TORTINI

For your delectation and delight, desultory dicta on the law of delicts.

Sympathy for the Diablo — Peppermint Barry vs Spicy Seafood Pasta

June 12th, 2013

Barry S. Levy is a physician, author, performer, and political activist.   Dr. Levy is a past president of the American Public Health Association, which conferred upon him its oldest and most prestigious award, the Sedgwick Memorial Medal, in 2005, for his outstanding achievements in public health.

Levy has been received other, less favorable notice from trial and appellate judges.  For instance, one federal judge found Levy engaged in a dubious enterprise to manufacture silicosis claims in Mississippi.  In re Silica Products Liability Litigation, 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 611-16, 622 & n.100 (S.D. Texas 2005) (expressing particular disappointment with Dr. Barry Levy, who although not the worst offender of a bad lot of physicians, betrayed his “sterling credentials” in a questionable enterprise to manufacture diagnoses of silicosis for litigation). See also Schachtman, Silica Litigation: Screening, Scheming & Suing; Washington Legal Foundation Critical Legal Issues Working Paper Series No. 135 (Dec. 2005) (exploring the ethical and legal implications of the entrepreneurial litigation in which Levy and others were involved).

Unfortunately, In re Silica was not an isolated case.  See, e.g., Lofgren v. Motorola, Inc., 1998 WL 299925, No. CV 93-05521 (Ariz. Super. Ct., Maricopa Cty. June 1, 1998); Harman v. Lipari, N.J. L. Div. GLO-L-1375-95, Order of Nov. 3, 2000 (Tomasello, J.) (barring the use of Barry Levy in class action for medical monitoring damages); Castellow v. Chevron USA, 97 F.Supp. 2d 780, 793-95 (S.D. Tex. 2000); Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine Inc., 482 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2007); Watts v. Radiator Specialty Co., 990 So. 2d 143 (Miss. 2008); Aurand v. Norfolk So. Ry., 802 F.Supp.2d 950 (2011).

Now, once again, right here in River City, Dr. Levy has stepped out of bounds, and has been stripped of his mantle of testifying expert witness.  Mallozzi v. Ecosmart Technologies, Inc., 2013 WL 2415677, No. 11-CV-2884 (SJF)(ARL) (E.D.N.Y. May 31, 2013).

Over the course of a few minutes, plaintiff Velio Mallozi applied a “couple of ounces” of EcoSmart Organic Home Pest Control product to the foundation of his home, and a few squirts inside.  The product used, EcoSmart, contains plant oils, including one percent peppermint oil.  Id. at *1.  Mallozi did not experience any acute ill effects from his organic pest control efforts, and later went to dinner at an [unidentified] Italian restaurant, where he enjoyed a meal of “spaghetti with seafood.”  Id. at *10.  Perhaps seafood diablo, but Judge Feuerstein doesn’t say.

After the seafood spaghetti meal, Mallozi experienced a serious bout of laryngopharyngeal reflux (LPR).  With sympathy for the diablo, Mallozi sued only EcoSmart, on the claim that his inhaling some spray, with its 1% peppermint oil, caused his LPR.

The Mallozis sought out B.S. Levy to support the claimed relationship.  Levy did not disappoint.  He rendered a report that asserted that the few minutes of inhaling minor amounts of peppermint oil causes relaxation of the lower esophogeal sphincter, and consequently LPR.  Id. at *5.  Levy relied upon four articles to support this claim, but Judge Feuerstein refused to accept the claim of support, at face value.  Her Honor reviewed each study, only to find that the exposures that were associated with relaxation of G.I. smooth muscle, for a short period of about 20 minutes, were trials of ingested peppermint oil, at significantly greater doses, over lengthy periods of observation.  Id. at *6.  The studies individually and collectively did not support Levy’s opinion.

One of the papers on Levy’s reliance list was a case report of a patient that suffered burns in her mouth from ingestion of pure peppermint oil. The court found that this case report, involving large doses of pure peppermint oil, with an outcome different from claimed by Mallozi, was irrelevant.  Id. Even if it were construed to offer some support, the anecdotal nature of the case report, lacking controls, renders the report an unreliable basis for a causal conclusion.  Id.

The trial court found that B.S. Levy’s analysis ignored the crucial roles of dose, duration, route of exposure, and the nature of plaintiff’s condition, LPR.   Id. at *8.  The court held that Levy’s opinion did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 702.  The plaintiffs failed to show that Levy’s opinion was supported sufficiently by facts or data, and they failed to show that his opinion was the product of applying reliable methods and principles.  Id.

Judge Feuerstein, having found that Levy’s opinion on general causation between EcoSmart and LPR was bereft of validity, could have stopped without addressing specific causation.  Such an approach would have had the virtue of judicial economy, but would have left out some delicious facts.  Levy purportedly used some sort of differential etiology to infer the cause of plaintiff’s LPR, but he omitted meaningful consideration of plaintiff’s having had a history of severe severe gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), which predated his bout of LPR.  Indeed, plaintiff’s GERD had been so severe that he had been previously hospitalized for GERD after ingesting coffee and donuts.   Judge Feuerstein found Levy’s iterative disjunctive syllogism invalid for having failed to address the prior history of GERD, and the intervening role of the pasta and seafood dinner, in bringing on the LPR.  Id. at *10-11.

The Material Safety Data Sheet Ploy

Judge Feuerstein also demonstrated a careful understanding of the meaning and role of the Material Data Safety Sheet (MSDS).  EcoSmart’s MSDS contained a warning that some sensitive persons may experience dizziness or irritation of their nasal passages, and that ingestion may cause GI irritation.  Id. at *13.  Dr. Levy had embraced this MSDS language as an “admission,” but he did not analyze the sources of information or their validity.  The MSDS warning, as required by law, addresses the potential hazard of the ingredient, peppermint oil, irrespective of dose, concentration, or route of administration.  Id., citing Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 278 (5th Cir.1998); Turner v. Iowa Fire Equip. Co., 229 F.3d 1202, 1209 (8th Cir.2000); Ingram v. Solkatronic Chem., Inc., No. 04–CV–0287, 2005 WL 3544244, at *6 (N.D.Okla. Dec. 28, 2005)).

The Treating Physician Echo

Apparently one of Mr. Mallozzi’s treating physicians joined the fray with echoes of Levy’s opinion.  Judge Feuerstein recognized that treating physicians are subject to the requirements of Rule 702, and that a me-too opinion deserved the me-too result.  Id. at *13, citing Davids v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 857 F.Supp. 2d 267, 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).

Pasta and Peppermints

Bad sense, innocence, cripplin’ my mind.
Old medical records I just can’t find.
Too much Cajun spice, and I forgot about GERD.
Incense and peppermints, haven’t you heard?
But who cares, it’s just litigation.
Lots to win, but nothing to lose.

Incense and peppermints, meaningless claims.
Turn on, drop in, toxins are all the same

Throw your pride to the side; it’s what you must do.

Daubert is politics; 702.
A yardstick for lunatics, your point of view.
The court cares what games you choose.
You have lots to win, but nothing to lose

(adapted from, and with apologies to, Strawberry Alarm Clock)

The Mt. Sinai Catechism

June 7th, 2013

There are mythologies in science as there in religion.  Back in the day, Dr. Irving Selikoff invented a catchy catechism about synergistic interaction between asbestos and smoking in producing lung cancer.  Selikoff’s study of insulators advanced lung cancer point estimates for asbestos alone, for smoking alone, and for asbestos and smoking together:  5-10-50, which became incorporated in innumerable textbooks, articles, expert witness reports, and court opinions.

E. Cuyler Hammond, Irving J. Selikoff,  and Herbert Seidman, “Asbestos Exposure, Cigarette Smoking and Death Rates,” 330 Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 473, 487 (1979).  Selikoff tells us that each insulator, starting in 1961, answered “a detailed questionnaire,” and later, repeat questionnaires on their smoking histories.  Id. at 475.

“Of the 8220 men who answered the questionnaire, 891 (11%) said that they had never smoked regularly; 488 (6%) had a history of pipe or cigar smoking but never smoked cigarettes regularly and; 6841 (83%) were either current or ex-cigarette smokers. Some of the cigarette smokers also smoked pipes or cigars or had done so in the past.”

Id. at 481.

The 5 supposedly represented the relative risk of asbestos exposure alone in insulators who did not smoke; the 10 supposedly represented the relative risk of smoking alone in the non-insulator general population of smokers; and the 50 represented the relative risk of insulators who had smoked.  Selikoff claimed that his data supported a multiplicative model of synergistic interaction between smoking and asbestos exposure.

Like other mythologies, there was a good bit of exaggeration and fabrication in Selikoff’s story. First, the non-smoking relative risk was based upon the observed risk ratio among insulators who “never smoked regularly.”  Smoking data were collected by survey, and the actual questionnaires and definition have never been published or provided by Selikoff and his colleagues.  Even taken at face value, “never smoked regularly” is not the same as non-smoker.  Adding that the insulators union was widely engaged in personal injury litigation, and that the membership had a strong motive to downplay their smoking histories, this exposure information becomes suspect.

The non-asbestos smoking lung cancer point estimate (10) was equally dubious.  The ten-fold risk statistic represented an average smoking lung cancer risk in the first Cancer Prevention Survey (CPS-1).  The insulators who smoked were rarely average smokers, and the CPS-1 point estimate was superseded within a couple of years by the new, revised CPS-II overall smoking lung cancer point estimate that was greater than twenty.  The CPS-II results were published in the 1980s and early 1990s, but Selikoff and his protégés contained to testify to the 5-10-50. See, e.g., Shopland, “Smoking-Attributable Cancer Mortality in 1991: Is Lung Cancer Now the Leading Cause of Death Among Smokers in the United States?” 83 J. Nat’l Cancer Inst. 1142 (1991).

These problems and others led astute authors to note their dissent from the simplistic multiplicative model.  F. Douglas K. Liddell, “The Interaction of Asbestos and Smoking in Lung Cancer,” 45 Ann. Occup. Hyg. 341 (2001) (“Both cigarette smoke and inhaled asbestos fibres can cause lung cancer, but the assessment of how these agents act in combination is a matter of great difficulty.”)

Despite the serious problems with the multiplicative model, Selikoff’s wanton republication of the 5-10-50 data, and the popularity of these data with testifying expert witnesses and regulating agencies, cemented their use in litigation. Consider, for instance, how the orthodoxy infiltrated the ostensibly neutral Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, which proclaimed the multiplicative synergy of smoking and asbestos in its second edition:

“Occupational asbestos exposure in nonsmokers increases the risk of lung cancer by a factor of about five, from about 11 per 100,000, for nonsmoking industrial workers not exposed to asbestos to about 58 per 100,000 for nonsmoking asbestos workers; a significant smoking history increases the rate of lung cancer by a factor of at least ten. See U.S. Surgeon Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., The Health Consequences of Smoking: Cancer and Chronic Lung Disease in the Workplace 216 (1985); see also Rodolfo Saracci, “The Interactions of Tobacco Smoking and Other Agents in Cancer Etiology,” 9 Epidemiologic Revs. 175, 176–80 (1987). Because the effects of smoking and asbestos are multiplicative for lung cancer, the population of smoking asbestos workers has a lung cancer incidence of 5 times 10, or 50 times the background rates, rather than the 15-fold increase predicted by adding the separate risks. See U.S. Surgeon Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra, at 216–17.”

Mary Sue Henifin, Howard M. Kipen, and Susan R. Poulter, “Reference Guide on Medical Testimony,” in Federal Judicial Center, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 439, 476 & n. 136 (2d ed. 2000).  Dr. Kipen was a protégé of Dr. Selikoff.  The reference to the multiplicative mantra was eliminated from the Third Edition of the Reference Manual.

Back in April of this year, some other Selikoff protégés were busy trying to rehabilitate the 5-10-50 mantra, with a new study. Science Daily earnestly reported news of the new study as though it were ground breaking.  See “Asbestos Exposure, Asbestosis, and Smoking Combined Greatly Increase Lung Cancer Risk” (Apr. 12, 2013)  (reporting on the in-press version of Steve Markowitz, Stephen Levin, Albert Miller, and Alfredo Morabia, “Asbestos, Asbestosis, Smoking and Lung Cancer: New Findings from the North American Insulator Cohort,” Am. J. Respir. & Critical Care Med. (2013)).  Interestingly, only Stephen Levin, who died over a year ago, is listed as affiliated with the Mt. Sinai School of Medicine.  Although some of the other authors had previous affiliations with Mt. Sinai, they are now listed at the Center for the Biology of Natural Systems, Queens College – CUNY.

Science Daily quotes lead author Markowitz as saying that “[t]he interactions between asbestos exposure, asbestosis and smoking, and their influence on lung cancer risk are incompletely understood.”  It seems unlikely that this new article will shed much light on the problem.   The authors claim to apply and extend Selikoff’s approach from previous publications.  This new publication thus incorporates the serious problems that had afflicted Selikoff’s papers, especially his use of CPS-I to provide a point estimate for smoking alone (the alleged 10 in the 5-10-50 theory).  Here is the abstract of the paper:

“Rationale

Asbestos, smoking, and asbestosis increase lung cancer risk in incompletely elucidated ways. Smoking cessation among asbestos-exposed cohorts has been little studied.

Objectives

To measure the contributions of asbestos exposure, asbestosis, smoking and their interactions to lung cancer risk in an asbestos-exposed cohort, and to describe their reduction in lung cancer risk when they stop smoking.

Methods

We examined lung cancer mortality obtained through the National Death Index for 1981-2008 for 2,377 male North American insulators for whom chest x-ray, spirometric, occupational and smoking data were collected in 1981- 1983 and for 54,243 non-asbestos exposed blue collar male workers from Cancer Prevention Study II for whom occupational and smoking data were collected in 1982.

Measurements and Main Results

Lung cancer caused 339 (19%) insulator deaths. Lung cancer mortality was increased by asbestos exposure among non-smokers [rate ratio = 3.6 (95% CI: 1.7-7.6)], by asbestosis among non-smokers [rate ratio = 7.40 (95% CI, 4.0-13.7], and by smoking without asbestos exposure [rate ratio = 10.3 (95% CI, 8.8-12.2)]. The joint effect of smoking and asbestos alone was additive [rate ratio = 14.4 (95% CI, 10.7-19.4)] and with asbestosis, supra-additive [rate ratio = 36.8 (95% CI, 30.1-46.0)]. Insulator lung cancer mortality halved within 10 years of smoking cessation and converged with that of never-smokers 30 years following smoking cessation.

Conclusions

Asbestos increases lung cancer mortality among non-smokers. Asbestosis further increases the lung cancer risk and, considered jointly with smoking, has a supra-additive effect. Insulators benefit greatly by quitting smoking.”

The big news that Steven Markowitz did not trumpet in the press releases was that in the absence of asbestosis, there was no multiplicative interaction.  The asbestos-alone (point estimate) is still suspect.  The paper characterizes this point estimate as applying to non-smokers without asbestosis, but given this group’s history of equivocating between “never smoked regularly” and “non-smoker,” and the difficulty in obtaining accurate smoking histories from men enmeshed in litigation over respiratory claims, the asbestos-alone point estimate remains doubtful.  Curiously, the smoking histories were collected in 1981-83, but there is no mention of any attempt to verify the histories against smoking histories provided by the study participants in earlier versions of Selikoff’s studies on the insulators.

Similarly, the smoking-alone point estimate is incredible.  The authors purport to draw the smoking-alone risk ratio from CPS-II; yet the risk ratio presented (10.3) is less than half that reported in multiple publications of the CPS-II study.  Markowitz and colleagues cite to two papers for the 10.3 point estimate; neither appears to support this number.  Steven Stellman & Lawrence, “Smoking habits and tar levels in a new American Cancer Society prospective study of 1.2 million men and women,” 76 J. Nat’l Cancer Inst. 1057 (1986); Michael Thun, Eugenia Calle, Carmen Rodriguez, and Phyllis Wingo, “Epidemiological research at the American Cancer Society. 9 Cancer Epidemiol. Biomarkers & Prevention 861 (2000).  I would welcome contradiction from anyone who can find the point estimate in the cited papers.

Consider one of the most recent publications, which drew upon CPS-II data, in the New England Journal of Medicine.  For men who were current smokers, compared with men who never smoked, the relative risk of lung cancer mortality was 24.97. Michael Thun, Brian Carter, Diane Feskanich, Neal D. Freedman, Ross Prentice, Alan D. Lopez, Patricia Hartge, and Susan M. Gapstur, “50-Year Trends in Smoking-Related Mortality in the United States,” 368 New Engl. J. Med. 351 (2013).

The Markowitz, Levin, Miller paper is still “in press.”  There is still time for the editors to take a closer look.  There is also time for the editors to insist upon a disclosure of the authors’ conflicts of interest. See, e.g., Wannall v. Honeywell Internat’l, Inc., Civ. Action No. 10-351 (BAH), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68523 (D.D.C. May 14, 2013) (discussing Markowitz’s participation as an expert witness).

The Doubling Dose

June 5th, 2013

Sander Greenland and others have raised various theoretical objections to the argument that relative risks should exceed two before attribution can be made in specific cases.  In large part, Greenland’s objections turn on conjecture that risks are not stochastically distributed in the population samples studied in epidemiologic studies.  These objections are potentially true, but the burden remains on the proponent.  When there is serious evidence of latency or bimodal distribution, then epidemiologic studies or clinical trials can be adapted to examine the risk in the relevant subgroup.  When this is done, the relative risk argument once again is unavoidable.  For many exposures and conditions of interest, epidemiologic studies have evolved to accommodate the relevant model of risk distribution.

Despite Greenland’s speculative objections, the concept of a doubling dose has been widely advocated by scientists. The following are a few of such endorsements:

Philip Enterline, “Attributability in the Face of Uncertainty,” 78 (Supp.) Chest 377, 377, 378 (1980);

Otto Wong, “Using Epidemiology to Determine Causation in Disease,” 3 Natural Resources & Env’t 20, 23 (1988); Ben Armstrong, Claude Tremblay, and Gilles Theriault, “Compensating Bladder Cancer Victims Employed in Aluminum Reduction Plants,” 30 J. Occup. Med. 771 (1988);

Joshua Muscat & Michael Huncharek, “Causation and disease: Biomedical science in toxic tort litigation,” 31 J. Occup. Med. 997 (1989);

Troyen A. Brennan, “Can Epidemiologists Give Us Some Specific Advice?” 1 Courts, Health Science & the Law 397, 398 (1991)(“This indeterminancy complicates any case in which epidemiological evidence forms the basis for causation, especially when attributable fractions are lower than 50%.  In such cases, it is more probable than not that the individual has her illness as a result of unknown causes, rather than as a result of exposure to hazardous substance.”);

Mark R. Cullen & Linda Rosenstock, “Principles and Practice of Occupational and Environmental Medicine,” chap. 1, in Linda Rosenstock & Marc Cullen, eds., Textbook of Clinical Occupational and Environmental Medicine 1, 13-14 (Phila. 1994);

David F. Goldsmith & Susan G. Rose, “Establishing Causation with Epidemiology,” in Tee L. Guidotti & Susan G. Rose, eds., Science on the Witness Stand:  Evaluating Scientific Evidence in Law, Adjudication, and Policy 57, 60 (OEM Press 2001)(“A relative risk greater than 2.0 produces an attributable risk (sometimes called attributable risk percent10) or an attributable fraction that exceeds 50%.  An attributable risk greater than 50% also means that ‘it is more likely than not’, or, in other words, there is a greater than 50% probability that the exposure to the risk factor is associated with disease.”)

Below, I have updated once again the case law on the issue of using relative and attributable risks to satisfy plaintiff’s burden of showing, more likely than not, that an exposure or condition caused a plaintiff’s disease or injury.


See , for the updated the case law on the issue of using relative and attributable risks to satisfy plaintiff’s burden of showing, more likely than not, that an exposure or condition caused a plaintiff’s disease or injury.

 

Landrigan v. The Celotex Corporation, Revisited

June 4th, 2013

Old-fashioned torts presented few problems for attributing causation of the plaintiff’s harm.  Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), may have involved uncertainty about the shooter, but there was no doubt that a pellet from one of the two defendants’ guns hit the plaintiff and caused a legally recognized injury.

Specific causation has been, and remains, the soft underbelly of the toxic tort world, at least for those cases not involving so-called signature diseases.  A priori assessments of risk do not necessarily translate into post-exposure, post-diagnosis attributions of outcome to exposure.  Put simply, risk is not cause. Guinn v AstraZeneca Pharms. LP, 602 F.3d 1245, 1255 (11th Cir. 2010) (“An expert, however, cannot merely conclude that all risk factors for a disease are substantial contributing factors in its development.  The fact that exposure to a substance may be a risk factor for a disease does not make it an actual cause simply because the disease developed.”) Unless there is a “fingerprint of causation,” what scientists would call a completely specific biomarker, then specific causation opinions are mostly guesswork.

Tobacco companies and others exploited this fact, in face of large relative risks of lung cancer among smokers, to maintain that these epidemiologic assessment were not probative of specific causation.  Andrew See, “Use of Human Epidemiology Studies in Proving Causation,” 67 Def. Couns. J. 478, 478 (2000) (“Epidemiology studies are relevant only to the issue of general causation and cannot establish whether an exposure or factor caused disease or injury in a specific individual.”); Melissa Moore Thomson, Causal Inference in Epidemiology: Implications for Toxic Tort Litigation, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 247, 255 (1992) (“statistic-based epidemiological study results should not be applied directly to establish the likelihood of causation in an individual plaintiff”); Michael Dore, Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in Demonstrating Cause-in-Fact, 7 Harv. Envt’l L. Rev. 429, 433 (1983) (“Epidemiological evidence, like other generalized evidence, deals with categories of occurrences rather than particular individual occurrences. . . . Such evidence may help demonstrate that a particular event occurred, but only when accompanied by more specific evidence.”).  See, e.g., In re Fibreboard Corp.,893 F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir.1990) (“It is evident that these statistical estimates deal only with general causation, for population-based probability estimates do not speak to a probability of causation in any one case; the estimate of relative risk is a property of the studied population, not of an individual’s case.” (emphasis in original; internal quotation omitted)).

Indeed, some courts continue to uphold this extreme anti-probabilistic view, even when relative risks exceed 20, or more.  McTear v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd., [2005] CSOH 69, at ¶ 6.180 (Nimmo Smith, L.J.) (“epidemiological evidence cannot be used to make statements about individual causation… . Epidemiology cannot provide information on the likelihood that an exposure produced an individual’s condition. The population attributable risk is a measure for populations only and does not imply a likelihood of disease occurrence within an individual, contingent upon that individual’s exposure.

In past posts, I have addressed some misunderstandings and misrepresentations concerning the use of a priori risk to assessment of specific causation.  One of the more glaring examples of bad scholarship in this area comes in a text edited by Professor Joseph Gastwirth:

“The court in Landrigan v. Celotex Corp. (1992: 1087) arrived at a similar conclusion, finding that:

a relative risk of 2.0 is not so much a password to a finding of causation as one piece of evidence, among others, for the court to consider in determining whether the expert has employed a sound methodology in reaching his or her conclusion.”

Accordingly the court granted recovery for injuries alleged to have arisen as the result of exposure to asbestos, although the demonstrated relative risk was 1.5.

Sana Loue, “Epidemiological Causation in the Legal Context: Substance and Procedures,” in Joseph Gastwirth, ed., Statistical Science in the Courtroom 263, 277 (2000).

Now that is stunningly bad scholarship, from someone who is both a lawyer and a scientist. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in the cited case, reversed a directed verdict for the defendants, and remanded for reconsideration of the admissibility of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses.  There was never even an opportunity for the Supreme Court to “grant recoveries.”  Indeed, Mrs. Landrigan never obtained a favorable verdict in her lawsuit.  After remand, she dismissed her action in the face of the daunting task faced by her expert witnesses.

The author of the chapter, Sana Loue, is a Professor and Director in the Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics in the School of Medicine of Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio. Dr. Loue holds doctoral degrees in epidemiology and medical anthropology, as well as a law degree.

Dr. Loue is not alone in misunderstanding the Landrigan case. Some of the confusion perhaps results from the New Jersey Supreme Court’s errant opinion.  Some language in the Supreme Court’s decision makes it seem that there was an objection to the admissibility of the plaintiff’s expert witnesses’ opinions.  There was none.  Unlike many gatekeeping decisions, the plaintiff had a full opportunity to be heard; the defendants moved for a directed verdict at the end of the plaintiff’s case.  In addressing the defendants’ motion, the trial court assumed, for the sake of argument, that asbestos can cause colorectal cancer.  General causation was, of course, contested, but the motion turned on whether there was evidence in the record that would support specific causation.  The trial court held that specific causation required expert witness opinion testimony, but that the testimony in the case failed to provide a basis on which a reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Landrigan’s colorectal cancer was caused by his alleged occupational asbestos exposure.

The New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed in a published opinion.  579 A.2d 1268 (1990).  The Appellate Division’s decision is still worth reading, not only because it correctly decided the issues, but because it reports material facts that the Supreme Court chose to ignore.  First, the Appellate Division noted that the most that Mr. Landrigan had sustained in terms of respiratory effects from his occupational asbestos exposure was pleural thickening, which never caused him impairment in his lifetime.  Indeed, Mr. Landrigan never was aware of this radiographic change, which only an expert witness hired by plaintiff’s counsel could see.  Id. at 1269.  (Plaintiff’ pulmonary physician expert witness, Dr. Sokolowski, had failed his B-reader examination, but he was a favorite of the asbestos plaintiffs’ bar for his “liberal” readings of chest films.)

The Appellate Division also emphasized the record evidence that the cause of most cases of colon cancer was (and remains) unknown, and more important that Mr. Landrigan’s colorectal cancer was physically indistinguishable from almost all other cases of the disease.  Id. at 1270.  The plaintiff’s hired expert witnesses had only epidemiologic evidence of an increased risk of colorectal cancer among asbestos-exposed workers. Although most of the better conducted studies fail to support the claim of increased risk, Drs. Sokolowski and Wagoner, the plaintiff’s witnesses, relied upon Selikoff’s cohort study of insulation workers, and its mortality risk ratios.  Irving J. Selikoff, E. Cuyler Hammond, and Herbert Seidman, “Mortality Experience of Insulation Workers in the United States and Canada, 1943-1976,” 330 Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 91, 103 (1979) (colorectal cancer risk ratio 1.55);  E. Cuyler Hammond, Irving J. Selikoff,  and Herbert Seidman, “Asbestos Exposure, Cigarette Smoking and Death Rates,” 330 Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 473, 480 (1979) (colorectal cancer mortality ratios 1.59 to 1.81).

Mrs. Landrigan’s witnesses both relied upon evidence of an increased risk, while ignoring or dismissing studies that found no such risk, and upon what they claimed was an absence of risk factors, such as fatty diet, excessive alcohol consumption, family history, and prior bowel disease, in Mr. Landrigan.  The trial court, and the Appellate Division, realized that the reasoning that these witnesses advanced failed to support their conclusions, as a matter of science, logic, and law:

“Although not stated by Dr. Sokolowski in so many words, he seems to be saying that risk exposure equates with causation, a proposition which we find legally untenable.”

579 A.2d at 1270 (1990).  The hand waving about ruling out known risk factors left the most likely cause in plain view:  unknown:

“One cannot rule out the presence of other risk factors without knowing what those factors may be.”

Id. at 1271.

The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further inquiries into the reliability of the expert witnesses’ opinions.  Landrigan v. The Celotex Corp., 127 N.J. 404, 605 A.2d 1079 (1992).  Therese Keeley, the capable lawyer who tried the Landrigan case for the defense, had argued the appeal before the Appellate Division, but another lawyer, less familiar with the issues, argued for the defendant, in the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court made much of the new lawyer’s concessions in oral argument:

“Defense counsel urges that the Appellate Division opinion may be read as requiring that an expert may not rely on an epidemiological study to support a finding of individual causation unless the relative risk is greater than 2.0. See 243 N.J.Super. at 457-59, 579 A.2d 1268. At oral argument before us, they agreed that such a requirement may be unnecessary. Counsel acknowledged that under certain circumstances a study with a relative risk of less than 2.0 could support a finding of specific causation. Those circumstances would include, for example, individual clinical data, such as asbestos in or near the tumor or a documented history of extensive asbestos exposure. So viewed, a relative risk of 2.0 is not so much a password to a finding of causation as one piece of evidence, among others, for the court to consider in determining whether the expert has employed a sound methodology in reaching his or her conclusion.”

Id. at 419.  Even so, these concessions, improvident as they might have been, would not permit the Supreme Court to resolve the case as it did.  There was nothing in the Landrigan case, however, which would count as a biomarker of individual causation, or as support for a claim that Mr. Landrigan’s exposure was so much heavier than average that his personal exposure put him on the dose-response curve at a point that corresponded to a relative risk greater than two.

Here is how the Supreme Court described Dr. Sokolowski’s attempted reasoning process:

“In the present case, Dr. Sokolowski began by reviewing the scientific literature to establish both the ability of asbestos to cause colon cancer and the magnitude of the risk that it would cause that result. Next, he assumed that decedent was exposed to asbestos and that his exposure, in both intensity and duration, was comparable to that of the study populations described in the literature. He then assumed that other known risk factors for colon cancer did not apply to decedent. After considering decedent’s exposure and the absence of those factors, Dr. Sokolowski concluded that decedent’s exposure more likely than not had been the cause of his colon cancer.”

Id. at 420-21, 1087-88.  The obvious fly in the ointment is simply that many people with no known risk factors for colon cancer develop the disease.  The assumption behind a cohort study is that all the risk factors are even balanced between the exposed and the unexposed cohorts, and so the relative risk reflects the role of the exposure in question.  Of course, this assumption is rarely true outside the context of a randomized clinical trial, and the Selikoff studies relied upon by plaintiff’s witnesses were particularly inept in controlling or accounting for confounding factors.  Assuming, however, that both the exposed and unexposed groups had the same proportion of men without “known” risk factors, then the most Sokolowski and Wagoner could say was that Mr. Landrigan’s risk of colorectal cancer had been increased by 55% or so, above that of the risk for men similarly situated but lacking occupational asbestos exposure.  This 55% increase was the basis for the Court’s observation that the attributable risk was about 35%.  What the Court left for another day was how, if at all, this evidentiary display could support a conclusion of specific causation.  The trial and intermediate appellate courts saw clearly that Sokolowski and Wagoner had utterly failed to support their specific causation opinions, but the Supreme Court was intent upon giving them another bite at the apple:

“Without limiting the trial court on remand, its assessment of Dr. Sokolowski’s testimony should include an evaluation of the validity both of the studies on which he relied and of his assumption that the decedent’s asbestos exposure was like that of the members of the study populations. The court should also verify Dr.  Sokolowski’s assumption concerning the absence of other risk factors. Finally, the court should ascertain if the relevant scientific community accepts the process by which Dr. Sokolowski reasoned to the conclusion that the decedent’s asbestos exposure had caused his cancer.”

Id. at 420, 1088.  The Court thus did not give plaintiff’s expert witnesses a free pass for trial number two.  When faced with the prospect of having to show that Sokolowski’s and Wagoner’s ipse dixit were reaccepted by the relevant scientific community, the plaintiff dismissed her case.

Two Schools of Thought

May 25th, 2013

In litigation of claims of professional malpractice, the “two schools of thought doctrine” is a complete defense.  Jones v. Chidester, 531 Pa. 31, 40, 610 A.2d 964 (1992).

As explained by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, physicians may defend against claims that they deviated from the standard of care, or of professional malpractice, by adverting to support for their treatment by a minority of professionals in their field:

“Where competent medical authority is divided, a physician will not be held responsible if in the exercise of his judgment he followed a course of treatment advocated by a considerable number of recognized and respected professionals in his given area of expertise.”

Id. at 40.  See also Fallon v. Loree, 525 N.Y.S.2d 93, 93 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (“one of several acceptable techniques”); Dailey, “The Two Schools of Thought and Informed Consent Doctrine in Pennsylvania,” 98 Dickenson L. Rev. 713 (1994); Douglas Brown, “Panacea or Pandora’ Box:  The Two Schools of Medical Thought Doctrine after Jones v. Chidester,” 44 J. Urban & Contemp. Law 223 (1993).

Perhaps the two schools doctrine is an interesting anomaly that harkens back to a legal epistemology founded in authority rather than evidence.  In the law of expert witnesses, the criterion for admissibility of opinion has shifted from “general acceptance” to epistemic warrant, but malpractice law still allows custom and practice to dictate the standard of care.  The two schools doctrine ameliorates the practice of basing standard of care on authoritative, non-evidence based practices and opinions.  If standards of care were truly evidence based, then there might still be situations in which the available evidence was inconclusive between two approaches to patient care.  In situations of inconclusive evidence between two approaches, the two schools doctrine would provide a defense.

Products Liability

In products liability cases, failure-to-warn theories are often predicated upon claims that defendants should have known of a risk of harm posed by their products.  Plaintiffs will cite past pronouncements made by authors as evidence that the harm was “known” to others, and thus the defendants should have known of the harm, and thus should have warned about the harm.  This species of claiming often takes place, however, without any analysis whether the past pronouncements were made with good and adequate scientific bases.

If products liability law persists in treating past, putative knowledge uncritically, then it should, at least, allow defendants to defend on the ground that there were contrary pronouncements made. Juries should be told that the existence of contrary pronouncements from a respectable minority of writers is a complete defense. The two schools of thought doctrine should thus be given wider play in tort law than just professional malpractice.  Products liability should honor the basic underlying principle of malpractice law that the opinions of even a respected minority of experts fully answers the claim of negligence. The existence of the contrary opinions should bar punitive damage claims altogether.

Consider what happens in the typical failure to warn case.  The plaintiff  goes trash picking through the dustbin of medical history to find some prescient writer who argued that the product in question causes disease.  Defendant points to other authors who disputed the relationship.  The court instructs the jury that they may find defendant negligent for failing to warn if they believe the plaintiffs’ evidence.  The jury makes its decision, thoroughly infected with hindsight bias.

This scenario is unsatisfactory and unduly restrictive.  Applying the two schools of thought doctrine, the court should instruct the jury to find for the plaintiff only if there was not a considerable number of recognized and respected professionals and  experts, who had opined that the product caused the specific injury in question.  The existence of such a minority should defeat claims for punitive damages as a matter of law.

United States v. Harkonen

On May 7, 2013, the Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals denied, Dr. Harkonen’s petition for rehearing in United States v. Harkonen.  No data or analyses were false or fabricated in the Harkonen case.  The government’s prosecution was predicated on a statistical orthodoxy that is opposed by a large number of recognized and respected statisticians.  This fact would have been a complete defense to a claim of professional negligence.  The two schools doctrine should completely bar a prosecution for fraud.

Remarkably, expert witnesses commonly testify to causal associations on lesser evidence than Dr. Harkonen relied upon in a press release for his judgment of causal efficacy, but the trial court believed the jury could infer scienter and falsity from conversations between an “orthodox” statistician and Dr. Harkonen about the propriety of drawing a casual inference from a given dataset.

Perhaps civil litigants should start counterclaiming for fraud when they receive expert witness reports.

Asbestos Litigation Blues

May 22nd, 2013

Mr. Curtis  Geatz alleges that he has mesothelioma as a result of asbestos exposure, including exposure to crocidolite from having smoked Kent Micronite filtered cigarettes for nine months, in 1955-56. Geatz v. Benjamin Moore & Co., File No. 62CV124946, Minn. D. Ct. for Ramsey Cty. (2d Jud. Dist.).  SeeLorillard Executive Admits Asbestos Once Included in Kent Filters” (April 23, 2013) (misleadingly suggesting that testimony about filter content was something other than very old news).

Crocidolite is clearly the most potent cause of mesothelioma.  In a published cohort study of workers at Hollingsworth & Vose, a company that made the filters for the Kent cigarette, over 15 percent of all deaths were due to mesothelioma.  James Talcott, et al., “Asbestos-Associated Diseases in a Cohort of Cigarette-Filter Workers,” 321 New Engl. J. Med. 1220 (1989).

Despite the high potency of crocidolite in causing mesothelioma, the late Irving Selikoff  worked hard to advance his opinion that all asbestos fiber types were comparable.  Selikoff also propagandized the view that crocidolite was not widely used in the United States, although he and his colleagues documented the use of “blue” fiber at Johns-Manville factories in the United States. SeeSelikoff and the Mystery of the Disappearing Amphiboles” (Dec. 10, 2010).

In Mr. Geatz’s case, Lorillard moved for summary judgment on grounds that crocidolite fibers in the cigarettes plaintiff smoked were not a substantial contributing factor of his mesothelioma. The trial court denied Lorillard’s motion, apparently on the strength of unidentified exhibits attached to an attorney affidavit (Tiffany Dickenson).

Mr. Geatz’ claim is not implausible on its face, but the trial court’s refusal of Lorillard’s motion for summary judgment is a conclusory black box.  It may be right or wrong, but it fails to describe the defendant’s evidence or arguments as to why potent crocidolite in the Kent filter could not have been a substantial factor, or the plaintiffs’ evidence as to why the jury should be allowed to say otherwise.  Lorillard may have argued that the fibers did not leave the filter, or that the exposure would have been too low, even to the extremely potent crocidolite fiber.  Apparently there was no threshold issue of admissibility of each side’s expert witnesses, but still, the scientific issues, the plaintiffs, and the defendants deserve some explanation of the court’s decision.

As They WOE, So No Recovery Have the Reeps

May 22nd, 2013

Late last year, Justice York excluded Dr. Shira Kramer’s WOE-ful opinion that gasoline fumes from an alleged fuel-line leak caused Sean Reep to be born with cerebral palsy.  Reeps v. BMW of North America, LLC, 2012 NY Slip Op 33030(U), N.Y.S.Ct., Index No. 100725/08 (New York Cty. Dec. 21, 2012) (York, J.).  Kramer’s opinion was a parody of science, pieced together from case reports, animal studies, and epidemiologic studies that looked at exposures utterly unlike that of Mrs. Reep’s exposure.

Justice York saw through the charade.  The animal studies were largely exonerative. The case reports were of birth defects quite different from those sustained by Sean Reeps.  The epidemiologic studies were of different chemicals or chemicals at levels very different from those experienced by Mrs. Reeps. Plaintiffs’ expert witnesses ignored established principles of teratology in claiming late-term birth defects to have been causally related to early term exposures. Plaintiffs’ expert witnesses gave a convincing presentation of how not to do science, and why judicial gatekeeping is necessary.  SeeNew York Breathes Life into Frye Standard – Reeps v. BMW” (Mar. 5, 2013).

Justice York clearly articulated that the “plaintiff’s burden to prove the methodology applied to reach the conclusions will not be rejected by specialists in the field.”  Reeps, slip op. at 11.  The trial court recognized that under the New York state version of Frye, the court must determine whether plaintiffs’ expert witnesses are faithfully applying a methodology, such as the Bradford Hill criteria, or whether they are they are “pay[ing] lip service to them while pursuing a completely different enterprise.”  Id.  Justice York recognized that the court must examine a proffered opinion to determine whether it “properly relates existing data, studies or literature to the plaintiff’s situation, or whether, instead, it is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

Plaintiffs were unhappy with Justice York’s decision, and their counsel moved for reconsideration, positing only 15 supposed errors or misunderstandings in the opinion. On May 10, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration and further explicated the scientific deficiencies of plaintiffs’ witnesses’ opinions.

The trial court was unimpressed:

“In general, attorney for plaintiffs misrepresents the substance of this court’s Decision. The court did not prefer conclusions of defendants’ experts to that of plaintiffs – disagreement among experts is to be expected, since causation analysis involves professional judgment in interpreting data and literature. An expert opinion is precluded when it is reached in violation of generally accepted scientific principles. The court determined that Drs. Kramer and Frazier did not follow generally accepted scientific methodology.”

Reeps, 2013 NY Slip Op 31055(U) at 2 (Opinion on Motions to Reargue, to Renew, and for Oral Hearing) (May 10, 2013).

The court noted that the plaintiffs’ witnesses’ novel claim that low-level gasoline vapor inhalation causes birth defects, a claim that had escaped the attention of all other scientists and regulatory agencies, cried out for judicial intervention.  Id. at 3.

The court also rebuffed the claim that plaintiffs’ witnesses, Shira Kramer and Linda Frazier, had followed the Bradford Hill guidelines:

 “These guidelines are employed only after a study finds an association to determine whether that association reflects a true causal relationship.”

Id. at 5 (quoting Federal Judicial Center, National Research Council, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence at 598-599 (3d ed. 2011)) (emphasis in the original). Kramer and Frazier never got off the dime with the Bradford Hill guidelines.

In considering the plaintiffs’ motions, the trial court also had occasion to revisit the assertion that “weight of the evidence” (WOE) substituted for, or counted as, a scientific basis for a conclusion of causality:

“The metaphorical use of the term is, if nothing else, ‘a colorful way to say the body of evidence we have examined and judged using a method we have not described but could be more or less inferred from a careful between-the-lines reading of our paper’.”

Id. at 5 (quoting Douglas Weed, “Weight of Evidence: A Review of Concept and Methods,” 25 Risk Analysis 1545, 1546-47 (2005).

Unmoved by the sophistical hand waving, the court emphasized that Kramer and Frazier had confused “suggestive” evidence with “conclusions,” and they had misrepresented the meaning and significance of threshold limit values.  All in all, a convincing demonstration of the need for, and the judicial competence to carry out, gatekeeping of expert witness opinion testimony.

Biopersistant Silicone

May 18th, 2013

From the late 1980’s until the late 1990’s, a cadre of public health zealots waged war against various silicone medical devices, but especially against silicone gel breast implants.  Their charge was that silicone degraded in vivo to silica, and that it caused autoimmune disease.  Their supposed method:  weight of the evidence.

I recall sitting next to Professor Carl Cranor at a meeting in Washington, D.C.  When the subject of silicone gel breast implants came up, he started trash talking the exonerative epidemiology.  When I introduced myself and told him that I represented one of the defendants in that litigation, he got up and moved.  Thankfully.

In 1999, the Institute of Medicine issued its consensus report that debunked the plaintiffs’ attempts to draw a causal connection between silicone and autoimmune disease.  Stuart Bondurant, et al., Safety of Silicone Breast Implants (1999).   The phrases “weight of the evidence” or “weight of evidence” are never mentioned in the report, over 500 pages long.

Recently, the silicone plaintiffs’ causal theory has resurfaced. There has been no new important evidence, but with the scientific community’s attention drawn elsewhere, some old zealots and some new have wandered back into the field to recycle the claims and hypotheses that consumed lawyers and scientists in the last century.

Last year saw a review by Yehuda Shoenfeld and his Israeli colleagues, who describe a “new” syndrome that manifests with various immune-system disturbances.  These authors call their syndrome ASIA (autoimmune syndrome induced by adjuvant). M. Lidar, N. Agmon-Levin, P. Langevitz, and Y. Shoenfeld, “Silicone and scleroderma revisited,” 21 Lupus 121 (2012).

Shoenfeld, who has dabbled with this theory for 20 years, acknowledges that the epidemiologic studies fail to support the ASIA notion.  Despite the lack of support from controlled, observational studies, these authors proceed to describe “the mechanisms by which silicone may mediate autoimmunity in general, as well as the evidence for causal associations with more specific autoimmune syndromes in general, and scleroderma in particular.”  Id. at 121.

Last month, an article was published online with a collection of case reports from the Netherlands. Jan Tervaert & R. M. Kappel, “Silicone implant incompatibility syndrome (SIIS):A frequent cause of ASIA (Shoenfeld’s syndrome),” 56 Immunologic Research (2013), published online, April 2013.  The authors employ Shoenfeld’s criteria for ASIA, and postulate a causal relationship between silicone implants and the syndrome in 32 cases.

This month, the assault has stepped up.  Yehuda Shoenfeld, “Video Q&A: what is ASIA? An interview with Yehuda Shoenfeld,” 11 BMC Medicine 118 (2013). The video of Dr. Shoenfeld is also available for those who may find it hard to believe that article has found its way into print.

Silicone.  It never goes away.

IARC and Cranor’s Apologetics for Flawed and Fallacious Science

May 13th, 2013

In his recent contribution to the Center for Progressive Reform’s symposium on the Milward case, Professor Cranor suggests that the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) uses weight of the evidence (WOE) in its carcinogenicity determinations.  See Carl F. Cranor, “Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products: Advances in General Causation Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation,” PDF 3 Wake Forest J. L. & Policy 105 (2013)[hereinafter cited as Cranor]  Cranor’s suggestion is demonstrably wrong.

The IARC process is described in several places, but the definitive presentation of the IARC’s goals and methods is set out in a document known as the “Preamble.”   World Health Organization, IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans — Preamble (2006) [cited herein as Preamble]. There is no mention of WOE in the Preamble.

The IARC process consists upon assessments of carcinogenicity of  substances or exposure circumstances, and categorization into specified groups:

IARC Category

Verbal Description

IARC “Findings”

Group 1 [Known] Carcinogenic to humans

111

Group 2A Probably carcinogenic to humans

65

Group 2B Possibly carcinogenic to humans

274

Group 3 Not classifiable as to its carcinogenicity to humans

504

Group 4 Probably not carcinogenic to humans

1

The IARC operative definitions that a substance to a category are highly stylized and unique to IARC.  The definitions do not coincide with ordinary language definitions or general scientific usage.  Only one substance is categorized as “probably not carcinogenic to humans” is Caprolactam.

Alas, oxygen, nitrogen, carbon dioxide, sugar, table salt, water, and many other exposures we all experience, and even require, do not make it to “probably not carcinogenic.”  This fact should clue in the casual reader that the IARC classifications are greatly influenced by the precautionary principle.  There is nothing wrong with this influence, as long as we realize that IARC categorizations do not necessarily line up with scientific determinations.

Cranor attempts to exploit IARC classifications and their verbiage, but in doing so he misrepresents the IARC enterprise.  For instance, his paper for the CPR symposium strongly suggests that a case involving a Group 2A carcinogen would necessarily satisfy the preponderance of evidence standard common in civil cases because the IARC denominates the substance or exposure circumstance as “probably carcinogenic to humans.”  This suggestion is wrong because of the technical, non-ordinary language meanings given to “probably” and “known.” The IARC terminology involves a good bit of epistemic inflation.  Consider first what it means for something to be “probably” a carcinogen:

“Group 2.

This category includes agents for which, at one extreme, the degree of evidence of carcinogenicity in humans is almost sufficient, as well as those for which, at the other extreme, there are no human data but for which there is evidence of carcinogenicity in experimental animals. Agents are assigned to either Group 2A (probably carcinogenic to humans) or Group 2B (possibly carcinogenic to humans) on the basis of epidemiological and experimental evidence of carcinogenicity and mechanistic and other relevant data. The terms probably carcinogenic and possibly carcinogenic have no quantitative significance and are used simply as descriptors of different levels of evidence of human carcinogenicity, with probably carcinogenic signifying a higher level of evidence than possibly carcinogenic.”

Preamble at 22, § 6(d).  So probably does not mean “more likely than not,” and “possibly” means something even less than some unspecified level of probability.  An IARC classification of 2A will not help a plaintiff reach the jury because it does not connote more likely than not.

A category I finding is usually described as a “known” carcinogen, but the reality is that there may still be a good deal of epistemic uncertainty over the classification:

“Group 1: The agent is carcinogenic to humans.

This category is used when there is sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity in humans. Exceptionally, an agent may be placed in this category when evidence of carcinogenicity in humans is less than sufficient but there is sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity in experimental animals and strong evidence in exposed humans that the agent acts through a relevant mechanism of carcinogenicity.”

Preamble at 22, § 6(d).

Again, the precautionary nature of the categorization should  be obvious.  Knowledge of carcinogenicity is equated to sufficient evidence, which leaves open whether there is a body of contradictory evidence.  The IARC’s definition of “sufficiency” does place some limits on what may affirmatively count as “sufficient” evidence:

Sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity: The Working Group considers that a causal relationship has been established between exposure to the agent and human cancer. That is, a positive relationship has been observed between the exposure and cancer in studies in which chance, bias and confounding could be ruled out with reasonable confidence. A statement that there is sufficient evidence is followed by a separate sentence that identifies the target organ(s) or tissue(s) where an increased risk of cancer was observed in humans. Identification of a specific target organ or tissue does not preclude the possibility that the agent may cause cancer at other sites.”

Preamble (2006), at 19, § 6(a).  This definition hardly helps Cranor in his attempt to defend bad science.  Scientists may reasonably disagree over what is sufficient evidence, but the IARC requires, at a minimum, that “chance, bias and confounding could be ruled out with reasonable confidence.”  Id.  Ruling out chance, of course, introduces considerations of statistical significance, multiple comparisons, and the like.  Ruling out bias and confounding with confidence is an essential part of the IARC categorization process,  just as it is an essential part of the scientific process.  Reviewing the relied upon studies for whether they ruled out chance, bias, and confounding, was precisely what the Supreme Court did in General Electric v. Joiner, and what the current statute, Federal Rule of Evidence 702, now requires.  Failing to review the extant epidemiologic studies for their ability to rule out chance,  bias, and confounding is exactly what the district court judge did in Milward.

IARC and Conflicts of Interest – Nemo iudex in causa sua

Holding out the IARC process as exemplifying scientific method involves other controversial aspects of the process.  IARC’s classifications are determined by “working groups” that review the available scientific literature on an agent’s carcinogenicity.  Members of these of groups are selected in part because they have “have published significant research related to the carcinogenicity of the agents being reviewed… .” Preamble at 5.  See also Vincent Cogliano, Robert A. Baan, Kurt Straif, et al., “The science and practice of carcinogen identification and evaluation,” 112 Envt’l Health Persp. 1269, 1273 (2004).

While the IARC tries hard to avoid apparent financial conflicts of interest, its approach to selecting voting members of the working groups invites a more pervasive, more corrupting influence:  working group members must vote on the validity of their own research.  The prestige of their own research will thus be directly affected by the group’s vote, as well as by the analysis in the resulting IARC monograph.  Many writers have criticized this approach.  See, e.g., Paolo Boffetta, Joseph McLaughlin, Carlo La Vecchia, Robert Tarone, Loren Lipworth, and William Blot, “A further plea for adherence to the principles underlying science in general and the epidemiologic enterprise in particular,” 38 Internat’l J. Epidemiol. 678 (2009); Michael Hauptmann & Cecile Ronckers, “A further plea for adherence to the principles underlying science in general and the epidemiologic enterprise in particular,” 39 Internat’l J. Epidemiol. 1677 (2010).

Notably absent from Cranor’s defense of using bad science and incomplete evidence is his disregard of systematic reviews and meta-analysis.  Although “agency” science is a weak shadow of the real thing, even federal agencies have come to see the importance of using principles of systematic reviews in their assessments of science for policy purposes.  See, e.g., FDA, Guidance for industry evidence-based review system for the scientific evaluation of health claims (2009).  Currently underway at the National Toxicology Program’s Office of Health Assessment and Translation (OHAT) is an effort to implement systematic review methodology in the Program’s assessments of potential human health hazards.  That the NTP is only now articulating an OHAT Evaluation Process, incorporating principles of systematic review, suggests that something less rigorous has been used previously.  See Federal Register Notice , 78 Fed. Reg. 37 (Feb. 25, 2013).

No one should be fooled by Cranor’s attempt to pass off  precautionary judgments as scientific determinations of causality.

Cranor’s Defense of Milward at the CPR’s Celebration

May 12th, 2013

THE RISE OF THE UBER-EXPERT

One of the curious aspects of the First Circuit’s decision in Milward was the court’s willingness to tolerate a so-called weight of the evidence (WOE) assessment of a causal issue by toxicologist Martyn Smith, when much of the key evidence did not involve toxicology.  In defending WOE, Professor Cranor argues that scientists (such as those in an International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) working group) evaluate evidence from different lines of research into a single, evaluative judgment of the likelihood of causation.  The lines of evidence may involve animal toxicology, cell biology, epidemiology or other disciplines:

“In drawing conclusions from the data to a theory or explanation, it is necessary for scientists to evaluate the quality of different lines of evidence, to integrate them and to assess what conclusion the lines of evidence most likely supports and how well they do so in comparison with alternative explanations.”

See Carl F. Cranor, “Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products: Advances in General Causation Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation,” PDF 3 Wake Forest J. L. & Policy 105, 117 (2013)[hereinafter cited as Cranor].

Presumably, the scientists will come to the table with the training, experience, and expertise appropriate to their discipline.  The curious aspect of Cranor’s defense is that Martyn Smith’s expertise did not encompass many of  the lines of research advanced, in particular, the epidemiologic.  Of course, in the real world of science, the assessment of the “lines” of evidence is conducted by scientists from the different, relevant disciplines.  In the make-believe world of courtroom science, the collaboration breaks down when a single expert witness, such as Smith, offers opinions outside his real expertise.  Because the law is not particularly demanding with respect to the extent and scope of expertise, Smith was able to hold forth not only on animal experiments, but on human epidemiologic studies.  The defense was able to show that Smith disregarded basic principles of epidemiology, but the First Circuit agreed with Cranor, that consideration of Smith’s disregard should be kicked down the road, to the jury for its consideration.

As a practical matter, in today’s world of highly specialized scientific disciplines, it is simply not possible for an expert witness to address evidence from all the fields needed to evaluate the multiple lines of evidence relevant to a causal issues.  We should rightfully be skeptical of a single expert witness who claims the ability to weigh disparate lines of evidence to synthesize a judgment of causation.  Of course, this is how science is practiced in a courtroom, not in a university.

REJECTION OF EVIDENCE HIERARCHY

Another salient feature of Cranor’s argument is his insistence that there is no hierarchy of evidence.  Cranor’s argument is ambiguous between rejecting a hierarchy of disciplines or a hierarchy within epidemiology itself .  Cranor never actually argues directly for a leveling of all types of epidemiologic studies, and as we will see, his one key citation (repeated three times) is for the hierarchy of disciplines:  epidemiology, molecular biology, genetics, pathology, and the like.

Clearly there are instances of causation determined without epidemiology.  The Henle-Koch postulates after all were developed to assess causation by infection biological organisms.  And in some instances, very suggestive evidence of viral causes of cancer has been attained before confirming epidemiologic evidence.  If there is a meaningful population attributable risk, however, epidemiology should be able to confirm the suspicions of virology or molecular biology.

Cranor repeatedly cites a meeting report of a workshop held in Washington, D.C., in 2003.  See also Michael Green, Michal Freedman, and Leon Gordis, “Reference Guide on Epidemiology,” in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 549, 564 (3d ed. 2011) (citing same meeting report).  Cranor’s citations and quotations misleadingly suggest that the report was an official function of the National Cancer Institute (NCI), and that the published report was an official pronouncement of the NCI.  Neither suggestion is true.

Cranor praises the Circuit’s Milward decision for adopting his argument and citing the meeting report for his claim that there is no hierarchy of evidence:

“Citing National Cancer Institute scientists, [the Circuit] also added that “[t]here should be no such hierarchy” of evidence for carcinogenicity as between epidemiological and some other kinds of evidence.100 These scientists and many distinguished scientific committees would not require epidemiological studies to support claims that a substance can cause adverse effects in humans or place certain other a priori constraints on evidence.101

Cranor at 119 (citing Milward, at 17, citing Michele Carbone, et al., Modern Criteria to Establish Human Cancer Etiology, 64 Cancer Research 5518, 5522 (2004)).

Given the emphasis that Cranor places upon the Carbone article, it is worth taking a close look.  Carbone’s article was styled “Meeting Report.” See also Michelle Carbone, Jack Gruber, and May Wong, “Modern criteria to establish human cancer etiology,” 14 Semin. Cancer Biol. 397 (2004).  The article was a report of a workshop, not an official NCI publication.  The NCI hosted the meeting; the meeting was not sponsored by the NCI, and the published meeting report was not an official statement of the NCI.  Notably, the report appeared in Cancer Research as a paid advertisement, not in the Journal of the National Cancer Institute as a scholarly article.

In assessing the citation, readers should consider the authors of the meeting report.  Importantly, the discipline of epidemiology was not strongly represented; most of the chairpersons and scientists in attendance were pathologists, cell biologists, virologists, and toxicologists.  The authors of the meeting report reflect the interests and focus of the scientists in attendance.  The lead author was Michele Carbone, a pathologist at Loyola University Chicago.  Some may recognize Carbone as one of the proponents of Simian Virus 40 as a cause of mesothelioma, a hypothesis that has not fared terribly well in the crucible of epidemiologic science.  Other authors included:

George Klein, with the Microbiology and Tumor Biology Center, Karolinska Institute, in Stockholm,

Jack Gruber, a virologist with the Cancer Etiology Branch of the NCI, and

May Wong, a biochemist, with the NCI.

The basis of the citation to Carbone’s meeting report is an informal discussion session that took place at the meeting.  Those in attendance broke out into two groups, one chaired by Brook Mossman, a pathologist, and the other group chaired by Dr. Harald zur Hausen, a famous virologist who discovered the causal relationship between human papilloma virus and cervical cancer.

The meeting report included a narrative of how the two groups responded to twelve questions. Cranor’s citation to this article is based upon one sentence in Carbone’s report, about one of twelve questions:

6. What is the hierarchy of state-of-the-art approaches needed for confirmation criteria, and which bioassays are critical for decisions: epidemiology, animal testing, cell culture, genomics, and so forth?

There should be no such hierarchy.  Epidemiology, animal, tissue culture and molecular pathology should be seen as integrating evidences in the determination of human carcinogenicity.”

Carbone at 5522.  Considering the fuller context of the meeting and this report, there is nothing particularly surprising about this statement.  It is not clear that the full question and answer even remotely supports the weight that Cranor places upon it.  Clearly, Cranor’s quotations are unduly selective.  For instance, Cranor does not discuss the disagreement among those in attendance over criteria for different carcinogens:

“2. Should the criteria be the same for different agents (viruses, chemicals, physical agents, promoting agents versus initiating DNA-damaging agents)?

There were different opinions. Group 1 debated this issue and concluded that the current listing of criteria should remain the same because we lack sufficient evidence to develop a separate classification. Group 2 strongly supported the view that it is useful to separate the biological or infectious agents from chemical and physical carcinogens due to their frequently entirely different mode of action.”

Carbone at 5521.

Perhaps Cranor did not think a legal audience would be interested in the emphasis given to epidemiology.  The authors of the meeting report noted that the importance to epidemiology for general causation, but its limitations for determining specific causation:

“Concerning the respective roles of epidemiology and molecular pathology, it was noted that epidemiology allows the determination of the overall effect of a given carcinogen in the human population (e.g., hepatitis B virus and hepatocellular carcinoma) but cannot prove causality in the individual tumor patient.”

Carbone at 5518.  The report did not state that epidemiology was not necessary for confirmation of carcinogenicity in the species of interest (humans). The meeting report emphasized the need to integrate the findings of epidemiology and of molecular biology; it did not urge that epidemiology be ignored or disregarded:

“A general consensus was often reached on several topics such as the need to integrate molecular pathology and epidemiology for a more accurate and rapid identification of human carcinogens.”

Carbone at 5518.

“Ideally, before labeling an agent as a human carcinogen, it is important to have epidemiological, experimental animals, and mechanistic evidences (molecular pathology). Not all of the evidence is always available, and, at times, it may be prudent to identify a human carcinogen earlier rather than later.”

Carbone at 5519 (emphasis added).  Unlike Cranor, the authors of the meeting report distinguish between instance when they are acting on a scientific determination of causation, and a precautionary assessment that proceeds prudentially “as if” causation is determined.

Against this fuller context, Cranor’s characterization of the meeting report, and his limited citations and quotations can be seen to be misleading:

“The First Circuit wisely followed the Etiology Branch of the National Cancer Institute, which sponsored a workshop on cancer causation that concluded ‘there should be no . . . hierarchy’ among epidemiology, animal testing, cell culture, genomics, and so forth.164

Cranor at 129.  The suggestion that the informal workshop statement represented the views of the Etiology Branch is bogus.  Not content to misrepresent twice, Cranor comes back for yet a third misleading citation to this report:

“A further conclusion, already noted, is that scientific experts in court should be permitted to rely upon all scientifically relevant evidence in nondeductive arguments to draw conclusions about causation.209 “There should be no such hierarchy” of evidence, as the Milward court put it, following scientists conducting a workshop at the National Cancer Institute.210 This decision stands as an important corrective to the views of some other appellate and district courts concerning the scientific foundation for expert testimony in toxic tort cases.”

Cranor at 135 (emphasis in original) (citing Carbone for a third time).  To see how misleading is Cranor’s suggestion that scientists should be permitted upon all scientific relevant evidence, consider the meeting report’s careful admonition about the lack of validity of some animal models and mechanistic research:

“Moreover, carcinogens and anticarcinogens can have different effects in different situations.  As shown by the example of addition of β-carotene in the diet, β-carotene has chemopreventive effects in many experimental systems, yet it appears to have increased the incidence of lung cancer in heavy smokers. Animal experiments can be very useful in predicting the carcinogenicity of a given chemical. However, there are significant differences in susceptibility among species and within organs in the same species, and differences in the metabolic pathway of a given chemical among human and animals could lead to error.”

Carbone at 5521.  Obviously relevance is conditioned upon validity, a relationship that is ignored, suppressed, and dismissed in Cranor’s article.

The devil, or the WOE, comes from with ignoring the details.