any type caused ovarian cancer throughout the 20th century and a decade into the 21st century. The world of opinions changed, however, in 2011, when a working group of the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) met in Lyon, France, and issued its support for the general causation claim in a suspect document published in 2012.[5] The IARC has strict rules that prohibit anyone who has any connection with manufacturing industry from serving on its working groups, but the Agency allows consultants and contractors for the lawsuit industry to serve without limitation. The 2011 working group on fibers and dusts thus sported lawsuit industry acolytes such as Peter F. Infante, Jonathan Samet, and Philip J. Landrigan.

Given the composition of this working group, no one was surprised by its finding:

“The Working Group noted that a causal association between exposure to asbestos and cancer of the ovary was clearly established, based on five strongly positive cohort mortality studies of women with heavy occupational exposure to asbestos (Acheson et al., 1982; Wignall & Fox, 1982; Germani et al., 1999; Berry et al., 2000; Magnani et al., 2008). The conclusion received additional support from studies showing that women and girls with environmental, but not occupational exposure to asbestos (Ferrante et al., 2007; Reid et al., 2008, 2009) had positive, though non-significant, increases in both ovarian cancer incidence and mortality.”[6]

The herd mentality is fairly strong in the world of occupational medicine, but not everyone concurred. A group of Australian asbestos researchers (Reid, et al.) without lawsuit industry credentials published another meta-analysis in 2011, as well.[7] Although the Australian researchers reported an increased summary estimate of risk, they were careful to point out that this elevation may have resulted from disease misclassification:

“In the studies that did not examine ovarian cancer pathology, or confirmed cases of mesothelioma from a cancer or mesothelioma registry, misclassification of the cause of death in some cases is likely to have occurred, given that misclassification was reported in those studies that did reexamine cancer pathology specimens. Misclassification may result in an underestimate of peritoneal mesothelioma and an overestimate of ovarian cancer or the converse. Among women, peritoneal mesothelioma may be more likely to be classified as ovarian, colon, or stomach cancer, rather than a rare occupational cancer.”[8]

The authors noted that Irving Selikoff had first reported that a significant number of peritoneal cancers, likely mesothelial in origin, have been misclassified as ovarian cancers. Studies that relied upon death certificates only might thus be very misleading. Supporting the danger of misclassification, the Reid study reported that:

“Only the meta-analysis of those studies that reported ovarian cancer incidence (i.e., those studies that did not rely on cause of death certification to classify their cases of ovarian cancer) did not observe a significant excess risk.”[9]

Reid also reported the absence of other indicia of causation:

“No study showed a statistically significant trend  of ovarian cancer with degree of asbestos exposure. In addition, there was no evidence of a significant trend across studies as grouped exposure increased.”[10]

Other scientists and physicians have acknowledged the controversial nature of the IARC’s determination. In 2011, pathologist Samuel Hammar, who has testified regularly for the lawsuit industry, voiced concerns about the diagnostic accuracy of ovarian cancer cases in asbestos studies:

“It has been difficult to draw conclusions on the basis of epidemiologic studies of ovarian cancers because, histologically, their distinction between peritoneal mesothelioma and carcinomatous peritonei (including primary peritoneal serous papillary adenocarcinoma) is difficult. Ovarian tumors tend to grow by extension and uncommonly metastasize through the bloodstream, which is similar to tumors of mesothelial origin … .”[11]

In 2014, a working group of the Finnish Institute of Occupational Health noted that “despite the conclusions by IARC and the support from recent studies, the hypothesis that asbestos is [a] cause of ovarian cancer remains controversial.”[12] The same year, 2014, the relevant chapter in a leading textbook by Dr. Victor L. Roggli and colleagues opined that:

“the balance of the evidence available at present does not support an association between asbestos exposure and cancers of the female reproductive system.”[13]

Two years later, a text by Dr. Dorsett D. Smith cited “the lack of certainty of the pathologic diagnosis of ovarian cancer versus a peritoneal mesothelioma in epidemiologic studies” as making the epidemiology uninterpretable and any conclusions impossible.[14]

Against this backdrop of evidence, I took a look at what Johnson & Johnson had to say about the occupational asbestos epidemiology in its briefs, in section “B. Studies on asbestos and ovarian cancer.”[15] The defense acknowledged that plaintiffs’ expert witnesses Drs. Jacqueline Moline and Dean Felsher focused on the IARC conclusion, and on studies of heavy occupational exposure. J & J recited without comment or criticism what plaintiffs’ expert witnesses had testified, much of which was quite objectionable.[16]

For instance, Moline and Felsher both reprised the scientifically and judicially debunked views that there is “no known safe level of exposure,” from which they inferred the non-sequitur that “any amount above ordinary background levels – could cause ovarian cancer.”[17] From ignorance, nothing derives but conjecture.

Another example was Felsher’s testimony that asbestos can make the body of an ovarian cancer patient therapy-resistant. In response to these and other remarkable assertions, J & J countered with only the statement that their expert witness, Dr. Huh, “did not agree that all of this was true in the context of ovarian cancer.”[18]

Huh, indeed; that the defense expert witness disagree with some of what plaintiffs’ witnesses claimed hardly frames an issue for exclusion of any expert witness’s opinion. Even more disturbing, there is no appellate point that corresponds to a motion to exclude Dr Moline’s testimony.

The Egilman Challenge

There was a challenge to the testimony of another expert witness, David Egilman, a frequent testifier for Mark Lanier and other lawsuit industrialists. One of the challenges that the defendants made on appeal to the admissibility of Dr. David Egilman’s testimony was his use of a 1972 NIOSH study that apparently quantified exposure in terms of fibers per cubic centimeter, without specifying whether all fibers in the measurement were asbestos fibers, as opposed to non-asbestos fibers, including talc fibers.

The Missouri Court of Appeals rejected this specificc challenge in part because Egilman had explained that:

“whether the 1972 NIOSH study identified fibers specifically as ‘asbestos’ was inconsequential, as the only other possible fiber that could be present in a talc sample is a ‘talc fiber, which is chemically identical to anthophyllite asbestos and structurally the same’.”[19]

Talc typically crystallizes in small plates, but it can occur occasionally as fibers. Egilman, however, equated a talc fiber as chemically and structurally identical to an anthophyllite fiber.

Does Egilman’s opinion hold water?

No, Egilman has wet himself badly (assuming the Missouri appellate court quoted testimony accurately).

According to the Mineralogical Society of America’s Handbook of Mineralogy (and every other standard work on mineralogy I reviewed), anthophyllite and talc, whether in fibrous habit or not, are two different minerals, with very different chemical formulae, crystal chemistry, and structure.[20] Anthophyllite has the chemical formula: (Mg;Fe2+)2(Mg;Fe2+)5Si8O22(OH)2 and is an amphibole double chain silicate. Talc, on the other hand, is a phyllosilicate, a hydrated magnesium silicate with the chemical formula Mg3Si4O10(OH)2. Talc crystallizes in the triclinic class, although sometimes monoclinic, and crystals are platy and very soft.

If the Missouri Court of Appeals characterized Egilman’s testimony correctly on this point, then Egilman gave patently false testimony. Talc and anthophyllite are different chemically and structurally.


[1]  SeeThe Slemp Case, Part I – Jury Verdict for Plaintiff – 10 Initial Observations”; “The Slemp Case, Part 2 – Openings”; “ Slemp Trial Part 3 – The Defense Expert Witness – Huh”; “Slemp Trial Part 4 – Graham Colditz”; “ Slemp Trial Part 5 – Daniel W. Cramer”; “Lawsuit Magic – Turning Talcum into Wampum”; “Talc Litigation Supported by Slippery Expert Witness” (2017).

[2]  Ingham v. Johnson & Johnson, No. No. ED107476, Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District (St. Louis) (June 23, 2020) (Slip op.).

[3]  Cara Salvatore, “Missouri Appeals Court Slashes $4.7B Talc Verdict Against J&J,” Law360 (June 23, 2020).

[4]  Jonathan M. Samet, et al., Asbestos: Selected Cancers Effects (I.O.M. Committee on Asbestos 2006).

[5]  International Agency for Research on Cancer, A Review of Human Carcinogens, Monograph Vol. 100, Part C: Arsenic, Metals, Fibres, and Dusts (2012).

[6]  Id. at 256. Some members followed up their controversial finding with an attempt to justify it with a meta-analysis; see M. Constanza Camargo, Leslie T. Stayner, Kurt Straif, Margarita Reina, Umaima Al-Alem, Paul A. Demers, and Philip J. Landrigan, “Occupational Exposure to Asbestos and Ovarian Cancer: A Meta-analysis,” 119 Envt’l Health Persp. 1211 (2011).

[7]  Alison Reid, Nick de Klerk, and Arthur W Musk, “Does Exposure to Asbestos Cause Ovarian Cancer? A Systematic Literature Review and Meta-Analysis,” 20 Cancer Epidemiol., Biomarkers & Prevention 1287 (2011) [Reid].

[8]  Reid at 1293, 1287.

[9]  Id. at 1293.

[10]  Id. at 1294.

[11]  Samuel Hammar, Richard A. Lemen, Douglas W. Henderson & James Leigh, “Asbestos and other cancers,” chap. 8, in Ronald F. Dodson & Samuel P. Hammar, eds., Asbestos: Risk Assessment, Epidemiology, and Health Effects 435 (2nd ed. 2011) (internal citation omitted).

[12]  Finnish Institute of Occupational Health, Asbestos, Asbestosis and Cancer – Helsinki Criteria for Diagnosis and Attribution 60 (2014) (concluding that there was an increased risk in cohorts of women with “relatively high asbestos exposures”).

[13]  Faye F. Gao and Tim D. Oury, “Other Neoplasia,” chap. 8, in Tim D. Oury, Thomas A. Sporn & Victor L. Roggli, eds., in Pathology of Asbestos-Associated Diseases 177, 188 (3d ed. 2014).

[14]  Dorsett D. Smith, The Health Effects of Asbestos: An Evidence-based Approach 208 (2016).

[15]  Brief of Appellants Johnson & Johnson and Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc., at 29, in Ingham v. Johnson & Johnson, No. No. ED107476, Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District (St. Louis) (filed Sept. 6, 2019) [J&J Brief].

[16]  Id. at 30.

[17]  See Mark A. Behrens & William L. Anderson, “The ‘Any Exposure’ Theory: An Unsound Basis for Asbestos Causation and Expert Testimony,” 37 SW. U. L. Rev. 479 (2008); William L. Anderson, Lynn Levitan & Kieran Tuckley, “The ‘Any Exposure’ Theory Round II — Court Review of Minimal Exposure Expert Testimony in Asbestos and Toxic Tort Litigation Since 2008,” 22 Kans. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 1 (2012); William L. Anderson & Kieran Tuckley, “The Any Exposure Theory Round III: An Update on the State of the Case Law 2012 – 2016,” Defense Counsel J. 264 (July 2016); William L. Anderson & Kieran Tuckley, “How Much Is Enough? A Judicial Roadmap to Low Dose Causation Testimony in Asbestos and Tort Litigation,” 42 Am. J. Trial Advocacy 38 (2018).

[18]  Id. at 30.

[19]  Slip op. at 54.

[20]  John W. Anthony, Richard A. Bideaux, Kenneth W. Bladh, and Monte C. Nichols, Handbook of Mineralogy (Mineralogical Soc’y of America 2001).

SKAPPOLOGY

May 26th, 2020

The Genetic Literacy Project (GLP) asks:

“Who is David and who is Goliath in the lobbying battle over agricultural biotechnology? Activists? Agro-business? In a commitment to transparency, the GLP has mined 5 years of data to help the public understand the funding network that shapes the biotechnology debate.”

The amount of money flowing into the campaign against genetically modified organisms (GMOs) is astonishing, but it does not stop the hypocritical complaints against industry’s sponsorship of studies to help show the safety of GMOs. In a recent on-line article, the GLP has published charts to map contributions from not-for-profit non-governmental organizations to anti-biotechnology advocacy groups. Close to a billion dollars ($850M) flowed into the coffers of these organizations from 2012 to 2016. The GLP’s work on tracking this funding is commendable for bringing balance to the debate about the effect of corporate money on health and environmental issues. Corporate includes the lawsuit industry and the advocacy industries.

Well actually, it would be a wonderful world if the GLP’s tracking were unnecessary. In one such alternative universe, people would ask to examine the evidence for and against claims, and they would have a healthy respect for uncertainty.

Studies funded by parties are routinely relied upon in litigation, and they are often pivotal in how courts decide significant claims of environmental or occupational harm.[1] Unfortunately, the sponsorship of studies by plaintiffs’ counsel, third-party litigation funding entities, and advocacy groups is often obscured or hidden.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

I recently happened upon an article of interest in an obscure journal, by a well-known author.[2]  The author, John C. Bailar, formerly an Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of the National Cancer Institute, was  professor emeritus in the University of Chicago’s Department of Public Health Sciences. He died in September 2016. Bailar was a graduate of the Yale University medical school, and also held a doctorate in statistics.

There is nothing ground breaking in Bailar’s article, but it is a nice summary of the ways that errors can creep into the scientific literature, short of actual fabrication or falsification of data.[3] It is also worth reading because it is an article that comes from one of the several Coronado Conferences, sponsored by an advocacy organization that has fraudulently concealed its funding, The Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy, aka SKAPP.

To be sure, authors of SKAPP-funded articles have invariably cited their funding from SKAPP, and Bailar was no exception. Bailar made the following acknowledgements:

“Support for this paper was provided by The Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy (SKAPP) at The George Washington University School of Public Health and Health Services. It is revised from a paper presented at SKAPP’s March 2006 Coronado Conference “Truth and Advocacy: The Quality and Nature of Litigation and Regulatory Science.” The papers from that conference will be published elsewhere.”[4]

The acknowledgement of support was rather anemic by SKAPP standards.  Most SKAPP-funded articles recited something closer to the following provided by David Michaels, who headed up SKAPP and worked as an expert witness for the litigation industry, until becoming the Administrator of the Occupational Health & Safety Administration, in President Obama’s administration:[5]

“DM [David Michaels] and CM [Celeste Monforton] are employed by the George Washington University School of Public Health and Health Services as part of the Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy (SKAPP). Their salaries, in part, are funded by the Common Benefit Litigation Expense Trust, a fund established pursuant to a court order in the Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability litigation. SKAPP’s funding is unrestricted; its funders are not given advance notice or the opportunity to review or approve any documents produced by the project. PL [Peter Lurie] is with Public Citizen’s Health Research Group.”

Michaels’ statement was perhaps a little more forthcoming, but few scientists or lay persons would know that his salary, and support, came from plaintiffs’ lawyers as part of an active litigation effort. Although Michaels claimed that the funding was unrestricted, like Big Tobacco funding, the sponsor, plaintiffs’ counsel, created a substantial selection effect in choosing beneficiaries who would deliver its pre-approved message. The Common Benefit Trust may sound like an eleemosynary, public-spirited, organization, with the imprimatur of the federal court system.  It was not.

Was Bailar influenced by his source of funding?  His topic would have permitted him many examples from the annals of science or litigation, but interestingly one of the few examples Bailar chose to give details about was a scientific dispute between the semiconductor industry and Richard Clapp, who was acting as an expert witness in litigation against that industry.  Although Clapp used a study design known to be inaccurate and biased, Bailar touted Clapp’s research over that sponsored by members of the industry.  Richard Clapp, in addition to have been an expert witness for the litigation industry on many occasions, also happened to have been a member of the SKAPP’s advisory committee. Hmmm.

Whence comes SKAPP funding?  SKAPP trades on most readers’ lack of familiarity with how “common benefit funds” are established.  They sound like some sort of disembodied charitable trust, such as the Pew. In fact, the silicone common benefit trust was nothing more than a funding device for mass federal litigation involving silicone breast implants. Ironically, the funding came from a litigation in which one leading judge described plaintiffs’ expert witnesses as “charlatans,” and the litigation claims as largely based upon fraud.[6] Cynics might believe that Bailar’s choice of Clapp versus the semiconductor industry, regardless of the merits, was driven by a desire to please SKAPP & Clapp.

The common benefit fund for the silicone-gel breast implant litigation was created by Order 13, “Establishing Plaintiffs’ Litigation Expense Fund to Compensate and Reimburse Attorneys for Services Performed and Expenses Incurred for Common Benefit.” The late Judge Sam Pointer, appointed to preside over MDL 926, In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation, Master File No. CV 92-P-10000-S, entered the order on July 23, 1993.  Some of the pertinent terms of Order 13 illustrate how it was supposed to operate:

This order is entered in order to provide for the fair and equitable sharing among plaintiffs of the cost of special services performed and expenses incurred by attorneys acting for the common benefit of all plaintiffs.

  1. Plaintiffs’ Litigation Expense Fund to be Established. Plaintiffs’ National Liaison Counsel … are directed to establish an interest-bearing account to receive and disburse funds as provided in this order.

***

  1. Assessment.

(a)    All plaintiffs and their attorneys who, after this date, either agree — for a monetary consideration — to settle, compromise, dismiss, or reduce the amount of a claim or, with or without a trial, recover a judgment for monetary damages or other monetary relief, including both compensatory and punitive damages, with respect to a breast implant claim are hereby assessed:

(1)    5% of the “gross monetary recovery,” if the agreement is made or the judgment is entered after this date and before November 1, 1993, or

(2)    6% of the “gross monetary recovery,” if the agreement is made or the judgment is entered after October 31, 1993.

Defendants are directed to withhold this assessment from amounts paid to plaintiffs and their counsel, and to pay the assessment into the fund as a credit against the settlement or judgment.  ***

  1. Disbursements.

(a)    Payments may be made from the fund to attorneys who provide services or incur expenses for the joint and common benefit of plaintiffs in addition to their own client or clients.  Attorneys eligible are not limited to Plaintiffs’ National Liaison Counsel and members of Plaintiffs’ National Steering Committee, but include, for example, other attorneys called upon by them to assist in performing their responsibilities, State Liaison Counsel, and other attorneys performing similar responsibilities in state court actions in which the presiding state-court judge has imposed similar obligations upon plaintiffs to contribute to the fund.

(b)    Payments will be allowed only to compensate for special services performed, and to reimburse for special expenses incurred, for the joint and common benefit of all plaintiffs.

***

(c)    No amounts will be disbursed without review and approval by a committee of federal and state judicial officers to be designated by the court.  The committee may, however, utilize the services of a special master to assist in this review, and may authorize one or more of its members to act for the committee in approving particular types of applications for disbursement.

(d)    If the fund exceeds the amount needed to make payments as provided in this order, the court will order an refund to those who have contributed to the fund.  Any such refund will be made in proportion to the amount of the contributions.”

For a while, a defense lawyer, representing the defendants in the silicone MDL, participated in discussions concerning MDL 926 Order 13 funds, until the plaintiffs’ lawyers decided that his services were not needed, and excluded him from discussions of the use of the monies. The reality is that the plaintiffs’ lawyers in the silicone litigation were able to bamboozle the slim oversight committee into approving a propaganda campaign against Daubert gatekeeping, and that recipients of the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ largesse were able to misrepresent their funding as though it were from a federal court.

There are further ironies connected with the silicone common benefit trust.  First, the silicone litigation was effectively over when the court-appointed expert witnesses’ reports that announced that the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses lacked sound scientific evidence to support conclusions of causation.  SKAPP’s website reports that its activities started around 2002, by which time both the court-appointed witnesses, as well as the British Ministry of Health, and the Institute of Medicine’s select committee had reported that there was no basis for the plaintiffs’ causal claims in litigation.[7] The second irony is that SKAPP, through its sponsorship of various research and writing projects, had made the recipients of SKAPP money, by the terms of Order 13, agents of the silicone plaintiffs’ lawyers and their clients. Recipients of SKAPP funding who did not disclose that their support or salaries come from the coffers of plaintiffs’ counsel were engaged in misleading their readers and the scientific and legal communities.

I have written often in the past about SKAPP as an agent of plaintiffs’ counsel in mass tort litigation.[8] The concern is not new, but it has continuing significance because of the asymmetrical standard advanced by the lawsuit industry and its scientific advisors who seek to disqualify manufacturing industry and its scientific advisors from participating in scientific debate and argument about various health claims.[9]


[1]  See, e.g., Leaf River Forest Prods. v. Ferguson, 662 So. 2d 648, 657 (Miss. 1995) (litigation involving defense expert witness’s reliance upon dioxin studies funded by defendant paper mills); Maurer v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., No. Civ. A. 92-3485, 2002 WL 31819160 at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 13, 2002) (granting defendant’s summary judgment against plaintiff’s claim that breast implants caused her harm; citing defendants’ sponsored epidemiologic studies showing no causal link, including epidemiologic study conducted in Sweden); Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. Evans, 232 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“commend[ing] defendants’ sponsorship of independent scientific research…”); FTC v. Pantron I, Corp., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21858 (C.D. Cal. Sept 6, 1991) (finding study funded by defendants met “basic and fundamental requirements for scientific validity and reliability”).

[2]  John C. Bailar, “How to distort the scientific record without actually lying: truth, and the arts of science,” 11 European J. Oncol. 217 (2006).

[3]  Id. at 218.

[4]  Id. at 223.

[5]  David Michaels, Celeste Monforton & Peter Lurie, “Selected science: an industry campaign to undermine an OSHA hexavalent chromium standard,” 65 Envt’l Health 5 (2006).

[6]     Hon. Jack B. Weinstein, “Preliminary Reflections on Administration of Complex Litigation” 2009 Cardozo L. Rev. de novo 1, 14 (2009).

[7]   Independent Review Group, Silicone Breast Implants: The Report of the Independent Review Group 8, 22-23 (July 1998) (concluding that there was no demonstrable risk of connective tissue disease from silicone breast implants); Stuart Bondurant, Virginia Ernster, and Roger Herdman, eds., Safety of Silicone Breast Implants (1999) (rejecting plaintiffs’ theories and litigation claims of systemic disease).

[8]   “SKAPP A LOT” (April 30, 2010); “Manufacturing Certainty” (Oct. 25, 2011); “David Michaels’ Public Relations Problem” (Dec. 2, 2011); “Conflicted Public Interest Groups” (Nov. 3, 2013). See also Walter Olson, Schools for Misrule: Legal Academia and an Overlawyered America 121-22 (2011); David E. Bernstein & Eric G. Lasker, “Defending Daubert: It’s Time to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 702,” 57 William & Mary L. Rev. 1, 39 & n.211 (2015); Ted Frank, “Daubert Debate,” Overlawyered (July 5, 2003); Peter Nordberg, “Bernstein on SKAPP (part 1),” Daubert on the Web (Jul)y 02, 2003).

[9]   Consider the media hysteria over former President Obama’s nomination of Dr. Robert Califf, to serve as Chair of the Food and Drug Administration.[9] The criticism was based upon his having served as the founding director of the Duke Clinical Research Institute, which received funding directly from pharmaceutical companies. The Senate confirmed Califf (89 to 4), but the controversy highlights the hypocrisy in play. Brady Dennis, “Senate confirms Robert Califf as new FDA commissioner,” Wash. Post (Feb. 24, 2016).