TORTINI

For your delectation and delight, desultory dicta on the law of delicts.

High, Low and Right-Sided Colonics – Ridding the Courts of Junk Science

July 16th, 2016

Not surprisingly, many of Selikoff’s litigation- and regulatory-driven opinions have not fared well, such as the notions that asbestos causes gastrointestinal cancers and that all asbestos minerals have equal potential and strength to cause mesothelioma.  Forty years after Selikoff testified in litigation that occupational asbestos exposure caused an insulator’s colorectal cancer, the Institute of Medicine reviewed the extant evidence and announced that the evidence was  “suggestive but not sufficient to infer a causal relationship between asbestos exposure and pharyngeal, stomach, and colorectal cancers.” Jonathan Samet, et al., eds., Institute of Medicine Review of Asbestos: Selected Cancers (2006).[1] The Institute of Medicine’s monograph has fostered a more circumspect approach in some of the federal agencies.  The National Cancer Institute’s website now proclaims that the evidence is insufficient to permit a conclusion that asbestos causes non-pulmonary cancers of gastrointestinal tract and throat.[2]

As discussed elsewhere, Selikoff testified as early as 1966 that asbestos causes colorectal cancer, in advance of any meaningful evidence to support such an opinion, and then he, and his protégées, worked hard to lace the scientific literature with their pronouncements on the subject, without disclosing their financial, political, and positional conflicts of interest.[3]

With plaintiffs’ firm’s (Lanier) zealous pursuit of bias information from the University of Idaho, in the LoGuidice case, what are we to make of Selikoff’s and his minions’ dubious ethics of failed disclosure. Do Selikoff and Mount Sinai receive a pass because their asbestos research predated the discovery of ethics? The “Lobby” (as the late Douglas Liddell called Selikoff and his associates)[4] has seriously distorted truth-finding in any number of litigations, but nowhere are the Lobby’s distortions more at work than in lawsuits for claimed asbestos injuries. Here the conflicts of interests truly have had a deleterious effect on the quality of civil justice. As we saw with the Selikoff exceptionalism displayed by the New York Supreme Court in reviewing third-party subpoenas,[5] some courts seem bent on ignoring evidence-based analyses in favor of Mount Sinai faith-based initiatives.

Current Asbestos Litigation Claims Involving Colorectal Cancer

Although Selikoff has passed from the litigation scene, his trainees and followers have lined up at the courthouse door to propagate his opinions. Even before the IOM’s 2006 monograph, more sophisticated epidemiologists consistently rejected the Selikoff conclusion on asbestos and colon cancer, which grew out of Selikoff’s litigation activities.[6] And yet, the minions keep coming.

In the pre-Daubert era, defendants lacked an evidentiary challenge to the Selikoff’s opinion that asbestos caused colorectal cancer. Instead of contesting the legal validity or sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ general causation claims, defendants often focused on the unreliability of the causal attribution for the specific claimant’s disease. These early cases are often misunderstood to be challenges to expert witnesses’ opinions about whether asbestos causes colorectal cancer; they were not.[7]

Of course, after the IOM’s 2006 monograph, active expert witness gatekeeping should eliminate asbestos gastrointestinal cancer claims, but sadly they persist. Perhaps, courts simply considered the issue “grandfathered” in from the era in which judicial scrutiny of expert witness opinion testimony was restricted. Perhaps, defense counsel are failing to frame and support their challenges properly.  Perhaps both.

Arthur Frank Jumps the Gate

Although ostensibly a “Frye” state, Pennsylvania judges have, when moved by the occasion, to apply a fairly thorough analysis of proffered expert witness opinion.[8] On occasion, Pennsylvania judges have excluded unreliably or invalidly supported causation opinions, under the Pennsylvania version of the Frye standard. A recent case, however, tried before a Workman’s Compensation Judge (WCJ), and appealed to the Commonwealth Court, shows how inconsistent the application of the standard can be, especially when Selikoff’s legacy views are at issue.

Michael Piatetsky, an architect, died of colorectal cancer. Before his death, he and his wife filed a worker’s compensation claim, in which they alleged that his disease was caused by his workplace exposure to asbestos. Garrison Architects v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Piatetsky), No. 1095 C.D. 2015, Pa. Cmwlth. Ct., 2016 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 72 (Jan. 22, 2016) [cited as Piatetsky]. Mr. Piatetsky was an architect, almost certainly knowledgeable about asbestos hazards generally.  Despite his knowledge, Piatetsky eschewed personal protective equipment even when working at dusty work sites well marked with warnings. Although he had engaged in culpable conduct, the employer in worker compensation proceedings does not have ordinary negligence defenses, such as contributory negligence or assumption of risk.

In litigating the Piatetsky’s claim, the employer dragged its feet and failed to name an expert witness.  Eventually, after many requests for continuances, the Workers’ Compensation Judge barred the employer from presenting an expert witness. With the record closed, and without an expert witness, the Judge understandably ruled in favor of the claimant.

The employer, sans expert witness, had to confront claimant’s expert witness, Arthur L. Frank, a minion of Selikoff and a frequent testifier in asbestos and many other litigations. Frank, of course, opined that asbestos causes colon cancer and that it caused Mr. Piatetsky’s cancer. Mr. Piatetsky’s colon cancer originated on the right side of his colon. Dr. Frank thus emphasized that asbestos causes colon cancer in all locations, but especially on the right side in view of one study’s having concluded “that colon cancer caused by asbestos is more likely to begin on the right side.” Piatetsky at *6.

On appeal, the employer sought relief on several issues, but the only one of interest here is the employer’s argument “that Claimant’s medical expert based his opinion on flimsy medical studies.” Piatetsky at *10. The employer’s appeal seemed to go off the rails with the insistence that the Claimant’s medical opinion was invalid because Dr. Frank relied upon studies not involving architects. Piatetsky at *14. The Commonwealth Court was able to point to testimony, although probably exaggerated, which suggested that Mr. Piatetsky had been heavily exposed, at least at times, and thus his exposure was similar to that in the studies cited by Frank.

With respect to Frank’s right-sided (non-sinister) opinion, the Commonwealth Court framed the employer’s issue as a contention that Dr. Frank’s opinion on the asbestos-relatedness of right-sided colon cancer was “not universally accepted.” But universal acceptance has never been the test or standard for the rejection or acceptance of expert witness opinion testimony in any state.  Either the employer badly framed its appeal, or the appellate court badly misstated the employer’s ground for relief. In any event, the Commonwealth Court never addressed the relevant legal standard in its discussion.

The Claimant argued that the hearing Judge had found that Frank’s opinion was based on “numerous studies.” Piatetsky at *15. None of these studies is cited to permit the public to assess the argument and the Court’s acceptance of it. The appellate court made inappropriately short work of this appellate issue by confusing general and specific causation, and invoking Mr. Piatetsky’s age, his lack of family history of colon cancer, Frank’s review of medical records, testimony, and work records, as warranting Frank’s causal inference. None of these factors is relevant to general causation, and none is probative of the specific causation claim.  Many if not most colon cancers have no identifiable risk factor, and Dr. Frank had no way to rule out baseline risk, even if there were an increased risk from asbestos exposure. Piatetsky at *16. With no defense expert witness, the employer certainly had a difficult appellate journey. It is hard for the reader of the Commonwealth Court’s opinion to determine whether the case was poorly defended, poorly briefed on appeal, or poorly described by the appellate judges.

In any event, the right-sided ruse of Arthur Frank went unreprimanded.  Intellectual due process might have led the appellate court to cite the article at issue, but it failed to do so.  It is interesting and curious to see how the appellate court gave a detailed recitation of the controverted facts of asbestos exposure, while how glib the court was when describing the scientific issues and evidence.  Nonetheless, the article referenced vaguely, which went uncited by the appellate court, was no doubt the paper:  K. Jakobsson, M. Albin & L. Hagmar, “Asbestos, cement, and cancer in the right part of the colon,” 51 Occup. & Envt’l Med. 95 (1994).

These authors 24 observed versus 9.63 expected right-sided colon cancers, and they concluded that there was an increased rate of right-sided colon cancer in the asbestos cement plant workers.  Notably the authors’ reference population had a curiously low rate of right-sided colon cancer.  For left-sided colon cancer, the authors 9.3 expected cases but observed only 5 cases in the asbestos-cement cohort.  Contrary to Frank’s suggestion, the authors did not conclude that right-sided colon cancers had been caused by asbestos; indeed, the authors never reached any conclusion whether asbestos causes colorectal  cancer under any circumstances.  In their discussion, these authors noted that “[d]espite numerous epidemiological and experimental studies, there is no consensus concerning exposure to asbestos and risks of gastrointestinal cancer.” Jakobsson at 99; see also Dorsett D. Smith, “Does Asbestos Cause Additional Malignancies Other than Lung Cancer,” chap. 11, in Dorsett D. Smith, The Health Effects of Asbestos: An Evidence-based Approach 143, 154 (2015). Even this casual description of the Jakobsson study will awake the learned reader to the multiple comparisons that went on in this cohort study, with outcomes reported for left, right, rectum, and multiple sites, without any adjustment to the level of significance.  Risk of right-sided colon cancer was not a pre-specified outcome of the study, and the results of subsequent studies have never corroborated this small cohort study.

A sane understanding of subgroup analyses is important to judicial gatekeeping. SeeSub-group Analyses in Epidemiologic Studies — Dangers of Statistical Significance as a Bright-Line Test” (May 17, 2011).  The chapter on statistics in the Reference Manual for Scientific Evidence (3d ed. 2011) has some prudent caveats for multiple comparisons and testing, but neither the chapter on epidemiology, nor the chapter on clinical medicine[9], provides any sense of the dangers of over-interpreting subgroup analyses.

Some commentators have argued that we must not dissuade scientists from doing subgroup analysis, but the issue is not whether they should be done, but how they should be interpreted.[10] Certainly many authors have called for caution in how subgroup analyses are interpreted[11], but apparently Expert Witness Arthur Frank, did not receive the memo, before testifying in the Piatetsky case, and the Commonwealth Court did not before deciding this case.


[1] As good as the IOM process can be on occasion, even its reviews are sometimes less than thorough. The asbestos monograph gave no consideration to alcohol in the causation of laryngeal cancer, and no consideration to smoking in its analysis of asbestos and colorectal cancer. See, e.g., Peter S. Liang, Ting-Yi Chen & Edward Giovannucci, “Cigarette smoking and colorectal cancer incidence and mortality: Systematic review and meta-analysis,” 124 Internat’l J. Cancer 2406, 2410 (2009) (“Our results indicate that both past and current smokers have an increased risk of [colorectal cancer] incidence and mortality. Significantly increased risk was found for current smokers in terms of mortality (RR 5 1.40), former smokers in terms of incidence (RR 5 1.25)”); Lindsay M. Hannan, Eric J. Jacobs and Michael J. Thun, “The Association between Cigarette Smoking and Risk of Colorectal Cancer in a Large Prospective Cohort from the United States,” 18 Cancer Epidemiol., Biomarkers & Prevention 3362 (2009).

[2] National Cancer Institute, “Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk” (last visited July 10, 2016) (“In addition to lung cancer and mesothelioma, some studies have suggested an association between asbestos exposure and gastrointestinal and colorectal cancers, as well as an elevated risk for cancers of the throat, kidney, esophagus, and gallbladder (3, 4). However, the evidence is inconclusive.”).

[3] Compare “Health Hazard Progress Notes: Compensation Advance Made in New York State,” 16(5) Asbestos Worker 13 (May 1966) (thanking Selikoff for testifying in a colon cancer case) with, Irving J. Selikoff, “Epidemiology of gastrointestinal cancer,” 9 Envt’l Health Persp. 299 (1974) (arguing for his causal conclusion between asbestos and all gastrointestinal cancers, with no acknowledgment of his role in litigation or his funding from the asbestos insulators’ union).

[4] F.D.K. Liddell, “Magic, Menace, Myth and Malice,” 41 Ann. Occup. Hyg. 3, 3 (1997); see alsoThe Lobby Lives – Lobbyists Attack IARC for Conducting Scientific Research” (Feb. 19, 2013).

[5]

SeeThe LoGiudice Inquisitiorial Subpoena & Its Antecedents in N.Y. Law” (July 14, 2016).

[6] See, e.g., Richard Doll & Julian Peto, Asbestos: Effects on health of exposure to asbestos 8 (1985) (“In particular, there are no grounds for believing that gastrointestinal cancers in general are peculiarly likely to be caused by asbestos exposure.”).

[7] See Landrigan v. The Celotex Corporation, Revisited” (June 4, 2013); Landrigan v. The Celotex Corp., 127 N.J. 404, 605 A.2d 1079 (1992); Caterinicchio v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 127 NJ. 428, 605 A.2d 1092 (1992). In both Landrigan and Caterinicchio, there had been no challenge to the reliability or validity of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses’ general causation opinions. Instead, the trial courts entered judgments, assuming arguendo that asbestos can cause colorectal cancer (a dubious proposition), on the ground that the low relative risk cited by plaintiffs’ expert witnesses (about 1.5) was factually insufficient to support a verdict for plaintiffs on specific causation.  Indeed, the relative risk suggested that the odds were about 2 to 1 in defendants’ favor that the plaintiffs’ colorectal cancers were not caused by asbestos.

[8] See, e.g., Porter v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., Sept. Term 2007, No. 03275. 2016 WL 614572 (Phila. Cty. Com. Pleas, Oct. 5, 2015); “Demonstration of Frye Gatekeeping in Pennsylvania Birth Defects Case” (Oct. 6, 2015).

[9] John B. Wong, Lawrence O. Gostin & Oscar A. Cabrera, “Reference Guide on Medical Testimony,” in Reference Manual for Scientific Evidence 687 (3d ed. 2011).

[10] See, e.g., Phillip I. Good & James W. Hardin, Common Errors in Statistics (and How to Avoid Them) 13 (2003) (proclaiming a scientists’ Bill of Rights under which they should be allowed to conduct subgroup analyses); Ralph I. Horwitz, Burton H. Singer, Robert W. Makuch, Catherine M. Viscoli, “Clinical versus statistical considerations in the design and analysis of clinical research,” 51 J. Clin. Epidemiol. 305 (1998) (arguing for the value of subgroup analyses). In United States v. Harkonen, the federal government prosecuted a scientist for fraud in sending a telecopy that described a clinical trial as “demonstrating” a benefit in a subgroup of a secondary trial outcome.  Remarkably, in the Harkonen case, the author, and criminal defendant, was describing a result in a pre-specified outcome, in a plausible but post-hoc subgroup, which result accorded with prior clinical trials and experimental evidence. United States v. Harkonen (D. Calif. 2009); United States v. Harkonen (D. Calif. 2010) (post-trial motions), aff’d, 510 F. App’x 633 (9th Cir. 2013) (unpublished), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 824, ___ U.S. ___ (2014); Brief by Scientists And Academics as Amici Curiae In Support Of Petitioner, On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States, W. Scott Harkonen v. United States, No. 13-180 (filed Sept. 4, 2013).

[11] SeeSub-group Analyses in Epidemiologic Studies — Dangers of Statistical Significance as a Bright-Line Test” (May 17, 2011) (collecting commentary); see also Lemuel A. Moyé, Statistical Reasoning in Medicine:  The Intuitive P-Value Primer 206, 225 (2d ed. 2006) (noting that subgroup analyses are often misleading: “Fishing expeditions for significance commonly catch only the junk of sampling error”); Victor M. Montori, Roman Jaeschke, Holger J. Schünemann, Mohit Bhandari, Jan L Brozek, P. J. Devereaux & Gordon H Guyatt, “Users’ guide to detecting misleading claims in clinical research reports,” 329 Brit. Med. J. 1093 (2004) (“Beware subgroup analysis”); Susan F. Assmann, Stuart J. Pocock, Laura E. Enos, Linda E. Kasten, “Subgroup analysis and other (mis)uses) of baseline data in clinical trials,” 355 Lancet 1064 (2000); George Davey Smith & Mathias Egger, “Commentary: Incommunicable knowledge? Interpreting and applying the results of clinical trials and meta-analyses,” 51 J. Clin. Epidemiol. 289 (1998) (arguing against post-hoc hypothesis testing); Douglas G. Altman, “Statistical reviewing for medical journals,” 17 Stat. Med. 2662 (1998); Douglas G. Altman, “Commentary:  Within trial variation – A false trail?” 51 J. Clin. Epidemiol. 301 (1998) (noting that observed associations are expected to vary across subgroup because of random variability); Christopher Bulpitt, “Subgroup Analysis,” 2 Lancet: 31 (1988).

The LoGiudice Inquisitiorial Subpoena & Its Antecedents in N.Y. Law

July 14th, 2016

The plaintiffs’ bar’s inquisition into funding has been a recurring theme in the asbestos and other litigations.[1] It is thus interesting to compare the friendly reception Justice Moulton gave plaintiffs’ subpoena in LoGiudice[2] with the New York courts’ relatively recent hostility toward a defendant’s subpoena to Mt. Sinai School of Medicine.

A few years ago, Justice Sherry Heitler quashed a defendant’s attempt to subpoena information from the archives of a deceased, former faculty member of the Mount Sinai School of Medicine (“Mt. Sinai”), in Reyniak v. Barnstead Internat’l, No. 102688-08, 2010 NY Slip Op 50689, 2010 WL 1568424 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 6, 2010). In a cursory opinion, Justice Heitler cited institutional expense, chilling of research, and scholars’ fears that their unpublished notes, ideas, and observations would become public as a result of litigation. Heitler relied upon and followed an earlier New York state court’s decision that adopted a rather lopsided “balancing” analysis, which permitted the New York courts to ignore the legitimate needs of defendants for access to underlying data.[3]

Remarkably, Justice Heitler failed to cite a federal appellate court’s subsequent decision, which upheld the tobacco companies’ subpoena to Mount Sinai.[4] Her opinion also ignored the important context of the asbestos litigation, in which Selikoff, long since deceased, played a crucial role in fomenting and perpetuating litigation, with tendentious publications and pronouncements. Some might say, “manufacturing certainty.” Perpetuating the Litigation Industry’s Selikoff mythology, Justice Heitler described Selikoff as a ground breaking asbestos researcher, but she either ignored, or was ignorant of, his testimonial adventures, his attempts to influence litigation with ex parte meetings with presiding judges, and his other questionable litigation-related conduct.

Selikoff’s participation in litigation was not always above board.  His supposedly ground-breaking work was funded by the insulator’s union, which also sought him out as a testifying expert witness. Among his many testimonial adventures,[5] Selikoff testified as early as 1966 that asbestos causes colorectal cancer, and that it caused a specific claimant’s colorectal cancer. See “Health Hazard Progress Notes: Compensation Advance Made in New York State,” 16(5) Asbestos Worker 13 (May 1966) (thanking Selikoff for his having given testimony to support an insulator’s claim that asbestos caused his colorectal cancer). To be sure, Selikoff made his litigation claims in the scientific literature as well, but without any acknowledgement of his involving in litigation involving this very issue, and his funding by the asbestos union.[6]

Given the dubious provenance of many of Selikoff’s opinions,[7] the disparate treatment of the subpoenas in LoGuidice and Reyniak is irreconcilable. The inflated prestige of Selikoff and Mount Sinai blinded the New York state trial courts to Selikoff’s role in litigation and his biased assessments in science. The judicial hypocrisy may well be the consequence of how the academic community has promoted Selikoff’s reputation, while working assiduously to undermine the reputations of anyone who has been connected with the defense of occupational disease claims. Consider, for instance, how Labor (Marxist) historians have railed against the role that Dr. Anthony Lanza played in personal injury litigation following the Gauley Bridge tunnel construction.  See Jock McCulloch and Geoffrey Tweedale, “Anthony J. Lanza, Silicosis and the Gauley Bridge ‘Nine’,” 27 Social History of Medicine 86 (2013). While these historians deplore Lanza, however, they laud Selikoff. SeeBritish Labor Historians Belaboring American Labor History – Gauley Bridge” (Oct. 14, 2013). Politics and occupational disease litigation are like that.


[1] See In re All Litigation filed by Maune, Raichle, Hartley, French & Mudd LLC v. 3M Co., No. 5-15-0235, Ill. App., 5th Dist.; 2016 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1392 (June 30, 2016); “Engineers for Automakers Must Unredact Agendas in Madison County Asbestos Litigation,” Madison County Record (July 2016); Lynn A. Lenhart, “Meeting Agendas Between Non-Party Consultant and Counsel for Asbestos Friction Clients Not Privileged” (July 5, 2016).  See also Weitz & Luxenberg P.C. v. Georgia-Pacific LLC, 2013 WL 2435565, 2013 NY Slip Op 04127 (June 6, 2013), aff’d, 2013 WL 2435565 (N.Y. App. Div., 1st Dep’t June 6, 2013); “A Cautionary Tale on How Not to Sponsor a Scientific Study for Litigation” (June 21, 2013).

[2] LoGiudice v. American Talc Co., No. 190253/2014, 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2360, (N.Y. Sup., N.Y. Cty., June 20, 2016).

[3] See In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 136 Misc 2d 282, 285, 518 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cty. 1987); see also In re New York County Data Entry Worker Prod. Liab.Litig., No. 14003/92, 1994 WL 87529 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Jan 31, 1994) (denying discovery because “special circumstances,” vaguely defined were absent).

[4] Mount Sinai School of Medicine v. The American Tobacco Co., 866 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1889).

[5]Selikoff and the Mystery of the Disappearing Testimony” (Dec. 3, 2010).

[6] See, e.g., Irving J. Selikoff, “Epidemiology of gastrointestinal cancer,” 9 Envt’l Health Persp. 299 (1974) (arguing for his causal conclusion between asbestos and all gastrointestinal cancers).movie Her trailer

[7] See generally Scientific Prestige, Reputation, Authority & The Creation of Scientific Dogmas” (Oct. 4, 2014); “Historians Should Verify Not Vilify or Abilify – The Difficult Case of Irving Selikoff” (Jan. 4, 2014).

LoGuidice v. American Talc Co. — Subpoenas to Investigate Funding

July 13th, 2016

Mickey Gunter is a University Distinguished Professor of Geological Sciences, at the University of Idaho. Gunter has long been involved in the mineralogical issues surrounding asbestos contamination and content.  He served as a member of an EPA review committee for World Trade Center dust screening method (2005), a member of an ATSDR expert panel on asbestos biomarkers (2006), and as a panel member and reviewer for the Institute of Medicine and National Research Council, Workshop on NIOSH research on asbestos and elongated mineral particles (2009). Gunter has been publishing on asbestos and asbestiform mineralogy for well over a decade.[1]

Gunter has testified for talc companies that have been dragged into mesothelioma litigation, based upon testing he conducted for Colgate-Palmolive [Colgate], starting in 2011.  In his testimony, Gunter has acknowledged that University employees and laboratories were involved in testing Colgate-Palmolive’s Cashmere Bouquet talcum powder for asbestos content and contamination. In addition to compensating Gunter, Colgate and others have contributed to the University of Idaho, and provided support for Gunter’s student assistant, Mr. Matthew Sanchez.

In a recent New York trial court ruling, Justice Peter H. Moulton refused a motion to quash plaintiff’s subpoena served on the University of Idaho, designed to obtain evidence to show that Colgate-Palmolive Company’s gifts to the University affected research that has become relevant to their claims that Colgate’s talcum powder was contaminated with asbestos. LoGiudice v. American Talc Co., No. 190253/2014, 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2360, (N.Y. Sup., N.Y. Cty., June 20, 2016).

The plaintiffs based their lawsuit on the conjecture that the exposure to Colgate-Palmolive’s talc must contain asbestos because the talc caused mesothelioma.  Somehow idiopathic mesothelioma and occult asbestos exposure magically disappear in the plaintiffs’ worldview.

The plaintiffs’ vacuous and circular arguments supposedly thus made their claim of financial bias relevant.  Plaintiff’s mesothelioma must have been caused by cosmetic talc, but Gunter’s and Sanchez’s test results found no asbestos in the talc the tested. Therefore, the test results were skewed by financial bias. There is no suggestion in Justice Moultin’s opinion to suggest that there was any error, omission, or misconduct involved in the analytical testing conducted by Professor Gunter and his assistant.

Without much real analysis, Justice Moulton found the subpoena-based inquiry into financial influence relevant and proper.  Gunter had testified about asbestos contamination in Cashmere Bouquet and conducted research, published articles, and given speeches[2] on the subject. With minor modifications to the plaintiffs’ subpoena, he denied Colgate’s motion to quash, and allowed the plaintiffs proceed with their investigation. What the disinterested observer might well miss is that Gunter’s views were well formed, articulated, and published in advance of his retention by Colgate in litigation.

Professor Gunter thus represents an example of a litigant’s (Colgate’s) seeking out a highly qualified scientist, with relevant expertise, in part based upon his previously stated views. To be sure, his testing results of the particular talc were not done and available until commissioned by Colgate, but Gunter’s sound views about what would count as an asbestos fiber, based upon mineralogical, scientific criteria (rather than arbitrary legal, regulatory criteria) were well known in advance of retention.


[1] See, e.g., B. D. McNamee, Mickey E. Gunter & C. Viti, “Asbestiform talc from a talc mine near Talcville, New York, U.S.A.:  composition, morphology, and genetic relationships with amphiboles,” Canadian Mineralogist (2016 in press); Bryan R. Bandli & Mickey E. Gunter, “Examination of asbestos standard reference materials, amphibole particles of differing morphology, and phase discrimination from talc ores using scanning electron microscopy and transmitted electron backscatter diffraction,” 20 Microscopy and Microanalysis 1805 (2014); B. D. McNamee & Mickey E. Gunter, “Compositional analysis and morphological relationships of amphiboles, talc, and other minerals found in the talc deposits from the Gouverneur Mining District, New York,” 61 The Microscope 147 ((2013) (part one); 62 The Microscope  3 (2014) (part two); Bryan R. Bandli & Mickey E. Gunter, “Mineral identification using electron backscatter diffraction from unpolished specimens:  Applications for rapid asbestos identification,” 61 The Microscope 37 (2013); M. R. Van Baalen, Brooke T. Mossman, Mickey E. Gunter & C.A. Francis, “Environmental geology of Belvidere Mt., Vermont,” in Westerman, D.S. and Lathrop, A.S. eds., Guidebook to Field Trips in Vermont and adjacent regions of New Hampshire and New York.  New England Intercollegiate Geological Conference, 101st Annual Meeting, B11-23 (2009); Mickey E. Gunter, “Asbestos sans mineralogy,”  5 Elements 141 (2009); D. M. Levitan, J. M. Hammarstrom, Mickey E. Gunter, R. R. Seal II, I. M. Chou & N. M. Piatak, “Mineralogy of mine waste at the Vermont Asbestos Group mine, Belvidere Mountain, Vermont,” 94 American Mineralogist 1063 (2009); Mickey E. Gunter, E. Belluso & A. Mottana, “Amphiboles:  Environmental and health concerns.  In Amphiboles:  Crystal Chemistry, Occurrences, and Health Concerns,” 67 Reviews in Mineralogy & Geochemistry 453 (2007).

[2] See, e.g., Mickey Gunter, Matthew Sanchez & Richard Van Orden, “Fibrous talc (ribbon talc/”kinky” talc),” at Talc Methods Expert Panel Meeting, United States Pharmacopeial Convention, Rockville, Maryland (June 28, 2016).

Mens Rea Defense – Good Heart (?) and Empty Head

July 11th, 2016

Extreme Carelessness Versus Gross Negligence

The case of Hilary Clinton offers an interesting fact set for exploring jurisprudential questions about the differences among intentional, reckless, and negligent misconduct. Of course, Clinton’s malfeasance, regardless of the attributed mens rea, has received a good deal of publicity, and ultimately, there should be an exemplary factual record, which can be used to explore the different culpable states of mind.

In her column yesterday, Maureen Dowd captured how many rational United States voters must feel about the irrationality of our national politics, and the Clinton email scandal.[1]  James Comey, Director of the FBI, detailed the facts that would probably require President Obama to fire Hilary Clinton if she were still Secretary of State in his administration.  Instead, the President is endorsing Clinton to be his successor. Of course, Obama could put the nation at ease, however, by revealing that he never allowed Clinton to have access to REALLY confidential information because he just did not trust her. Perhaps that might improve public perception of his judgment while exculpating her.

Dowd was commenting upon Comey’s conclusion that Hillary Clinton’s use of email for State Department confidential and classified communications, over her own, private e-mail server to handle work-related communications was “extremely careless.” See James B. Comey, “Statement by FBI Director on the Investigation of Secretary Hillary Clinton’s Use of a Personal E-Mail System,” FBI Press Office, Washington, D.C. (July 05, 2016). In his press conference, however, Comey announced that the FBI would not recommend criminal charges because in his view Ms. Clinton’s conduct was not proscribed by pertinent statutes. And of course, Obama’s Attorney General, Loretta Lynch, fresh from a tête-à-tête with Ms. Clinton’s husband, who had nominated her to the position of United States Attorney back in 1999, agreed with Comey in a New York minute.

Comey framed his political indictment of extreme carelessness in a way to suggest that although Clinton might not be worthy of a security clearance, she should not be prosecuted:

“Although we did not find clear evidence that Secretary Clinton or her colleagues intended to violate laws governing the handling of classified information, there is evidence that they were extremely careless in their handling of very sensitive, highly classified information.”

Comey acknowledged that “there is evidence of potential violations of the statutes regarding the handling of classified information,” but offered his judgment “that no reasonable prosecutor would bring such a case.”[2]

But why is it that no reasonable prosecute would indict? This is where the Clinton scandal raises questions about inferring mental states and becomes jurisprudentially interesting.

Comey was clear that Clinton had put confidential, classified information at risk, by using her email on foreign soil, where sophisticated, “hostile actors” could have hacked her account without her being able to certify otherwise. Cybersecurity experts were less “politic,” and more willing to go beyond “possible” to claim “probable” hacking had taken place. Clinton had no full-time cyber-security professional monitoring her email system.[3]

Comey ended his performance by claiming that only the facts mattered; opinions were irrelevant. “Just the facts, ma’am.” But his judgments about reasonable prosecutors, obstruction, and disloyalty are not facts; they are opinions, and particularly, they are opinions that involve inferences about mental states, mens rea, and motives.

Comey offered precedent, in the form of prior prosecutions, which according to Comey, all involved elements of intentional conduct, including willful mishandling of classified information, indications of disloyalty to the United States, or efforts to obstruct justice. And Comey just did not see those elements in the Hilary Clinton case.

Were the inferences to these putatively missing elements truly unwarranted? Was Comey really looking or was this a case of cognitive bias or willful blindness? After all, Comey was compelled “on the facts,” to acknowledge that there were over 100 Clinton emails with classified information turned over to the State Department, and a few additional emails found with classified information, which were not turned over to State.  Of course no one could say what was in the emails that had been spoliated by Clinton or under her supervision.

Clinton clearly had attempted to obstruct the investigation into her unlawful conduct. She repeatedly lied about her motive for eschewing State Department regulations and protocols. She destroyed evidence.  She lied about the content of the emails and their security status. Clinton’s disloyalty to the country was manifest. She adopted a private, unsecured email system not only for her own convenience, for the needs of her own future political candidacy, and so that she could provide access to confidents not in the government, such as unapproved actors, Sidney Blumenthal and William J. Clinton.

Given that the email server belonged to the Clintons, not the State Department, former President Bill Clinton, could check into his Chappaqua, New York, system to catch up on the latest diplomatic initiatives before he set off to give a six-figure speech to foreign potentates. Bill Clinton claimed he does not send emails, but that does not mean he does not read emails, on which may have been blind copied. How convenient to bcc Bill on emails sent to Barack, to get keep him “in the loop”?

Comey’s suggestion that Clinton did not meet the mens rea requirement of the pertinent criminal statute would not seem to hold up under scrutiny. The provisions of the federal criminal code define punishable conduct for “gathering, transmitting, or losing defense information.” 18 U.S. Code § 793. This provision does require intent or gross negligence, which Comey seemed to suggest were absent or not readily proven in the Clinton case. And yet, Clinton intended to gather and transmit defense information contrary to law.  Actually “losing information” is not a required element, although even there, Clinton lost information that sat on her server when she chose to destroy it rather than maintain it, as was legally required.

As for gross negligence, Comey himself made the case, although he characterized Clinton’s conduct as “extremely careless.” There does not seem to be any meaningful distinction between gross negligence and extreme carelessness. The current Wikipedia entry for gross negligence illustrates the subtle, sometimes evanescent distinctions among “negligence,” “gross negligence,” and “recklessness”:

 “Gross negligence is legally culpable carelessness that shows a conscious and voluntary disregard of the need to use reasonable care, and likely to cause foreseeable grave injury or harm. The difference between “negligence” and “gross negligence” may be subjective since it is a matter of degree. Negligence is the opposite of diligence, or being careful. The standard of ordinary negligence is what conduct deviates from the proverbial “reasonable person.” By analogy, if somebody has been grossly negligent, that means they have fallen so far below the ordinary standard of care that one can expect, to warrant the label of being “gross.” Prosser and Keeton describe gross negligence as being “the want of even slight or scant care”, and note it as having been described as a lack of care that even a careless person would use. They further note that while some jurisdictions equate the culpability of gross negligence with that of recklessness, most simply differentiate it from simple negligence in its degree.[1]

Jurisprudes struggle to define gross negligence and distinguish it from ordinarily negligence and recklessness. Consensus and precise definitions are hard to find, and some of the case law definitions appear vacuous or circular. In many analyses, the grossness of someone’s negligence may be something recognized when encountered, much like Potter Stewart’s obscenities. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).

The recent litigation over the 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, caused by the oil rig, Deepwater Horizon, illustrates the struggle to define gross negligence:

“Gross negligence is a nebulous term that is defined in a multitude of ways, depending on the legal context and the jurisdiction. However, when the “cluster of ideas” surrounding “gross negligence” is considered, the prevailing notion is that gross negligence differs from ordinary negligence in terms of degree, and both are different in kind from reckless, wanton, and willful misconduct.

[…]

Gross negligence, like ordinary negligence, requires only objective, not subjective, proof. While ordinary negligence is a failure to exercise the degree of care that someone of ordinary prudence would have exercised in the same circumstances, gross negligence is an extreme departure from the care required under the circumstances or a failure to exercise even slight care. Thus, the United States contends that gross negligence differs from ordinary negligence only in degree, not in kind.”

In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in Gulf of Mexico, 2014 WL 4375933 (E.D. La. Sept. 4, 2014).

Some commentators have argued that reckless and careless are synonyms.[4] This argument ignores important distinctions drawn in the criminal law, and in the law of torts. Perhaps the clearest distinction between recklessness and negligence is set out in the Model Penal Code’s definitions of the kinds of culpability.  MPC  § 2.02 (2). Subsection (c) defines “recklessly” as follows:

“A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.”

And Subsection (d) defines “negligently” as follows:

“A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor’s failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.”

So both recklessness and (criminal) negligence involve “gross” deviations, but recklessness requires a greater subjective awareness, whereas negligence can be shown using an objective, “reasonable person” test.

Given Comey’s recitation of “just the facts,” and adding in his Capitol Hill testimony, it would seem that a rookie prosecutor could indict and convict Ms. Clinton of intentional or grossly negligent mishandling of confidential information, as well as a conspiracy to cover it up.

Of course, there might be good political reasons not to indict Clinton, including that it might cause the election of Donald Trump, but that would require adverting to facts beyond the Clinton case.


[1] Maureen Dowd, “The Clinton Contamination,” New York Times (July 10, 2016).

[2] See Daniel Fisher, “FBI Calls Hillary’s E-Mail Habits ‘Extremely Careless’ But Not Criminal,” Forbes (July 5, 2016).

[3] David E. Sanger, “Hillary Clinton’s Email Was Probably Hacked, Experts Say,” New York Times (July 6, 2016).

[4] See Craig Bannister, “A President Can’t Be RecklessNational Review (July 2016).

Lawyer and Economist Expert Witnesses Fail the t-Test

July 7th, 2016

Chad L. Staller is a lawyer and James Markham is an economist.  The two testify frequently in litigation.  They are principals in a litigation-mill known as the Center for Forensic Economic Studies (CFES), which has been a provider of damages opinions-for-hire for decades.

According to its website, the CFES is:

“a leading provider of expert economic analysis and testimony. Our economists and statisticians consult on matters arising in litigation, with a focus on the analysis of economic loss and expert witness testimony on damages.

We assist with discovery, uncover key data, critique opposing claims and produce clear, credible reports and expert testimony. Attorneys and their clients have relied on our expertise in thousands of cases in jurisdictions across the country.”

Modesty was never CFES’s strong suit. CFES was founded by Chad Staller’s father, the late Jerome M. Staller, who infused the run-away inflation of the early 1980s into his reports for plaintiffs in personal injury actions. When this propensity for inflation brought in a large volume of litigation consulting, Staller brought on Brian P. Sullivan.  The CFES website notes that Sullivan’s “courtroom demeanor was a model of modesty and good humor, yet he was known to be merciless when cross examined by an opposing attorney.” My personal recollection is that Sullivan sweated profusely on cross-examination. In one case, in which I cross-examined him, Sullivan had added several figures incorrectly to the plaintiff’s detriment.  My cross-examination irked the trial judge (Judge Dowling, who was easily irked) to the point that he interrupted me to ask why I was wasting time to point out an error that favored the defense. The question allowed me to give a short summation about how I thought the jury might want to know that the witness, Sullivan, had such difficulty in adding uncomplicated numbers.

In Butt v. v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, 2016 WL 3365772 (E.D. Pa. June 16, 2016) [cited as Butt], plaintiffs, women union members sued for alleged disparate treatment, which treatment supposedly caused them to have lower incomes than male union members. To support their claims, the women produced reports prepared by CFES’s Chad Staller and James Markham. Counsel for the union challenged the admissibility of the proffered opinions under Rule 702. The magistrate judge sustained the Rule 702 challenges, in an opinion that questioned the reliability and ability of the challenged putative expert witnesses.[1]

Staller and Markham apparently had proffered a “t-test,” which, in their opinion, showed a statistically significant disparity in male and female hours worked, “not attributable to chance.” Butt at *1. Staller and Markham failed, however, to explain or justify their use of the t-test.  The sample size in their analysis included 17 women and 388 men on average across ten years. The magistrate judge noted serious reservations over the CFES analysis’s failure to specify how many men or women were employed in any given year. Plaintiffs’ counsel improvidently attempted to support the CFES analysis by adverting to the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence (3d ed. 2011), which properly notes that the t-test is designed for small samples, but also issues the caveat that “[a] t-test is not appropriate for small samples drawn from a population that is not normal.” Butt at *1 n.2. The CFES reports, submitted without statistical analysis output, apparently did not attempt to justify the assumption of normality; nor did they proffer a non-parametric analysis.

Putting aside the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses’ failure to explain and justify its use of the t-test, the magistrate judge took issue with the assumption that a comparison of average salaries between the genders was an appropriate analysis in the first place. Butt at *2.

First, the CFES reports assigned damages beyond the years used in their data analysis, which ended in 2012. This extrapolation was especially speculative unwarranted given that union carpenter working hours were trending downward after 2009. Butt at *3. Second, and even more seriously, the magistrate judge saw that no useful comparison could be made between male and female salaries without taking into account several important additional variables such as their individual skills, the extent that individual carpenters solicited employment, or used referral systems, or accepted out-of-town employment. Butt at *3.[2] Without an appropriate multivariate analysis, the CFES reports could not conclude that the discrepancy in hours worked was caused by, rather than merely correlated with, gender. Butt at *4.[3]


[1] See Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 350 F.3d 316, 322 (3d Cir. 2003) (affirming exclusion of “speculative and unreliable” expert evidence).

[2] citing Stair v. Lehigh Valley Carpenters Local Union No. 600 of United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, No. Civ. A. 91-1507, 1993 WL 235491, at *7, *18 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 1993) (Huyett, J.), aff’d, 43 F.3d 1463 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Many variables determine the number of hours worked by a carpenter: whether the carpenter solicits employment, whether he or she uses the referral system, whether an employer asks for that carpenter by name, whether the carpenter will accept out of town employment, and whether the carpenter has the skills requested by an employer when that employer calls the Union for a referral.”

[3] Interesting cases cited by the magistrate judge in support included Molthan v. Temple University, 778 F.2d 955, 963 (3d Cir. 1985) (“Because the considerations affecting promotion decisions may differ greatly from one department to another, statistical evidence of a general underrepresentation of women in the position of full professor adds little to a disparate treatment claim.”); Riding v. Kaufmann’s Dep’t Store, 220 F.Supp. 2d 442, 459 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (“Plaintiff’s statistical evidence is mildly interesting, but she does not put the data in context (how old were the women?) [or] tell us what to do with it or what inferences should be gathered from it…”); Brown v. Cost Co., No. Civ. A. 03-224 ERIE, 2006 WL 544296, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2006) (excluding statistical evidence proffered in support of claims of disparate treatment).

National Academies’ Teaching Modules on Scientific Policy Issues

June 30th, 2016

Today, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine announced its release of nine teaching modules to help public policy decision makers and students in professional schools understand the role of science in policy decision making.[1] The modules were developed by university faculty members for  the use of other faculty who want to help their students appreciate the complexity and nuances of the evidence for and against scientific claims.

A group within the Academies’ Committee on Science, Technology and the Law supervised the development of the teaching modules, which are now publicly available at the Academies’ website. The Committee was chaired by Paul Brest, former dean and professor emeritus (active), Stanford Law School, and Saul Perlmutter, Franklin W. and Karen Weber Dabby Chair, University of California, Berkeley, and senior scientist, E.O. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. The Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation and the National Biomedical Research Foundation sponsored the development of the modules.

The modules use case studies to illustrate basic scientific and statistical principles involved in contemporary scientific issues that have significant policy implications. The modules are designed to help future policy and decision makers understand and evaluate the scientific evidence that they will doubtlessly encounter. To date, nine modules have been developed and released, in the hope that they will serve as references and examples for future teaching modules.

The nine modules prepared to date are:

Models: Scientific Practice in Context

prepared by:
– Elizabeth Fisher, Professor of Environmental Law, Faculty of Law and Corpus Christi College, Oxford University
– Pasky Pascual, Environmental Protection Agency
– Wendy Wagner, Joe A. Worsham Centennial Professor,  University of Texas at Austin School of Law

The Interpretation of DNA Evidence: A Case Study in Probabilities

prepared by:

– David H. Kaye, Associate Dean for Research and Distinguished Professor, The Pennsylvania State University (Penn State Law)

Translating Science into Policy: The Role of Decision Science

prepared by:

– Paul Brest, Former Dean and Professor Emeritus (active), Stanford Law School

Placing a Bet: A New Therapy for Parkinson’s Disease

prepared by:

– Kevin W. Sharer, Senior Lecturer, Harvard Business School, Harvard University

Shale Gas Development

prepared by:

– John D. Graham, Dean, School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University
– John A. Rupp, Adjunct Instructor, School of Public and Environmental Affairs, and Senior Research Scientist, Indiana Geological Survey, Indiana University
– Adam V. Maltese, Associate Professor of Science Education, School of Education, and Adjunct Faculty in Department of Geological Sciences, Indiana University

Drug-Induced Birth Defects: Exploring the Intersection of Regulation, Medicine, Science, and Law

prepared by:

– Nathan A. Schachtman, Lecturer in Law, Columbia Law School

Vaccines

prepared by:

– Arturo Casadevall, Professor and Chair, W. Harry Feinstone Department of Molecular Microbiology and Immunology, Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health

Forensic Pattern Recognition Evidence

prepared by:

– Simon A. Cole, Professor, Department of Criminology, Law, and Society, Director, Newkirk Center for Science and Society, University of California, Irvine
– Alyse Berthental, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Criminology, Law, and Society, University of California, Irvine
– Jaclyn Seelagy, Scholar, PULSE (Program on Understanding Law, Science, and Evidence),  University of California, Los Angeles School of Law

Scientific Evidence of Factual Causation

prepared by:

– Steve C. Gold, Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law-Newark
– Michael D. Green, Williams Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law
– Joseph Sanders, A.A. White Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center


[1] SeeAcademies Release Educational Modules to Help Future Policymakers and Other Professional-School Students Understand the Role of Science in Decision Making” (June 30, 2016).

Whether to Conduct Depositions of Expert Witnesses

June 23rd, 2016

In a Litigation magazine article, Gregory Joseph sets out some strong reasons to consider for not conducting depositions of expert witnesses under the revised 2010 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). See Gregory P. Joseph, “The Temptation to Depose Every Expert,” 40 Litigation 35 (Winter 2014) [cited below as Joseph]. Joseph points out that FRCP 26(a)(2)(B) requires parties to disclose, for all retained expert witnesses, “all opinions” and the “full factual basis” of all their opinions, among other things. The rule is exacting. All opinions includes “a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them.” FRCP 26(a)(2)(B)(i). And a full factual basis includes “the facts or data considered by the witness in forming” all of the opinions disclosed in the report. FRCP 26(a)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).

Joseph argues that the breadth of the required disclosure, combined with sanctions for retained expert witnesses’s attempting to testify beyond the four corners of their reports, should give lawyers sufficient assurances in many instances to forego conducting depositions of expert witnesses.

Joseph notes that the FRCP creates a presumptive mandatory sanction of exclusion for undisclosed expert testimony. FRCP 37(c)(1).[1]  Joseph offers other arguments beyond the supposed comfort given by the “four corners” rule set out in the FRCP. Joseph at 36-37. First, the deposition may “reopen” discovery by giving expert witnesses opportunities to expand upon the four corners of their reports. Although some courts will limit what expert witnesses can throw over the transom at depositions, a supervising magistrate or district judge may not regard the expansion upon the disclosures in the report as “sandbagging,” and thus fail exclude the arguably new opinions or bases. Joseph cites a few cases in which courts condemned the sandbagging of counsel by the offering of new opinions in depositions, but points out that exclusion is this circumstance is highly discretionary. The court is not required to exclude, and it may permit the new material, or allow the new material with an inadequate amount of additional time in deposition. So taking the deposition has risks.

Joseph argues also that depositions may educate expert witnesses about intended trial cross-examination, and help adversary counsel better prepare direct examination and anticipatory rebuttal. Furthermore, the new protections afforded expert witnesses from discovery into drafts of reports and most communications with retaining counsel take away one of the previous reasons to conduct depositions.

To be sure, some additional areas of discovery may be covered by interrogatories, Rule 34 document requests, or Rule 45 subpoenas directly to the expert witnesses. These non-deposition methods of discovery, however, will not reach valuable topics of discovery such as oral communications between retained expert witnesses and professional colleagues, consulting expert witnesses, the retaining lawyers’ clients, and other persons. The suggested alternative discovery methods also suffer in that they will provoke canned answers, written by counsel, and not the ingenuous, unrehearsed responses of expert witnesses required to give answers directly and without resort to  “privileged” consultation with retaining counsel.

The revised FRCP carve out important areas of inquiry from the new protections against discovery into draft reports and with counsel. Counsel still are permitted to inquire into compensation, the retaining attorneys’ provision of “facts or data” considered by the witnesses, and retaining attorneys’ identification of assumptions “relied” upon by the witnesses. Invoices can, of course, be subpoenaed, but often oral examination is required to discover whether the invoices have been paid, whether they are contingent, or whether payment flows to the personal benefit of the expert witnesses. Inquiring into what “facts or data” were provided by retaining counsel can be attempted by written discovery, but the written responses will likely be hedged and unclear, and the responses will not distinguish which lawyer-provided “facts or data” were actually relied upon.

The FRCP clearly allow discovery into retaining attorneys’ provision of assumptions relied upon by expert witnesses, but clear, unrehearsed answers to questions about what was assumed and relied upon, as opposed to merely considered, are not likely to be forthcoming in written discovery. Furthermore, if there will be any fair opportunity to explore the significance of relying upon counsel’s assumptions, only a deposition will likely allow for the extemporaneous, first-person expression of expert witnesses’ opinions. Questions into expert witnesses’ opinions based upon hypothetical questions that contradict the assumptions given, or into opinions about the level of confidence or knowledge witnesses have about the correctness of the assumptions, are likely to be effective only in face-to-face encounters.

There are important additional reasons for taking expert witness depositions, not addressed in Joseph’s article. Litigation-savvy expert witnesses will often glibly assert that they have “considered” all the relevant studies, data, and facts. If written discovery is propounded to inquire whether a study omitted from the “consideration” list in the FRCP report was not considered, the study, if meaningful, will be added to the list in the written response with a feeble excuse that it was inadvertently omitted from the list. And the omission will likely be judged harmless because the party seeking discovery obviously knew about the omitted study already. Written discovery into what studies, data, or facts were considered but not relied upon will also yield highly rehearsed answers, and interrogatories will not permit inquiries into the fine details of key studies.

The pertinent sections of the FRCP do not require expert witness reports to distinguish what the witnesses have considered from what they have actually relied upon. Written discovery could be propounded, but again, it will not likely yield clear answers such as might be had with follow up inquiry into what was considered but not relied upon, and why was reliance rejected. The deposition upon oral examination has the benefit of permitting follow up questions into why some studies were relied upon for some parts but not others, or were considered but completely excluded from actual reliance. The opportunity to field incoherent, inconsistent rationales for inclusions and exclusions that establish expert witness cherry picking will be lost without the face-to-face encounter allowed by oral examination.

With some courts engaged in retrograde refusal to apply Rule 702 as enacted, some expert witnesses have been encouraged to employ vague, invalid, and unreliable methodologies, such as the so-called “weight of the evidence” approach. Oral examination will be necessary to establish expert witnesses’ weighting considerations, their inclusion and exclusion criteria, and to test their consistency in applying these considerations and criteria, across the entire evidentiary base for conclusions.

Concessions to Be Obtained

Written discovery is not well suited to inquire into general principles of interpreting data and studies, data integrity and validity, and validity of inference.  Interrogatories are too difficult to draft in sufficient detail to permit setting up an examination that will lead to the disqualification of the expert witness under Rule 702.  Obtaining concise, clear concessions about basic methodological principles is crucial to structuring persuasive cross-examinations.  Of course, if the deponent balks at accepting generally accepted principles, then this testimony is filed under Rule 702 motion, rather than trial cross-examination.

Furthermore, written discovery is poorly suited to identify whether expert witnesses have subject-matter weaknesses.  Interrogatories are the wrong discovery tool to conduct pop-quizzes on arcane statistical and scientific methodologies. Lawyers rightfully do not want to get into show-game style quizzes to test expert witnesses’ understanding of the esoteric, but important, methodologies used in the studies relied upon, in front of a jury. Rule 26 reports rarely announce that witnesses have had no meaningful training in statistics and that they have no idea what assumptions were made in various statistical analyses or tests in the studies that they have embraced and relied upon for their opinions.

Expert witnesses have social and professional connections not always apparent from their curriculum vitae, their Rule 26 reports, or their websites. Expert witnesses are not likely, for instance, to disclose that they are Marxists, who believe that corporations are evil and mercenary, and cannot be trusted to tell the truth in litigation.[2]

As noted, the FRCP requires disclosure of facts or data considered, which disclosure is usually inadequate to permit distinguishing what was actually relied upon in forming opinions. But what about opinions considered or relied upon? FRCP does not address reliance upon opinions; nor does Rule 703. Expert witnesses may contend that their opinions are not “based upon” others’ opinions, but that their opinions are strengthened and corroborated by the opinions of others. The FRCP do not specifically call for disclosure of opinions relied upon by retained expert witnesses, and adversary counsel can be trusted to argue that there were no obligations to disclose opinions or the identity of “authoritative” treatises and publications. If there is no entitlement to disclosure, there can be no surprise and prejudice.

Interpreting the scope of the report may not be as clear as Joseph suggests.  Rule 26 reports usually contain some opinions with sufficient breadth and generality that foregoing depositions becomes a game of Russian roulette.  Trial judges may not look kindly upon “scope of the report” objections, made at trial, when the objecting counsel had the opportunity to conduct an examination, and the report language is sufficiently broad to intimate the witness’s opinion at trial. Judges seem to have great hindsight vision, and they may well distrust counsel’s objections as a different sort of sandbagging. An entire strategy of restraint may be sunk by a quick, discretionary ruling on “scope of the report,” which often will favor the proponent of the witness.

Joseph is correct that many depositions fail to accomplish much, but such failures are not the result of how wonderful the revised FRCP are.  Failed depositions are more likely to result from the lack of preparation, creativity and knowledge of counsel in carrying out coherent, effective depositions.


[1] See Primus v. United States, 389 F.3d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 2004); Vaughn v. City of Lebanon, 18 F.App’x 252, 263 (6th Cir. 2001); Musser v. Gentiva Health Services, 356 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2004). See also Design Strategy, Inc. v. Davis, 469 F.3d 284, 296 (2d Cir. 2006) (characterizing exclusion as discretionary, but upholding district court’s exclusion).

[2] Such as may be seen with expert witnesses who belong to the Committees of Correspondence for Democracy and Socialism, a branch of the Communist Party USA, formed in 1992, after the demise of the Soviet Union.

The IARC Announces Water Causes Cancer

June 18th, 2016

Well, drinking water very hot, or other scalding beverages, probably does cause cancer. Earlier this week, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) issued a press release that one of its working groups had reviewed the data on the carcinogencity of coffee, maté, and very hot beverages, and concluded that maté, which is often served very hot, “probably” causes esophageal cancer. IARC Press Release N° 244, “IARC Monographs evaluate drinking coffee, maté, and very hot beverages” (June 15, 2016). Very hot beverages were rated 2A, for their probably causing human esophageal cancer.

The good news is that “probably” does not mean “more likely than not” in IARC-speak, and the working group was evaluating hazard not risk.[1] IARC classifications do not attempt to quantify the magnitude of risk that may result from exposure to a classified “hazard.” Id. at Note to the Editor. Because all empirical propositions have a probability of being true, somewhere between 0 and 100%, (with P ≠ 0; P ≠ 100%), the IARC classifications of “probably” causing cancer are probably not particularly meaningful.  Everything “probably” causes cancer in this sense. See Ed Yong, “Beefing With the World Health Organization’s Cancer Warnings,” The Atlantic (Oct 26, 2015).

The IARC group’s evaluation of “very hot drinks” accords with the World Health Organization’s Technical Report Series 916 on Diet, Nutrition and the Prevention of Chronic Diseases, which recommends against consumption of scalding hot temperatures. See Anahad O’Connor, “Coffee May Protect Against Cancer, W.H.O. Concludes,” N.Y. Times (June 15, 2016)[O’Connor]. As though people, other than McDonald’s coffee drinkers, needed such a recommendation. The IARC group found no conclusive evidence to implicate drinking cold maté, or maté at temperatures below scalding levels.

An IARC Decision We Can Like a Latte

The Working Group found no conclusive evidence for a carcinogenic effect of drinking coffee, and placed coffee in its category 3, “not classifiable” with respect to carcinogenicity.[2] The working group’s evaluation included over 1,000 observational and experimental studies, including randomized trials, and found no evidence to support the claims that coffee causes human cancer. The IARC also found a good deal of evidence supporting the claim that drinking coffee reduces the risk of various human cancers.

There is a Group 4, for exposures probably not carcinogenic in humans, but in its 45 years of evaluations, the IARC has found only one substance on Planet Earth, which does not cause cancer:  caprolactam.  Perhaps after another 1,000 studies, coffee will reach this exalted category. For now, coffee is unclassifiable with “inadequate” evidence of human carcinogenicity in the IARC’s view.

The New York Times, not particularly expertly, and without supporting citations, declared that the evidence for coffee’s health benefits could not establish actual causation of benefit because the data came from epidemiologic studies.  See O’Conner. This would not be the first time that the New York Times made up things.

In 1991, the IARC evaluated coffee drinking as a “possible” human carcinogen (Group 2B), based upon limited evidence of an association with urinary bladder cancer in case-control studies, and some evidence in experimental animals.[3] This year’s evaluation of coffee as Group 3 thus represents a rare reversal of opinion, in the face of additional evidence, from the IARC.


[1] The IARC Preamble definition of probable reveals that “probable” does not mean greater than 50%. See alsoThe IARC Process is Broken” (May 4, 2016).

[2] See Dana Loomis, Kathryn Guyton, Yann Grosse, Béatrice Lauby-Secretan, Fatiha El Ghissassi, Véronique Bouvard, Lamia Benbrahim-Tallaa, Neela Guha, Heidi Mattock, Kurt Straifon behalf of the IARC Monograph Working Group, “Carcinogenicity of drinking coffee, mate, and very hot beverages,” Lancet Oncology (2016 in press).

[3] IARC, “Coffee, tea, mate, methylxanthines and methylglyoxal,” 51 IARC Monogr Eval Carcinog Risks Humans 1 (1991).

The Webb of Unsophistication in Products Liability Law

May 29th, 2016

The Heart of the Matter

The classic early cases in products liability law were about consumers hurt by consumer products, sold by manufacturers or dealers directly to consumers. The key component of these cases was inequality of bargaining power, of knowledge about latent defects or hazards, and of control over the discovery of latent hazards or defects. American products liability law was created around consumer products.  Just think of Henningsen, Escola, and MacPherson.[1]  These were all consumer products for which the rhetoric about inequality of bargaining, knowledge, and control over design, manufacturing, and latent hazards sometimes makes sense. The paradigmatic model for products liability, however, frequently does not work for the three-way relationship of sales of products to large industrial employers. The model especially does not work when the product is a raw material used throughout a factory, or incorporated into another product.

Many courts have failed to come to grips with the inadequacy of the consumer model for products liability cases in instances of occupational harm to industrial employees.  Courts have been trying to ram this square peg into a round hole since the early asbestos litigation (which perhaps made some sense because there was inequality between Johns Manville and most vendees), but makes no sense when John Manville is itself the purchaser.

The Tangled Webb in California Law

The Webb case received some attention after the California Court of Appeals reversed a trial court’s entry of JNOV for defendant Special Electric on the so-called sophisticated intermediary defense.  SeeCalifornia Supreme Court Set To Untangle Webb” (July 7, 2013); “Big Blue & The Sophisticated User and Intermediary Defenses” (Sept. 27, 2014); G. Jeff Coons, What a Tangled Webb We Weave: Court Imposes Failure to Warn Liability On Supplier to Johns-Manville” (April 2013). Special Electric petition for review, and eventually the California Supreme Court called for full briefing and oral argument in the Webb case.

The wheels of justice grind slowly in California. Special Electric filed its opening brief on the merits, on September 10, 2013. Webb’s widow answered in December 2013, and Special Electric replied in February 2014. Several amici curiae joined the fray in April 2014. Mark A. Behrens filed a brief on behalf of the Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc., Chamber of Commerce, NFIB Small Business Legal Center, and American Chemistry Council. The Pacific Legal Foundation also filed, as did Elementis Chemicals Inc.

After mulling over the briefs for two years, the California Supreme Court heard argument on March 1, 2016, and then in surprisingly short order, affirmed the intermediate appellate, earlier this week. The Supreme Court’s ruling upheld a Court of Appeal’s decision that reversed a judgment for defendant Special Electric, based upon a jury verdict in favor of William Webb, who was exposed to crocidolite sold by Special Electric, and which caused him to develop mesothelioma in 2011. The Supreme Court’s opinion[2] held that sophisticated intermediary doctrine was a complete legal defense, even potentially for an asbestos supplier, but declined to apply it to the benefit of Special Electric, which had misrepresented facts about crocidolite and offered no evidence that its purchaser was sophisticated about crocidolite asbestos and its unique relationship with mesothelioma. [Slip opinion cited here as Webb.] Webb v. Special Elec. Co., Inc., 2016 BL 163642, Cal., No. S209927, 5/23/16).

The majority opinion[3] fortunately was able to separate the poorly framed and supported defense by Special Electric from the basic tenets of tort law and the sophisticated intermediary defense. To the extent that anyone doubted the validity of the sophisticated intermediary defense, the Webb Court formally adopted the doctrine as the law of California, as set out in the Second and Third Restatements of Tort Law. Webb at 15-16. According to the Court, a defendant may set up sophisticated intermediary doctrine as a complete defense, to failure to warn claims for known or knowable product risks, sounding in negligence or in strict liability, when the defendant supplier:

“(1) provides adequate warnings to the product’s immediate purchaser, or sells to a sophisticated purchaser that it knows is aware or should be aware of the specific danger, and

(2) reasonably relies on the purchaser to convey appropriate warnings to downstream users who will encounter the product.”

Webb at 16 (emphasis in original).[4]

As an affirmative defense, the defendant supplier must carry its burden of showing that it adequately warned the intermediary, or that it knew the intermediary knew or should have known of the specific hazard, and that it reasonably relied upon the purchaser to transmit warnings. Id.

On appeal, the California Supreme Court held that defendant Special Electric failed to preserve its entitlement to the sophisticated intermediary defense because “it never attempted to show that it actually or reasonably relied on Johns-Manville to warn end users. Nor did Special Electric request a jury instruction or verdict form question on the sophisticated intermediary doctrine.” Webb at 23.

Alternatively, on the assumption that Special Electric preserved the defense, the Court held that this defendant failed to establish the defense as a matter of law because:

“[a]lthough the record clearly shows Johns-Manville was aware of the risks of asbestos in general, no evidence established it knew about the particularly acute risks posed by the crocidolite asbestos Special Electric supplied. In addition, plaintiffs presented evidence that at least one Special Electric salesperson told customers crocidolite was safer than other types of asbestos fiber, when the opposite was true.”

Webb at 23.

The Webb Court reviewed the Tort Restatements’ embrace of the sophisticated intermediary defense in both the Second and Third editions.  The Webb Court noted that the Third Restatement demonstrated the continued validity and vitality of the defense, as had been expressed in the Section 388 of the Restatement Second of Torts.[5] The Court noted and followed the Third Restatement’s recitation of guiding considerations for invoking and sustaining the defense:

“There is no general rule as to whether one supplying a product for the use of others through an intermediary has a duty to warn the ultimate product user directly or may rely on the intermediary to relay warnings. The standard is one of reasonableness in the circumstances. Among the factors to be considered are the gravity of the risks posed by the product, the likelihood that the intermediary will convey the information to the ultimate user, and the feasibility and effectiveness of giving a warning directly to the user.”

Webb at 15 (citing Restatement 3d Torts, Products Liability, § 2, com. i, at p. 30.) Citing California precedent, the Webb Court noted that

“[t]he focus of the [sophisticated intermediary] defense . . . is whether the danger in question was so generally known within the trade or profession that a manufacturer should not have been expected to provide a warning specific to the group to which plaintiff belonged.”

Webb at 9-10 (quoting from Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. 43 Cal.4th 56, 72 (2008).  The pertinent legal test is whether a reasonable supplier would have known of the intermediary’s sophistication with respect to the relevant risk. Webb at 20.[6] Of course, the existence of a pervasive regulatory control of risk creation, detection, and mitigation in the workplace would count heavily in this objective test.  “Every person has a right to presume that every other perform his duty and obey the law.” Webb at 21 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).

The Restatement factors, however, did not support Special Electric’s invocation of the defense in a case involving:

(1) crocidolite asbestos, one of the most hazardous substances known,

(2) defendant’s affirmative and blatantly false misrepresentations of the relative safety of crocidolite relative to chrysotile asbestos,[7] and

(3) a complete failure of proof that the purchaser, Johns Manville, knew that crocidolite was especially hazardous with respect to the causation of mesothelioma.

Webb at 23-24. Factors one and two were givens for defense counsel, but factor three speaks to unnecessary coyness on the part of the defense.  Showing that Johns Manville was well aware of the extraordinarily great hazard of crocidolite would have been relatively easy to do from past transcripts, articles, speeches, and litigation conduct of the Johns Manville companies. Despite the extreme hazards from uncontrolled asbestos exposures, the Webb case explained that the sophisticated intermediary defense was not per se inapplicable to asbestos cases, and went so far as to disapprove an earlier California Court of Appeals decision that refused to apply the defense in the asbestos personal injury context when no warnings had been given.[8] “Sophistication obviates the need for warnings because a sophisticated purchaser already knows or should know of the relevant risks.” Webb at 17-18.

The Webb case acknowledged that defective design claims against raw material suppliers are incoherent and invalid, whether for the raw material itself, or for downstream design defect claims against for the product with the incorporated raw material. “[A] basic raw material such as sand, gravel, or kerosene cannot be defectively designed.” Webb at 11-12 (quoting from Restatement 3d Torts, Products Liability, § 5, com. c, at p. 134).[9]

The Webb Court also evinced a healthy disrespect for the notion that tort law is only about spreading risk and compensating injured persons. The Court acknowledged that in some instances, there were competing policies of compensating persons injured by products and “encouraging conduct that can feasibly be performed.” Webb at 2. The Court also acknowledged that there were hazards to warning when none was needed or when the absence of a warning would not be a legal cause of harm:

“Because sophisticated users already know, or should know, about the product’s dangers, the manufacturer’s failure to warn is not the legal cause of any harm. A sophisticated user’s knowledge is thus the equivalent of prior notice. The defense serves public policy, because requiring warnings of obvious or generally known product dangers could invite consumer disregard and contempt for warnings in general.”

Webb at 9 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the sophisticated intermediary defense balances the need for the worker-consumer’s safety with “the practical realities of supplying products.” Webb at 17.

The Webb decision puts California in line with the majority rule that recognizes the validity of the sophisticated intermediary defense, and embraces real-world truth that:

“[in] some cases, the buyer’s sophistication can be a substitute for actual warnings, but this limited exception only applies if the buyer was so knowledgeable about the material supplied that it knew or should have known about the particular danger.”

Webb at 17.[10] The Court noted and agreed with the Restatement Third’s observation that imposing liability upon raw material suppliers for failure to warn can be unduly and unfairly burdensome when such liability would require remote suppliers

“to develop expertise regarding a multitude of different end-products and to investigate the actual use of raw materials by manufacturers over whom the supplier has no control.”

Webb at 12 (quoting from Restatement 3d Torts, Products Liability, § 5, com. c, at p. 134).

Concurrence

Chief Justice Tani Gorre Cantil-Sakauye, along with Justice Ming W. Chin, concurred in the result, but dissented from the majority’s rationale as overly broad. The concurring justices insisted that a supplier reasonably relies upon its purchaser only when the purchaser has actual awareness of the product’s risks. Webb concurrence at 4. Even this stingier approach noted that one of the purpose of warnings is

“to enable the consumer or others who might come in contact with the product to choose not to expose themselves to the risks presented.”

Webb Concurrence at 3 (citing Restatement3d Torts, Products Liability, § 2, com. i, at p. 30).  In many sophisticated intermediary contexts involving occupational exposures to fumes, vapors, and dusts, workers (consumers) cannot appreciate whether they might come in contact with the product such that they have actual risks unless the sophisticated intermediary measures its specific workplace exposures, given its actual engineering, administrative, and person protection controls.

Commentary

The Webb Court failed to address in any meaningful form how Special Electric could discharge a duty to warn Mr. Webb directly, when it sold blue asbestos to Johns-Manville, which then incorporated that fiber, along with other recycled asbestos into transite pipes. To this extent, the Webb decision carries forward the glib belief in efficacy of warnings, without any evidence or critical thought.

It is hard to imagine an industrial purchaser that was unaware of the special hazards of crocidolite by 1970, and yet Special Electric apparently failed to offer evidence on the issue whether Johns-Manville had such awareness. A court might take judicial notice of Johns-Manville sophistication, but there is not even the suggestion that Special Electric attempted to supplement the vacuous record with a request for judicial notice.

If the California Supreme Court’s recitation of the facts of the case is correct, then we are left with an unflattering inference about Special Electric’s trial strategy and execution.  Perhaps Special Electric was coyly trying to avoid a downside outcome in which it was responsible for 99.99% of the verdict because its blue asbestos was by far the most important cause of Mr. Webb’s tragic disease, a disease that would have almost certainly been avoided had never had exposure to blue asbestos. The propensity of crocidolite to cause mesothelioma is orders of magnitude greater than chrysotile, which by itself may not even be a competent cause of the harm suffered by Mr. Webb.

In the final analysis, the Webb Court correctly adopted the sophisticated intermediary principle as an essential limit to tort liability, but denied its benefit to Special Electric.  The sophisticated intermediary doctrine should not, however, be conceived of as an affirmative defense.  The scope of the rule is defined by the rationale for its existence, and the sophisticated intermediary situation lies outside the realm and rationale of protecting, by warning, consumers against latent hazards.  It is time that courts recognize that much litigation brought to its doors is really the result of labor-management issues within the workplace, and not the doings or responsibility of remote suppliers of raw materials.


[1] See, e.g, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (holding that privity of contract did not bar suit and that product manufacturers could be liable to consumers for injuries); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P. 2d 436  (1944).

[2] See Steven Sellers, “California Ruling Defines Asbestos Supplier’s Duty to Warn,” BNA Product Safety & Liability Reporter (May 24, 2016).

[3] The majority opinion was written by Associate Justice Carol A. Corrigan, and joined by Associate Justices Kathryn Mickle Werdegar, Goodwin Liu, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar and Leondra R. Kruger.

[4] See also Webb at 2 (“Under the sophisticated intermediary doctrine, the supplier can discharge this duty if it conveys adequate warnings to the material’s purchaser, or sells to a sufficiently sophisticated purchaser, and reasonably relies on the purchaser to convey adequate warnings to others, including those who encounter the material in a finished product. Reasonable reliance depends on many circumstances, including the degree of risk posed by the material, the likelihood the purchaser will convey warnings, and the feasibility of directly warning end users.”); Webb at 6 (“[T]he sophisticated intermediary doctrine provides that a supplier can discharge its duty to warn if it provides adequate warnings, or sells to a sufficiently sophisticated buyer, and reasonably relies on the buyer to warn end users about the harm.”). Webb at 17 (“If a purchaser is so knowledgeable about a product that it should already be aware of the product’s particular dangers, the seller is not required to give actual warnings telling the buyer what it already knows.”).

[5] See Webb at 15 (“The drafters intended this comment to be substantively the same as section 388, comment n, of the Restatement Second of Torts.”) (citing Restatement 3d Torts, Products Liability, § 2, com. i, reporter’s note 5, at p. 96; Humble Sand & Gravel Inc. v. Gomez, 146 S.W.3d 170, 190 (Tex. 2004). See also Webb at 9 (citing Restatement 2d Torts, § 388 (b), com. k, at pp. 306-307) (“Courts have interpreted section 388, subdivision (b), to mean that if the manufacturer reasonably believes the user will know or should know about a given product’s risk”).

[6] Relevant considerations may include the general dissemination of knowledge of relevant risks, the intermediary’s knowledge of those risks, and the intermediary’s reputation for care. Webb at 20.

[7] Webb at 3, 23.

[8] See Webb at 17-18 (disapproving of the holding in Stewart v. Union Carbide Corp., 190 Cal. App. 4th 23, 29-30 (2010)).

[9] See also Webb at 12 (quoting from Restatement 3d Torts, Products Liability, § 5, com. c, at p. 134) (“Inappropriate decisions regarding the use of such materials are not attributable to the supplier of the raw materials but rather to the fabricator that puts them to improper use.”).

[10] citing approvingly Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 334 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that raw asbestos supplier did not need to warn asbestos product manufacturer Fibreboard, which was “a sophisticated, expert, and knowledgeable manufacturer” of insulation products, about asbestos risks); Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 671 F. Supp. 1055, 1061-1062  (D. Md. 1987) (exculpating supplier when purchaser was a highly sophisticated manufacturer with knowledge from independent sources, as well as its suppliers), aff’d, 863 F.2d 1162 (4th Cir. 1988).

Credible Incredulity

May 19th, 2016

Has skepticism become a victim of political correctness and adversarial zeal?

In the last century, philosopher Bertrand Russell advanced intelligent skepticism against myriad enthusiams and mindless beliefs, political, religious, and pseudo-scientific. Russell saw unwarranted certainty as a serious intellectual offense:

“The fundamental cause of the trouble is that in the modern world the stupid are cocksure while the intelligent are full of doubt.”

Bertrand Russell, “The Triumph of Stupidity” (1933), Mortals and Others: Bertrand Russell’s American Essays, 1931-1935 , at 28 (1998).  When many American intellectuals were still in their love swoon over Stalin, Russell chastised the Soviet dictator for his betrayal of ideals and his enslavement of Eastern European. Stalinism’s certainty about politics and science was not a virtue, but a grave sin.  Or, in Russell’s words:

“One of the painful things about our time is that those who feel certainty are stupid, and those with any imagination and understanding are filled with doubt and indecision.”

Bertrand Russell, New Hopes for a Changing World at 4-5 (1951).

In the 21st century, ideologues of various stripes have tried to silence healthy skepticism and doubt by claiming that their critics have “manufactured doubt.”[1] This aggression against skepticism and doubt, joined with a biased conception of conflicts of interest, have become part of a concerted campaign to privilege tendentious scientific claims from critical scrutiny.

Philosopher Susan Haack, who has aligned herself on occasion with these politicized acolytes of certainty,[2] recently has pushed back, with a reminder that credulity for unwarranted claims, in all walks of life, is unethical.[3]  Haack’s essay is a delightful effort to clarify what credulity is, and to explore why credulity is an epistemologic vice and a social hazard, as well as the implications for citizens and scientists of living in an evidence-based, not a faith-based world.

Drawing inspiration from the the English mathematician and philosopher, William Kingdon Clifford, Haack has adopted one of Clifford’s bon mots as her motto:

“The credulous man is father to the liar and the cheat.”[4]

Indeed! And credulous judges and juries are the parents to specious claims and shyster lawyers.

Clifford’s essay should be required reading for politicians, judges, regulators, and legislators who evaluate the claims of scientist advocates.  Spurning ethical relativism, Clifford identified the key intellectual “sin” in an evidence-based world:

 “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.”

William K. Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief,” 29 Contemporary Rev. 289, 295 (1877).

Professor Haack should be commended for her fulsome irony for publishing in a journal of one of the world’s more credulous institutions, and for reminding us that credulity is an intellectual vice.


[1] See, e.g., David Michaels, Doubt is Their Product: How Industry’s Assault on Science Threatens Your Health (2008); Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway, Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming (2010).

[2] See, e.g.,Bendectin, Diclegis & The Philosophy of Science” (Oct. 26, 2013).

[3] Susan Haack, “Credulity and Circumspection: Epistemological Character and the Ethics of Belief,” 88 Proc. Am. Catholic Philosophical Assn 27 (2015).

[4] citing and quoting William K. Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief ” (1877), in Leslie Stephen and Sir Frederick Pollock, eds., The Ethics of Belief and Other Essays 70, 77 (London 1947).

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