TORTINI

For your delectation and delight, desultory dicta on the law of delicts.

Johnson & Johnson Leaves Them in the Dust – Echeverria Verdict Unraveled

October 24th, 2017

It was a tough week for the talc litigation industry. On October 17, the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed a large verdict for plaintiffs because a St. Louis trial court unconstitutionally had asserted personal jurisdiction over Johnson & Johnson. In essence, the Missouri appellate court just said no to forum shopping. Fox v. Johnson & Johnson, Mo. Ct. App., No. ED104580 (Oct. 17, 2017). And on Friday, October 20, a California trial court, on sober second thought, granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and in the alternative, a new trial in the recent Escheverria case, which had resulted in plaintiffs’ awards approaching half a billion dollars. See Orders regarding Defendants Combined Motion for New Trial and Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, Echeverria v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., Case No. BC628228, JCCP No. 4872, Calif. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty. (Oct. 20, 2017) [cited below as Echeverria op.] See also Daniel Siegal, “J&J Wins Battle Against $417M Talc Award, But War Not Over,” Law360 (Oct. 23, 2017).

The trial court issued an opinion, over 50 pages long, which carefully reviewed the parties’ contentions. Only some of the issues considered by the trial court are discussed below.

Differential Etiology

Differential etiology resembles the biological process of solid waste management; both employ the process of elimination.

Most diseases in humans have a large “idiopathic” or “cause unknown” component. The differential methodology purports to take all the known causes and rule out the ones that are improbable in a given case. As a matter of logic, this is what is known as an iterative disjunctive syllogism. If you start with:

A or B or C.

And you show not B;

and then, not C.

you are left with A.

This argument is, of course, a perfectly valid syllogism. If the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true. The problem is that the initial premise, to be accurate for many if not most human chronic diseases, must include a disjunct, U, or “cause unknown.” And once U is added to the first line of the syllogism, rarely is there a way to exclude it.

Sometimes the “cause unknown” component may be very small. For instance, in human malignant mesothelioma, the overwhelming majority of occupational cases do have a known cause: amphibole asbestos. When sufficient amphibole asbestos fiber exposure has been shown, there is usually no serious issue of individual attribution left for debate. The base rate of (idiopathic) mesothelioma is very low, and the relative risk from occupational amphibole asbestos exposure is extraordinarily large.

Ovarian cancer, which is the subject of the Escheverria case, is a very different story. The rate of idiopathic cases – no known causes – is much higher, and may even make up a majority of cases. The so-called differential etiology method never gets down to a conclusion that it is the talc (assuming arguendo that talc causes ovarian cancer). You always have talc or unknown cause in the conclusion.

In Escheverria, the plaintiffs’ lawyers called only one expert witness on specific causation, Echeverria’s treating physician, Dr. Annie Yessaian (“Yessaian”). Yessaian advanced a “differential etiology” analysis, which she claimed allowed her to conclude that talc was “more probable than not” a cause of plaintiff’s ovarian cancer. Echeverria op. at 5. Upon careful review, the trial court realized that Yessaian had never properly applied the iterative disjunctive syllogism, or differential etiology, to reach a valid conclusion. Despite a good deal of hand waving, Yessaian never ruled out other causes of the plaintiff’s ovarian cancer. Echeverria op. at 30.

The plaintiff’s menarche was at age 11, and so she had had a large number of ovulatory cycles. She was obese, and over 60 years old at the time of diagnosis. Yessaian did not rule these factors out; rather she testified without foundation that these factors were “less likely than not” causes of plaintiff’s ovarian cancer1. Echeverria op. at 31. The trial court noted that these potential causes had never been eliminated from the list of differentials; Yessaian had simply “discounted” them by ipse dixit. As for the “U,” or unknown causes that are clearly at play in many if not most ovarian cancers, Yessaian admitted that Escheverria’s cancer “probably” resulted from some unknown risk factor; but then, out of thin air, she testified that the probability of idiopathic causation was less than 50%. The trial court concluded that Yessian’s ruling in and ruling out decisions were ultimately nothing more than conjecture, and the plaintiff had never properly shown specific causation. Id. at 26-27, 31.

Relative Risk Less than Two

Yessaian’s specific causation opinion cratered further as a result of her inability to identify any specific biomarker or “fingerprint” of causation. The plaintiffs’ expert witnesses had argued that chronic inflammation is the mechanism by which talc causes ovarian cancer, but there was no histopathologic evidence of inflammation in association with ovarian tissue that had given rise to the cancer.

The relative risk argument is one way to attribute specific causation, and circumvent idiopathic causes by quantifying the contribution of the specific causal factor (again assuming it really is such) vis-a-vis the baseline risk of disease from unknown causes. The plaintiff, however, had called an expert witness on epidemiology, Jack Siemiatycki, who had explained that a risk ratio of 2.0 is “the point at which the probability of causation, which is the probability that a given agent causes a specific disease, exceeds 50 percent ….” Escheverria op. at 5. The defense epidemiologic expert, Dr. Douglas Weed, similarly testified and elaborated on the concept of probability of causation and attributable risk.2

The plaintiffs’ counsel attempted to extricate themselves from this arithmetic quagmire by arguing that there was “multiple causation,” and interaction among causes. Escheverria op. at 41-42. Yessaian, however, had disavowed even the most obvious concurrent causes (ovulatory cycles and age), and put all her markers down on talc. There was no evidence of multiple causation to muck up the analysis. Of course, the talc epidemiologic studies were all multivariate analyses that measured associations of talc and ovarian cancer in the presence of co-variates, such as age at menarche, and age at diagnosis.

Furthermore, Yessian was constrained by her acknowledgement that histologic type of ovarian cancer is highly relevant, and that none of the studies of serous ovaran cancer (the type diagnosed in Ms. Escheverria) reported out risk ratios in excess of 2.0. Escheverria op. at 28-29. Yessaian could not escape the inexorable math, and testimony about probability of causation from Jack Siemiatycki. Id at 29.3

Their case in extremis, the plaintiffs’ counsel argued4 that epidemiologic studies were not needed to prove causation, which might be true in a case involving a known mechanism with highly specific biomarkers to identify the causal mechanism that had taken place in the claimant. Having cited and relied extensively upon epidemiologic studies, Yessaian was hoisted with own her petard; the trial court found the assertion that there was an alternative path to specific causation to be absent from the record and quite incredible.

State of the Art

The duty to warn is constrained by what is known or should have been known at the time of marketing, what lawyers sometimes call “state of the art.” The trial court reasoned that since Eva Echeverria developed her serous ovarian cancer in 2007, the relevant scientific state of knowledge was censored at the time of plaintiff’s diagnosis. Any warning given after 2007 could not have prevented plaintiffs’ disease. (In truth, the relevant censoring date was likely well before 2007, but an earlier date would not have made a difference in the judicial outcome.)

There was no serious claim that the defendants had “secret” knowledge other than what was known in the scientific community. Plaintiffs’ expert witness on epidemiology, Jack Siemiatycki, co-chaired the IARC working group that concluded and published in 2007, that talc was a possible cause of ovarian cancer, a finding that rejected a higher classification, such as “probable” or “known.” IARC Monograph for Carbon Black, Titanium Dioxide & Talc, vol 93 (2010); Robert Baan, et al., “Carcinogenicity of carbon black, titanium dioxide, and talc,” 7 Lancet Oncology 295 (2006)5. In Escheverria, Siemiatycki testified in accordance with his public scientific work, and his service on the IARC working group, and he conceded that in 2007, there was no known causal connection between talc and human ovarian cancer. Notably, the defense lawyers failed to convert this state-of-the-art issue into a dispositive judgment because they had failed to ask for a binding jury instruction on the issue. Escheverria op. at 32.

For the trial court, the absence of scientific knowledge up to and including 2007, the year of Escheverria’s diagnosis, was also relevant to the existence vel non of malice that would support the imposition of punitive damages. Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the trial court found that there was a scientific debate whether talc causes ovarian cancer, which debate would not allow the imputation of scienter to the defendants to permit the jury to infer that the defendants had acted with malice. Escheverria op. at 35. Given that no one in the medical or scientific community had asserted a relevant causal conclusion in or before 2007, the trial court’s conclusion is unassailable. The court’s analysis, however, begs the question why a lay jury is permitted to find any breach of a duty to warn, in the face of an engaged scientific community that uniformly refused to advance a causal conclusion in the relevant time frame.

New Trial on General and Specific Causation

The trial court did not belabor the analysis of general causation beyond pointing out that there were substantial uncertainties for many of the Bradford Hill considerations, such as consistency, strength, and exposure-response. With respect to specific causation, all the problems discussed on the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict were also relevant to finding that the plaintiff failed to establish specific causation by a preponderance of the evidence. Escheverria op. at 40.

The trial court identified several grounds for the grant of a new trial, but one ground involved improper argument by plaintiffs’ counsel, who has repeatedly resorted to the same argument in previous cases. Forewarned, the defense sought a ruling in limine to exclude all evidence of lobbying and communications with federal agencies over regulations and regulatory classifications of talc. In a pretrial ruling, the trial court permitted the use of company documents about attempts to influence the National Toxicology Program (NTP) and the IARC for the limited purpose of notice to defendants that scientific organizations were considering whether to label talc as a carcinogen. Escheverria op. at 45.

Perhaps the trial court was being charitable in assessing what the lobbying evidence would be used for, but the plaintiffs did not need evidence of lobbying to prove “notice.” Early, often, and deliberately, the plaintiffs’ lawyers used evidence of lobbying for purposes well beyond the permissible, limited relevancy of notice. Escheverria’s counsel, Allen Smith argued, in opening and in closing that the defendants had “fended off” the National Toxicology Program (NTP), and that “if Johnson & Johnson would have just stayed out of it, let the scientists do their work at the U.S. government, the NTP would have listed talc as a carcinogen as far back as 2000.” So lobbying activities were not used as evidence of notice at all, but rather for arguing an inference of malice and outrageous misconduct from the prevention of regulation. Escheverria op. at 46.

Predictable.


1 Yessaian did advert to a study that she interpreted as failing to establish an association between obesity and ovarian cancer, but for the other risk factors of age and ovulatory cycles, the plaintiff’s expert witness offered no basis at all.

2 The trial court studiously avoided reference to the defense expert witness on epidemiology. SeeEcheverria Talc Trial – Crossexamination on Alleged Expert Witness Misconduct” (Oct. 21, 2017).

3 citing well-known relative risk of two cases, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F. 3d 1311, 1321 (9th Cir. 1995); In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., Sales Prac. & Prod. Liab. Litig., 185 F. Supp. 3d 786, 791-92; Marder v. G.D. Searle & Co., 630 F. Supp. 1087, 1092 (D.Md. 1986), aff’d mem. on other grounds sub nom. Wheelahan v. G.D.Searle & Co., 814 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).

4 citing the dubious In re Neurontin Marketing, Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 612 F. Supp. 2d 116, 132 (D. Mass. 2009), aff’d, 712 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2013).

5 Unfortunately, even the IARC classification of “probably” carcinogenic to humans is actually fairly meaningless exercises in semantics, not science. A close reading of the IARC Preamble definition of probable reveals that probable does not mean greater than 50%: “The terms probably carcinogenic and possibly carcinogenic have no quantitative significance and are used simply as descriptors of different levels of evidence of human carcinogenicity, with probably carcinogenic signifying a higher level of evidence than possibly carcinogenic.”

Echeverria Talc Trial – Crossexamination on Alleged Expert Witness Misconduct

October 21st, 2017

In a post-trial end-zone victory dance in Echeverria v. Johnson & Johnson, plaintiffs’ lawyer, Allen Smith proffered three explanations for the jury’s stunning $417 million verdict in his talc ovarian cancer case.1 One of the explanations asserted was Smith’s boast that he had adduced evidence that Johnson & Johnson’s expert witness on epidemiology, Douglas Weed, a former National Cancer Institute epidemiologist and physician, had been sanctioned in another, non-talc case in North Carolina, for lying under oath about whether he had notes to his expert report in that other case.2 Having now viewed Dr. Weed’s testimony3, through the Courtroom Video Network, I can evaluate Smith’s claim.

Weed’s allegedly perjurious testimony took place in Carter v. Fiber Composites LLC, 11 CVS 1355, N.C. Super. Ct., where he served as a party expert witness. In April 2014, Weed gave deposition testimony in the discovery phase of the Carter case. Although not served personally with a lawful subpoena, defense counsel had agreed to accept a subpoena for their expert witness to appear and produce documents, as was the local custom. In deposition, plaintiffs’ counsel asked Dr. Weed to produce any notes he created in the process of researching and writing his expert witness report. Dr. Weed testified that he had no notes. 

The parties disputed whether Dr. Weed had complied with a subpoena served upon defense counsel. The discovery dispute escalated and Dr. Weed obtained legal counsel, and submitted a sworn affidavit that denied the existence of notes. Plaintiffs’ counsel pressed on Dr. Weed’s understanding that he had no “notes.” In an Order, dated May 6, 2014, the trial court directed Dr. Weed to produce everything in his possession. In response to the order, Weed produced his calendar and a thumb drive with “small fragments of notes,” “inserts,” and “miscellaneous items.”

The North Carolina court did not take kindly to Dr. Weed’s confusion about whether his report “segments” and “inserts” were notes, or not. Dr. Weed viewed the segments and inserts to have been parts of his report, and later included within his report without any substantial change. The court concluded, however, that although Dr. Weed did not violate any court order, his assertion, in deposition, in an affidavit, and through legal counsel, was unreasonable, and directly related to his credibility in the Carter case. See Order Concerning Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions Against Defendants and Non-Party Witness for Defendants (June 22, 2015) (Forrest D. Bridges, J.).

The upshot was that Dr. Weed and his counsel had provided false information to the court, on the court’s understanding of what had been requested in discovery. In the court’s view, Dr. Weed’s misunderstanding may have been understandable as a non-lawyer, but it was not reasonable for him to persist and have his counsel argue that there were no notes. The trial court specifically did not find that Dr. Weed had lied, as asserted by Allen Smith, but found that Weed’s conduct was undertaken intentionally or with reckless disregard of the truth, and that his testimony was an unacceptable violation of the oath to tell the whole truth. The trial court concluded that it could not sanction Dr. Weed personally, but its order specified that as a sanction, the plaintiffs’ counsel would be permitted to cross-examine Dr. Weed with the court’s findings and conclusions in the Carter case. Id. Not surprisingly, defense counsel withdrew Dr. Weed as an expert witness.

In the Echeverria case, the defense counsel did not object to the cross-examination; the video proceedings did not inform the viewers whether there had been a prior motion in limine concerning this examination. Allen Smith’s assertion about the North Carolina court’s findings was thus almost true. A cynic might say he too had not told the whole truth, but he did march Dr. Weed through Judge Bridges’ order of June 2015, which was displayed to the jury.

Douglas Weed handled the cross-examination about as well as possible. He explained on cross, and later on redirect, that he did not regard segments of his report, which were later incorporated into his report as served, to be notes. He pointed out that there was no information in the segments, which differed from the final report, or which was not included in the report. Smith’s cross-examination, however, had raised questions not so much about credibility (despite Judge Bridges’ findings), but about whether Dr. Weed was a “quibbler,” who would hide behind idiosyncratic understandings of important words such as “consistency.” Given how harmless the belatedly produced report fragments and segments were, we are left to wonder why Dr. Weed persisted in not volunteering them.

Smith’s confrontation of Dr. Weed with the order from the Carter case came at the conclusion of a generally unsuccessful cross-examination. Unlike the Slemp case, in which Smith appeared to be able to ask unfounded questions without restraint from the bench, in Echeverria, Smith drew repeated objections, which were frequently sustained. His response often was to ask almost the same question again, drawing the same objection and the same ruling. He sounded stymied and defeated.

Courtroom Video Network, of course, does not film the jurors, and so watching the streaming video of the trial offers no insights into how the jurors reacted in real time to Smith’s cross-examination. If Weed’s testimony was ignored or discredited by Smith’s cross-examination on the Carter order, then the Escheverria case cannot be considered a useful test of the plaintiffs’ causal claim. Dr. Weed had offered important testimony on methodological issues for conducting and interpreting studies, as well as inferring causation.

One of the peculiarities of the Slemp case was that the defense offered no epidemiologist in the face of two epidemiologists offered by the plaintiff. In Escheverria, the defense addressed this gap and went further to have its epidemiologist address the glaring problem of how any specific causal inference can be drawn from a risk ratio of 1.3. Dr. Weed explained attributable risk and probability of causation, and this testimony and many other important points went without cross-examination or contradiction. And yet, after finding general causation on a weak record, the jury somehow leaped over an insurmountable epistemic barrier on specific causation.


1 Amanda Bronstad, “New Evidence Seen as Key in LA Jury’s $417M Talc Verdict,” Law.com (Aug. 22, 2017).

3 The cross-examination at issue arose about one hour, nine minutes into Smith’s cross-examination, on Aug. 15, 2017.

Statistical Gobbledygook Goes to the Supreme Court

October 20th, 2017

Back in July, my summer slumber was rudely interrupted by an intemperate, ad hominem rant from statistican Sander Greenland. Greenland’s rant concerned my views of the the Supreme Court’s decision in Matrixx Initiatives v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27 (2011).

Greenland held forth, unfiltered, on Deborah Mayo’s web blog, where he wrote:

Glad to have finally flushed out Schachtman, whose blog did not allow my critical dissenting comments back when this case first hit. Nice to see him insult the intellect of the Court too, using standard legal obfuscation of the fact that the Court is entitled to consider science, ordinary logic, and common sense outside of that legal framework to form and justify its ruling – that reasoning is what composes the bulk of the opinion I linked. Go read it and see what you think without the smokescreen offered by Schachtman.”

A megateam of reproducibility-minded scientists look to lowering the p-value,” Error Statistics (July 25, 2017).

Oh my! It is true that my blog does not have comments enabled, but as I have written on several occasions, I would gladly welcome requests to post opposing views, even those of Sander Greenland. On Deborah Mayo’s blog, I had the opportunity to explain carefully why Greenland has been giving a naïve, mistaken characterization of the holding of Matrixx Initiatives, in his expert witness reports for plaintiffs’ counsel, as well as in his professional publications. Ultimately, Greenland ran out of epithets, lost his enthusiasm for the discussion, and slunk away into cyber-silence.

I was a bit jarred, however, by Greenland’s accusation that I had insulted the Court. Certainly, I did not use any of the pejorative adjectives that Greenland had hurled at me; rather, I simply have given legal analysis of the Court’s opinions and a description of the legal, scientific, and statistical errors therein.1 And, to be sure, other knowledgeable writers and evidence scholars, have critiqued the Court’s decision and some of the pronouncements of the parties and the amici in Matrixx Initiatives2.

This week, John Pfaff, a professor at Fordham Law School, published an editorial in the New York Times, to argue that “The Supreme Court Justices Need Fact-Checkers,” N.Y. Times (Oct. 18, 2017). No doubt, Greenland would consider Pfaff’s editorial to be “insulting” to the Court, unless of course, Greenland thinks criticism can be insulting only if it challenges views he wants to see articulated by the Court.

In support of his criticism of the Court, Pfaff adverted to the Chief Justice’s recent comments in the oral argument of a gerrymandering case, Gill v. Whitford. In a question critical of the gerrymander challenge, Chief Justice Roberts described the supporting evidence:

it may be simply my educational background, but I can only describe as sociological gobbledygook.”

Oral Argument before the U.S. Supreme Court at p.40, in Gill v. Whitford, No. 16-1161 (Oct. 3, 2017). The Chief Justice’s dismissive comments about gobble may well have been provoked by an amicus brief filed on behalf of 44 election law, scientific evidencce, and empirical legal scholars, who explored the legal and statistical basis for striking down the Wisconsin gerrymander. See Brief of Amici Curiae, of 44 Election Law, Scientific Evidence, and Empirical Legal Scholars, filed in Gill v. Whitford, No. 16-1161 (Sept. 1, 2017).

As with Greenland’s obsequious respect for the Matrixx Initiatives opinion, no one is likely to have been misled by Chief Justice Roberts’ false modesty. John Roberts was graduated summa cum laude from Harvard College in three years, although with a major in a “soft” discipline, history. He went on to Harvard Law School, where he was the managing editor of the Harvard Law Review, and was graduated magna cum laude. As a lawyer, Roberts has had an extraordinarily successful career. And yet, the Chief Justice went out of his way to disparage the mathematical and statistical models used to show gerrymandering in the Gill case, as “gobbledygook.” Odds are that the Chief Justice was thus not deprecating his own education; yet, inquiring minds might wonder whether that education was deficient in mathematics, statistics, and science.

Policy is a major part of the court’s docket now, whether the Justices likes it or not. The Justices cannot avoid adapting to the technical requirements of scientific and statistical issues, and they cannot simply dismiss evidence they do not understand as “gobbledygook.” Referencing a recent ProPublica report, Professor Pfaff suggests that the Supreme Court might well employ independent advisors to fact check their use of descriptive statistics3

The problem identified by Pfaff, however, seems to implicate a fundamental divide between the “two cultures” of science and the humanities. See C.P. Snow, The Rede Lecture 1959. Perhaps Professor Pfaff might start with his own educational institution. The Fordham University School of Law does not offer a course in statistics and probability; nor does it require entering students to have satisfied a requirement of course work in mathematics, science, or statistics. The closest offering at Fordham is a course on accounting for lawyer, and the opportunity to take a one-credit course in “quantitative methods” at the graduate school.

Fordham School of Law, of course, is hardly alone. Despite cries for “relevancy” and experiential learning in legal education, some law schools eschew courses in statistics and probability for legal applications, sometimes on the explicit acknowledgement that such courses are too “hard,” or provoke too much student anxiety. The result, as C.P. Snow saw over a half century ago, is that lawyers and judges cannot tell gobbledygook from important data analysis, even when it smacks them in the face.


1 With David Venderbush of Alston & Bird LLP, I published my initial views of the Matrixx case, in the the form of a Washington Legal Foundation Legal Backgrounder, available at the Foundation’s website. See Schachtman & Venderbush, “Matrixx Unbounded: High Court’s Ruling Needlessly Complicates Scientific Evidence Principles,” 26 (14) Legal Backgrounder (June 17, 2011). I expanded on my critique in several blog posts. See, e.g., Matrixx Unloaded” (Mar. 29, 2011); The Matrixx Oversold” (Apr. 4, 2011); The Matrixx – A Comedy of Errors” (Apr. 6, 2011); De-Zincing the Matrixx” (Apr. 12, 2011); “Siracusano Dicta Infects Daubert Decisions” (Sept. 22, 2012).

2 See David Kaye, “The Transposition Fallacy in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano: Part I” (Aug. 19, 2011), and “The Transposition Fallacy in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano: Part II” (Aug. 26, 2011); David Kaye, “Trapped in the Matrixx: The U.S. Supreme Court and the Need for Statistical Significance,” BNA Product Safety & Liability Reporter 1007 (Sept. 12, 2011).

Love that Hormesis to Pieces

October 12th, 2017

Hermann Joseph Muller was an American biologist who won the Nobel Prize in 1946, for Physiology or Medicine, for his work on fruit fly genetics. In his Nobel Prize speech, Muller opined that there was no threshold dose for radiation-induced mutagenesis. Muller’s speech became a locus of support for what later became known as the “linear no threshold” (LNT) theory of carcinogenesis.

Muller was an ardent eugenicist, although of the communist, not the Nazi, variety.1 After 1932, Muller’s political enthusiasms took him to the Soviet Union, where Muller blithely ignored murderous purges and famines, in order to pursue his scientific interests for the greater glory of the Proletarian Dicatorship.2 Muller became enamored of a People’s eugenics program. On May 5, 1936, Muller wrote to “Comrade Stalin,” “[a]s a scientist with confidence in the ultimate Bolshevik triumph throughout all possible spheres of human endeavor,” to offer the brutal dictator “a matter of vital importance arising out of my own science – biology, and, in particular, genetics.”3

Comrade Stalin was underwhelmed by Muller’s offer, and threw his lot in with Trofim Lysenko. A disheartened Muller managed to extricate himself from the Soviet fatherland, but not so much from its politics and ideology4. After returning to the United States, he remained active in noteworthy liberal and progressive political activities. Alas, he also seemed to remain a Communist fellow traveler, who found time to criticize only the Soviet embrace of Lysenkoism and its treatment of dissident geneticists (such as himself), with nary a mention of Ukrainian farmers, political dissidents, or the Soviet subjugation of eastern and central Europe.5

In retreating from his Soviet homeland, Muller did not abandon his eugenic vision for the United States. In 1966, Muller urged the immediate establishment of sperm banks for “outstanding men,” such as himself, to make deposits for use in artificial insemination6

**********************************

Back in a 1976, George E. P. Box outlined his notion that all models are wrong even though some may be useful7. The LNT model, as devised by Muller and embraced by regulatory agencies around the world, has long since lost its usefulness in describing and predicting biological phenomena. LNT is scientific in the sense that it is testable and falsifiable; LNT has been tested and falsified. Muller’s model ignores relevant biological processes of tolerance, defense, and adaptation8

The resilience of the LNT seems to be due to the advocacy of scientists and regulators who find the simplistic LNT model to be useful in ensuring regulation of, and compensation for, low-dose exposures. The perpetual machine litigation created with asbestos comes to mind. Other “political scientists” come to mind as well. Theory and data are often in tension, but at the end of any debate, scientists are obligated to “save the phenomena.” Fortunately, there are scientists who are challenging the dominance of the LNT model, and who are pointing out where the model just does not fit the data9.

In the United States, Muller’s theories were subjected to some real-world tests. In May 1947, Muller warned of the possible evolution of evil monsters born to Japanese survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, on the basis of his assessment that the atomic bombs had produced countless mutants. Later that year, however, Austin Brues, director of the Argonne National Laboraty, published his findings of children born to Hiroshima survivors, who had no more mutations than baseline expectation10.

Notwithstanding the shaky evidentiary foundations of Muller’s views, his prestige as a Nobel laureate encouraged the adoption and promotion of the LNT model by the National Academy of Sciences’ Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation (BEAR) I Genetics Panel. Edward J. Calabrese, a prominent toxicologist in the Department of Environmental Health Sciences, School of Public Health and Health Sciences, University of Massachusetts, has taken pains, on multiple occasions, to trace the genealogy of this error. His most recent, and most succinct effort, is a worthwhile read for policy makers, judges, and lawyers who want to understand the historical dimension of the LNT model11. A fuller bibliography is set out as an appendix to this post.


 

1 Herman Joseph Muller, Out of the Night – a Biologist’s View of the Future (1935).

2 Elof Alex Carlson, Genes, Radiation, and Society: The Life and Work of H.J. Muller (1981).

3 John Glad, “Hermann J. Muller’s 1936 Letter to Stalin,” 43 The Mankind Quarterly 305 (2003).

4 See, e.g., Peter J. Kuznick, Beyond the Laboratory: Scientists as Political Activists in 1930’s America 121 (1987).

5 Hermann J. Muller, “The Crushing of Genetics in the USSR,” 4 Bull. Atomic Scientists 369 (1948). Some have attempted to protect Muller’s conduct by arguing that he testified before the House Un-American Activities Committee, where he was critical of Soviet restrictions on secondary education. See Thomas D. Clark, Indiana University: Midwestern Pioneer 310 (1977). Given Muller’s privileged position to observe first hand what had happened to Ukrainian farmers and others, this coming forward on Soviet education seems feeble indeed.

6 See Sperm Banks Urged by Nobel Laureate,” N.Y. Times (Sept. 13, 1966).

7 See George E. P. Box, “Science and Statistics,” 71 J. Am. Stat. Ass’ 791 (1976); George E. P. Box, “Robustness in the strategy of scientific model building,” in R. L. Launer & G.N. Wilkinson, Robustness in Statistics at 201–236 (1979); George E. P. Box & Norman Draper, Empirical Model-Building and Response Surfaces at 74 (1987) (“Remember that all models are wrong; the practical question is how wrong do they have to be to not be useful.”).

8 See, e.g., Adam D. Thomas, Gareth J. S. Jenkins, Bernd Kaina, Owen G. Bodger, Karl-Heinz Tomaszowski, Paul D. Lewis, Shareen H. Doak, and George E. Johnson, “Influence of DNA Repair on Nonlinear Dose-Responses for Mutation,” 132 Toxicol. Sci. 87 (2013).

9 See, e.g., Bill Sacks & Jeffry A. Siegel, “Preserving the Anti-Scientific Linear No-Threshold Myth: Authority, Agnosticism, Transparency, and the Standard of Care,” 15 Dose-Response: An Internat’l J. 1 (2017); Charles L. Sanders, Radiobiology and Radiation Hormesis: New Evidence and its Implications for Medicine and Society (2017).

10 William Widder, “Probe Effects of Atom Bomb: Study Betrays No Evidence of Mutations,” Greensburg Daily News (Greensburg, Indiana) at 22 (Mon, Nov. 24, 1947).

11 Edward J.Calabrese, “The Mistaken Birth and Adoption of the LNT: An Abridged Version,” 15 Dose-Response: An Internat’l J. (2017).


Appendix

Edward J.Calabrese & Linda A. Baldwin, “Chemical hormesis: its historical foundations as a biological hypothesis,” 19 Human & Experimental Toxicol. 2 (2000)

Edward J. Calabrese and Linda A. Baldwin, “Hormesis: U-shaped dose responses and their centrality in toxicology,” 22 Trends Pharmacol. Sci. 285 (2001)

Edward J.Calabrese, “Hormesis: a revolution in toxicology, risk assessment and medicine: Re-framing the dose–response relationship,” 5 Eur. Mol. Bio. Org. Reports S37 (2004)

Edward J. Calabrese & Robyn Blain, “The occurrence of hormetic dose responses in the toxicological literature, the hormesis database: an overview,” 202 Toxicol. & Applied Pharmacol. 289 (2005);

Edward J. Calabrese, “Pain and U-shaped dose responses: occurrence, mechanisms and clinical Implications,” 38 Crit. Rev. Toxicol. 579 (2008)

Edward J. Calabrese, “Neuroscience and hormesis: overview and general findings,” 38 Crit. Rev. Toxicol. 249 (2008)

Edward J. Calabrese, “Linear No Threshold (LNT) – The New Homeopathy,” 31 Envt’l Toxicol. & Chem. 2723 (2012)

Edward J. Calabrese, “Muller’s Nobel Prize Lecture: When Ideology Prevailed over Science,” 126 Toxicol. Sci. 1 (2012)

Edward J. Calabrese, “How the U.S. National Academy of Sciences misled the world community on cancer risk assessment: new findings challenge historical foundations of the linear dose response, 87 Arch. Toxicol. 2063 (2013)

Edward J. Calabrese, “On the origins of the linear no-threshold (LNT) dogma by means of untruths, artful dodges and blind faith,” 142 Envt’l Research 432 (2015)

Edward J. Calabrese, “An abuse of risk assessment: how regulatory agencies improperly adopted LNT for cancer risk assessment,” 89 Arch. Toxicol. 647 (2015)

Edward J. Calabrese, “LNTgate: How scientific misconduct by the U.S. NAS led to governments adopting LNT for cancer risk assessment,” 148 Envt’l Research 535 148 (2016)

Edward J. Calabrese, “The threshold vs LNT showdown: Dose rate findings exposed flaws in the LNT model part 1. The Russell-Muller debate,” 154 Envt’l Res. 435 (2017)

Edward J. Calabrese, “The threshold vs LNT showdown: Dose rate findings exposed flaws in the LNT model part 2. How a mistake led BEIR I to adopt LNT,” 154 Envt’l Res. 452 (2017)

Multiplicity in the Third Circuit

September 21st, 2017

In Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, C.A. No. 2:10-cv-01283 (W. D. Pa.), plaintiffs claimed that their employer’s reduction in force unlawfully targeted workers over 50 years of age. Plaintiffs lacked any evidence of employer animus against old folks, and thus attempted to make out a statistical disparate impact claim. The plaintiffs placed their chief reliance upon an expert witness, Michael A. Campion, to analyze a dataset of workers agreed to have been the subject of the R.I.F. For the last 30 years, Campion has been on the faculty in Purdue University. His academic training and graduate degrees are in industrial and organizational psychology. Campion has served an editor of Personnel Psychology, and as a past president of the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology. Campion’s academic website page notes that he manages a small consulting firm, Campion Consulting Services1.

The defense sought to characterize Campion as not qualified to offer his statistical analysis2. Campion did, however, have some statistical training as part of his master’s level training in psychology, and his professional publications did occasionally involve statistical analyses. To be sure, Campion’s statistical acumen paled in comparison to the defense expert witness, James Rosenberger, a fellow and a former vice president of the American Statistical Association, as well as a full professor of statistics in Pennsylvania State University. The threshold for qualification, however, is low, and the defense’s attack on Campion’s qualifications failed to attract the court’s serious attention.

On the merits, the defense subjected Campion to a strong challenge on whether he had misused data. The defense’s expert witness, Prof. Rosenberger, filed a report that questioned Campion’s data handling and statistical analyses. The defense claimed that Campion had engaged in questionable data manipulation by including, in his RIF analysis, workers who had been terminated when their plant was transferred to another company, as well as workers who retired voluntarily.

Using simple z-score tests, Campion compared the ages of terminated and non-terminated employees in four subgroups, ages 40+, 45+, 50+, and 55+. He did not conduct an analysis of the 60+ subgroup on the claim that this group had too few members for the test to have sufficient power3Campion found a small z-score for the 40+ versus <40 age groups comparison (z =1.51), which is not close to statistical significance at the 5% level. On the defense’s legal theory, this was the crucial comparison to be made under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The plaintiffs, however, maintained that they could make out a case of disparate impact by showing age discrimination at age subgroups that started above the minimum specified by the ADEA. Although age is a continuous variable, Campion decided to conduct z-scores on subgroups that were based upon five-year increments. For the 45+, 50+, and 55+ age subgroups, he found z-scores that ranged from 2.15 to 2.46, and he concluded that there was evidence of disparate impact in the higher age subgroups4. Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, C.A. No. 2:10-cv-01283, 2015 WL 4232600, at *11 (W.D. Pa. July 13, 2015) (McVerry, S.J.)

The defense, and apparently the defense expert witnesses, branded Campion’s analysis as “data snooping,” which required correction for multiple comparisons. In the defense’s view, the multiple age subgroups required a Bonferroni correction that would have diminished the critical p-value for “significance” by a factor of four. The trial court agreed with the defense contention about data snooping and multiple comparisons, and excluded Campion’s opinion of disparate impact, which had been based upon finding statistically significant disparities in the 45+, 50+, and 55+ age subgroups. 2015 WL 4232600, at *13. The trial court noted that Campion, in finding significant disparities in terminations in the subgroups, but not in the 40+ versus <40 analysis:

[did] not apply any of the generally accepted statistical procedures (i.e., the Bonferroni procedure) to correct his results for the likelihood of a false indication of significance. This sort of subgrouping ‘analysis’ is data-snooping, plain and simple.”

Id. After excluding Campion’s opinions under Rule 702, as well as other evidence in support of plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim, the trial court granted summary judgment on the discrimination claims. Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, No. 2:10–cv–1283, 2015 WL 5156913 (W. D. Pa. Sept. 2, 2015).

On plaintiffs’ appeal, the Third Circuit took the wind out of the attack on Campion by holding that the ADEA prohibits disparate impacts based upon age, which need not necessarily be on workers’ being over 40 years old, as opposed to being at least 40 years old. Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 66-68 (3d Cir. 2017). This holding took the legal significance out of the statistical insignificance of Campion’s comparison 40+ versus <40 age-group termination rates. Campion’s subgroup analyses were back in play, but the Third Circuit still faced the question whether Campion’s conclusions, based upon unadjusted z-scores and p-values, offended Rule 702.

The Third Circuit noted that the district court had identified three grounds for excluding Campion’s statistical analyses:

(1) Dr. Campion used facts or data that were not reliable;

(2) he failed to use a statistical adjustment called the Bonferroni procedure; and

(3) his testimony lacks ‘‘fit’’ to the case because subgroup claims are not cognizable.

849 F.3d at 81. The first issue was raised by the defense’s claims of Campion’s sloppy data handling, and inclusion of voluntarily retired workers and workers who were terminated when their plant was turned over to another company. The Circuit did not address these data handling issues, which it left for the trial court on remand. Id. at 82. The third ground went out of the case with the appellate court’s resolution of the scope of the ADEA. The Circuit did, however, engage on the issue whether adjustment for multiple comparisons was required by Rule 702.

On the “data-snooping” issue, the Circuit concluded that the trial court had applied “an incorrectly rigorous standard for reliability.” Id. The Circuit acknowledged that

[i]n theory, a researcher who searches for statistical significance in multiple attempts raises the probability of discovering it purely by chance, committing Type I error (i.e., finding a false positive).”

849 F.3d at 82. The defense expert witness contended that applying the Bonferroni adjustment, which would have reduced the critical significance probability level from 5% to 1%, would have rendered Campion’s analyses not statistically significant, and thus not probative of disparate impact. Given that plaintiffs’ cases were entirely statistical, the adjustment would have been fatal to their cases. Id. at 82.

At the trial level and on appeal, plaintiffs and Campion had objected to the data-snooping charge on ground that

(1) he had engaged in only four subgroups;

(2) virtually all subgroups were statistically significant;

(3) his methodology was “hypothesis driven” and involved logical increments in age to explore whether the strength of the evidence of age disparity in terminations continued in each, increasingly older subgroup;

(4) his method was analogous to replications with different samples; and

(5) his result was confirmed by a single, supplemental analysis.

Id. at 83. According to the plaintiffs, Campion’s approach was based upon the reality that age is a continuous, not a dichotomous variable, and he was exploring a single hypothesis. A.240-241; Brief of Appellants at 26. Campion’s explanations do mitigate somewhat the charge of “data snooping,” but they do not explain why Campion did not use a statistical analysis that treated age as a continuous variable, at the outset of his analysis. The single, supplemental analysis was never described or reported by the trial or appellate courts.

The Third Circuit concluded that the district court had applied a ‘‘merits standard of correctness,’’ which is higher than what Rule 702 requires. Specifically, the district court, having identified a potential methodological flaw, did not further evaluate whether Campion’s opinion relied upon good grounds. 849 F.3d at 83. The Circuit vacated the judgment below, and remanded the case to the district court for the opportunity to apply the correct standard.

The trial court’s acceptance that an adjustment was appropriate or required hardly seems a “merits standard.” The use of a proper adjustment for multiple comparisons is very much a methodological concern. If Campion could reach his conclusion only by way of an inappropriate methodology, then his conclusion surely would fail the requirements of Rule 702. The trial court did, however, appear to accept, without explicit evidence, that the failure to apply the Bonferroni correction made it impossible for Campion to present sound scientific argument for his conclusion that there had been disparate impact. The trial court’s opinion also suggests that the Bonferroni correction itself, as opposed to some more appropriate correction, was required.

Unfortunately, the reported opinions do not provide the reader with a clear account of what the analyses would have shown on the correct data set, without improper inclusions and exclusions, and with appropriate statistical adjustments. Presumably, the parties are left to make their cases on remand.

Based upon citations to sources that described the Bonferroni adjustment as “good statistical practice,” but one that is ‘‘not widely or consistently adopted’’ in the behavioral and social sciences, the Third Circuit observed that in some cases, failure to adjust for multiple comparisons may “simply diminish the weight of an expert’s finding.”5 The observation is problematic given that Kumho Tire suggests that an expert witness must use “in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150, (1999). One implication is that courts are prisoners to prevalent scientific malpractice and abuse of statistical methodology. Another implication is that courts need to look more closely at the assumptions and predicates for various statistical tests and adjustments, such as the Bonferroni correction.

These worrisome implications are exacerbated by the appellate court’s insistence that the question whether a study’s result was properly calculated or interpreted “goes to the weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility.”6 Combined with citations to pre-Daubert statistics cases7, judicial comments such as these can appear to be a general disregard for the statutory requirements of Rules 702 and 703. Claims of statistical significance, in studies with multiple exposure and multiple outcomes, are frequently not adjusted for multiple comparisons, without notation, explanation, or justification. The consequence is that study results are often over-interpreted and over-sold. Methodological errors related to multiple testing or over-claiming statistical significance are commonplace in tort litigation over “health-effects” studies of birth defects, cancer, and other chronic diseases that require epidemiologic evidence8.

In Karlo, the claimed methodological error is beset by its own methodological problems. As the court noted, adjustments for multiple comparisons are not free from methodological controversy9. One noteworthy textbook10 labels the Bonferroni correction as an “awful response” to the problem of multiple comparisons. Aside from this strident criticism, there are alternative approaches to statistical adjustment for multiple comparisons. In the context of the Karlo case, the Bonferroni might well be awful because Campion’s four subgroups are hardly independent tests. Because each subgroup is nested within the next higher age subgroup, the subgroup test results will be strongly correlated in a way that defeats the mathematical assumptions of the Bonferroni correction. On remand, the trial court in Karlo must still make his Rule 702 gatekeeping decision on the methodological appropriateness of whether Campion’s properly considered the role of multiple subgroups, and multiple anaslyses run on different models.


1 Although Campion describes his consulting business as small, he seems to turn up in quite a few employment discrimination cases. See, e.g., Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 10 Civ. 6950 (AT) (JCF) (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Brand v. Comcast Corp., Case No. 11 C 8471 (N.D. Ill. July 5, 2014); Powell v. Dallas Morning News L.P., 776 F. Supp. 2d 240, 247 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (excluding Campion’s opinions), aff’d, 486 F. App’x 469 (5th Cir. 2012).

2 See Defendant’s Motion to Bar Dr. Michael Campion’s Statistical Analysis, 2013 WL 11260556.

3 There was no mention of an effect size for the lower aged subgroups, and a power calculation for the 60+ subgroup’s probability of showing a z-score greater than two. Similarly, there was no discussion or argument about why this subgroup could not have been evaluated with Fisher’s exact test. In deciding the appeal, the Third Circuit observed that “Dr. Rosenberger test[ed] a subgroup of sixty-and-older employees, which Dr. Campion did not include in his analysis because ‘[t]here are only 14 terminations, which means the statistical power to detect a significant effect is very low’. A.244–45.” Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 82 n.15 (3d Cir. 2017).

4 In the trial court’s words, the z-score converts the difference in termination rates into standard deviations. Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, C.A. No. 2:10-cv-01283, 2015 WL 4232600, at *11 n.13 (W.D. Pa. July 13, 2015). According to the trial court, Campion gave a rather dubious explanation of the meaning of the z-score: “[w]hen the number of standard deviations is less than –2 (actually–1.96), there is a 95% probability that the difference in termination rates of the subgroups is not due to chance alone” Id. (internal citation omitted).

5 See 849 F.3d 61, 83 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing and quoting from Paetzold & Willborn § 6:7, at 308 n.2) (describing the Bonferroni adjustment as ‘‘good statistical practice,’’ but ‘‘not widely or consistently adopted’’ in the behavioral and social sciences); see also E.E.O.C. v. Autozone, Inc., No. 00-2923, 2006 WL 2524093, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 29, 2006) (‘‘[T]he Court does not have a sufficient basis to find that … the non-utilization [of the Bonferroni adjustment] makes [the expert’s] results unreliable.’’). And of course, the Third Circuit invoked the Daubert chestnut: ‘‘Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but

admissible evidence.’’ Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).

6 See 849 F.3d at 83 (citing Leonard v. Stemtech Internat’l Inc., 834 F.3d 376, 391 (3d Cir. 2016).

7 See 849 F.3d 61, 83 (3d Cir. 2017), citing Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400 (1986) (‘‘Normally, failure to include variables will affect the analysis’ probativeness, not its admissibility.’’).

8 See Hans Zeisel & David Kaye, Prove It with Figures: Empirical Methods in Law and Litigation 93 & n.3 (1997) (criticizing the “notorious” case of Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986), for its erroneous endorsement of conclusions based upon “statistically significant” studies that explored dozens of congenital malformation outcomes, without statistical adjustment). The authors do, however, give an encouraging example of a English trial judge who took multiplicity seriously. Reay v. British Nuclear Fuels (Q.B. Oct. 8,1993) (published in The Independent, Nov. 22,1993). In Reay, the trial court took seriously the multiplicity of hypotheses tested in the study relied upon by plaintiffs. Id. (“the fact that a number of hypotheses were considered in the study requires an increase in the P-value of the findings with consequent reduction in the confidence that can be placed in the study result … .”), quoted in Zeisel & Kaye at 93. Zeisel and Kaye emphasize that courts should not be overly impressed with claims of statistically significant findings, and should pay close attention to how expert witnesses developed their statistical models. Id. at 94.

9 See David B. Cohen, Michael G. Aamodt, and Eric M. Dunleavy, Technical Advisory Committee Report on Best Practices in Adverse Impact Analyses (Center for Corporate Equality 2010).

10 Kenneth J. Rothman, Sander Greenland, and Timoth L. Lash, Modern Epidemiology 273 (3d ed. 2008); see also Kenneth J. Rothman, “No Adjustments Are Needed for Multiple Comparisons,” 1 Epidemiology 43, 43 (1990)

Seventh Circuit Franks ‘Every Exposure’ Theory for Extinction

September 11th, 2017

In Krik v. Exxon Mobil Corp., no. 15-3112, 2017 WL 3768933, Slip op. (7th Cir. Aug. 31, 2017) [slip op. cited as Krik], a jury found that smoking cigarettes causes lung cancer, which is not particularly noteworthy. The plaintiff, Charles Krik, however, wanted the jury to find that asbestos exposure, either alone or with his 45 pack-year smoking history caused his lung cancer. The jury found that smoking was the sole cause. Hannah Meisel, “7th Circuit Affirms Exxon’s Trial Win In Asbestos Cancer Suit,” Law360 (Sept. 1, 2017).

Krik’s asbestos exposure was not particularly impressive, and he apparently did not have asbestosis. He claimed asbestos exposure from his four years of work aboard naval vessels, occasionally removing insulation materials, and his two weeks as an independent contractor at an Exxon Mobil refinery, where he replaced heaters supposedly insulated with asbestos. Exxon Mobil disputed whether the heaters even had asbestos in them. The naval vessels would have had asbestos insulation from many manufacturers, but Krik focused on Owens-Illinois because it is the only solvent company remaining in the plaintiffs’ asbestos-powered perpetual litigation machine.

Lung cancer in a man with minor asbestos exposure with very substantial tobacco consumption – who are you going to call? See Arthur Frank Report, 2011 WL 12192776 (2011).

Arthur Frank is a physician who counts himself among the intellectual progeny of the late Irving Selikoff. Like Selikoff, Frank is intensely interested in outcomes that help workers show that their work has caused them illness. In furthering his interests, Frank sometimes makes things up, such as the “each and every exposure” theory. Frank is also a proponent of the “big-tent” theory of causation, which attempts to keep every possible defendant in a lawsuit, bu asserting that every asbestos exposure, regardless of its intensity, duration, quantity, variety of asbestos, or fiber length, constitutes a cause of plaintiff’s lung cancer.

Defendants moved to bar Frank’s opinions under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. See Exxon Mobil’s motion, at 2013 WL 10847058. Judge Lee of the Northern District of Illinois found that Arthur Frank’s opinions, in the form of the “each and every exposure theory,” “any exposure theory,” “single fiber theory,” or “no safe level of exposure theory” was scientifically insubstantial and inadmissible under Rule 702. Krik at 2-3. Judge Lee thus ruled that Krik could not offer expert witness opinions that espoused “every exposure” is substantial.

After Judge Lees’ ruling, Krik’s case was transferred to Judge Manish Shah, for trial. Despite the earlier ruling by Judge Lee, Krik’s counsel called Dr. Frank to testify at trial, with a repackaged opinion about Krik’s “cumulative exposure” caused his lung cancer, and every constituent exposure to that cumulative exposure was causally responsible.

After a voir dire examination of Frank, Judge Shah concluded that Frank’s opinion was still untethered to any “specific quantum of exposure attributable to the defendants, but was instead based on his medical and scientific opinion that every exposure is a substantial contributing factor to the cumulative exposure that causes cancer.” Krik v. Owens‐Illinois, Inc., No. 10‐CV‐07435, 2015 WL 5050143, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2015). Frank and plaintiffs’ counsel had attempted to circumvent the earlier ruling by Judge Lee, but their ruse failed to fool Judge Shah. On appeal to the Seventh Circuit1, a panel affirmed Judge Shah’s reasoning and exclusion of Arthur Frank’s opinions. Krik at 4-5.

Arthur Frank is used to making things up, including the law. The law of causation in most jurisdictions distinguishes between substantial and insubstantial contribution, but Frank decreed: “Either it’s zero or it’s substantial; there is no such thing as not substantial.” R. 66‐3 at 23, pageID 923. Really? In Frank’s mind, even a minute, perhaps a second, of fleeting exposure, would be a substantial contributing factor to a plaintiff’s lung cancer because he has legislated insubstantial out of existence. R. 376 at 273–74, pageID 10146‐47.

Frank’s testimony presented several problems:

First, his cumulative exposure theory was no different from the previously excluded “each and every exposure” theory. Even Frank, in his deposition testimony conflated “each and every exposure” with a cumulative exposure theory.

Second, Frank’s opinion did not conform to the legal standard. In the initial ruling on Frank, Judge Lee held that plaintiff must show that asbestos was a “substantial contributing factor” to his injury2.

Third, Frank’s opinion lacked an adequate scientific foundation. Krik was tasked with showing that asbestos was a “substantial contributing factor” to his lung cancer. Krik at 7; Krik, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 747 (Lee, J.). Frank’s opinion on “every exposure” did not help him make out his case.

The trial court judges recognized, putting aside the issue of thresholds, that asbestos‐induced lung cancers are dose dependent. At the very least, any attempt to attribute a person’s lung cancer to an exposure requires a consideration of the timing and quantum of exposure. Frank, in defiance of basic common sense and basic toxicologic principles, would – if allowed by courts – treat every exposure, regardless how de minimis, as a substantial contribution to the total exposure and the total risk. Krik at 8; Krik, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 753 (Lee, J.).

The panel of the Seventh Circuit found the trial judges’ exclusion of the Frank nonsense to be well supported and well within their discretion as gatekeepers3. Krik at 14

Krik’s counsel also complained that the trial court refused to admit the so-called Helsinki document4, a 1997 statement of public policy statement of scientists who opined that “[c]umulative exposure on a probability basis should thus be considered the main criteria for the attribution of a substantial contribution by asbestos to lung cancer risk.” R. 412‐4 at 4, pageID 13657.

The problem for counsel, and for Frank, was that Frank never referred to or embraced the Helsinki statement as an “authoritative text.” If he had, he would have been roundly impeached by the statement’s pronouncement that the “likelihood that asbestos exposure has made a substantial contribution increases when the exposure increases.” Id. The Seventh Circuit held that the exclusion of this document as a stand-alone piece of evidence did not support plaintiff’s theory, and that its exclusion was not an abuse of discretion5. Krik at 15-17.


1 The appellate court noted that it reviewed de novo the question whether the trial court properly applied Rule 702. The district court’s decision to exclude or admit expert witness opinion testimony is reviewed only for “abuse of discretion.” Krik at 4 (citing C.W. ex rel. Wood v. Textron, Inc., 807 F.3d 827, 835 (7th Cir. 2015). The party proponent has the burden of showing that the challenged expert witness testimony satisfies the Rule 702 statutory requirements, by a preponderance of evidence. Id. (citing Lewis v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 561 F.3d 698, 705 (7th Cir. 2009).

2 Krik v. Crane Co., 76 F. Supp. 3d 747, 753 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (citing Lindstrom v. A‐C Prod. Liab., 424 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying maritime law); Thacker v. UNR Indus., Inc., 603 N.E.2d 449, 457 (Ill. 1992) (Illinois law).

3 The panel noted that the Sixth and Ninth Circuits had ruled similarly. McIndoe v. Huntington Ingalls Inc., 817 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2016); Lindstrom v. A‐C Prod. Liab., 424 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The requirement, however, is that the plaintiff make a showing with respect to each defendant that the defendant’s product was a substantial factor in plaintiff’s injury … . A holding to the contrary would permit imposition of liability on the manufacturer of any product with which a worker had the briefest of encounters on a single occasion.”).

5 Accord Rockman v. Union Carbide Corp., No. CV RDB‐16‐1169, 2017 WL 3022969, at *5 (D. Md. July 17, 2017); Bell v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., No. CV 15‐6394, 2016 WL 5847124, at *3, n.3 (E.D. La. Oct. 6, 2016), recon. denied, No. CV 15‐6394, 2017 WL 876983 (E.D. La. Mar. 6, 2017); Watkins v. Affinia Group, 2016‐Ohio‐2830, ¶ 37, 54 N.E.3d 174, 182; In reJames Wilson Assoc., 965 F.2d 160, 173 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. Dixon, 413 F.3d 520, 524–25 (5th Cir. 2005); Yates v. Ford Motor Co., 113 F. Supp. 3d 841, 862 (E.D.N.C. 2015); Betz v. Pneumo Abex, LLC, 44 A.3d 27, 47, 55 n.35 (Pa. 2012); Bostic v. Georgia‐Pacific Corp., 439 S.W.3d 332, 356–57 (Tex. 2014).

Graced

September 5th, 2017

“With half-damp eyes I stared to the room
Where my friends and I spent many an afternoon
Where we together weathered many a storm
Laughin’ and singin’ till the early hours of the morn”
Bob Dylan, “Bob Dylan’s Dream” (1963)

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Well, not really singing so much as analyzing, calculating, discussing, debating, and occasionally laughing, too.

A few weeks ago, two good friends, Dr David Schwartz, and Dr Judi Steinman, came to visit me in New York. I seem to have known David and Judi, forever. David went to work for McCarter & English, shortly after finishing his post-doctoral training in neuropharmacology and neurophysiology, and his doctorate from Princeton in neuroscience. At McCarter, David worked initially on the Prozac cases, but after the 1992 Pamela Jean Johnson Christmas eve verdict in the silicone gel breast implant litigation, David jumped in to help McCarter and other lawyers understand the sketchy scientific evidence that was being proffered in support of claims by the “silicone sisters.” Judi, whose doctorate was in psychobiology and neuroscience from Rutgers, joined us on the science McCarter science team, a couple of years later. Together, we had the challenge and thrill of putting an end to a rather disreputable chapter in American tort litigation history, MDL 926, a.k.a. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Product Liability Litigation.

Ultimately, we all moved on from the McCarter firm. David went on to start a first-rate scientific consulting firm, Innovative Science Solutions (ISS) which serves the pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical device industries. As a principal in ISS, David worked with me in welding fume and other litigations, and we continue to collaborate on various projects. A few years ago, we co-produced a short film, “The Daubert Will Set Your Client Free.”

Judi moved to Hawaii, where, in 2003, she started BioTechnoLegal Services LLC, which provides scientific and medico-legal advice to lawyers in complex health-effects litigation. Judi joined the faculty of the University of Hawaii’s Department of Pharmaceutical Sciences, and for some years, she was the Program Coordinator for the University’s Master of Science program in Clinical Psychopharmacology. A couple of years ago, I gave a lecture by Skype to one of Judi’s classes at the University on meta-analysis in pharmacoepidemiology.

What a treat to have David and Judi in my living room, to talk and reminisce. David had planned to conduct an interview of me, but we might as well have conducted interviews of each other, and the varied roads we have traveled. David persisted in his plan to make me the interviewed, and he has now graced me twice by posting the interview to his firm’s website. David Schwartz, “Effective Use of Scientific Principles in the Courtroom: From Silicone to Talc and Beyond,” ISS Blog (Aug. 30, 2017)

Our discussion on a warm July afternoon made me nostalgic, but also pushed me into reflecting on how I came to live in the interdisciplinary world of law and science. Science had always been a part of my life. As a young boy, I lost myself in my grandfather’s Medical Clinics of North America, and my uncle’s college and medical school textbooks. There were several physicians in my family, and one of my favorites was my great uncle Sam, who was an orthopedic surgeon. Uncle Sam delighted my cousins and me with visits to the skeleton that dangled from a hook in his office. When I got my first microscope at age 11, Uncle Sam gave me a collection of tissue slides and taught me the difference between a sarcoma and a carcinoma. This was much more fun than trading baseball cards.

Another childhood treat was visiting my cousin Nan, whose parents had given her a subscription to “Things of Science.” Every month, she received a magical blue box with stuff – scientific stuff, with suggestions for experiments and observations. Whenever I had a chance, I would press Nan to get out the most recent box, and we would we become engrossed in the latest scientific marvel. Nan’s younger sister, Elena, a few years younger, recently reminded me how jealous she was when she was excluded from our scientific play.

In high school school, I had the good fortune to attend a National Science Foundation summer program to study physics. In college, I studied biology, and worked in the laboratory of a professor who was studying tubulin mutations and nuclear migration.

Watching the scientific process unfold through experiments and analysis was a huge thrill, but also, in some ways, a disappointment. Science is a long game, with lots of dead ends and missteps. After finishing university training in biological sciences, I stayed another year to complete a second major in philosophy, and entered graduate school to study philosophy. My experience in the laboratory ultimately made me more interested in the epistemology of scientific evidence and knowledge, as well as the implementation of scientific knowledge in policy decisions. Studying philosophy gave me plenty of opportunity to understand “meta-science,” but in the late 1970s, there were few opportunities for gainful employment. The tenure-track market was saturated by recent doctorates who had swelled the university departments during the Vietnam War. The department chairman, Arthur Smullyan, would send out regular memoranda to remind us that we were not likely going to find university-level teaching jobs. I recall sitting in Patty’s restaurant, on Sicard Street, New Brunswick, where some of my fellow graduate students and I, after finishing our qualifying exams, were drowning our sorrows in cheap beer and pizza. We all bemoaned our lack of job opportunities, and in a fit of exasperation, I suggested that we might form a consulting company. Having polished our skills in argumentation, I thought that there could be a way to eke out a living, much like Monty Python’s “Argument Clinic.” To my surprise, my colleagues pointed out that there already was such a profession. Naively, I asked which one, only to be confused why I had never before thought of law as a career. I took the LSAT, and the rest is history. When I started law school, I thought that my studying biology and philosophy were dead ends in my education, which shows how wrong I can be.

Lawsuit Magic – Turning Talcum into Wampum

August 27th, 2017

Last week, a Los Angeles jury, with little prior experience in giving away other people’s money, awarded Eva Echeverria $417,000,000 dollars, in compensatory and punitive damages.1 Pundits in the media, and from both sides of the bar, including your humble blogger, jumped in to offer their speculation about the cause of profligacy.2

In speaking to one reporter, I described the evidence against Johnson & Johnson in an earlier trial (Slemp) as showing that the company needed to engage more fully with the scientific evidence, and not reduce complex evidence to sound bites. Alas, no good deed goes unpunished; my comments were reduced to sound bites! The reporter quoted me in part as having said that the case was a tough one for the defense, but left out that I thought the case was tough because the defense will have a difficult time educating judges and juries in the scientific methods and judgment needed to reach a sound conclusion. The reporter suggested that I had opined that the evidence against J & J was “compelling,” when I had suggested the evidence was confounded and biased, and that J & J needed to take greater care in addressing study validity.3

Perhaps more interesting than my speculation is the guesswork of the plaintiffs’ counsel, who has had more experience with conjecture than I will ever enjoy. In an interview with an American Law Media reporter4, Allen Smith offered his view that three “new” pieces of evidence explain the Los Angeles hyper-verdict:

1. evidence that other companies selling consumer talcum power have begun to place ovarian cancer warnings on their packaging, within the few months;

2. evidence that two persons involved in the Cosmetic Industry Review, which has concluded that talcum powder is safe, had received payments from Johnson & Johnson for speaking engagements; and

3. evidence that Douglas Weed, a former National Cancer Institute epidemiologist, who testified for Johnson & Johnson as an expert witness in the Echeverria case, had been sanctioned in another, non-talc case in North Carolina, for lying under oath about whether he had notes to his expert report in that other case.

Smith claimed that the new evidence was “very compelling,” especially the evidence that Johnson & Johnson had presented “unbelievable and non-credible witnesses on an issue so important like this.”

Now, Smith was trial counsel. He was intimately involved in presenting the evidence, and in watching the jurors’ reactions. Nonetheless, I am skeptical that these three “bits” explain the jury’s extravagance.

The first “bit” seems completely irrelevant. The fact of another company’s having warned within months of the trial, and years after the plaintiff was diagnosed with ovarian cancer, suggests that the evidence was inflammatory without having any probative value. Feasibility of warning was not an issue. State of the art was an issue. In the Slemp trial, Graham Colditz testified that he had had his epiphany that talc causes ovarian cancer only two years ago, when he was instructed by plaintiffs’ counsel to formulate an opinion on the causal claim. That another company recently placed a warning to ward off the lawsuit industry is hardly evidence of industry or governmental standard. All that can really be said is that some companies have been bullied or scared into warnings by the Lawsuit Industry, in the hopes of avoiding litigation. Indeed, it is not at all clear how this bit of irrelevancy was admitted into evidence. All in all, this evidence of a recent warning, years after the plaintiff’s use of the defendant’s talcum powder seems quite out of bounds.

The second bit was simply more of the same inflammatory, scurrilous attacks on Johnson & Johnson. Having watched much of the Slemp trial, I can say that this was Allen Smith’s stock in trade. From media reports, he seemed to have succeeded in injecting his personal attacks on the most peripheral of issues into the Echeverria trial. Not everything in Slemp was collateral attack, but a lot was, and much of it was embarrassing to the legal system for having tolerated it.

The third bit of evidence about Dr. Weed’s having been sanctioned was news to me. A search on Westlaw and Google Scholar failed to find the sanctions order referred to by plaintiffs’ counsel. If anyone is familiar with the North Carolina case that gave rise to the alleged court sanction, please send me a copy or a citation.


1 Daniel Siegal, “J&J Hit With $417M Verdict In 1st Calif. Talc Cancer Trial,” Law360 (Aug. 21, 2017). The case was Echeverria v. Johnson & Johnson, case no. BC628228, Los Angeles Cty. Superior Court, California.

2 See Daniel Siegal, “Science No Salve For J&J In Talc Cases, $417M Verdict Shows,” Law360, Los Angeles (Aug. 22, 2017). See also Margaret Cronin Fisk & and Edvard Pettersson, “J&J Loses $417 Million Talc Verdict in First California Case,” Bloomberg News (Aug. 21, 2017).

3 Tina Bellon, “Massive California verdict expands J&J’s talc battlefield,” Reuters (Aug. 22, 2017); Tina Bellon, “Massive California verdict expands J&J’s talc battlefield,” CNBC (Aug. 22, 2017); Tina Bellon, “J&J’s talc woes expand with massive California verdict,” BNN Reuters (Aug. 22, 2017).

4 Amanda Bronstad, “New Evidence Seen as Key in LA Jury’s $417M Talc Verdict,” Law.com (Aug. 22, 2017).

Trial by Twitter

August 13th, 2017

Did you read Trump’s tweet from last night?

Time to take down the Statue of Liberty. Ugly dress, too French, heavy calves. Sad, must go.”

OK. I admit, I made that up, but it could have been true. Trumpovich has said more outrageous, stupider things, frequently and with wild abandon.

I don’t really understand this Twitter thing. What worse is that I do understand how it feeds uncritical thinking by people who prefer sound bite to argument and discourse. But we live in a democracy, and this is what people want; right? This is what the First Amendment requires?

So why not make American great again, and merge two great institutions together: the right to trial by jury with the right to express one’s self in mindless sound bites? Let us admit it: Twitter has blossomed because Americans have the attention span of crickets. And many have no more cognitive ability than crickets, to boot, but you go to trial with the jurors you have, not the jurors you want.

Here is how trial by twitter might work. A “fair and impartial,” but appropriately ignorant jury is selected for a trial that involves a scientific controversy, at least a controversy in the minds of the litigants and their hired expert witnesses. The jurors need not be inconvenienced by travel to the local court house; they need only have their smartphones available at all times. If they cannot afford a smartphone, one will be given to them. The lawyers will then start to tweet their opening statements, alternating tweets. Each side is allowed 100 tweets. In trials designated complex, each side gets 150 tweets.

Then come the witnesses. One at a time, first for plaintiff; then for defendant. Each witness is permitted to tweet his or her testimony, after first tweeting an oath to tweet the truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me. The witness is permitted two tweets, after which the opposing counsel is permitted to cross-tweet once. Opposing counsel may interpose an objection tweet, with the trial judge tweeting his or her ruling. If the objection is sustained, then the offending tweet will be deleted. The 2:1 tweets are repeated until the witness has nothing left to tweet. After each witness, legal counsel are permitted interim argument of 25 tweets each, alternating. In an effort to promote early settlements, jurors are permitted to “like” tweets from witnesses or counsel, at every stage.

Final arguments are tweeted, of course, again with alternating tweets. The tweeter with the burden of proof gets the final tweet, followed by the judge’s instructions, delivered in tweets. A jury foreperson is appointed, and deliberations proceed by twitter, marked private. Verdicts are returned by the foreperson’s tweet, with the other jurors’ tweeting their agreement, or dissents. Post-verdict motions and appeals can easily be handled by twitter, as well.

Due process preserved, and the right to trial inviolate!

Half of advertising revenues go to Legal Services to pay for legal counsel for the indigent.

 

WOE — Zoloft Escapes a MDL While Third Circuit Creates a Conceptual Muddle

July 31st, 2017

Multidistrict Litigations (MDLs) can be “muddles” that are easy to get in, but hard to get out of. Pfizer and subsidiary Greenstone fabulously escaped a muddle through persistent lawyering and the astute gatekeeping of a district judge, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. That judge, the Hon. Cynthia Rufe, sustained objections to the admissibility of plaintiffs’ epidemiologic expert witness Anick Bérard. When the MDL’s plaintiffs’ steering committee (PSC) demanded, requested, and begged for a do over, Judge Rufe granted them one more chance. The PSC put their litigation industry eggs in a single basket, carried by statistician Nicholas Jewell. Unfortunately for the PSC, Judge Rufe found Jewell’s basket to be as methodologically defective as Bérard’s, and Her Honor excluded Jewell’s proffered testimony. Motions, paper, and appeals followed, but on June 2, 2017, the Third Circuit declared that the PSC and its clients had had enough opportunities to get through the gate. Their baskets of methodological deplorables were not up to snuff. In re Zoloft Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 16-2247 , __ F.3d __, 2017 WL 2385279, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9832 (3d Cir. June 2, 2017) (affirming exclusion of Jewell’s dodgy opinions, which involved multiple methodological flaws and failures to follow any methodology faithfully) [Slip op. cited below as Zoloft].

Plaintiffs Attempt to Substitute WOE for Depressingly Bad Expert Witness Opinion

The ruse of conflating “weight of the evidence,” as used to describe the appellate standard of review for sustaining or reversing a trial court’s factual finding with a purported scientific methodology for inferring causation, was on full display by the PSC in their attack on Judge Rufe’s gatekeeping. In their appellate brief in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the PSC asserted that Jewell had used a “weight of the evidence method,” even though that phrase, “weight of the evidence” (WOE) was never used in Jewell’s litigation reports. The full context of the PSC’s argument and citations to Milward make clear a deliberate attempt to conflate WOE as an appellate judicial standard for reviewing jury fact finding and a purported scientific methodology. See Appellants’ Opening Brief at 54 (Aug. 10, 2016) [cited as PSC] (asserting that “[a]t all times, the ultimate evaluation of the weight of the evidence is a jury question”; citing Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products Group, Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 20 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 63 (2012).

Having staked the ground that WOE is akin to a jury’s factual finding, and thus immune to any but the most extraordinary trial court action or appellate intervention, the PSC then pivoted to claim that Jewell’s WOE-ful method was nothing much more than an assessment of “the totality of the available scientific evidence, guided by the well-accepted Bradford-Hill criteria.” PSC at 3, 4, 7. This maneuver allowed the PSC to argue, apparently with a straight face, that WOE methodology as used by Jewell, had been generally accepted in the scientific community, as well as by the Third Circuit, in previous cases in which the court accepted the use of Bradford Hill’s considerations as a reliable method for establishing general causation. See PSC at 4 (citing Gannon v. United States, 292 F. App’x 170, 173 n.1 (3d Cir. 2008)). Jewell then simply plugged in his expertise and “40 years of experience,” and the desired conclusion of causation popped out. Id. Quod erat demonstrandum.

In pressing its point, the PSC took full advantage of loose, inaccurate language from the American Law Institute’s Restatement’s notorious comment C:

No algorithm exists for applying the Hill guidelines to determine whether an association truly reflects a causal relationship or is spurious.”

PSC at 33-34, citing Restatement (Third) of Torts: Physical and Emotional Harm § 28 cmt. c(3) (2010). Well true, but the absence of a mathematical algorithm hardly means that causal judgments are devoid of principles and standards. The PSC was undeterred, by text or by shame, from equating an unarticulated use of WOE methodology with some vague invocation of Bradford Hill’s considerations for evaluating associations for causality. See PSC at 43 (citing cases that never mentioned WOE but only Bradford Hill’s 50-plus year old heuristic as somehow supporting the claimed identity of the two approaches)1.

Pfizer Rebuffs WOE

Pfizer filed a comprehensive brief that unraveled the PSC’s duplicity. For unknown reasons, tactical or otherwise, however, Pfizer did not challenge the specifics of PSC’s equation of WOE with an abridged, distorted application of Bradford Hill’s considerations. See generally Opposition Brief of Defendants-Appellees Pfizer Inc., Pfizer International LLC, and Greenstone LLC [cited as Pfizer]. Perhaps given page limits and limited judicial attention spans, and just how woefully bad Jewell’s opinions were, Pfizer may well have decided that a more directed approach of assuming arguendo WOE’s methodological appropriateness was a more economical, pragmatic approach. A close reading of Pfizer’s brief, however, makes clear that it never conceded the validity of WOE as a scientific methodology.

Pfizer did point to the recasting of Jewell’s aborted attempt to apply Bradford Hill considerations as an employment of WOE methodology. Pfizer at 46-47. The argument reminded me of Abraham Lincoln’s famous argument:

How many legs does a dog have if you call his tail a leg?

Four.

Saying that a tail is a leg doesn’t make it a leg.”

Allen Thorndike Rice, Reminiscences of Abraham Lincoln by Distinguished Men of His Time at 242 (1909). Calling Jewell’s supposed method WOE or Bradford Hill or WOE/Bradford Hill did not cure the “fatal methodological flaws in his opinions.” Pfizer at 47.

Pfizer understandably and properly objected to the PSC’s attempt to cast Jewell’s “methodology” at such a high level of generality that any consideration of the many instances of methodological infidelity would be relegated to mere jury questions. Acquiescence in the PSC’s rhetorical move would constitute a complete abandonment of the inquiry whether Jewell had used a proper method. Pfizer at 15-16.

Interestingly, none of the amici curiae addressed the slippery WOE arguments advanced by the PSC. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae American Tort Reform Ass’n & Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (Oct. 18, 2016); Brief of Washington Legal Fdtn. as Amicus Curiae (Oct. 18, 2016). There was no meaningful discussion of WOE as a supposedly scientific methodology at oral argument. See Transcript of Oral Argument in In re Zoloft Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 16-2247 (Jan. 25, 2017).

The Third Circuit Acknowledges that Some Methodological Infelicities, Flaws, and Fallacies Are Properly the Subject of Judicial Gatekeeping

Fortunately, Jewell’s methodological infidelities were easily recognized by the Circuit judges. Jewell treated multiple studies, which were nested within one another, and thus involved overlapping and included populations, as though they were independent verifications of the same hypothesis. When the population at issue (from the Danish cohort) was included in a more inclusive pan-Scandivanian study, the relied-upon association dissipated, and Jewell utterly failed to explain or account for these data. Zoloft at 5-6.

Jewell relied upon a study by Anick Bérard, even though he later had to concede that the study had serious flaws that invalidated its conclusions, and which flaws caused him to have a lack of confidence in the paper’s findings.2 In another instance, Jewell relied innocently upon a study that purported to report a statistically significant association, but the authors of this paper were later required by the journal, The New England Journal of Medicine, to correct the very calculated confidence interval upon which Jewell had relied. Despite his substantial mathematical prowess, Jewell missed the miscalculation and relied (uncritically) upon a finding as statistically significant when in fact it was not.

Jewell rejected a meta-analysis of Zoloft studies for questionable methodological quibbles, even though he had relied upon the very same meta-analysis, with the same methodology, in his litigation efforts involving Prozac and birth defects. Not to be corralled by methodological punctilio, Jewell conducted his own meta-analysis with two studies Huybrechts (2014) and Jimenez-Solem (2012), but failed to explain why he excluded other studies, the inclusion of which would have undone his claimed result. Zoloft at 9. Jewell purported to reanalyze and recalculate point estimates in two studies, Jimenez-Solem (2012) and Huybrechts (2014), without any clear protocol or consistency in his approach to other studies. Zoloft at 9. The list goes on, but in sum, Jewell’s handling of these technical issues did not inspire confidence, either in the district or in the appellate court.

WOE to the Third Circuit

The Circuit gave the PSC every conceivable break. Because Pfizer had not engaged specifically on whether WOE was a proper, or any kind of, scientific method, the Circuit treated the issue as virtually conceded:

Pfizer does not seem to contest the reliability of the Bradford Hill criteria or weight of the evidence analysis generally; the dispute centers on whether the specific methodology implemented by Dr. Jewell is reliable. Flexible methodologies, such as the “weight of the evidence,” can be implemented in multiple ways; despite the fact that the methodology is generally reliable, each application is distinct and should be analyzed for reliability.”

Zoloft at 18. The Court acknowledged that WOE arose only in the PSC’s appellate brief, which would have made the entire dubious argument waived under general appellate jurisdictional principles, but the Court, in a footnote, indulged the assumption, “for the sake of argument,” that WOE was Jewell’s purported method from the inception. Zoloft at 18 n. 39. Without any real evidentiary support or analysis or concession from Pfizer, the Circuit accepted that WOE analyses were “generally reliable.” Zoloft at 21.

The Circuit accepted, rather uncritically, that Jewell used a combination of WOE analysis and Bradford Hill considerations. Zoloft at 17. Although Jewell had never described WOE in his litigation report, and WOE was not a feature of his hearing testimony, the Circuit impermissibly engrafted Carl Cranor’s description of WOE as involving inference to the best explanation. Zoloft at 17 & n.37, citing Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

There was, however, a limit to the Circuit’s credulousness and empathy. As the Court noted, there must be some assurance that the purported Bradford Hill/WOE method is something more than a “mere conclusion-oriented selection process.” Zoloft at 20. Ultimately, the Court put its markers down for Jewell’s putative WOE methodology:

there must be a scientific method of weighting that is used and explained.”

Zoloft at 20. Calling the method WOE did not, in the final analysis, exclude Jewell from Rule 702 gatekeeping. Try as the PSC might, there was just no mistaking Jewell’s approach as anything other than a crazy patchwork quilt of numerical wizardry in aid of subjective, result-oriented conclusion mongering.

In the Court’s words:

we find that Dr. Jewell did not 1) reliably apply the ‘techniques’ to the body of evidence or 2) adequately explain how this analysis supports specified Bradford Hill criteria. Because ‘any step that renders the analysis unreliable under the Daubert factors renders the expert’s testimony inadmissible’, this is sufficient to show that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Jewell’s testimony.”

Zoloft at 28. As heartening as the Circuit’s conclusion is, the Court’s couching its observation as a finding (“we find”) is disheartening with respect to the Third Circuit’s apparent inability to distinguish abuse-of-discretion review from de novo appellate findings. Equally distressing is the Court’s invocation of Daubert factors, which were dicta in a Supreme Court case that was superseded by an amended statute over 17 years ago, in Federal Rule of Evidence 702.

On the crucial question whether Jewell had engaged in an unreliable application of methods or techniques that superficially, at a very high level of generality, claim to be generally accepted, the Court stayed on course. The Court “found” that Jewell had applied techniques, analyses, and critiques so obviously inconsistently that no amount of judicial indulgence, assumptions arguendo, or careless glosses could save Jewell and his fatuous opinions from judicial banishment. Zoloft 28-29. Returning to the correct standard of review (abuse of discretion), but the wrong governing law (Daubert instead of Rule 702), the Court announced that:

[b]ecause ‘any step that renders the analysis unreliable under the Daubert factors renders the expert’s testimony inadmissible’, this is sufficient to show that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Jewell’s testimony.”

Zoloft at 21 n.50 (citation omitted). The Court found itself unable to say simply and directly that “the MDL trial court decided the case well within its discretion.”

The Zoloft case was not the Third Circuit’s first WOE rodeo. WOE had raised its unruly head in Magistrini v. One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d 584, 602 (D.N.J. 2002), aff’d, 68 F. App’x 356 (3d Cir. 2003), where an expert witness, David Ozonoff, offered what purported to be a WOE opinion. The Magistrini trial court did not fuss with the assertion that WOE was generally reliable, but took issue with how Ozonoff tried to pass off his analysis as a comprehensive treatment of the totality of the evidence. In Magistrini, Judge Hochberg noted that regardless of the rubric of the methodology, the witness must show that in conducting a WOE analysis:

all of the relevant evidence must be gathered, and the assessment or weighing of that evidence must not be arbitrary, but must itself be based on methods of science.”

Magistrini, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 602. The witness must show that the methodology is more than a “mere conclusion-oriented selection process,” and that it has a “a scientific method of weighting that is used and explained.” Id. at 607. Asserting the use of WOE was not an excuse or escape from judicial gatekeeping as specified by Rule 702.

Although the Third Circuit gave the Zoloft MDL trial court’s findings a searching review (certainly much tougher than the prescribed abuse-of-discretion review), the MDL court’s finding that Jewell “failed to consistently apply the scientific methods he articulates, has deviated from or downplayed certain well-established principles of his field, and has inconsistently applied methods and standards to the data so as to support his a priori opinion” were ultimately vindicated by the Court of Appeals. Zoloft at 10.

All’s well that ends well. Perhaps. It remains unfortunate, however, that a hypothetical method, WOE — which was never actually advocated by the challenged expert witnesses, which lacks serious support in the scientific community, and which was merely assumed arguendo to be valid — will be taken by careless readers to have been endorsed the Third Circuit.


1 Among the cases cited without any support for the PSC’s dubious contention were Gannon v. United States, 292 F. App’x 170, 173 n.1 (3d Cir. 2008); Bitler v. A.O. Smith Corp., 391 F.3d 1114, 1124-25 (10th Cir. 2004); In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1995); In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2007-MD-1871, 2011 WL 13576, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2011) (“Bradford-Hill criteria are used to assess whether an established association between two variables actually reflects a causal relationship.”).

2 Anick Bérard, Sertraline Use During Pregnancy and the Risk of Major Malformations, 212 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 795 (2015).

The opinions, statements, and asseverations expressed on Tortini are my own, or those of invited guests, and these writings do not necessarily represent the views of clients, friends, or family, even when supported by good and sufficient reason.