Back in 2001, in the aftermath of the silicone gel breast implant litigation, I participated in a Federal Judicial Center (FJC) television production of “Science in the Courtroom, program 6” (2001). Program six was a round-table discussion among the directors (past, present, and future) of the FJC, all of whom were sitting federal judges, with two lawyers in private practice, Elizabeth Cabraser and me. One of the more exasperating moments in our conversation came when Ms. Cabraser, who represented plaintiffs in the silicone litigation, complained that Daubert was unfair because corporate defendants were able to order up supporting scientific studies, whereas poor plaintiffs counsel did not have the means to gin up studies that confirmed what they knew to be true. Refraining from talking over her required all the self-restraint I could muster, but I did eventually respond by denying her glib generalization and offering the silicone litigation as one in which plaintiffs, plaintiffs’ counsel, and plaintiffs’ support groups were all involved in funding and directing some of the sketchiest studies, most of which managed to find homes in so-called peer-reviewed journals of some sort, even if not the best.
The litigation connections of the plaintiff-sponsored studies in the silicone litigation were not apparent on the face of the published articles. The partisan funding and provenance of the studies were mostly undisclosed and required persistent discovery and subpoenas. Cabraser’s propaganda reinforced the recognition of what so-called mass tort litigation had taught me about all scientific studies: “trust but verify.” Verification is especially important for studies that are sponsored by litigation-industry actors who have no reputation at stake in the world of healthcare.
Verification is not a straightforward task, however. Peer-review publication usually provides some basic information about “methods and materials,” but rarely if ever do published articles provide sufficient data and detail about methodology to replicate the reported analysis. In legal proceedings, verification of studies conducted and relied upon by testifying expert witnesses is facilitated by the rules of expert witness discovery. In federal court, expert witnesses must specify all opinions and all bases for their opinions. When such witnesses rely upon their own studies, and thus have had privileged access to the complete data and all analyses, courts have generally permitted full inquiry into the underlying materials of relied-upon studies. On the other, when the author of a relied-upon study is a “stranger to the litigation,” neither a party nor a retained expert witness, courts have permitted generally more limited discovery of the study’s full data set and analyses. Regardless of the author’s status, the question remains how litigants are to challenge an adversary’s expert witness’s trusted reliance upon a study, which cannot be “verified.”
Most lawyers would prefer, of course, to call an expert witness who has actually conducted studies pertinent to the issues in the case. The price, however, of allowing the other side to discover the underlying data and materials of the author expert witness’s studies may be too high. The relied-upon studies may well end up discredited, as well as the professional reputation of the expert witness. The litigation industry has adapted to these rules of discovery by avoiding, in most instances, calling testifying expert witnesses who have published studies that might be vulnerable.
One work-around to the discovery rules lies in the use of “consulting, non-testifying expert witnesses.” The law permits the use of such expert witnesses to some extent to facilitate candid consultations with expert witnesses, usually without concerns that communications will be shared with the adversary party and witnesses. The hope is that such candid communications will permit realistic assessment of partisan positions, as well as allowing scientists and scholars to participate in an advisory capacity without the burden of depositions, formal report writing, and appearances at judicial hearings and trials. The confidentiality of consulting expert witnesses is open to abuse by counsel who would engage the consultants to conduct and publish studies, which can then be relied upon by the testifying expert witnesses. The upshot is that legal counsel can manipulate the published literature in a favorable way, without having to disclose their financial sponsorship or influence of the published studies used by their testifying expert witnesses.
This game of hiding study data and sponsorship through the litigation industry’s use of confidential consulting expert witnesses pervades so-called mass tort litigation, which provides ample financial incentives for study sponsorship and control. Defendants will almost always be unable to play the game, without detection. A simple interrogatory or other discovery request about funding of studies will reveal the attempt to pass off a party-sponsored study as having been conducted by disinterested scientists. Furthermore, most scientists will feel obligated to reveal corporate funding as a potential conflict of interest, in their submission of manuscripts for publication.
Revealing litigation-industry (plaintiffs’) funding of studies is more complicated. First, the funding may be through one firm, which is not the legal counsel in the case for which discovery is being conducted. In such instances, the plaintiff’s lawyers can truthfully declare that they lack personal knowledge of any financial support for studies relied upon by their testifying expert witnesses. Second, the plaintiffs’ lawyer firm is not a party is not itself subject to discovery. Even if the plaintiffs’ lawyers funded a study, they can claim, with plausible deniability, that they funded the study in connection with another client’s case, not the client who is plaintiff in the case in which discovery is sought. Third, the plaintiffs’ firm may take the position, however dubious it might be, that the funding of the relied-upon study was simply a confidential consultation with the authors of that study, and not subject to discovery.
The now pending litigation against ondansetron (Zofran) provides the most recent example of the dubious use of consulting expert witnesses to hide party sponsorship of an epidemiologic study. The plaintiffs, who are claiming that Zofran causes birth defects in this multi-district litigation assigned to Judge F. Dennis Saylor, have designated Dr. Carol Luik as their sole testifying expert witness on epidemiology. Dr. Luik, in turn, has relied substantially upon a study conducted by Dr. April Zambelli-Weiner.
According to motion papers filed by defendants, the plaintiffs’ counsel initially claimed that they had no knowledge of any financial support or conflicts for Dr Zambelli-Weiner. The conflict-of-interest disclosure in Zambelli-Weiner’s paper was, to say the least, suspicious:
“The authors declare that there was no outside involvement in study design; in the collection, analysis and interpretation of data; in the writing of the manuscript; and in the decision to submit the manuscript for publication.”
As an organization TTi reports receiving funds from plaintiff law firms involved in ondansetron litigation and a manufacturer of ondansetron.”
According to its website, TTi
“is an economically disadvantaged woman-owned small business headquartered in Westminster, Maryland. We are focused on the development, evaluation, and implementation of technologies and solutions that advance the transformation of data into actionable knowledge. TTi serves a diverse clientele, including all stakeholders in the health space (governments, payors, providers, pharmaceutical and device companies, and foundations) who have a vested interest in advancing research to improve patient outcomes, population health, and access to care while reducing costs and eliminating health disparities.”
According to defendants’ briefing, and contrary to plaintiffs’ initial claims and Zambelli-Weiner’s anemic conflicts disclosure, plaintiffs’ counsel eventually admitted that “Plaintiffs’ Leadership Attorneys paid $210,000 as financial support relating to” Zambelli-Weiner’s epidemiologic study. The women at TTi are apparently less economically disadvantaged than advertised.
The Zofran defendants served subpoenas duces tecum and ad testificandum on two of the study authors, Drs. April Zambelli-Weiner and Russell Kirby. Curiously, the plaintiffs (who would seem to have no interest in defending the third-party subpoenas) sought a protective order by arguing that defendants were harassing “third-party scientists.” Their motion for protection conveniently and disingenuously omitted, that Zambelli-Weiner had been a paid consultant to the Zofran plaintiffs.
Judge Saylor refused to quash the subpoenas, and Zambelli-Weiner appeared herself, through counsel, to seek a protective order. Her supporting affidavit averred that she had not been retained as an expert witness, and that she had no documents “concerning any data analyses or results that were not reported in the [published study].” Zambelli-Weiner’s attempt to evade discovery was embarrassed by her having presented a “Zofran Litigation Update” with Plaintiffs’ counsel Robert Jenner and Elizabeth Graham at a national conference for plaintiffs’ attorneys. Judge Saylor was not persuaded, and the MDL court refused Dr. Zambelli-Weiner’s motion. The law and the public has a right to every man’s, and every woman’s, (even if economically disadvantaged) evidence.
Tellingly, in the aftermath of the motions to quash, Zambelli-Weiner’s counsel, Scott Marder, abandoned his client by filing an emergency motion to withdraw, because “certain of the factual assertions in Dr. Zambelli-Weiner’s Motion for Protective Order and Affidavit were inaccurate.” Mr. Marder also honorably notified defense counsel that he could no longer represent that Zambelli-Weiner’s document production was complete.
Early this year, on January 29, 2019, Zambelli-Weiner submitted, through new counsel, a “Supplemental Affidavit,” wherein she admitted she had been a “consulting expert” witness for the law firm of Grant & Eisenhofer on the claimed teratogenicity of Zofran. Zambelli-Weiner also produced a few extensively redacted documents. On February 1, 2019, Zambelli-Weiner testified at deposition that the moneys she received from Grant & Eisenhofer were not to fund her Zofran study, but for other, “unrelated work.” Her testimony was at odds with the plaintiffs’ counsel’s confession that the $210,000 related to her Zofran study.
Zambelli-Weiner’s etiolated document production was confounded by the several hundred of pages of documents produced by fellow author, Dr. Russell Kirby. When confronted with documents from Kirby’s production, Zambelli-Weiner’s lawyer unilaterally suspended the deposition.
Deja Vu All Over Again
Federal courts have seen the Zambelli maneuver before. In litigation over claimed welding fume health effects, plaintiffs’ counsel Richard (Dickie) Scruggs and colleagues funded some neurological researchers to travel to Alabama and Mississippi to “screen” plaintiffs and potential plaintiffs in litigation for over claims of neurological injury and disease from welding fume exposure, with a novel videotaping methodology. The plaintiffs’ lawyers rounded up the research subjects (a.k.a. clients and potential clients), talked to them before the medical evaluations, and administered the study questionnaires. The study subjects were clearly aware of Mr. Scruggs’ “research” hypothesis, and had already promised him 40% of any recovery.
After their sojourn, at Scruggs’ expense to Alabama and Mississippi, the researchers wrote up their results, with little or no detail of the circumstances of how they had acquired their research “participants,” or those participants’ motives to give accurate or inaccurate medical and employment history information.
Defense counsel served subpoenas upon both Dr. Racette and his institution, Washington University St. Louis, for the study protocol, underlying data, data codes, and all statistical analyses. Racette and Washington University resisted sharing their data and materials with every page in the Directory of Non-Transparent Research. They claimed that the subpoenas sought production of testimony, information and documents in violation of:
“(1) the Federal Regulations set forth in the Department of Health and Human Services Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects,
(2) the Federal regulations set forth in the HIPPA Regulations,
(3) the physician/patient privilege,
(4) the research scholar’s privilege,
(5) the trade secret/confidential research privilege and
(6) the scope of discovery as codified by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure.”
After a long discovery fight, the MDL court largely enforced the subpoenas. The welding MDL court ordered Racette to produce
“a ‘limited data set’ which links the specific categories requested by defendants: diagnosis, occupation, and age. This information may be produced as a ‘deidentified’ data set, such that the categories would be linked to each particular patient, without using any individual patient identifiers. This data set should: (1) allow matching of each study participant’s occupational status and age with his or her neurological condition, as diagnosed by the study’s researchers; and (2) to the greatest extent possible (except for necessary de-identification), show original coding and any code-keys.”
After the defense had the opportunity to obtain and analyze the underlying data in the Scruggs-Racette study, the welding plaintiffs retreated from their epidemiologic case. Various defense expert witnesses analyzed the underlying data produced by Racette, and prepared devastating rebuttal reports. These reports were served upon plaintiffs’ counsel, whose expert witnesses never attempted any response. Reliance upon Racette’s study was withdrawn or abandoned. After the underlying data were shared with the parties to MDL 1535, no scientist appeared to defend the results in the published papers. The Racette Alabama study faded into the background of the subsequent welding-fume cases and trials.
The motion battle in the welding MDL revealed interesting contradictions, similar to those seen in the Zambelli-Weiner affair. For example, Racette claimed he had no relationship whatsoever with plaintiffs’ counsel, other than showing up by happenstance in Alabama at places where Scruggs’ clients also just happened to show up. Racette claimed that the men and women he screened were his patients, but he had no license to practice in Alabama, where the screenings took place. Plaintiffs’ counsel disclaimed that Racette was a treating physician, which acknowledgment would have made the individual’s screening results discoverable in their individual cases. And more interestingly, plaintiffs’ counsel claimed that both Dr. Racette and Washington University were “non-testifying, consulting experts utilized to advise and assist Plaintiffs’ counsel with respect to evaluating and assessing each of their client’s potential lawsuit or claim (or not).”
Over the last decade or so, best practices and codes of conduct for the relationship between pharmacoepidemiologists and study funders have been published. These standards apply with equal force to public agencies, private industry, and regulatory authories. Perhaps it is time for them to specify that the apply to the litigation industry as well.
