TORTINI

For your delectation and delight, desultory dicta on the law of delicts.

A Citation for Jurs & DeVito’s Unlawful U-Turn

February 27th, 2024

Antic proposals abound in the legal analysis of expert witness opinion evidence. In the courtroom, the standards for admitting or excluding such evidence are found in judicial decisions or in statutes. When legislatures have specified standards for admitting expert witness opinions, courts have a duty to apply the standards to the facts before them. Law professors are, of course, untethered from either precedent or statute, and so we may expect chaos to ensue when they wade into disputes about the proper scope of expert witness gatekeeping.

Andrew Jurs teaches about science and the law at the Drake University Law School, and Scott DeVito is an associate professor of law at the Jacksonville University School of Law. Together, they have recently produced one of the most antic of antic proposals in a fatuous call for the wholesale revision of the law of expert witnesses.[1]

Jurs and DeVito rightly point out that since the Supreme Court, in Daubert,[2] waded into the dispute whether the historical Frye decision survived the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, we have seen lower courts apply the legal standard inconsistently and sometimes incoherently. These authors, however, like many other academics, incorrectly label one or the other standard, Frye or Daubert, as being stricter than the other. Applying the labels of stricter and weaker standards, ignores that they are standards that measure completely different things. Frye advances a sociological standard, and a Frye test challenge can be answered by conducting a survey. Rule 702, as interpreted by Daubert, and as since revised and adopted by the Supreme Court and Congress, is an epistemic standard. Jurs and DeVito, like many other legal academic writers, apply a single adjective to standards that measure two different, incommensurate things. The authors’ repetition of the now 30-plus year-old mistake is a poor start for a law review article that sets out to reform the widespread inconsistency in the application of Rule 702, in federal and in state courts.

In seeking greater adherence to the actual rule, and consistency among decisions, Jurs and DeVito might have urged for judicial education, or blue-ribbon juries, or science courts, or greater use of court-appointed expert witnesses. Instead they have put their marker down on abandoning all meaningful gatekeeping. Jurs and DeVito are intent upon repairing the inconsistency and incoherency in the application of Daubert, by removing the standard altogether.

“To resolve the problem, we propose that the Courts replace the multiple Daubert factors with a single factor—testability—and that once the evidence meets this standard the judge should provide the jury with a proposed jury instruction to guide their analysis of the fact question addressed by the expert evidence.”[3]

In other words, because lower federal courts have routinely ignored the actual statutory language of Rule 702, and Supreme Court precedents, Jurs and DeVito would have courts invent a new standard, that virtually excludes nothing as long as someone can imagine a test for the asserted opinion. Remarkably, although they carry on about the “rule of law,” the authors fail to mention that judges have no authority to ignore the requirements of Rule 702. And perhaps even more stunning is that they have advanced their nihilistic proposal in the face of the remedial changes in Rule 702, designed to address judicial lawlessness in ignoring previously enacted versions of Rule 702. This antic proposal would bootstrap previous judicial “flyblowing” of a Congressional mandate into a prescription for abandoning any meaningful standard. They have articulated the Cole Porter standard: anything goes. Any opinion that “can be tested is science”; end of discussion.  The rest is for the jury to decide as a question of fact, subject to the fact finder’s credibility determinations. This would be a Scott v. Sandford rule[4] for scientific validity; science has no claims of validity that the law is bound to respect.

Jurs and DeVito attempt a cynical trick. They argue that they would fix the problem of “an unpredictable standard” by reverting to what they say is Daubert’s first principle of ensuring the reliability of expert witness testimony, and limiting the evidentiary display at trial to “good science.” Cloaking their nihilism, the authors say that they want to promote “good science,” but advocate the admissibility of any and every opinion, as long as it is theoretically “testable.” In order to achieve this befuddled goal, they simply redefine scientific knowledge as “essentially” equal to testable propositions.[5]

Jurs and DeVito marshal evidence of judicial ignorance of key aspects of scientific method, such as error rate. We can all agree that judges frequently misunderstand key scientific concepts, but their misunderstandings and misapplications do not mean that the concepts are unimportant or unnecessary. Many judges seem unable to deliver an opinion that correctly defines p-value or confidence interval, but their inabilities do not allow us to dispense with the need to assess random error in statistical tests. Our faint-hearted authors never explain why the prevalence of judicial error must be a counsel of despair that drives us to bowdlerize scientific evidence into something it is not. We may simply need better training for judges, or better assistance for them in addressing complex claims. Ultimately, we need better judges.

For those judges who have taken their responsibility seriously, and who have engaged with the complexities of evaluating validity concerns raised in Rule 702 and 703 challenges, the Jurs and DeVito proposal must seem quite patronizing. The “Daubert” factors are simply too complex for you, so we will just give you crayons, or a single, meaningless factor that you cannot screw up.[6]

The authors set out a breezy, selective review of statements by a few scientists and philosophers of science. Rather than supporting the extreme reductionism, Jurs and DeVito’s review reveals that science is much more than identifying a “testable” proposition. Indeed, the article’s discussion of philosophy and practice of science weighs strongly against the authors’ addled proposal.[7]

The authors, for example, note that Sir Isaac Newton emphasized the importance of empirical method.[8] Contrary to the article’s radical reductionism, the authors note that Sir Karl Popper and Albert Einstein stressed that the failure to obtain a predicted experimental result may render a theory “untenable,” which of course requires data and valid tests and inferences to assess. Quite a bit of motivated reasoning has led Jurs and DeVito to confuse a criterion of testability with the whole enterprise of science, and to ignore the various criteria of validity for collecting data, testing hypotheses, and interpreting results.

The authors suggest that their proposal will limit the judicial inquiry to the the legal question of reliability, but this suggestion is mere farce. Reliability means obtaining the same or sufficiently similar results upon repeated testing, but these authors abjure testing itself.  Furthermore, reliability as contemplated by the Supreme Court, in 1993, and by FRE 702 ever since, has meant validity of the actual test that an expert witness argues in support of his or her opinion or claims.

Whimsically, and without evidence, Jurs and DeVito claim that their radical abandonment of gatekeeping will encourage scientists, in “fields that are testable, but not yet tested, to perform real, objective, and detailed research.” Their proposal, however, works to remove any such incentive because untested but testable research becomes freely admissible. Why would the lawsuit industry fund studies, which might not support their litigation claims, when the industry’s witnesses need only imagine a possible test to advance their claims, without the potential embarrassment by facts? The history of modern tort law teaches us that cheap speculation would quickly push out actual scientific studies.

The authors’ proposal would simply open the floodgates of speculation, conjecture, and untested hypothesis, and leave the rest to the vagaries of trials, mostly in front of jurors untrained in evaluating scientific and statistical evidence. Admittedly, some incurious and incompetent gatekeepers and triers of fact will be relieved to know that they will not have to evaluate actual scientific evidence, because it had been eliminated by the Jurs and DeVito proposal to make mere testability the touchstone of admissibility

To be sure, in Aristotelian terms, testability is logical and practically prior to testing, but these relationships do not justify holding out testability as the “essence” of science, and the alpha and omega of science.[9] Of course, one must have an hypothesis to engage in hypothesis testing, but science lies in the clever interrogation of nature, guided by the hypothesis. The scientific process lies in answering the question, not simply in formulating the question.

As for the authors’ professed concern about “rule of law,” readers should note that the Jurs and DeVito article completely ignores the remedial amendment to Rule 702, which went into effect on December 1, 2023, to address the myriad inconsistencies, and failures to engage, in required gatekeeping of expert witness opinion testimony.[10]

The new Rule 702 is now law, with its remedial clarification that the proponent of expert witness opinion must show the court that the opinion is sufficiently supported by facts or data, Rule 702(b), and that the opinion “reflects a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case,” Rule 702(d). The Rule prohibits deferring the evaluation of sufficiency of support or reliability of application of method to the trier of fact; there is no statutory support for suggesting that these inquires always or usually go to “weight and not admissibility.”

The Jurs and DeVito proposal would indeed be a U-Turn in the law of expert witness opinion testimony. Rather than promote the rule of law, they have issued an open, transparent call for licentiousness in the adjudication of scientific and technical issues.


[1] Andrew Jurs & Scott DeVito, “A Return to Rationality: Restoring the Rule of Law After Daubert’s Disasterous U-Turn,” 164 New Mexico L. Rev. 164 (2024) [cited below as U-Turn]

[2] Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

[3] U-Turn at 164, Abstract.

[4] 60 U.S. 393 (1857).

[5] U-Turn at 167.

[6] U-Turn at 192.

[7] See, e.g., U-Turn at 193 n.179, citing David C. Gooding, “Experiment,” in W.H. Newton-Smith, ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Science 117 (2000) (emphasizing the role of actual experimentation, not the possibility of experimentation, in the development of science).

[8] U-Turn at 194.

[9] See U-Turn at 196.

[10] See Supreme Court Order, at 3 (Apr. 24, 2023); Supreme Court Transmittal Package (Apr. 24, 2023).

Grumpy Old Men

February 11th, 2024

This blog is not about politics, although sometimes I have wandered into the political thicket when the events of the day involved scientific and statistical issues.[1] Our current events today do not involve statistical evidence so much as political, moral, and practical judgment. At some point, however, I cannot avoid a sense of responsibility to speak on the issues. On the one side, we have a grumpy old man who has evidenced some senior moments. On the other side, we have a grumpy old man who has evidenced senior moments as well as a vile character and temperament, generally devoid of decency, historical knowledge, and practical judgment.

Some have argued that the first grumpy old man is propped up by Marxists, the ultra-woke, and “haters” of the USA. Others have argued that the second grumpy old man is a creature of a personality cult, and that he is a documented rapist, fraudster, liar, hustler, and worse.[2]

Well, I know I am not going to firm up the political quagmire on which we now stand. But I have a humble, and I hope constructive, suggestion. Supporters of both grumpy old men would, I think, agree that they care about strength, intelligence, tactical and strategic ability, mental acuity and stamina, and a desire to win.  My suggestion is instead of having debates between the main protagonists, which many would agree to be a waste of time and money, we should instead require the grumpy old men to face off in a chess match. It need not be long; it could be, say, best of three games. Their moves would be observable by all, including their ability to conform to the rules of game, which require, among other things, refraining from talking and making noise. The American public, and the world, would see whether one or the other, or both, or neither, of the grumpy old men have the cognitive and intellectual ability and a true “killer” instinct, to be a national leader in these troubled times. Professional psychologists could analyze the intelligence of the players in real time.

Perhaps the rules of the game might be modified to include shock collars to discipline either player who spoke during the game, other than to offer a draw, or to resign.

Perhaps I am grumpy old man myself.


[1] SeePernicious Probabilities in the Supreme Court” (Nov. 21, 2020); “A Trumpence for Your Thoughts” (Nov. 21, 2020). And I have supported sound deployment of statistical evidence. See, e.g., Brief of 27 Election Law, Scientific Evidence, and Empirical Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, in Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, Supreme Court of the United States (Mar. 9, 2019); Brief of 44 Election Law, Scientific Evidence, and Empirical Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, in Gill v. Whitford, No. 16-1161, Supreme Court of the United States (Sept. 1, 2017).

[2] The supporters of the second grumpy old man have criticized those who criticize his supporters, on grounds that there are substantive issues at stake in their support.  See Julian Adorney, “Stop Dunking on Trump Supporters: No one is beyond reach—unless everyone around them refuses to reach out,” Quilette (Feb. 7, 2024). This of course misses the point that the supporters have had plenty of other viable candidates to support who would have actually been articulate voices on their behalf.  The supporters have shown, consistently over eight years, that they do not care about immorality or sycophancy to dictators, and that they prefer a sexual abuser and fraudster.

IARC’S Fundamental Distinction Between Hazard and Risk – Lost in the Flood

February 1st, 2024

Socrates viewed philosophy as beginning in wonder,[1] but Socrates and his philosophic heirs recognized that philosophy does not get down to business until it starts to clarify the terms of discussion. By the middle of the last century, failure to understand the logic of language replaced wonder as the beginning of philosophy.[2] Even if philosophy could not cure all conceptual pathology, most writers came to see that clarifying terms, concepts, and usage was an essential starting point in thinking clearly about a subject.[3]

Hazard versus Risk

Precision in scientific exposition often follows from the use of measurements, using agreed upon quantitative units, and accepted, accurate, reliable procedures for measurements. When scientists substitute qualitative measures for what are inherently quantitative measures, they frequently lapse into error. For example, beware of rodent studies that proclaim harms at “low doses,” which turn out to low in comparison to other rodent studies, but orders of magnitude greater exposure than experienced by human beings.

Risk is a quantitative term meaning a rate of some specified outcome. A Dictionary of Epidemiology, for instance, defines risk as:

“The probability of an adverse or beneficial event in a defined population over a specified time interval. In epidemiology and in clinical research it is commonly measured through the cumulative incidence and the incidence proportion.”[4]

An increased risk thus requires a measurement of a rate or probability of an outcome greater than expected in the absence of the exposure of interest. We might be uncertain of the precise measure of the risk, or of an increased risk, but conceptually a risk connotes a rate or a probability that is, at least in theory, measurable.

Hazard is a categorical concept; something is, or is not, a hazard without regard to the rate or incidence of harm. The definition of “hazard,” in the Dictionary of Epidemiology provides a definition that captures the non-quantitative, categorical natural of some exposure’s being a hazard:

“The inherent capability of a natural or human-made agent or process to adversely affect human life, health, property, or activity, with the potential to cause a disease.”[5]

The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) purports to set out a classification scheme, for human cancer hazards. As used by IARC, its classification scheme involves a set of epistemic modal terms: “known,” “probably,” “possibly,” and “indeterminate.” These epistemic modalities characterize the strength of the evidence that an agent is carcinogenic, and not the magnitude of quantitative risk of cancer from exposure at a given level. The IARC Preamble, which attempts to describe the Agency’s methodology, explains that the distinction between hazard and risk is “fundamental”:

“A cancer hazard is an agent that is capable of causing cancer, whereas a cancer risk is an estimate of the probability that cancer will occur given some level of exposure to a cancer hazard. The Monographs assess the strength of evidence that an agent is a cancer hazard. The distinction between hazard and risk is fundamental. The Monographs identify cancer hazards even when risks appear to be low in some exposure scenarios. This is because the exposure may be widespread at low levels, and because exposure levels in many populations are not known or documented.”[6]

This attempted explanation reveals an important problem in IARC’s project, as stated in the Preamble. First, there is an unproven assumption that there will be cancer hazards regardless of the exposure levels. The IARC contemplates that there may circumstances of low levels of risk from low levels of exposure, but it elides the important issue of thresholds of exposure, below which there is no risk. The Preamble suggests that IARC does not attempt to provide evidence for or against meaningful thresholds of hazardousness, but this failure greatly undermines the project.  Exposure circumstances may be such that there is no hazard at all, and so the risk is zero.

The purported distinction between hazard and risk, supposedly fundamental, is often blurred by the Agency, in the monographs produced by working groups on specific exposure circumstances. Consider for instance how a working group characterized the “hazard” of inhalation of respirable crystalline silica:

“ln making the overalI evaluation, the Working Group noted that carcinogenicity in humans was not detected in all industrial circumstances studied. Carcinogenicity may be dependent on inherent characteristics of the crystalline silica or on external factors affecting its biological activity or distribution of its polymorphs.

Crystalline silica inhaled in the form of quartz or cristobalite from occupational sources is carcinogenic to humans (Group 1)”[7]

So some IARC classifications actually do specify that exposure to a substance is not a hazard in all circumstances, a qualification that implies that the same exposure in some exposure circumstances is not a hazard, and so the risk is zero.

We know something about the deliberations of the crystalline silica working group. The members were deadlocked for some time, and the switch of one vote ultimately gave a bare majority to reclassifying crystalline silica as a Group I exposure. Here is how the working group member, Corbett McDonald described the situation:

“The IARC Working Group, in 1997, had considerable difficulty in reaching a decision and might well not have done so had it not been made clear that it was concerned with hazard identification, not risk.”[8]

It was indeed Professor McDonald who changed his vote based upon this linguistic distinction between hazard and risk. His own description of the dataset, however, suggests that the elderly McDonald was railroaded by more younger, more strident members of the group:

“Of the many studies reviewed by the Working Group … nine were identified as providing the least confounded evidence. Four studies which we considered positive included two of refractory brick workers, one in the diatomite industry and our own in pottery workers; the five which seemed negative or equivocal included studies of South Dakota gold miners, Danish stone workers, US stone workers and US granite workers. This further example that the truth is seldom pure and never simple underlines the difficulty of establishing a rational control policy for some carcinogenic materials.”[9]

In defense of his vote, McDonald meekly offered that

“[s]ome equally expert panel of scientists presented with the same information on another occasion could of course have reached a different verdict. The evidence was conflicting and difficult to assess and such judgments are essentially subjective. Of course, when the evidence is conflicting, it cannot be said to be sufficient. Not only was the epidemiologic evidence conflicting, but so was the whole animal toxicology, which found a risk of tumors in rats, but not in mice or hamsters.”

Aside from endorsing a Group I classification for crystalline silica, the working group ignored the purportedly fundamental distinction between hazard and risk, by noting that not all exposure circumstances posed a hazard of cancer. The same working group did even greater violence to the supposed distinction between risk and hazard in its evaluation of coal dust exposure and human cancer. Coal miners have been studied extensively for cancer risk, and the working group reviewed and evaluated the nature of their exposures and their cancer outcomes. Coal dust virtually always contains crystalline silica, often making up a sizable percentage of the total inhalational exposures (40% or so) of coal dust.[10] And yet, when the group studied the cancer rates among coal miners, and in animals, it concluded that there was “inadequate evidence in humans, and “in experimental animals,” for carcinogenicity. The same working group that agreed, on a divided vote, to place crystalline silica in Group 1, voted that “[c]oal dust cannot be classified as to its carcinogenicity to humans (Group 3).”[11]

The conceptual confusion between hazard and risk is compounded by the IARC’s use of epistemic modalities – known, probably, possibly, and indeterminate – to characterize the existence of a hazard. The Preamble, in Table 4, summarizes the categories and “the stream of evidence” needed to place any particular exposure in a one epistemic modal class or another. What is inexplicable is how and why a single substance such as crystalline silica goes from a known cancer hazard in some unspecified occupational setting but then its putative carcinogenicity becomes indeterminate when it makes up 40% of the inhaled dust in a coal mine.

 

The conceptual difficulty created by IARC’s fundamental distinction between hazard and risk is that risk might well vary across exposure circumstances, but there is no basis for varying the epistemic modality for the hazard assessment simply because coal dust is only say 40% crystalline silica. Some of the exposure circumstances evaluated for the Group I silica hazard classification actually were lower than the silica content of coal.  Granite quarrying, for example, involves exposure to rock dust that is roughly 30% crystalline silica.

The conceptual and epistemic confusion caused by IARC’s treatment of the same substance in different exposure circumstances is hardly unique to its treatment of crystalline silica and coal dust. Benzene has long been classified as a Group I human carcinogen, for its ability to cause a specific form of leukemia.[12] Gasoline contains, on average, about one percent benzene, and so gasoline exposure inevitably involves benzene exposure. And yet, benzene exposure in the form of inhaling gasoline fumes is only a “possible” human carcinogen, Group 2B.[13]

Similarly, in 2018, the IARC classified the evidence for the human carcinogenicity of coffee as “indeterminate,” Group 3.[14] And yet every drop of coffee inevitably contains acrylamide, which is, according to IARC, a Group 2A “probable human carcinogen.”[15] Rent-seeking groups, such as the Council for Education and Research on Toxics (founded by Carl Cranor and Martyn Smith) have tried shamelessly to weaponize the IARC 2A classification for acrylaminde by claiming a bounty against coffee sellers such as Star-Bucks in California Proposition 65 litigation.[16]

Similarly confusing, IARC designates acetaldehyde on its own a “possible” human carcinogen, group 2B, even though acetaldehyde is invariably associated with the metabolism of ethyl alcohol, which itself is a Group I human carcinogen.[17] There may well be other instances of such confusions, and I would welcome examples from readers.

These disparate conclusions strain credulity, and undermine confidence that the hazard-risk distinction does any work at all. Hazard and risk do have different meanings, and I would not want to be viewed as anti-semantic. IARC’s use of the hazard-risk distinction, however, lends itself to the interpretation that hazard is simply risk without the quantification. This usage actually is worse than having no distinction at all, because it ignores the existence of thresholds below which exposure carries no risk, as well as ignoring different routes of exposure and exposure circumstances that carry no risk at all. The vague and unquantified categorical determination that a substance is a hazard allows fear mongers to substitute subjective, emotive, and unscientific judgments for scientific assessment of carcinogenicity under realistic conditions of use and exposure.


[1] Plato, Theaetetus 155d (Fowler transl. 1921).

[2] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (1953).

[3] See, e.g., Richard M. Rorty, ed., The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method (1992); Nicholas Rescher, Concept Audits: A Philosophical Method (2016); Timothy Williamson, Philosophical Method: A Very Short Introduction 32 (2020) (discussing the need to clarify terms).

[4] Miquel Porta, Sander Greenland, Miguel Hernán, Isabel dos Santos Silva, John M. Last, and Andrea Burón, A Dictionary of Epidemiology 250 (6th ed. 2014).

[5] Id. at 128.

[6] IARC Monographs on the Identification of Carcinogenic Hazards to Humans – Preamble (2019) (emphasis added).

[7] IARC Monograph on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans: Volume 68, Silica, Some Silicates, Coal Dust, and para-Aramid Fibrils 210-211 (1997).

[8] Corbett McDonald & Nicola Cherry, “Crystalline Silica and Lung Cancer: The Problem of Conflicting Evidence,” 8 Indoor Built Environment 121, 121 (1999).

[9] Id.

[10] IARC Monograph on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans: Volume 68, Silica, Some Silicates, Coal Dust, and para-Aramid Fibrils 340 (1997).

[11] Id. at 393.

[12] IARC Monograph, Volume 120: Benzene (2018).

[13] IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans: Volume 45, Occupational Exposures in Petroleum Refining; Crude Oil and Major Petroleum Fuels 194 (1989).

[14] IARC Monograph No. 116, Drinking Coffee, Mate, and Very Hot Beverages (2018).

[15] IARC Monograph no. 60, Some Industrial Chemicals (1994).

[16] SeeCoffee with Cream, Sugar & a Dash of Acrylamide” (June 9, 2018); “The Council for Education and Research on Toxics” (July 9, 2013).

[17] IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans Volume 96 1278 (2010).