TORTINI

For your delectation and delight, desultory dicta on the law of delicts.

Historians Should Verify Not Vilify or Abilify – The Difficult Case of Irving Selikoff

January 4th, 2014

Dr. Selikoff had a general practice clinic in Paterson, New Jersey, in the 1950s, when his practice and his litigation support efforts were noticed by the asbestos insulation workers’ union.  Wikipedia, “Irving Selikoff” (last visited Jan. 4, 2014).  According to Wikipedia, “[t]he new cohort (asbestos workers) were still a small fraction of the clinic’s patient list,” but Selikoff noticed a surprising incidence of pleural mesothelioma, within a few years of opening his practice.  The Wiki authors seem deliberately vague about the date of Selikoff’s, and the union’s notice.  Most authors recognize the late Chris Wagner for the discovery of a high rate of mesothelioma, at least among those exposed to crocidolite asbestos. See J. Christopher Wagner, C.A. Sleggs, and Paul Marchand, “Diffuse pleural mesothelioma and asbestos exposure in the North Western Cape Province,” 17 Br. J. Indus. Med. 260 (1960); J. Christopher Wagner, “The discovery of the association between blue asbestos and mesotheliomas and the aftermath,” 48 Br. J. Indus. Med. 399 (1991).  Perhaps the vagueness is due to the realization that notice to Selikoff was notice to the union and its membership.

New Jersey lawyer Jon Gelman recounts how his father, also a New Jersey lawyer, involved Dr. Selikoff, back in 1954, as an expert witness in the “original 17” UNARCO (Union Asbestos and Rubber Co.) asbestos worker claims.  According to Gelman, these claims were successfully litigated with Selikoff’s services, in front of the New Jersey Division of Workers’ Compensation.  Jon L Gelman, “Dr. Yasunosuke Suzuki, A Pioneer of Mesothelioma Medical Research” (Nov. 23, 2011). Gelman does not report what diseases were involved in the 17 claims, arising out of the Paterson factory that used mostly amosite asbestos from South Africa. See Herbert Seidman, Irving J. Selikoff, and Steven K. Gelb, “Mortality Experience of Amosite Asbestos Factory Workers : Dose-Response Relationships 5 to 40 Years After Onset of Short-Term Work Exposure,” 10 Am. J. Indus. Med. 479 (1986).

Over the 20 years following the UNARCO 17,  Selikoff went on to have an active testimonial career, always testifying for the claimant, always testifying against the employer or the supplier.[1]  In 1972, Andrew Haas, President of the asbestos workers union thanked Selikoff for his frequent expert witness testimony on behalf of union members. Andrew Haas, Comments from the General President, 18 Asbestos Worker (Nov. 1972) (cited by Peter W.J. Bartrip, “Irving John Selikoff and the Strange Case of the Missing Medical Degrees,” 58 J. History Med. 3, 27 & n.88-92 (2003)).

Some of the positions that Selikoff took as a partisan expert witness suggest that he was outrunning his headlights.  For instance, in the mid-1960s, Selikoff testified in New York proceedings, in support of a union member, who had died of colon cancer.  Although Selikoff has little or no experience as an epidemiologist, he provided the “expert witness” support for the death claim based upon the very crude data from his insulator cohort study.  Here is how the union magazine heralded the compensation victory, made possible by Selikoff’s advocacy:

“The research into health hazards of insulation workers developed by the members of Local No. 12 and Local No. 32 has resulted in widening the basis of compensation claims in New York State.

Until now, the courts have been reluctant to accept many of the conditions to which insulation workers are prone, as related to employment. However, facts produced during the research investigations of Dr. 1. J. Selikoff, Dr. J. Churg, and Dr. E. Cuvler Hammond of the Environmental Sciences Laboratory of the Mt. Sinai Hospital in New York are resulting in a changing of this picture.

In the last two or three years, a number of decisions have been handed down in the courts of New York and New Jersey acknowledging that not only pneumoconiosis (asbestosis) occurring among insulation workers is compensable, but that also lung cancer and mesothelioma of the chest or mesothelioma of the abdomen should also be compensated.

A recent decision has widened the range of compensable diseases for insulation workers even further. A member of Local No. 12. unfortunately died of a cancer of the colon. Dr. Selikoff reported to the compensation court that his research showed that these cancers of the intestine were at least three times as common among the insulation workers as in men of the same age in the general population.

Based upon Dr. Selikoff’s testimony, the Referee gave the family a compensation award, holding that the exposure to many dusts during employment was responsible for the cancer. The insurance company appealed this decision. A special panel of the Workman’s Compensation Board reviewed the matter and agreed with the Referee’s judgement and affirmed the compensation award. This was the first case in which a cancer of the colon was established as compensable and it is likely that this case will become an historical precedent.”

“Health Hazard Progress Notes: Compensation Advance Made in New York State,” 16(5) Asbestos Worker 13 (May 1966).

The claimed association between colon cancer and asbestos was dubious at the time of Selikoff’s testimony, and became more so as time went on.  Nonetheless, colon cancer was important issue of compensation for the union membership.   Smoking was highly prevalent among the insulators, who had a high rate of lung cancer.  Colorectal cancer was the leading cause of cancer mortality among non-smokers in the general population, and Selikoff’s efforts to get the insulators to stop smoking was going to shift cancer mortality, naturally, to colorectal cancer. Adding colorectal cancer to the list of “compensable diseases” became an important part of the union’s (and the litigation industry’s) compensation strategy. Selikoff dug in, publishing and republishing the data from the insulator cohort study, which was uncontrolled for smoking and other risk factors. See, e.g., Irving J. Selikoff, “Epidemiology of gastrointestinal cancer,” 9 Envt’l Health Persp. 299 (1974) (arguing for his causal conclusion between asbestos and all gastrointestinal cancers).

More sophisticated epidemiologists consistently rejected the Selikoff conclusion on asbestos and colon cancer, which grew out of Selikoff’s litigation activities.  Richard Doll & Julian Peto, Asbestos: Effects on health of exposure to asbestos 8 (1985) (“In particular, there are no grounds for believing that gastrointestinal cancers in general are peculiarly likely to be caused by asbestos exposure.”)  The litigation efforts of the unions, the litigation industry, and the army of testifying physicians organized by Dr. Selikoff, kept the asbestos-colorectal cancer issue in play in the courts, despite ever increasing data against the conclusion.  Finally, four decades after the asbestos insulation union magazine’s notice about Selikoff’s success in a colon cancer case, the Institute of Medicine weighed in on the issue, to find the evidence inconsistent and insufficient to support a causal conclusion. Jonathan Samet, et al., Institute of Medicine, Asbestos: Selected Health Effects (2006).

The Selikoff acolytes, a/k/a “The Lobby,” will review this narrative as “Shooting the messenger: the vilification of Irving J. Selikoff.” Wikipedia, “Irving Selikoff” (last visited Jan. 4, 2014) (citing Jock McCulloch & Geoffrey Tweedale, “Shooting the messenger: the vilification of Irving J. Selikoff,” 37 Internat’l J. Health Serv. 619 (2007)).

This view is curious and incorrect for several reasons. First, it is curious that the cited authors, labor historians McCulloch and Tweedale, have themselves taken the liberty to attack important scientists for their litigation .  Last year, these authors published their “vilification” of Dr. Anthony Lanza, for having participated in the defense of some litigation cases arising out of the Gauley Bridge tunnel construction.  See Jock McCulloch and Geoffrey Tweedale, “Anthony J. Lanza, Silicosis and the Gauley Bridge ‘Nine’,” 26 Social History of Medicine (2013), in press.  See alsoBritish Labor Historians Belaboring American Labor History – Gauley Bridge”(Oct. 14, 2013) (pointing out errors in McCulloch and Tweedale’s account of Gauley Bridge).

Second, the Selikoff acolytes are incorrect because the historical facts of Selikoff’s involvement are important for an understanding of how some opinions, such as the notion that asbestos causes colorectal cancer, gained currency in lay and professional communities. These views may have been less attractive to the media and to judges if they had known that Selikoff was such an active worker for the litigation industry, as far back as the early 1950s.

One interesting example of how important judges misunderstood Selikoff’s activities comes from no less an astute observer than Judge Jack Weinstein, who held Selikoff up as an “independent, emiment scientist,” who eschewed the courtroom for the laboratory. See, e.g., Hon. Jack B. Weinstein, Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation: The Effect of Class Actions, Consolidations, and other Multi-Party Devices 117 (1995) (“A court should not coerce independent eminent scientists, such as the late Dr. Irving Selikoff, to testify if, like he, they prefer to publish their results only in scientific journals.”)  Weinstein was demonstrably wrong in this assessment, just as anyone who held up Lanza as never becoming involved in litigation activities would have been wrong.

Third, this information is important in understanding the evolution of the scientific community’s views about disclosing conflicts of interest.  None of Selikoff’s articles disclosed funding from the unions, or his testimonial activities on behalf of the unions and their allied attorneys.  For some reason, Selikoff’s heirs, who have continued to follow and to publish about the health outcomes among the asbestos insulation workers, feel that they are exempt from prevailing views about disclosure.

Dr. Steven Markowitz is the lead author on an update of the lung cancer mortality data of asbestos insulators. Steven B. Markowitz, Steven M. Levin, Albert A. Miller, and Alfred Morabia, “Asbestos, asbestosis, smoking, and lung cancer. New findings from the North American insulator cohort,” 188 Am. J. Respir. Crit. Care Med. 90 (2013).  Dr. Markowitz testifies widely for plaintiffs in asbestos personal injury cases.  See, e.g., Wannall v. Honeywell International Inc., 2013 WL 1966060 (D.D.C. May 14, 2013) (excluding Markowitz’ testimony as unreliable). A review of the disclosure statements for the authors of the 2013 asbestos insulator cohort study shows that Dr. Markowitz declared no consultations that could be a potential conflict of interest. SeeThe Mt. Sinai Catechism” (June 7, 2013); and “More Hypocrisy Over Conflicts of Interest,” (Dec. 4, 2010) (detailing failures of Selikoff acolytes, Castleman, Lemen, and Frank, in disclosing litigation activities when presenting on related issues to professional societies).

Fourth, there is a recent trend by the litigation industry to claim that failure of defense expert witnesses to make disclosures of their ties to companies constitutes fraud.  Indeed, last spring, the New York Appellate Division affirmed a trial court’s decision to conduct an in camera inspection of documents underlying research studies sponsored and funded by Georgia Pacific. Weitz & Luxenberg P.C. v. Georgia-Pacific LLC, 2013 WL 2435565, 2013 NY Slip Op 04127 (June 6, 2013). The Appellate Division held that the plaintiffs had made a sufficient “showing of a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person that in camera review of the materials may reveal evidence to establish the claim that the crime-fraud exception applies.” 2013 WL 2435565, at *4.  SeeA Cautionary Tale on How Not to Sponsor a Scientific Study for Litigation” (June 21, 2013).

The claim of fraud was perhaps as tenuous as the assertion of the attorney-client privilege.  For  instance, some of the alleged fraudulent conduct was nothing more than an alleged failure to disclose fully the nature of the relationship between the sponsor, Georgia Pacific, and one of the authors:

“For articles lead-authored by David M. Bernstein, Ph.D., and co-authored by Holm, the only disclosure was that the research was ‘sponsored’ or ‘supported’ by a grant from GP. The articles did not disclose that Holm was specially employed by GP for the asbestos litigation or that he reported to GP’s in-house counsel.”

2013 WL 2435565, at *4.  If this evidence be sufficient to show fraud, there will be many parties and expert witnesses in trouble, including the reputation of Dr. Selikoff, and his influence on asbestos litigation and regulation in this country, and abroad.

Finally, this information is important to counteract the distortions of the Selikoff acolytes.  Consider for instance the current entry for Selikoff in Wikipedia.  Wikipedia, “Irving Selikoff” (last visited Jan. 4, 2014):

“Part of the contrary perspective was presented by a Nathan A. Schachtman, an adjunct lecturer at the Columbia Law School. He suggested that Selikoff and his supporters may have organized ‘a lopsided medical conference, arranged for the conference to feature defendant’s expert witnesses, set out to give short shrift to opposing points of view, invited key judges to attend the conference, and paid for the judges’ travel and hotel expenses’. This quote from Schachtman came from a web site he maintained, unlike the quote from McCulloch and Tweedale, whose comments were published only after being accepted by reviewers for a refereed academic journal.“Nathan A. Schachtman”. www.law.columbia.edu. Columbia Law School. Retrieved September 16, 2013.”

While ’tis true that this humble blogger’s posts are not peer reviewed, what is interesting is that the acolytes did not, and could not, counter on the merits.

What is more, my account of “Selikoff and his supporters” did not recount that they “may have organized ‘a lopsided medical conference, arranged for the conference to feature defendant’s expert witnesses, set out to give short shrift to opposing points of view, invited key judges to attend the conference, and paid for the judges’ travel and hotel expenses’.”  My account documented that Selikoff and his supporters did, in fact, do these things.  Actually, they were previously documented in litigation and reported by the courts that held that one of the judges who improvidently had attended Selikoff’s Third Wave Conference had to disqualified from presiding over an asbestos class action.  In re School Asbestos Litigation, 977 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1992); see Cathleen M. Devlin, “Disqualification of Federal Judges – Third Circuit Orders District Judge James McGirr Kelly to Disqualify Himself so as to Preserve the Appearance of Justice under 28 U.S.C.§ 455,” 38 Vill. L. Rev. 1219 (1993); W.K.C. Morgan, “Asbestos and cancer: history and public policy,” 49 Br. J. Indus. Med. 451, 451 (1992)

The point here is not to villify Selikoff but to gain historical perspective and understanding of the enthusiasms that went into creating the largest mass tort in American legal history. Selikoff was an important player in the passion play of products liability litigation, but it is time to substitute history for hagiography.



[1] Bradshaw v. Twin City Insulation Co. Ltd., Industrial Court of Indiana, Claim No. O.D.1454 (Oct. 14, 1966); Bradshaw v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., E. D. Michigan Southern Division, Civ. Action No. 29433 (July 6, 1967); Bambrick v. Asten Hill Mfg. Co., Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 664 (1972); Tomplait v. Combustion Engineering Inc.., E. D. Tex. Civ. Action No. 5402 (March 4, 1968); Rogers v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., Cir. Ct. Mo., 16th Jud. Cir., Div. 9, Civ. Action No. 720,071 (Feb. 19, 1971); Utter v. Asten-Hill Mfg. Co., 453 Pa. 401 (1973); Karjala v Johns-Manville Products Corp., D. Minn., Civ. Action Nos. 5–71 Civ. 18, and Civ. 40 (Feb. 8, 1973).  Selikoff also participated as a testifying witness for the government, in United States v. Reserve Mining Co. See United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408 (D.Minn.1972); Armco Steel Corp. v. United States, 490 F.2d 688 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F.Supp. 11 (D.Minn.1974); Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. 1974); Minnesota v. Reserve Mining Co., 418 U.S. 911 (1974); Minnesota v. Reserve Mining Co., 419 U.S. 802 (1974); United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 394 F.Supp. 233 (D.Minn.1974); Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975); Minnesota v. Reserve Mining Co., 420 U.S. 1000, 95 S.Ct. 1441, 43 L.Ed.2d 758 (1975); Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 408 F.Supp. 1212 (D.Minn.1976); United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 412 F.Supp. 705 (D.Minn.1976); United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 417 F.Supp. 789 (D.Minn.1976); United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 417 F.Supp. 791 (D.Minn.1976); 543 F.2d 1210 (1976).

 

Expiation of Guilt by Expert Witnessing – The Strange Case of Gerrit Schepers

October 19th, 2013

Expert witnesses come in all sizes, colors, shapes, races, ethnicities, and personalities.  More interestingly, expert witnesses have various motives for becoming involved in the litigation process.  Most expert witnesses, I believe, become involved because they find the issues interesting, and intellectually challenging.  After looking at the claims and defenses put forward by the parties, these expert witnesses believe that one side or the other has the better warrant, or perhaps the only warrant, for its contentions.

Some witnesses sign up to “change the world.”  They are advocates, and they see the courtroom as an extension of the laboratory or the university.  They may want acceptance for their theories or beliefs, and they hope that favorable jury verdicts and judgments based upon those verdicts will elevate their theories in the world of science or policy.

Other expert witnesses are motivated by “white-hat bias.”  They see a verdict for the side for which they testify as promoting retributive, distributive, or social justice.  They may be deontological or utilitarian or Aristotelian in their assessments of the issues, but they are motivated by considerations that often transcend the facts of the particular case.

Of course, there are expert witnesses who see litigants and litigation as an ATM to aid their personal fisc.

I have known only one expert witness who was motivated by guilt.

                                                                               * * * * * *

Robert B. Anderson kindly alerted me to an interesting historical wiki on Saranac Lake, New York, with some interesting entries for some of the protagonists of the asbestos litigation:  Leroy Upson Gardner, Arthur Vorwald, Gerrit Schepers, and others. 

Dr. Edward Livingston Trudeau founded the Saranac Laboratory for the Study of Tuberculosis, in 1884, as a center for research and treatment of tuberculosis.  The Laboratory, later became known as the Trudeau Institute, was also one of the leading pneumoconiosis research facilities in the 20th century.  Many companies engaged the Laboratory to test their products, or the materials within their products; and Saranac Lake was the natural venue for various symposia and research meetings on industrial dust diseases.

As its director from 1927, until his death in 1946, Dr. Gardner helped put the Saranac Laboratory on the intellectual world map.  His directorship coincided with the period in which the pneumoconioses were becoming important topics in industrial medicine, and in labor-industry battles.  After Dr. Gardner’s death, Dr. Vorwald became the Director of Laboratories at Saranac. He held the position from 1947, until 1954, when he left to organize a new medical school department, of Industrial Medicine and Hygiene, in Wayne State University, in Michigan.

In 1954, the Laboratories fell into the hands of Dr. Schepers, who oversaw its passing into irrelevancy as research moved into the major universities.  Schepers left Saranac in 1958.

Dr. Schepers used his supposed personal knowledge of dealings with various companies to create a livelihood in later life, when he testified extensively for plaintiffs’ counsel in asbestos personal injury litigation.  As the litigation matured, so did Dr. Schepers, who became deaf and daft, and fantasized and testified to conversations with people, long dead, who could not contradict him.  Schepers thus used his longevity to good advantage.

After Dr. Schepers adopted the catechism of Mt. Sinai, his publications, from the early 1980s until his death, became particularly unreliable, and these typically are the only ones cited now by plaintiffs’ counsel and plaintiffs’ expert witnesses.  Fortunately, Dr. Schepers memorialized his contemporaneous observations, which frequently contradicted him when he was confronted by well-prepared defense counsel, in court or deposition examination.  Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, and most state evidentiary law, Schepers’ prior statements are admissible as they bear on his credibility and the truth of his later, scurrilous writings:

“When a hearsay statement … has been admitted in evidence, the declarant’s credibility may be attacked, and then supported, by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness. The court may admit evidence of the declarant’s inconsistent statement or conduct, regardless of when it occurred or whether the declarant had an opportunity to explain or deny it. If the party against whom the statement was admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party may examine the declarant on the statement as if on cross-examination.”

Federal Rule of Evidence 806See, e.g., “Gerrit W. H. Schepers, MD, RIP” (2011).

The Saranac Wiki also notes that Schepers was “an experienced anthropologist and neurologist.”  Most scientists, however, have been probably all too happy to forget Dr. Schepers’ work in this area.  See, e.g., G.W.H. Schepers, “The Corpus Callosum and Related Structures in the South African Negro Brain,” 24 Am. J. Physical Anthropology 161 (1938).

The Wiki points to a hagiographic obituary that quotes an anonymous friend who called Schepers “the Old War Horse, the record holder for longevity in the struggle against corporate crime.” Laurie Kazan-Allen and Barry Castleman,  “The Passing of a Great Man” (Sept. 13, 2011).   Schepers lived to 97, but his struggle was with his own past, not with alleged corporate crime.

Labor historian Jock McCulloch wrote about Schepers’ role in documenting silicosis disability among South African miners, but even Schepers’ good deeds came with a dubious shadow.  McCulloch describes a South African investigator who described “Dr Schepers as a man whose outstanding intellect was compromised by an ‘inexcusable scientific dishonesty’.”  Jock McCulloch, “Hiding a Pandemic: Dr G.W.H. Schepers and the Politics of Silicosis in South Africa,” 35 J. Southern African Studies 835, 838 (2009) (citing to South African National Archives, Pretoria, F 33\671, Supplementary Confidential Report of the Departmental Committee of Enquiry into the Relation between Silicosis and Pulmonary Disability. Departmental Committee to Inquire into the Definition of Silicosis & Chest Diseases (Oosthuizen) Departmental Committee at 23 (1954)).

Contrary to the fantasy “state of the art” that made Schepers so much in demand for plaintiffs’ lawyers, and endeared so to Kazan, Castleman, and McCulloch, Schepers’ publications tell a different story. Schepers’ very first publication on asbestos and cancer came in 1963, after the work by Dr. Christopher Wagner and others, from South Africa. At that time, he wrote about pulmonary cancers:

“Neoplasia occurs in two forms:  alveolar and bronchiole carcinoma, and pleural mesothelioma.  The latter is particularly common in crocidolite workers, and has been mainly reported from South Africa.”

G. Schepers, ““Lung Disease Caused by Inorganic and Organic Dust” 44 Chest 133, 136 (1963).  This statement came after his South Africa and Saranac experiences, but before senescence set in. Schepers also noted that “neoplasia has not yet resulted” from asbestos in experimental models.  Id. at 136.

American College of Chest Physicians (1964)     

In 1964, Schepers helped prepare a position paper on asbestosis for the American College of Chest Physicians.  This report noted that the enhanced prevalence of pulmonary neoplasia did not appear to apply for the chrysotile industry in North America:

“In the medical literature, there are more articles favoring a positive relationship between cancer of the lung and asbestosis than denying it. While it has been reported that there may be an enhanced prevalence of pulmonary neoplasia in some asbestos industries (e.g. crocidolite or amosite), or in some locations (e.g. South Africa, England), this does not appear to apply for the chrysotile industry in North America. This comment applies both with respect to intrapulmonary new growths and to pleural mesothelioma.”

Peter A. Theodos, John W. G. Hannon, Paul Cartier, Ross K. Childerhose, David T. Dubow, G. W. H. Schepers, Reginald H. Smart, and Roy E. Whitehead, “Asbestosis:  Report of the Section on Nature and Prevalence Committee on Occupational Diseases of the Chest,” 45 Chest 107, 109b (1964).  This report also put pleural plaques into proper historical and physiological perspective:

“In many individuals and perhaps even the majority of cases, these pleural plaques do not present any histologic lesions of asbestosis and contain no asbestos fibers. *** These plaques, though apparent on X‑ray, are not associated with any disability.”

Id. at 109a.

New York Academy of Science Conference on Asbestos (1964)

Also in 1964, Schepers was a significant presence at Dr. Selikoff’s 1964 conference of the New York Academy of Science, where he commented upon others’ presentations.  Here Schepers continued to express his doubts about the carcinogenicity of North American chrysotile:

“Finally, there is the question of whether inhalation of chrysotile is associated with neoplasia.  On critically reviewing the work histories of eleven cases of lung cancer in chrysotile workers, I find that all of these had at one time or another also been exposed to other forms of asbestos, mainly amosite or crocidolite.  Their predominant exposure was to chrysotile, but since there is strong evidence incriminating amosite as a carcinogen, the fact that these men also had been exposed to amosite is disruptive of a theory of carcinogenicity per se.”

Schepers, “Discussion,” in Biological Effects of Asbestos 132 Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 589, 596 (1965). Schepers paved the way on manufacturing uncertainty when he suggested at the 1964 conference, an alternative hypothesis to crocidolite as a cause of mesothelioma; he suggested that some of the mesotheliomas in South Africa might have been caused by a native grass known as Klitsgras.

Talc Symposium (1973)

In May 1973, Schepers participated in a written presentation at a symposium on talc, sponsored by the United States Department of Interior.  At the time, Schepers was an employee of the United States government, the Chief of the Medical Service, Veterans Administration, in Lebanon, Pennsylvania:

“There are marked differences between the capacities of the individual classes of silicate minerals to provoke responses in human and animal tissues. There also are major misconceptions as to what these substances can do when inhaled by man or other mammals. Two of the most extreme of these are

(1) that all siliceous minerals are equally pathogenic and

(2) that there is even the least semblance between the effects of the asbestiform and the non-asbestiform silicates.”

Gerrit W. H. Schepers, “The Biological Action of Talc and Other Silicate Minerals,” at 54, in Aurel Goodwin, Proceedings of the symposium on talc: U.S. Bureau of Mines; Information Circular 8639 (1974).  This view was directly opposed to the Mt. Sinai gospel about to be delivered in another government proceeding. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency v. Reserve Mining Co., 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc).  Schepers, however, had not yet gotten the memo, or perhaps his loyalty was still to his employer, the United States government.  Schepers was not, however, under the influence of any company or corporate interest, when he wrote:

“Is chrysotile a carcinogen? This is a very perplexing question. A crescendo of popular opinion has sought to incriminate chrysotile. This author remains unconvinced.  The main premise for carcinogenicity stems from epidemiological observation of employees of the insulation and shipbuilding industries. In both these industries there has been in the past considerable exposure of pipe laggers to asbestos dust. Only in recent decades, however, have these insulation bats been composed predominantly of chrysotile. In former years crocidolite and amosite were important components.

                                                                               ***

Finally, it should be pointed out that the role of cigarette smoking has not been satisfactorily discounted in the referenced epidemiological studies of lung cancer among insulation workers. In some groups reported an excess prevalence of lung cancer was not demonstrable when cigarette smoking was taken into consideration. Epidemiological surveys of chrysotile workers in Quebec showed no excess of lung cancer. A review of pleural mesothiliomatosis in Canada also failed to focus attention on Quebec or any other center where chrysotile industries are concentrated.”

Gerrit W. H. Schepers, “The Biological Action of Talc and Other Silicate Minerals,” at 70.  Unlike Dr. Selikoff, Schepers was not a crocidolite denier.

OSHA Proceedings 1976

In 1970, the Williams-Steiger Act created a new federal agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and one of its first missions was to address an asbestos problem that emerged in the 1960s.  The new agency held extensive hearings and engaged in factfinding, which was dominated by Dr. Selikoff and other proxies for the labor unions.

In 1976, Schepers was not yet under the influence of the Mt. Sinai crowd; indeed, he was an employee of the United States.  Here are the contemporaneous views of Dr. Schepers, as he attempted to influence the OSHA investigation of the asbestos fiber controversy.  In a letter dated July 19, 1976, Schepers wrote Grover Wrenn, Chief, Division of Health Standards Development, OSHA:

“This is a follow-up on our recent meeting with the Assistant Secretary of Labor at which we discussed the question of asbestosis and berylliosis and the relationship of exposure of various industrial substances to lung cancer.

I promised to help you place items in the record which you appeared not have available.”

                                                        ***

“As you can see my researches cast considerable doubt on the proposition that American fibrous minerals are carcinogenic.  I am not one of those that deny the carcinogenicity of everything.  To the contrary, I believe that I have helped prove that some environmental pollutants are carcinogenic.  For this reason you may perhaps accept the credibility of my findings when I state that I could detect no evidence of carcinogenicity for either chrysotile, talc or fiberglass.”

Asbestos Litigation – The Gathering Storm (1978)

By the late 1970s, asbestos litigation was swamping American courtrooms.  The United States Navy in particular was threatened by the potential expense of compensating its large civilian shipyard workforce.  Schepers sought out the role of testifying witness, in a letter dated March 10, 1978, Dr Schepers wrote to Captain Hoeffler, of the Navy’s Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, in Washington D.C.  Schepers shamelessly took credit for discovering the connection between mesothelioma and amphibole asbestos, in 1949. Of course, if this self-aggrandizing claim were true, Schepers would have been involved in a much more devastating cover-up than any American company.  Here is the substance of Schepers’ 1978 solicitation letter:

“Here is a CV and some reprints which will possibly be helpful.  Since I have been involved with so many things, my expertise with respect to asbestosis is somewhat hidden among the rest.  For emphasis therefore let me summarize that my clinical and research involvement with asbestosis and thus also lung cancer spans some thirty years.  I commenced this work in South Africa, where as a …. Medical director for the pneumoconiosis Bureau we researched the working conditions and health of all employees of that countries [sic] extensive crocidolite and amosite mines and industries.  The fact that mesothelioma can be associated with asbestos dust was first discovered by me during 1949 at the Penge Egnep mines in the Eastern Transvaal.  It is also important to know that only one out of three persons who develop mesothelioma ever was exposed to asbestos dust.  The Institute for Pneumoconiosis Research which I started there has abundant evidence about this.

In the USA I next studied the asbestos problem for the Quebec Government and the Johns Mansville Company and also for various asbestos producing companies.  This embraced research on human subjects, lung tissue and experimental animals.  The net result of my fifteen years of work in this field has been to convince me that chrysotile, which is the North American type of asbestos, is relatively innocuous as compared to the African and Russian varieties.  I have never seen a case of lung cancer develop on any person exposed to chrysotile only.  However I have seen plenty of lung cancers in asbestos workers.

This is because most asbestos workers are exposed to carcinogenic materials other than asbestos and all the cases with lung cancer also were chronic lung self-mutilators through cigarette smoking.  In a rather major set of experiments of mine, I exposed animals to the most potent known carcinogenic (beryllium sulphate) and then exposed them to asbestos (chrysotile) dust.  These animals had fewer cancers than those exposed to the beryllium sulphate.  So chrysotile is not even a significant co-carcinogen.  I reversed the order of the exposure – namely asbestos (chrysotile) first and the the BeSO4.  The result was the same.  The animals exposed only to chrysotile never developed any lung cancers.

I probably have the largest collection of asbestosis case materials, having been a consultant to hundreds of physicians.  I have a very detailed knowledge of what various types of asbestos can and cannot do to the lungs.  If my command of this subject can be of use to the Navy in the current law suit, please feel to use my services as consultant as you deem fit.”

Schepers Reinvented

As we can see from his 1978 correspondence, Dr. Schepers was not shy about touting his expertise, or his opinions about the innocuousness of chrysotile asbestos.  Castleman’s revisionist history has some support only from Scheper’s own later attempts to reinvent his past.  See, e.g., Gerrit W.H. Schepers, “Chronology of Asbestos Cancer Discoveries: Experimental Studies of the Saranac Laboratory,” 27 Am. J. Indus. Med. 593-606 (1995). The contemporaneous history of Schepers’ views is, however, completely at odds with words written only after decades of consulting with, and testifying for, plaintiffs’ counsel in asbestos litigation.

Like many other defense lawyers, I confronted Dr. Schepers in cases in which he testified both on state-of-the-art issues and on the causation of mesothelioma.  Towards the end of his testifying career, he likened his courtroom performances to that of “performing seal for lawyers in the courtroom.”  Testimony of Gerrit W. Schepers, in Hill v. Carey Canada, New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division for Camden County, Docket No. L-051429-84, 48-50 (July 24, 1990) (before Judge Supnick and a jury). 

The interviews he gave for the media were even more of a performance. In one interview that Schepers gave about a year or so before his death, he cut even more grandiose poses of a whistleblower and crusader.  See Lorraine Mallinder, “Deadly Secret: A 1940s whistle-blower uncovers hidden evidence linking asbestos to cancer,” 91 Canada’s History 33 (April 2011). 

Why did Schepers commit himself in retirement to the plaintiffs’ bar and their relentless prosecution of asbestos cases?  Marxist historians and writers such as McCulloch and Castleman, who see every societal ill as the result of corporate influence will not likely discern Schepers’ true motivations.  By the time I encountered Schepers he was no longer a needy former civil servant.  He was trying to rewrite history because he was personally responsible for the continued use of South African crocidolite in the United States, for decades after he claimed to have discovered its causal relation to mesothelioma.  He was a man tormented by guilt, and his ritualistic participation in trials of mesothelioma claims was expiation for his role in the tragedy.

It is sad that the asbestos litigation is still with us. Dean Wellington’s pipedream of turning the asbestos litigation feeding frenzy into an administrative routine is long gone.  The bankruptcies of dozens of companies, with the losses of jobs and income for many thousands of American workers is a great tragedy; but so is the loss of historical perspective.

British Labor Historians Belaboring American Labor History – Gauley Bridge

October 14th, 2013

Jock McCulloch and Geoffrey Tweedale are labor historians, which means mostly they write about the issues of interest to industrial workers, from an unremittingly pro-labor and anti-management perspective.  Recently, these British writers have weighed in on American labor history, and the role of Dr. Anthony Lanza in the litigation that followed the Gauley Bridge tunnel construction.  See Jock McCulloch and Geoffrey Tweedale, “Anthony J. Lanza, Silicosis and the Gauley Bridge ‘Nine’,” 26 Social History of Medicine (2013), in press [cited as M&T]

Here is the authors’ abstract:

“Gauley Bridge was the scene of America’s biggest industrial disaster, in which hundreds of workers died from silicosis in the aftermath of the drilling in 1930–31 of a hydro-electric tunnel at Hawk’s Nest. This article scrutinises for the first time the role of Dr A. J. Lanza (a medical director of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company) in hiding the extent of acute silicosis amongst the tunnellers. Lanza and his allies in the medical profession were able to impose their own interpretation on events at Gauley Bridge. Their analysis of nine autopsies ignored the evidence of acute silicosis, in favour of one which emphasised tuberculosis, racial susceptibility, syphilis, the supposed negligence of the workforce and alleged racketeering by lawyers. The result was that acute silicosis largely disappeared from medical discourse and Gauley Bridge was denied a place in America’s national consciousness.”

McCulloch & Tweedale’s investigation into Lanza’s role in the litigation is interesting, but hardly surprising.  He was, after all, a medical director of a large insurance company, and no doubt that the Gauley Bridge litigation, which started in 1932, threatened Met Life’s interests and his own.  These British authors, however, do a much less convincing job of investigating the bias of the physicians who testified for some of the Gauley Bridge victims, and of the plaintiffs’ lawyers, who had a substantial interest in passing off tuberculosis, pneumonia, and other respiratory illnesses as silicosis.

Was Gauley Bridge Denied A Place in America’s National Consciousness?

McCulloch and Tweedale claim that the Gauley Bridge disaster hardly registered in the nation’s memory.  Their claim is demonstrably false. M&T at 2. These authors appear to make their claim to advance a conspiratorial labor view of history that fails to account for evidence from many other walks of life. They write:

“The neglect of Hawk’s Nest—which is indicative of the way that risks in the workplace and silicosis in particular have been underplayed or ignored by historians and social scientists—is unfortunate.”

M&T at 3.  While their suggestion that Hawk’s Nest, another name for the Gauley Bridge locale, has been ignored by social historians until recently has some plausibility, their implication of more widespread neglect cannot be sustained. Furthermore, their suggestion that Gauley Bridge fits into their Marxist paradigm of corporate corruption of science (citing similar works by Michaels, Castleman, Rosner, et al.) ignores the robust debate from all sectors of society, including the scientific community, organized labor, political actors, industry, government, and academia.

The Gauley Bridge disaster, and disaster it was, was memorialized in song, in literature, and most important, in a refined understanding of how extreme silica exposures can lead to rapid onset of silicosis.  These “non-labor” sources are generally ignored in the authors’ “tunnel vision.” McCulloch and Tweedale’s indictment against Lanza asserts that Lanza:

“did not seek to find a truthful explanation for the premature deaths of these men(and countless others), but instead hijacked the medical agenda to serve powerful business interests. In doing so, they certainly proved to be accomplices, but hardly unknowing ones.”

M&T at 3-4.

The historical evidence may support Lanza’s work behind the scenes in the Gauley Bridge trials, but the authors broad, overwrought implications are non-sequiturs:

“As a result, for almost half a century Hawk’s Nest was denied a place in the national consciousness and silicosis was elided as a major public health issue in the USA.”

M&T at 4.

In Song

In 1936, Josh White wrote and sang a labor protest song, “Silicosis is Killing Me”:

I said silicosis, you made a mighty bad break of me.
Awww, silicosis made a mighty bad break of me.
You robbed me of my youth and health;
All you brought poor me was misery.

Now silicosis, you’re a dirty robber and a thief.
Awww silicosis, dirty robber and a thief.
Robbed me of my right to live and all you brought poor me was grief.

I was there digging that tunnel for six bits a day;
I was there digging that tunnel for six bits a day;
Didn’t know I was digging my own grave, silicosis eating my lungs away.

I says mama, mama, mama, cool my fevered head.

I says mama, mama, come and cool my fevered head.
I’m going to meet my Jesus, God knows I’ll soon be dead.

Six bits I got for digging, digging that tunnel hole.

Six bits I got for digging, digging that tunnel hole.
Takes me away from my baby, it sure done wrecked my soul.

Now tell all my buddies, tell all my friends you see;

Now tell all my buddies, tell all my friends you see.
I’m going way up yonder, please don’t grieve for me.

In Cinema

Silicosis was addressed in the emerging art form of cinema, but perhaps most notably in The Citadel (1938), which featured Robert Donat as a physician trying to treat and prevent silicosis.  The movie was nominated for an Academy Award, for best picture in 1939; King Vidor was nominated for his directing of the movie.

Perhaps less artistic, but no less compelling than King Vidor, in 1937, Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins declared war on silicosis, toured mines, convened national conferences on the problem, and issued a film entitled, “Stop Silicosis.”

 

Secretary Perkins as she appeared in “Stop Silicosis.”

 

In Media

The Gauley Bridge disaster and aftermath were covered widely in newspapers and  magazines through the mid- to late-1930s.  McCulloch and Tweedale concede the existence “extensive national media coverage.” M&T at 14.  They complain, however, that “press interest subsided.” Id.  Before we advert to conspiracy theories and suggestions of mass attention deficit disorder, we need only remind ourselves that soon after the Congressional hearings, and the National Silicosis Conference, of the 1930s, Hirohito and Hitler occupied center stage.  Press interest is, almost by definition, ephemeral.

In Legislative Action

In 1936, Congress reacted angrily to the media coverage of the Gauley Bridge tunnel workers’ developing and dying of acute silicosis.

A contemporaneous account described the congressional hearings and quoted from the Committee’s official report:

“In a two hundred printed page report the Committee on Labor of the House of Representatives at Washington furnishes the ‘Hearings’ on House Joint Resolution 449 – the legislative vehicle which rudely trundled into the light of publicity the secrets of the silicosis tragedy at Gauley Bridge, West Virginia.  This Committee of the Congress presents the testimony of many specialists, including several from the United States Bureau of Mines and the Public Health Service, as well as of special investigators and several surviving victims of the occupational disease from this now notorious tunnel operation. The official report of the investigation

concludes:

‘That the whole driving of the tunnel was begun, continued, and completed with grave and inhuman disregard of any consideration for the health, lives, and future of the employees.

That as a result many workmen became infected with silicosis; that many died of the disease and many not yet dead are doomed to die from the ravages of the disease as a result of their employment and the negligence of the employing contractor. That such negligence was either willful or the result of inexcusable and indefensible ignorance there can be no doubt on the face of the evidence presented to the committee.’

The record presents a story of a condition that is hardly conceivable in a democratic government in the present century. It would be more representative of the middle ages. It is the story of a tragedy worthy of the pen of a Victor Hugo–the

story of men in the darkest days of the depression, with work hard to secure, driven by despair and the stark fear of hunger to work for a mere existence wage under almost intolerable conditions.”

26 Am. Labor Legis. Rev. 66 (1936)

Francis Perkins, Roosevelt’s Secretary of Labor, in 1938 convened a National Silicosis Conference, which brought together organized labor, industry, government, and academics to address the outstanding safety and health issues in industries that gave rise to unsafe silica exposures among their workers.  The National Silicosis Conference published its proceedings in a series of reports, which in turn were memorialized in textbooks of the time.  See, e.g., Jewett V. Reed & A.K. Harcourt, The Essentials of Occupational Disease 162 & n. 15 (1941) (citing National Silicosis Conference, Report on Medical Control. United States Dep’t of Labor Bull. No. 21, Part 1 (1938)).

LITIGATION:  plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose

Jock McCulloch and Geoffrey Tweedale deplore Dr. Lanza’s participation in the silicosis litigation that followed the Gauley Bridge disaster.  They go to great lengths to suggest that Lanza suppressed the diagnostic entity of “acute silicosis,” and that he was motivated by race prejudice against the African American tunnel workers and bias in favor of the insurance company for which he worked.

Their narrative of the Gauley Bridge litigation, however, is selective and fatally incomplete.  They report that the first case to go to trial in 1933, Raymond Johnson v. Rinehart & Dennis Company, resulted in a hung jury, and they offer multiple hearsay to suggest that the defense bribed several members of the jury.  Perhaps there is something to the innuendo, but these historians ignore the contemporaneous accounts that described the circus atmosphere created by the histrionics of the plaintiffs’ counsel.  Newsweek described the “legal pyrotechnics”:  the plaintiffs’ lawyers

“threw handfuls of white silica dust into the air to show jurors how it hung like an ectoplasmic pall.  The plaintiffs’ legal team arranged a court room procession of doomed silicosis sufferers — the parade of the living dead.”

“Silicosis Tunneling Through an Atmosphere of Deadly Dust” Newsweek 33, 34 (Jan. 25, 1936).  Rinehart & Dennis settled 200 cases in the aftermath of the hung jury.  The plaintiffs’ lawyers filed additional cases, but McCulloch and Tweedale fail to report that the next jury, sitting in Charleston, rejected the worker’s claim. Id.

In 1949, the U. S. Supreme Court, following the lead of the New York Court of Appeals, declared it to be a matter of common knowledge that breathing silica dust “is injurious to the lungs and dangerous to health,” a fact the plaintiff’s employer “was bound to know.” Urie v. Thomas, 337 U.S. 163, 180 (1949), citing Sadowski v. Long Island R.R., 292 N.Y. 448, 456 (1944).

In Occupational Medicine

Before the Gauley Bridge disaster, acute silicosis was not a well-defined diagnostic condition.  A paper published in the Journal of the American Medical Association, in 1932, states that “acute silicosis” did not gain recognition until 1929.  Earle M. Chapman, “Acute Silicosis,” 98 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 1439 (1932).  The author described cases arising out of the abrasive soap manufacturing industry, where silica exposures were confounded by exposure to alkali soap powder.

Two papers in 1933, in the American Journal of Public Health, gave tentative recognition to acute silicosis, and cautiously labeled the condition, “so-called acute silicosis.”  Homer L. Sampson, “The Roentgenogram in So-Called ‘Acute’ Silicosis, 23 Am. J. Pub. Health 1237 (1933); and Leroy U. Gardner, “Pathology of So-Called Acute Silicosis,” 23 Am. J. Pub. Health 1237 (1933).

Unfortunately for McCulloch and Tweedale’s thesis, the recognition of acute silicosis, and the assessment of the prevalence of all varieties of silicosis, were confounded by the wide-spread prevalence of tuberculosis (TB).  The radiographic appearance of TB often consists of  nodular opacities, which physicians, using early, unsophisticated chest radiography, could easily confuse with silicosis.  Often workers had both TB and silicosis, and the severity of the patients’ conditions could not easily be attributed to one or the other condition.

Reading the medical literature of the day is a healthful antidote to the glib generalizations that unfairly import present-day knowledge into the discussion of silicosis in the 1930s.  In 1934, Dr. John Hawes, in the New England Journal of Medicine, noted that:

“Our ideas concerning silicosis have undergone radical changes during the past ten to fifteen years.”

John B. Hawes, II & Moses Stone, “The Effect of Acute Respiratory Tract Infections Upon Latent Silicosis,” 211 New Engl. J. Med. 1147, 1147 (1934).  Tuberculosis and tuberculosilicosis were major confounders in the clinical, diagnostic picture confronted by physicians in the 1930s and 1940s. See, e.g., Louis Benson, “Tuberculosilicosis,” 223 New Engl. J. Med. 398 (1940);  H. K. Taylor & H. Alexander, “Silicosis and Silico-Tuberculosis,” 111 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 400 (1938); G. Ornstein & D. Olmar, “Tuberculosis and Silicosis,” 2 Quarterly Bulletin Seaview Hospital 28 (1936).

An editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine, in 1936, presented a balanced view of the issues, and noted that both labor and management had important work to do to bring the safety issues under control.  Editorial, “The Problem of Silicosis,” 214 New Engl. J. Med. 794 (1936).

Effective therapies for TB became available in the 1950s.  During the 1930s, silicotuberculosis was often called “complicated” silicosis; i.e., silicosis was complicated by mycobacterial infection.  In the 1950s, with the advent of antiobiotic therapies for TB, “complicated silicosis” changed meaning to refer to advanced chronic silicosis in which small silicotic nodules had coalesced into large nodules.

Even after antibiotics became available for TB, silicosis was hardly forgotten.  Of course, the medical profession and the citizenry had other pressing issues in the 1950s: polio, an emerging epidemic of tobacco-related lung cancer, the threat of war and nuclear holocaust.  Still, silicosis remained part of the larger discussion of occupational and environmental hazards.  See, e.g., Harriet L. Hardy, “Medical Progress: Occupational Medicine,” 247 New Engl. J. Med. 473 (1951).  See also Schachtman, “Conspiracy Theories: Historians, In and Out of Court” (2013) (discussing the quantitation of publication rates about silicosis in both PubMed and in Google labs, both of which show continuing interest in, and publication about, silicosis throughout the 1950s and 1960s, into the OSHA era).

The Gauley Bridge litigation was a short-lived side show in the history of silicosis. Contrary to the McCulloch and Tweedale’s narrative, however, acute or rapid-onset silicosis became a well-accepted diagnostic entity.  See, e.g., Lewis Gregory Cole & William Gregory Cole, Pneumoconiosis (Silicosis) – The Story of Dusty Lungs – A Preliminary Report (N.Y. 1940); Jewett V. Reed & A.K. Harcourt, The Essentials of Occupational Disease 164 (1941); Rutherford T. Johnstone, Occupational Medicine and Industrial Hygiene 337 (1948); Donald Hunter, Diseases of the Occupations 837, 849 (1955).

Prevalent Racketeering

McCulloch and Tweedale concede that accurate diagnoses of silicosis require a chest X-ray (which labor radicals and plaintiffs’ lawyers in the 1930s disputed), as well as well as careful clinical examination and full occupational and personal medical histories. M&T at 5.  Although they note the diagnostic difficulties, the authors miss the lack of specialization and experience among many general practice physicians to make an accurate diagnosis of silicosis.  They acknowledge that the use of X-rays in diagnosis was still contested in the early 1930s.  M&T at 11.  The situation in the 1930s was thus ripe for specious claiming.

What McCulloch and Tweedale also seem to miss in their focus on a few compelling Gauley Bridge cases is that the diagnostic difficulties and confounders were a prescription for fraud and scamming on the wider stage.  In deploring management’s lobbying for workmen compensation laws, they ignore that many labor unions concurred.  In the context of silicosis hazards, plaintiffs faced serious legal hurdles against their employers, in the form of limitations, assumption of risk, fellow worker, and contributory negligence defenses.

In 1936, in the pages of the New England Journal of Medicine, Dr. Hawes commented upon the widespread scamming and racketeering that accompanied the serious silicosis cases in West Virginia.

“Very few physicians are aware of the extent to which claims for alleged injury and disease due to dust are being brought before courts and industrial accident boards in this country. The situation in this regard amounts to a ‘racket’ compared with which others, notorious in New York, Chicago and elsewhere, fade into insignificance.   Unscrupulous lawyers have their ‘runners’ on the lookout for any employee who is exposed to dust in the course of his work, no matter what the nature of the dust nor however harmless it may be, who happens to come down with a cough or a cold or indeed with almost any other illness and then and there try to persuade him to bring suit. Unfortunately, in too many instances, physicians partly through ignorance and partly through an honest desire to help their patients and perhaps on the general theory of ‘soaking the insurance company’ are willing to testify that the dust to which this individual had been exposed was entirely responsible for his condition. In nearly 100 per cent of such cases the doctor takesat its face value the word of the worker and his friends as to the dust hazard without any real knowledge of the situation obtained from a personal inspection of the plant or at least by interviewing those in a position to know.”

John B. Hayes, II, MD, “Silicosis,” 215 New Engl. J. Med. 143 (1936).

Although the medical understanding of silicosis has advanced tremendously, the racketeering, alas, is still with us to this day.  See In re Silica Products Liab. Lit., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (Jack, J.) (describing the attorneys’ manufacturing fraudulent silicosis claims in MDL 1553).  Of course, there are real silicosis cases, but overwhelmingly they are “simple” silicosis cases, typically unaccompanied by impairment or disability.  Tuberculosis is now rarely a confounder, but histoplasmosis and coccidioidomycosis are important confounders of simple silicosis in some areas of the United States.

The Charge of Racism

McCulloch and Tweedale point out that Lanza formed an opinion that black workers were more prone to TB and silica-related disease because of their race and prevalent syphilis.  To be sure, there was (and still is) much race, ethnic, and religious prejudice in the United States.  Lanza’s views on race, however, are irrelevant to the ultimate acceptance of acute or rapid-onset silicosis as an occupational hazard of extremely high-levels of occupational silica exposure.  The race theory appeared to play no role in the civil litigation in West Virginia, and it receives no mention in the many textbooks that describe and accept acute silicosis as a diagnostic entity. As for the continuing existence of race prejudice, McCulloch and Tweedale might have noted that Dr. Gerrit Schepers, who testified for plaintiffs in asbestos and silica cases in the United States for decades, described young black African children as “pickaninnies.”  See Gerrit Schepers, “Discussion,” 132 Annals N. Y. Acad. Sci. 246, 247 (1965). It is a relatively easy, ad hominem game to play, to dismiss a scientist’s views because of his irrational race prejudices. Lanza may have been influenced by his racial theories in acting behind the scenes of the Gauley Bridge litigation, but McCulloch and Tweedale would be hard pressed to find them articulated in Lanza’s textbooks or articles.

The Rosner-Markowitz Hypothesis

The authors note that Lanza, with Metropolitan Life, helped to form the Air Hygiene Foundation (later the IHF), and they insinuate that these organizations were involved in various nefarious actions:

“The AHF (later named the Industrial Hygiene Foundation) was an enduring and powerful industry group, which helped defuse the silicosis crisis by helping companies defend compensation claims, by conducting industry-sponsored industrial hygiene studies and by assuaging public fears. This organisation, in effect, took the dust problem away from the trade unions and the public and sequestered it inside laboratories and private gatherings, where health issues could be mediated by experts and government, safe from untoward publicity. Industry lobbying was able to influence the shaping of state compensation laws for silicosis, which protected big business.”

M&T at 15-16.  These insinuations are borrowed, with attribution, from fellow labor historians, David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz.  The claims are a mixed lot.  For instance, why would not an industry work to help companies defend compensation claims?  Organized labor worked to help its members prosecute claims.  Surely McCulloch and Tweedale do not believe that every claim made was valid or that every defense frivolous.

Assuming that the AHF/IHF had some role in pressing for state workman compensation laws, then it was aligned with many labor unions that pushed for similar reforms.  As noted above, plaintiffs were often at a serious disadvantage in litigation against employers, and they frequently were turned out of court on grounds of limitations, contributory negligence, fellow-worker rule, or assumption of risk.  Plaintiffs needed certainty in coverage for occupational disease, not a jury lottery system, and employers needed some reasonable limits on the extent of liability.  Workman’s compensation was a compromise, bound not to satisfy everyone.

As for helping companies institute industrial hygiene measures and conduct hygiene studies, the AHF/IHF was helping industry live up to its obligations to provide a safe workplace.  The United States government, under the Presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, was involved in similar measures in the 1930s.  See, e.g., United States Dep’t of Labor, Silicosis Prevention:  Dust Control in Foundries (1939).

McCulloch and Tweedale’s accusation that the AHF/IHF “in effect, took the dust problem away from the trade unions and the public and sequestered it inside laboratories and private gatherings, where health issues could be mediated by experts and government, safe from untoward publicity,” is, of course, borrowed directly from the writings of Rosner and Markowitz.  The accusation does not gain any credibility from being repeated.  Involving scientists and competent laboratories that would study the issues and publish their results was a responsible step for industry to take.  Much of the early political rhetoric about silicosis was driven by personal, subjective anecdotes and uncontrolled observations.  The involvement of scientists was a step followed by labor unions, as in the example of the asbestos insulation workers union hiring Dr. Irving Selikoff in the 1950s to investigate their concerns about occupational cancer risk.

There was much to be gained by de-escalating the emotion and vitriol of the labor-management conflicts of the 1930s, although the de-escalation was unsatisfactory to radicals on both sides.  The fact is that the labor unions remained interested in, and concerned about, silicosis, both before and after World War II.  Labor unions had their own private gatherings, and engaged in rent-seeking from state and federal agencies, as did industry.  After the passage of the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, labor’s interests generally prevailed at the agency level.

“The result was that acute silicosis largely disappeared from medical discourse and Gauley Bridge was denied a place in America’s national consciousness.” M&T at Abstract.  This causal conclusion is demonstrably wrong.  If you like conspiracy theories, McCulloch and Tweedale’s history might well be self-referentially labeled, Deceit and Denial, after the work of their American counterparts, Rosner and Markowitz.

Professor Rachel Maines on Historians as Expert Witnesses

October 1st, 2013

Professor Rachel P. Maines, an historian in Cornell University recently presented on “Historians as Experts,” in an American Law Institute webcast continuing legal education program on “Finding and Developing New Expert Witnesses in Litigation” (Sept. 26, 2013).  Of course, historians are experts of sorts, or they aspire to be, but Professor Maines addressed historians as expert witnesses in court, a special breed of expert.

Professor Maines’ contributions to the history of technology, and to asbestos in particular, are impressive, and so I appreciated her noting my blog post, “How testifying historians are like lawn-mowing dogs,” (May 2010), as one of my more entertaining “diatribes against testifying historians.”  I don’t believe that historians are unnecessary in all cases, only in most cases.

Professor Maines also provided an important practice pointer by emphasizing the value of local historical societies as repositories of documents that may be important to litigation issues.  Indeed, recently, I had the pleasure of working with an archivist at the Onondaga County Historical Society, in Syracuse, New York, not far from the hallowed halls of Cornell.  A plaintiff, who worked at Syracuse China, in Syracuse, sued on a claim that he developed silicosis from workplace exposure.  The crystalline silica and clay suppliers provided warnings on bags and on Material Safety Data Sheets, but the defendants wanted to show the depth and the duration of the employer’s knowledge of silica hazards.

The works of historians and archivists proved to be very important in the favorable resolution of this upstate New York silicosis case.  The plaintiff worked at a chinaware factory owned by Syracuse China.  A chinaware collector’s history of Syracuse China contained several statements that the employer had longstanding knowledge of silicosis hazards, as do virtually all responsible employers in the United States, from the early 1930’s forward.  See Cleota Reed & Stan Skoczen, Syracuse China (Syracuse Univ. Press 1997).  Several internet sources alerted me to the existence of the Onondaga Historical Association and its potential as a source of important documents about Syracuse China, and its predecessor, Onondaga Pottery.  See, e.g., Tom Huddleston Jr., “Onondaga Historical Association unveils Syracuse China exhibit for two fundraisers,” (Mar. 22, 2010).  A few phone calls later, I had an appointment to visit the Onondaga Historical Association and meet its very helpful staff.

Syracuse China closed its doors and ceased manufacturing a few years before the law suit was filed, and discovery of the employer for evidence of its sophistication was slow going. As luck would have it, the company had provided a room full of documents going back to the first decades of the 20th century.  Among these documents were original pleadings in lawsuits, brought by employees who claimed to have developed silicosis in the 1930s.  The management clearly followed not only litigation developments, but also technical aspects of dust measurement and control.  In reviewing the Syracuse China archive at the Onondaga Historical Association, I found, among other things:

  • pre-OSHA New York state regulations for workplace safety for use of crystalline silica;
  • correspondence with silica expert, Dr. Leonard Greenberg, then at Yale University in the 1930s, and later an official in the New York Department of Labor; and
  • American Ceramic Society publications and documents on crystalline silica health hazards and environmental controls.

Personnel records allowed me to establish that Onondaga Pottery had hired a young scientist, Edward Schramm, in the 1930’s, from the United States Bureau of Standards.  Schramm served as one of the company’s representative to the American Ceramic Society.  In 1933, Schramm published an article “Dust Elimination in the Pottery Industry” in 16 J. Am. Ceramics Soc’y 205 (1933), a journal of the American Ceramics Society. The sophistication of the plaintiff’s employer with respect to silica hazards and their control was indisputable, from the 1930’s forward.

The “treasure trove” of historical documents from the local historical society allowed the defendants to file an extremely strong motion for summary judgment on the issue of sophisticated intermediary and proximate causation.  See Affirmation of Counsel for U.S. Silica Co. in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, in Irwin v. Alcoa, Inc. et al., New York Supreme Court (Onondaga County) Index No. 2010-1098 (Oct. 1, 2012).

Professor Maines’ advice is an important reminder of the utility of informal discovery through historical archives as a supplement to the more typical lawyerly tools of subpoenas and document requests.

Second Circuit Hands down a Marvel Opinion on Historian Expert Testimony

August 17th, 2013

“What will history say?  History, sir, will tell lies as usual.”
George Bernard Shaw, The Devil’s Disciple (1901)

 * * * * *

Parties to products liability litigation have for some time resorted to the ruse of using historians as rhetoricians and advocates to argue partisan litigation positions to the jury, in the evidentiary phase of trials.  The obvious opening for this ruse has come in advancing party positions on “state of the art” to claim or defend against negligence.  When plaintiffs use this tactic, they seek not only to introduce evidence of pre-sale belief or knowledge of hazards, but also to disparage any challenges to, or doubts about, hazards as unreasonable, biased, or malicious.  When defendants use this tactic, they of course seek to return the favor, by employing their expert witnesses as advocates on crucial issues of historical knowledge.

Two historian gladiators, David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz, have served as capable arguers in silica, asbestos, lead, and vinyl chloride litigation.  Indeed, you might well expect to meet them at the Argument Clinic, although more recently, they starred in an appearance in a California lead paint case, currently on trial.  See CA Lead Paint Trial: Same old Rosner, Markowitz show (Aug. 07, 2013); Howard Mintz, “Hazardous lead paint: Legal battle comes to trial in California” (July 16, 2013) (quoting Rosner’s email exchange with reporter in which he previews his partisan opinions on lead paint in advance of his testimony).

We can find no clearer statement of judicial antipathy to expert witness advocacy than the famous copyright decision by Judge Learned Hand in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).  Both sides in Nichols presented expert testimony on “dramatic writing” in an effort to prove or disprove a claim that one screenplay infringed upon another. Deprecating the lengthy, argumentative testimony from both sides’ experts, Judge Hand declared that

“[i]t ought not be allowed at all. . . .”

Id. at 123. Judge Hand explained with his usual magisterial authority:

“Argument is argument whether in the box or at the bar, and its proper place is the last.”

Id.

Other areas of expertise, besides historical scholarship, fail to satisfy the basic requirements of expert witness testimony. For instance, Judge Hand’s complaints about the “literary critic” expert witnesses in Nichols, have been relodged against “ethics” witnesses. In GST v. Telecommunications, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), both parties offered expert witness on the ethics of the conduct of corporate officers. Invoking the helpfulness criterion of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the Court found the proffered testimony would not aid the jury:

“It is evident that the contentious advocacy of the experts – illustrated by conclusions on the credibility of explanations regarding the business judgment of the board of directors . . . in clearly expressed, biased viewpoints – do little to aid the triers of fact on the underlying transactions.”

Id. at 110. The trial court discerned a serious danger that expert testimony on ethics would usurp the jury’s role in applying the law to the facts found in the case. Id. Permitting such testimony would allow expert witnesses to attempt to substitute their judgment for the jury’s. Id.; see, e.g., Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety, 505 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir. 1974) (noting disapprovingly that, evidence consisted “largely of hearsay, propaganda, speculation, and conjecture”). See also Imwinkelreid, “Expert Testimony by Ethicists: What Should Be the Norm?” 76 Temple L. Rev. 91, 114, 128 (2003) (noting that normative testimony will virtually always be inadmissible).

Of course, the substitution of an expert witness’s judgment for the jury’s is precisely what many trial lawyers hope to accomplish. Lawyers can select and present expert witnesses based upon their opinions and conclusions, whereas the conclusions of juries are all too unpredictable.  Trial courts must be vigilant to police expert witness opinion testimony in the area of history as much as, if not more than, in the area of scientific testimony. Rule 702’s requirement of knowledge that will assist the trier of fact is designed to prevent expert witnesses from testifying about matters within the common understanding of the jury, and about which the jurors can reason without help from an expert witness. In the Rezulin Multidistrict Litigation (MDL), testimony that was “a narrative of the case which a juror is equally capable of constructing” was precluded.  In re Rezulin Products Liability Litig., 309 F.Supp. 2d 531, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  Judge Kaplan explained that expert witnesses were not the appropriate conduit for a narrative of events, meetings, regulations, and documents, when they were not percipient witnesses. Such testimony was within the jury’s lay understanding, and the law prohibited the attempt to have expert witnesses “supplant the role of counsel in making argument at trial, and the role of the jury in interpreting the evidence.” Id. at 551.  See generallyNarratives & Historians for Hire”; and “How Testifying Historians Are Like Lawn-Mowing Dogs.”

In Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 2013 WL 4016875 (2d Cir. Aug. 8, 2013), the Second Circuit reaffirmed Learned Hand’s jaundiced view of expert witness advocates in the form of historian testimony. Jack Kirby was among the artists responsible for creating comic strip characters of X-Men, the Hulk, Captain America, Thor, and the Fantastic Four. Kirby’s heirs claimed that the intellectual property rights in these characters passed to them.  Marvel Characters, Inc., sought a declaratory judgment that the characters were “works for hire,” now owned by Marvel Entertainment, a subsidiary of corporate oligarch, Walt Disney Co.

The district court rejected the claims of Kirby’s heirs, and the Second Circuit affirmed. Marvel Worldwide, Inc. v. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d 720 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 2013 WL 4016875 (2d Cir. 2013).  In ruling on Marvel’s motion for judgment, the district evaluated and excluded the proffered expert witness testimony of John Morrow and Mark Evanier, who would have testified on the history of the relationship between Marvel and Jack Kirby. 777 F. Supp. 2d 720, 729-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The Second Circuit held that the district court had clearly not abused its discretion in these exclusionary rulings.  Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, slip op. at 36.

In affirming the rejection of these historians’ proffered opinions, the Circuit waxed  historiosophical:

“We have no doubt that a historian’s ‘specialized knowledge’ could potentially aid a trier of fact in some cases. A historian could, for example, help to identify, gauge the reliability of, and interpret evidence that would otherwise elude, mislead, or remain opaque to a layperson. He or she might helpfully synthesize dense or voluminous historical texts. Or such a witness might offer background knowledge or context that illuminates or places in perspective past events.”

Slip op. at 34 (internal citations omitted).

Morrow and Evanier wandered far outside the permissible boundaries of historian expert testimony.  They sought to marshal opinions based largely upon hearsay statements of various artists, uttered in a variety of settings, about how Marvel treated artists back in the day. From these statements, the aspiring litigation historians speculated about intentions, understandings, and motivations of the historical actors at Marvel, and of Jack Kirby.  Id. at 35.

The appellate court recognized the serious danger of using historian expert witnesses as

“a conduit for introducing hearsay under the guise that the testifying expert used the hearsay as the basis of his testimony.”

Id. (internal citations omitted).  The Circuit recognized that implicit in Rule 703 is something akin to a “best evidence” rule, which relegated the historians to clearly less than best:

“The appropriate way to adduce factual details of specific past events is, where possible, through persons who witnessed those events. And the jobs of judging these witnesses’ credibility and drawing inferences from their testimony belong to the factfinder.”

Id. at 37.  The Circuit also noted that the expert opinion testimony from historians was beset a serious evidentiary challenges. In addition to relevance, legal and logical, and Rule 702, historian opinions raises basic issues about the source of the opinions.

Applying these principles, the appellate court recognized that the heirs’ witnesses were not using specialized knowledge or offering helpful historian insights, but they were marshalling hearsay:

“But Morrow and Evanier do not bring their expertise to bear in any such way. As the district court recognized, their reports are by and large undergirded by hearsay statements, made by freelance artists in both formal and informal settings, concerning Marvel’s general practices towards its artists during the relevant time period.  Drawing from these statements, they then speculate as to the motivations and intentions of certain parties… .”

Id. at 36 (internal citations omitted).

The Second Circuit’s decision is timely.  Perhaps the California trial court pondering the claims against the paint industry will heed the Marvel opinion.  The Marvel Characters opinion should close the door on the use of Rosner and Markowitz’ historical argument, as well as that of other would-be testifying historians in other cases.  In products liability cases, many of the proffered witnesses seek to testify about hearsay statements, and argue inferences about intentions, understandings, and motivations of the historical actors.  Like Morrow and Evanier, they should be excluded from the litigation process.

State of the Art — Tasing in the Dark

June 11th, 2013

In American product liability litigation, there are two causation requirements:  warnings causation and factual causation.  The law imposes a duty to warn of risks, and the alleged failure to warn must have some connection with the plaintiff’s use of the product in such a way as to have caused him harm.  If an adequate warning, whatever that is, would have protected plaintiff from the harm, then there is the requisite nexus between the alleged failure to warn and plaintiff’s harm.

The product must also, however, be a factual cause of the harm.  For instance, a really scary warning that promised death and destruction might have kept the plaintiff from using the product, but still, the product itself must have caused the harm, for the plaintiff to satisfy the factual causation requirement.

The history of the last 50 years or so of American products liability law has been a narrative of unending assault on causation, both with respect to warnings causation, and to medical or factual causation.  Plaintiffs have sought to dilute, eliminate, create presumptions for, and shift the burden of proof of, both causation requirements.

The duty to warn arises, understandably, when the seller or manufacturer has knowledge that the product can cause harm, and the buyer lacks this knowledge.  For various reasons, sloppiness, ideology, or advocacy, some writers neglect the requirement that the buyer must lack the knowledge of the danger.  Quod vanum et inutile est, lex non requirit.  The law does not require what is vain and useless.  This principle of equity and law still informs the law of product liability, through doctrines and rules such as sophisticated user and sophisticated intermediary.

The duty to warn was traditionally couched in terms of a duty to impart knowledge, actual or constructive, or a connection between a foreseeable use of the product and a serious harm.  The plaintiffs’ bar’s war on causation has sought to lower the epistemic standard for both warning and factual causation.  There are too many cases to cite for the proposition that sellers must warn of potential risks as well as actually known or knowable risks.  This erosion would be harmless but for the similar erosion in standards of medical or factual causation, and the attempts to abandon meaningful standards of expert witness causation opinions.

It is thus refreshing to see the Ninth Circuit hold that California’s law of duty to warn applies to only to known or knowable risks.  Last year, the Court of Appeals held that a Taser manufacturer had no duty to warn of the risk that repeated shocks administered by its products could lead to death by inducing metabolic acidosis, given the state of the art at the time the product was manufactured. In Rosa v. Taser International, Inc., 684 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2012) , the Rosa’s son died after being “tased” by police officers.  The autopsy report attributed death to ventricular arrhythmia, caused by Michael Rosa’s having used methamphetamine, along with the police’s use of Tasers.  Expert witnesses postulated the mechanism of causation between tasing and death was metabolic acidosis, which consists of increased lactic acid levels, which in turn increased the risk of cardiac arrest.

The Rosas sued Taser International, Inc., the manufacturer of the “stun guns” on theories of strict liability and negligent failure to warn the purchasers, the police, of the dangers of the product.  (They did not sue the meth manufacturer or retailer.) The Rosas argued that Taser had a duty to warn of any risk, “no matter how unsubstantiated,” even if based upon speculative or conjectural statements, or inadequate studies.  Id. at 946.  The Court Appeals decisively rejected a duty to warn on this inconclusive evidentiary display.

The Ninth Circuit held that California law conditions the duty to warn on a high epistemic standard of knowledge, actual or constructive.  Id. at 946.  The manufacturer must warn of a “particular risk … known or knowable in light of the generally recognized and prevailing best scientific and medical knowledge available at the time of manufacture and distribution.Id. (quoting from Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 168 Cal.App.4th 89, 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 299, 310 (2008) (emphasis added by the Circuit Court).

Noting that the California courts have not articulated epistemological principles for knowledge of hazards that must find their way into warnings, the court, in Rosa, noted some accepted considerations.  First, ignorance is not a defense. ‘‘[A] manufacturer is held to the knowledge and skill of an expert in the field; it is obliged to keep abreast of any scientific discoveries and is presumed to know the results of all such advances.’’ Id. at 946 (citing Carlin v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.4th 1104, 56 Cal. Rptr.2d 162, 920 P.2d 1347, 1351 n. 3 (1996)).

Second, a manufacturer need not warn of “every report of a possible risk, no matter how speculative, conjectural, or tentative.” Id. (internal citations omitted).  A duty to warn of every possible risk would have the counter-productive result of diluting the effect of specific warnings of real risks, by “inundat[ing the public] indiscriminately with notice of any and every hint of danger.” Id.

The Rosas relied upon four peer-reviewed articles to argue that Taser had a duty to warn. Id. at 497. The Ninth Circuit looked past the fact of mere publication and peer review, to the actual nature and content of the relied-upon articles.  Some of the publications did not address stun guns, but two did, although in speculative ways.  See Raymond Fish & Leslie A. Geddes, “Effects of Stun Guns and Tasers,” 358 The Lancet 687 (2001).  The second publication was a Department of Defense report, which predated Michael Rosa’s death, but was not generally available until after his death.  John M. Kenny, et al., Human Effects Advisory Panel, Report of Findings Sticky Shocker Assessment (1999).  The court doubted whether such a report, unavailable to defendant, could be the predicate for defendant’s duty warn.  In any event, the content of the 1999 report was itself speculative, and merely concluded that  “deaths following Taser[] use may be due to acidosis.” Kenny at 31. The report did not state a causal conclusion, and it qualified its dataset as limited by small size.  Kenny at 32.

Taser added relevant warnings, six years after Michael Rosa’s death, and the Rosas sought to capitalize upon the warnings as admissions of some sort.  Id. at 948.  The Court of Appeals rebuffed this argument, not only on the basis of subsequent remedial measure, but also on the basis of “state of the art,” which requires that the evidence of the harm, which forms the basis for the duty to warn, be known or knowable at the time of marketing of the product.  Id.

In Rosa, the available evidence that might constitute “knowledge” of a harm shifted between the time of injury, and the time of litigation.  In latent disease litigation, the shift in evidence can be extreme, and hence the importance of “state of the art” as a limit to the duty to warn.

Can the evidence for a knowledge claim regress?  If what was in the medical literature at some earlier time turned out to be false later, then it would seem that it was never “knowledge” in the first place.  Still, plaintiffs would likely rely upon the older apparent knowledge to claim that it created a duty to warn.  For instance, in asbestos litigation, plaintiffs have claimed, since the late 1970s, that asbestos exposure causes gastrointestinal (GI) cancer.  The plaintiffs’ claims were supported  by Dr. Selikoff and his cadre of Mt. Sinai testifying physicians and scientists, and many textbooks and review articles stated, without qualification, that asbestos caused GI cancer.  In 2006, however, the Institutes of Medicine convened a committee to review non-pulmonary cancers and asbestos, and concluded that the studies, accumulated over 35 years since Dr. Selikoff’s ipse dixit, did not support a conclusion that asbestos causes colorectal cancer.  Institute of Medicine of the National Academies, Asbestos: Selected Health Effects (2006).  If the claim is unsupported in 2006, it was not established at times past, despite the assertions of plaintiffs and their partisan expert witnesses in litigation, and in publications.

Another example of the uneven path of knowledge is the claim that silica causes lung cancer.  Early writers suggested this hypothesis on the basis of flawed evidence, but the claim came to be rejected when astute authors realized that the lung cancer mortality experience of uranium miners was determined by their exposure to ionizing radiation, not to silica.  Starting in the 1980s, however, a group of advocate scientists started to press for recognition of silica itself as a lung carcinogen, and these scientists narrowly succeeded, by a deeply divided vote, in an IARC working group vote in 1996.  This IARC classification put crystalline silica into category I, but the rationale for this classification was soon thereafter shown to be lacking.  See Patrick A. Hessel, John F. Gamble, J. Bernard L. Gee, Graham Gibbs, Francis H.Y. Green, W. Keith C. Morgan, and Brooke T. Mossman, “Silica, Silicosis, and Lung Cancer: A Response to a Recent Working Group Report,” 42 J. Occup. Envt’l Med. 704 (2000).  A seller of crystalline silica should, under the Rosa case, be well within its rights not to warn of a risk of lung cancer.  The reality is that the litigation system is way too uncertain and even capricious, leading most companies to have warned of lung cancer “risk” from the mid-1980s, forward.

What is encouraging about Rosa is its implicit recognition that the Rule 702 factors for reliable scientific opinion are very much in play when evaluating historical scientific opinion, which is asserted to be the basis for a duty to warn.  The more typical “state of the art” decisions simply pass over validity and reliability of historical statements and conclusions, with a grand gesture that everything published serves to provide “notice” of a potential hazard.  This usual approach begs the question, however, whether there was a sound basis for a conclusion that the product was known to cause the harm alleged in the pending case.  The scientific nature of the historical determination may mean that historians, lacking in scientific credentials, will be inappropriate witnesses to support historical claims of knowledge of risks.  The Rosa court’s insistence upon historical study and conclusion validity and correctness requires a careful review of the historical epistemic claim in view of the full historical and contemporary record.

In the Rosa case itself, the claim of failure to warn failed as a result of a fair analysis of the extant evidence for the claim at the time of marketing of the Taser. The post-marketing shift in the epistemic basis for the failure-to-warn claim was irrelevant to the Rosas’ case.  Perhaps the warnings vel non on the methamphetamine used by Michael Rosa would have been a better predicate for the lawsuit?

The WABAC on the Wayback Machine – Proving Up Internet History

June 16th, 2012

Every TV-literate American of my generation knows that Mr. Peabody and his boy, Sherman, invented a time machine, the “WABAC machine,” which allowed them to travel back in time to explore, and to alter, historical events. The Rocky and Bullwinkle Show. My children know that the universe began with the creation of the internet, and that all you need to visit the past is the Wayback Machine, at http://archive.org/index.php

The content of the internet is not static; webpages come and go.  The Wayback Machine periodically archives snapshots of webpages, and makes them available for review.  The Wayback Machine has great utility for investigative journalists, historians, and, of course, lawyers.  See Healthcare Advocates, Inc. v. Harding, Earley, Follmer & Frailey, 497 F. Supp. 2d 627 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (describing the Internet Archive as “a nonprofit organization that has created an online library of digital media in an effort to preserve digital content for future reference. Its digital database is equivalent to a paper library, but is filled with digital media like websites instead of books. The library includes a collection of chronological records of various websites which Internet Archive makes available at no cost to the public via the Wayback Machine. The library’s records include more than 85 billion screenshots of web pages which are stored on a computer database in California. Internet Archive’s database provides users with the ability to study websites that may have been changed or no longer exist.”).

A few years ago, when I was practicing in Philadelphia, an out-of-town firm filed over 100 silicosis cases in the Court of Common Pleas.  The cases were generated by screenings funded and organized by the plaintiffs’ firm.  The plaintiffs’ and defense counsel tussled over the propriety of the screenings, and the plaintiffs’ firm insisted that it did not historically conduct radiographic screenings for pneumoconiosis cases.  A simple search for the plaintiffs’ firm’s website, on The Wayback Machine, told a different story.   See Schachtman, “State Regulators Impose Sanction for Unlawful Silicosis Screenings,” 17(13) Wash. Leg. Fdtn. Leg. Op. Ltr. (May 25, 2007).

Proving the past content of the plaintiffs’ firm’s website never became an issue in the Philadelphia silicosis issue, but the Wayback Machine has figured in other litigation where authentication was required.  United States v. Bansal, 663 F.3d 634 (3d Cir. 2011);  Keystone Retaining Wall Sys., Inc. v. Basalite Concrete Prods., LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145545, n.9 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2011) (noting that federal courts have regularly accepted evidence from the Internet Archive); St. Luke’s Cataract & Laser Inst., P.A. v. Sanderson, No. 8:06-CV-223, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28873, at *6, 2006 WL 1320242, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2006) (noting that a screen capture from the Internet Archive could be printed out and authenticated with an affidavit from a “representative of Internet Archive with personal knowledge of its contents, verifying that the printouts Plaintiff seeks to admit are true and accurate copies of Internet Archive’s records”).

There is also a significant secondary literature describing authentication procedures.  See WAYBACK MACHINE MEMO: Report of the Discovery Practices and Procedures Subcommittee of the Enforcement Committee (Nov. 2009) (collecting cases and urging authentication by judicial notice or stipulation); Wayback Machine Frequently Asked Questions (describing model affidavit for authentication, and alternative procedures in lieu of affidavit).

See also Kenneth N. Rashbaum, Matthew F. Knouff, and Dominique Murray, “Admissibility of Non-U.S. Electronic Evidence,” 18 Richmond J. L. & Tech. 9 (2012);  Rebecca Levy-Sachs & Jason Curtin, “Clearing Hurdles to Admission,” For The Defense 24 (Jan. 2011); James Gibson & Ketan Bhirud, “Admitting Web Pages Into Evidence,” Nevada Lawyer 15 (Oct. 2010); Deborah R. Eltgroth, “Best Evidence and the Wayback Machine: Toward a Workable Authentication Standard for Archived Internet Evidence,” 78 Fordham L. Rev. 181 (2009); Beryl A. Howell, “Proving Web History: How to Use the Internet Archive,” J. Internet Law 3 (Feb. 2006); Gregory P. Joseph, “Internet Archive (Wayback Machine) Printouts Received in Evidence on Preliminary Injunction Motion Evidently without Further Authentication — Courts Warming to Reliability“; Federal Evidence Review, “Authenticating Internet Screenshot Evidence Under FRE 901” (Dec. 19, 2011) (describing Bansal case and its review of authentication methods for the Wayback Machine archive of website pages).

 

The United States Government’s Role in the Asbestos Mess

January 31st, 2012

More Asbestos History

The role of the United States government in the asbestos mess is relatively unexplored historical territory.  Anti-asbestos zealots, including the “Lobby,” and the plaintiffs bar, have demonized industry for the failure to control asbestos health hazards.  The truth is very different.  (The term, “the Lobby,” comes from the insightful article by the late Prof. Liddell:  F. D. K. Liddell, “Magic, Menance, Myth and Malice,” 41 Ann. Occup. Hyg. 3 (1997).  Liddell’s article should be required reading for all judges with an asbestos docket, as well as all policy makers and legislators who tackle asbestos issues.)

Back in 2007, Walter Olson, wrote an important essay on government and risk, “Dangerous When In Power” Reason (Mar. 2007). Olson later followed up on this theme at Point of Law, where he wrote about “The U.S. Navy and the asbestos calamity.”  Olson published some observations I shared with him at the time:

“In the mid-1970s, amidst economic turmoil and declining military budgets, the US Navy found itself with a big problem. Payments to civilians under the FECA (Federal Employees Compensation Act), a statute that gives civilian employees of shipyards the equivalent of workers’ compensation benefits, came right out of the Navy’s budget for shipbuilding. The Navy had no insurance for FECA payments, and suddenly it found itself facing a large uptick in the number of claims made by civilians for asbestos-related injuries.

About the same time, many states adopted some version of strict product liability, some stricter than others. None was likely stricter than Pennsylvania’s version.

The FECA gives the government liens against any recovery in third-party actions. The JAG lawyers, faced with a blooming docket of FECA cases, started to encourage the workers compensation plaintiffs’ lawyers to file third-party actions. Indeed, in Philadelphia, the lawyers who stepped into the forefront of asbestos personal injury actions had been workers comp lawyers with a large FECA docket (Gene Locks; Joe Shein).

The cruel irony of the FECA (or workers’ comp) statutes is that the employer pays regardless of fault, that the employer can’t be sued in civil actions, and that the employer can recover ~80% of its payments from settlements or judgment proceeds from a civil defendant.

Ultimately, the plaintiffs’ bar found that recoveries and settlements were too certain to encumber themselves and their clients with government liens, and they stopped filing their FECA cases altogether.

The government’s role in fueling the explosion of asbestos civil actions has never, to my knowledge, been discussed in the media. When I was a young lawyer, my first trials were in defense of companies that were dragged into litigation over having sold asbestos products to the Navy, often pursuant to government specifications. These cases, filed in the late 1970s, up for trial in the mid-1980s, often had a letter in the claimant’s personnel file from the JAG officer, noting that the man had been diagnosed with asbestosis and urging him to seek legal counsel to consider a civil suit against the Navy’s suppliers. Unfortunately, I don’t have any of these documents anymore, but they may not be too difficult to obtain.

What a story is hidden away in those old files! Not only did the Navy know of the asbestos hazards, hide them from its civilian workers, but when those workers got sick, the Navy turned on its outside suppliers by encouraging its workers to sue the suppliers, while hiding behind the exclusive remedy provision of the FECA.”

The historical mythology of asbestos and its hazards was created in large measure with the active cooperation of the government and asbestos plaintiffs’ lawyers.  The government, acting through the plaintiffs’ bar, was able to keep its weapons budgets intact, by minimizing its own losses on FECA payments.  We should probably thus regard the asbestos litigation as an early form of the parens patriae suits that have become a commonplace.

In the late 1960s, some of the asbestos insulation manufacturers that were still in business, created their own mythology. In litigating the early,  Navy-inspired, failure-to-warn claims, these insulation manufacturers advanced the unfounded view that the dangerousness of asbestos to end users was somehow not known before Dr. Irving Selikoff publicized the hazard, with his work in 1964. The insulators union’s publication, Asbestos Worker, shows an awareness of the hazard before then; indeed, the union’s appreciation of the hazard was in large measure the reason that the union approached Selikoff to conduct epidemiologic studies on their membership. The U.S. Navy was also well aware of the hazards (and thus did not need to be warned by anyone), as can be seen in an article entitled “Asbestosis” by Capt. H.M. Robbins & W.T. Marr in the October 1962 issue of the Navy’s Safety ReviewSee also Walter Olson, “Asbestos awareness pre-Selikoff,” (Oct. 19, 2007).

Recently, a defense expert witness, Dr. Dennis Paustenach, published an historical review on the evolution of knowledge about asbestos.  Kara Franke & Dennis Paustenbach, “Government and Navy knowledge regarding health hazards of Asbestos: A state of the science evaluation (1900 to 1970),” 23(S3) Inhalation Toxicology 1 (2011) (available for download free of charge).

Here is the authors’ abstract:

“We evaluated dozens of published and unpublished documents describing the knowledge and awareness of both the scientific community and governmental entities, particularly the US Navy, regarding the health hazards associated with asbestos over time. We divided our analysis into specific blocks of time: 1900–1929, 1930–1959, and 1960–1970. By 1930, it was clear that high occupational exposure to asbestos caused a unique disease (asbestosis). Between about 1938 and 1965, a considerable amount of exposure and epidemiology data were collected by various scientific and government organizations. Between 1960 and 1970, mesothelioma was clearly linked to exposure to amphibole asbestos. Nonetheless, the Navy continued to require the use of asbestos-containing materials on ships, but also recommended that proper precautions be taken when handling asbestos. We concluded that the Navy was arguably one of the most knowledgeable organizations in the world regarding the health hazards of asbestos, and that it attempted to implement procedures that would minimize the opportunity for adverse effects on both servicemen and civilians. Finally, it is apparent from our research that through at least 1970, neither the military nor the private sector believed that the myriad of asbestos-containing products considered “encapsulated” (e.g. gaskets, brakes, Bakelite) posed a health hazard to those working with them.”

The subject is well covered territory, but the article approaches its subject matter from the perspective of what was known by the United States Navy, which may well have been singlehandedly responsible for exposing the greatest number of men and women to asbestos in the United States.  Back in the 1980s, Dr. Sam Forman covered a similar theme, but only through War War II.  See Samuel A. Forman, “U.S. Navy Shipyard Occupational Medicine Through World War II,” 30 J. Occup. Med. 28 (1988).

The focus on the Navy is a welcome change from the conspiratorial histories of Brodeur, Castleman, Rosner, and others whose writings suggest that “industry,” more or less specifically defined, withheld material knowledge from its customers.  In the case of the Navy, the withholding may have gone the other way around.

I leave it to readers to judge the bona fides and Franke and Paustenbach’s historical essay, but from my perspective, the article generally hits a more balanced and better supported view of the asbestos state of the art.

The article is, however, not without problems.

Here are some things that were either left out, or given incomplete or inadequate emphasis:

1. The Navy’s work rules that required asbestos insulation to be removed from its packaging on shore, before being taken on board ships.  This work rule deprived ship-board workers of the benefit of warnings.  (Whether package warnings could have made any difference to control exposures that required technical personnel with exposure measuring equipment is a whole other matter.)

2. The Navy had effective knowledge of working conditions through its ownership and control of the workplace.  In this respect, the Navy’s knowledge of the hazards created in its shipyards was vastly greater than that of remote suppliers.

3.  The Navy’s had no workers’ compensation budget per se.  Money paid to civilian employees under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (FECA) came directly from the Navy’s general revenues.  Navy legal counsel encouraged FECA plaintiffs’ counsel to sue the Navy’s vendors under emerging doctrines of strict liability.  In some states, such as Pennsylvania and New Jersey, the vendors, sued in strict liability, often could not point to the Navy’s negligence as a defense because the Navy was immune from a civil suit.

There are historical nits to pick with Franke’s article, as well.  Consider:

“the elevated risk of lung cancer was first formally discovered by Doll in 1955 (Doll, 1955).”

Id. at 2.  What does it mean to discover something formally?  Doll certainly did not present a mathematical proof, with Q.E.D. at the bottom line.  The men who had lung cancer in Doll’s cohort also had asbestosis, and his study suggested that there was a relationship between the diffuse interstitial pulmonary fibrosis and lung cancer, and not necessarily an association with the lighter, more intermittent exposures sustained by insulators.  Furthermore, although Doll’s cohort was impressive at the time, he had no control for smoking.  This oversight was remarkable given that Doll was working on the epidemiology of smoking and lung cancer at the very time he published his cohort study of asbestos factory workers.

And consider the authors’ statement:

“Crocidolite was not frequently used in products … .”

Id. at 3 (citing Rachel Maines, Asbestos and Fire (New Brunswick 2005). The authors do not provide a specific page reference so it is difficult to evaluate their citation of Professor Maines.  What is known, however, is that crocidolite was used in transite pipe and board products, as well as other products, used throughout the United States, including Navy shipyards.  After Johns-Manville went into bankruptcy, shipyard workers miraculously experienced a sudden, permanent loss of memory about their use of JM products.  A careful review of the pre-JM-bankruptcy testimony of key shipyard workers, however, shows that “big blue” was in Navy shipyards.

Discovery into the Origin of Historian Expert Witnesses’ Opinions

January 30th, 2012

As every trial lawyer in America knows, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were recently changed to protect expert witness draft reports and lawyer-expert witness communications from discovery.  See Rule 26. Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing Discovery (amended effective December 2010).

In particular, Rule 26(b) (4)(B), and (C) provides:

(4)(B) Trial-Preparation Protection for Draft Reports or Disclosures. Rules 26(b)(3)(A) and (B) protect drafts of any report or disclosure required under Rule 26(a)(2), regardless of the form in which the draft is recorded.

(C) Trial-Preparation Protection for Communications Between a Party’s Attorney and Expert Witnesses. Rules 26(b)(3)(A) and (B) protect communications between the party’s attorney and any witness required to provide a report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), regardless of the form of the communications, except to the extent that the communications:

(i) relate to compensation for the expert’s study or testimony;

(ii) identify facts or data that the party’s attorney provided and that the expert considered in forming the opinions to be expressed; or

(iii) identify assumptions that the party’s attorney provided and that the expert relied on in forming the opinions to be expressed.

In some ways, this amendment was a retrograde step.  Although protecting drafts and communications from discovery helps ease the expense and inconvenience of working with expert witnesses, the amendment also serves to protect unscrupulous lawyers and expert witnesses who work in concert to present tendentious opinions.

In the sciences, tendentious opinions will ultimately be embarrassed by future facts, but in the field of history, the interpretative narratives are often unfalsifiable and malleable.  Discovery into the creative process of historian expert witnesses’ opinions needs to be complete and thorough.

Consider the consider the case of Barry Castleman, who has testified for decades for the asbestos litigation industry, on historical issues in asbestos personal injury cases.  Back in 1986, when Castleman was still “researching” his opinions, he received a letter from plaintiffs’ lawyer, Tom Hart:

 

Mr. Barry Castleman                                                                                   January 9, 1986
1722 Linden Avenue
Baltimore, Maryland 21217

RE: Kenneth Lynch

Dear Barry:

As a follow-up to our conversation on January 6, 1986, I have reviewed our files and find that we do not have a file on Kenneth Lynch. Apparently I was provided with some of these papers indirectly. I seem to recall that the attorneys from California came to South Carolina and conducted the search for Kenneth Lynch’s papers.

We have not been eager to pursue this due to our understanding that Dr. Lynch was not convinced that asbestos was a cause of cancer. Despite his earlier publications, he remained personally reluctant to state that asbestos was causally related to the formation of cancers until some time in the late 1950’s or early 1960’s. This indecision on his part would be contrary to our best interests in the asbestos litigation and, accordingly, we have discouraged other counsel from exploring this further.

Since we do not have the specific documents you need, perhaps Marcia Hughes could provide them to you from Dick Gerry’s office in San Diego.

With best regards, I am

Very truly yours,

Thomas H. Hart, III

 

Dr. Lynch was a well-known South Carolina pathologist, who, along with Dr. William Smith, published a case report of lung cancer in a patient with asbestosis.  See Kenneth M. Lynch & William A. Smith, “Pulmonary asbestosis III: carcinoma of lung in asbestosilicosis,” 23 Am. J. Cancer 56 (1935).  Plaintiffs’ counsel were eager to over interpret this case report as showing an association, which was beyond the ability of a single, uncontrolled case to do.

The new Rule can be seen to have a few holes in it.  Discovery is permitted into facts or data provided by counsel, and which were considered by the expert witness.  Discovery is also permitted into the identity of assumptions given by the directing counsel, and relied upon by the expert witness.  The letter from Hart to Castleman above, however, illustrates that important insights may result from suggestions, implicit or explicit, not to look at certain facts.

COURTING CLIO: HISTORIANS UNDER OATH – Part 2

December 17th, 2011

Continued from Part 1:

Court-Appointed Historians

One lawyer, Jonathan Martin, trained in historical scholarship in Princeton University, has argued that historian expert witness opinion testimony is both unavoidable and refractory to the protections of judicial gatekeeping.  Martin, Historians at the Gate:  Accommodating Expert Historical Testimony in Federal Courts.” 78 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1518 (2003).  Mr. Martin acknowledges that historians are beholding to an objective methodology, but when they are in the employ of lawyers, historians abridge or abrogate their commitment to objectivity:

Just as scientific testimony must adhere to the scientific method so too must historical testimony adhere to the historical method.  Unfortunately, historians often neglect the conventional method of their craft when offering expert testimony.  Outside the courtroom, historians generally expect one another to formulate complex, nuanced, and balanced arguments that take into account all available evidence, including any countervailing evidence.  At trial, however, the pressures of the adversary system routinely push historians toward interpretations of the past that are compressed and categorical . . .  .  As a result, historians now frequently offer unreliable evidence.

Id. at 1521.  Mr. Martin proposes to remedy the frequent, unreliable testimony from historians by the routine appointment of court-appointed expert witnesses.

In passing, Mr. Martin notes that others have urged judicial gatekeeping, under Daubert or Frye, to address unreliable historian testimony, but he rejects gatekeeping of adversarial expert witnesses as insufficient.  Id. at 1522 n.23.  Given the dearth of reported cases of such gatekeeping, this rejection seems premature.  Perhaps more important, Mr. Martin, in his rush to advocate court-appointed historians, fails to address how and why historians’ opinions are different from the opinions of experts in other fields, which are successfully subjected to cross-examination and to reliability analysis.  Historians are not alone, certainly, in succumbing to the temptation to stray from objective methodology.  Mr. Martin is correct, however, in his implicit acknowledgment that historian opinion testimony warrants increased judicial scrutiny.

One way historians differ from other fields of objective study is that historical scholarship is perfused with argument.  In biomedical and physical sciences, the presentation of research is carefully and routinely segregated into hypothesis, materials and methods, findings, and discussion.  Research findings are neatly presented without inferences to conclusions.  If conclusions can be reliably reached from the research or experiment, the investigators present their conclusions, with appropriate qualifications and caveats, in the discussion sections of their writings.  Readers understand that the discussion section is often the least important part of a published article.

Lawyering is similarly segregated into proofs and argument.  The trial lawyers’ evidence, whether real, documentary, or testimonial, is confined to a portion of the trial open for proof of facts in issue.  The trial court has the responsibility to prevent argument, argumentative questioning, and argumentative testimony in the proof-phase of the trial.  Only in closing argument, may the trial lawyers urge inferences and conclusions that assist the trier of fact to resolve the factual disputes in the case.  To be sure, trial lawyers try and sometimes succeed in advancing their argument in the proof phase of trial, either by clever juxtaposition in presenting facts, by adducing opinions in carefully defined exceptions (such as character evidence), or by successfully evading the trial court’s supervision.

Historians, in their scholarship, may acknowledge an objective method in their fact-finding, but they are under no professional constraint to separate their fact-finding and argument.  Both popular and academic historical scholarship blend fact and opinion in a manner antithetical to the sciences.  The strength and persuasiveness of historical scholarship often turns on how well the historian creates a complex narrative of fact, inference, argument, and opinion.  And the greatest art is that which conceals itself.

The pervasive role of argument is a relatively small problem compared to the dominance and legitimacy of subjective perspective in historical narrative.  Historians write from a point of view.  Openly and honestly, they narrate historical facts and events from a Marxist, labor, feminist, free-market, religious, or other point of view.  Sometimes, their point of view is covert, but it still colors the narrative.  Importantly, the point of view is often not scientific in that the scholars would likely refuse to count any empirical evidence as refuting the “truth” of their narrative.

The problems and excesses of historian opinion testimony are thus not likely to be remedied by having a court-appointed historian weigh in on the issues.  Such a court-appointed historian would present a challenge to the parties, who would need to cross examine vigorously, and to the court, which would be obligated to review and pass on the reliability of its own expert witness.  The prestige and imprimatur of court appointment would just as likely thwart as promote the truth-finding function of trial.  The argumentativeness of historical narrative would escape meaningful detection and confrontation.  Court appointments of historian witnesses might well have the effect of ending the dispute, but not in a way that advances the just resolution of the parties’ claims.

Appointment of “neutral” expert witnesses may appear to be an attractive judicial strategy to a trial court faced with party expert witnesses that are “too extreme.”  Trial judges, especially in federal Multidistrict Litigation (MDL), hear capable advocates present highly credentialed expert witnesses.  Often the opinions of the parties’ expert witnesses are diametrically opposed in ways that do not let the trial court gauge their competing claims to truth.  If trial courts find assessment of these expert witnesses’ opinions to be difficult, juries are not likely to fare better.  In perplexity, judges may try to align themselves in the middle, and comfort themselves with the belief that the trust must lie somewhere between the parties’ polar views of the world.

In the silicone gel breast implant litigation, MDL 926, Judge Sam Pointer found himself in the “middle.”  He had refused Daubert challenges to plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, and stated that the parties’ expert witnesses were too extreme.  After Judge Jack Weinstein sua sponte raised the issue of court-appointed experts in breast implant cases, plaintiffs’ counsel petitioned Judge Pointer to appoint expert witnesses in all the federal cases.  Over defendants’ objections, Judge Pointer appointed a toxicologist, a rheumatologist, an immunologist, and an epidemiologist to address the plaintiffs’ claims that silicone causes systemic autoimmune and connective tissue diseases.  After a lengthy, expensive, complex proceeding, the MDL court-appointed expert witnesses filed reports and gave testimony that rejected plaintiffs’ claims.  Much to Judge Pointer’s surprise, but not the scientific community’s, the Court’s expert witnesses opined that plaintiffs’ claims were not supported and shown by sound scientific evidence.  Subsequently, a committee of the Institute of Medicine, of the National Academy of Sciences, reached the same exculpatory conclusion.

In MDL 926, the resort to court-appointed witnesses was necessitated by that trial court’s refusal or failure to engage in meaningful gatekeeping.  Remarkably, before the MDL Court even embarked upon the expensive detour of four Rule 706 witnesses, another federal court, employing expert witness advisors, reached the same conclusion in Daubert proceedings.  Hall v. Baxter, 947 F.Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996).  Judge Weinstein, sitting on all federal cases in the Eastern and Southern District of New York, had already granted partial summary judgment to defendants on plaintiffs’ systemic injury claims.  In re Breast Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1996).  Rule 706 was used by plaintiffs’ counsel to prolong and protract the federal proceedings, in the hope that they would be saved by research that they were sponsoring through their expert witnesses.

In looking at disputes of historical scholarship, we can easily imagine that judges will see the parties’ expert witnesses as too extreme.  The time-consuming, expensive resort to court-appointed witnesses, however, will not likely advance the resolution of issues of historical scholarship.  Unlike the selection process in MDL 926, where Judge Pointer could relatively quickly find his way to well-qualified, credible, and disinterested witnesses, the selection of an historian would stumble over the disinterestedness criterion.  Historians, by the nature of their craft, are permitted, and are encouraged, to advance a point of view that is out of place in the judicial process.

Historian Witnesses on State-of-the-Art in Tort Cases

In products liability litigation over designs or warnings, a supplier or manufacturer is typically held to the knowledge and expertise of an expert in the field.  Unfortunately, the law offers little help in answering the obvious question of which expert, of all the experts in the world, sets the appropriate standard.  In litigation over the quality of medical care, the law in many states resolves this issue by providing a defense under the “Two Schools of Thought Doctrine.”  See, e.g., “Two Schools of Thought and Informed Consent Doctrine in Pennsylvania.”  98 Dickenson L. Rev. 713 (1994).  A physician does not deviate from the standard of care simply because many or most physicians reject the approach he or she took to the patient’s problem.  As long as a substantial minority of physicians would have concurred in the judgment of the defendant physician, the claim of malpractice fails.  The Two School Doctrine has obvious implications for the standard of design or warning in products cases.

What is clear in products liability cases is that the standard of expertise must be assessed at a given time, when the product or material enters the stream of commerce.  In silicosis cases, which may involve long latency periods between exposure and manifestation of claimed disease, the parties may face historical issues of what experts knew at the legally relevant time of the sale.  Intellectual historians may indeed provide helpful insights into what was actually believed by experts in the past, but such historical data about past “beliefs” can answer the state-of-the-art inquiry only in part.  Knowledge requires at least true, justified belief.  Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations 167-288 (Cambridge 1981).  Hunches, suspicions, and hypotheses, even when published in respected books or journals, do not rise to the level of scientific knowledge that can be charged to the manufacturer or the supplier defendants.  Historians, unless adequately trained and expert in scientific method and research, will be inadequate to the task of explaining whether a given belief was justified and true.  Historians, motivated by politics or ideology, may try to advance their causes by trumpeting some past scientific findings, but in the last analysis, scientific theories cannot be chosen the way one chooses to be a Democrat or a Republican.  Proof of “state of the art,” or who knew what when, will require substantial expertise in science and medicine.  Historians may have to emote on the sidelines of these debates.