Talc Litigation in Missouri – Show Me the Law and the Evidence

In New Jersey, where the courts are particularly plaintiff friendly but not beyond the persuasive force of evidence, lawsuit industry claims that talc causes ovarian cancer have not fared well. Last year, Judge Johnson, of Atlantic County, New Jersey, held that the plaintiffs’ causal claims failed to meet even the minimal New Jersey legal threshold of scientific validity.1 Meanwhile, in Missouri, juries have been returning large verdicts for plaintiffs on their claims that their use of talc products caused their ovarian cancers.2

What gives? Why is the outcome of similar litigation so different in New Jersey from that in Missouri? One might mistakenly think that courts in Missouri would be skeptical of scientifically dubious claims. After all, Missouri is the “Show Me” state; right? Many people understand the state’s nickname to mean that Missourians are not gullible.3

The reality of the origins of the Missouri nickname may well be different. The most cited account reports that a congressman from Missouri, Willard Duncan Vandiver, used the phrase in an 1899 speech:

I come from a state that raises corn and cotton and cockleburs and Democrats, and frothy eloquence neither convinces nor satisfies me. I am from Missouri. You have got to show me.”

Basically, according to Vandiver, Missourians are “show me” simple folks because they do not read or understand eloquent language. Vandiver might have thought that scientific language was beyond his neighbors’ ken as well. Of course, things have changed since 1899. Missouri is no longer a state populated by Democrats. In the 2016 general election, Donald Drumpf received 56.8% of the Missouri votes cast. Hilary Clinton received 38.1%.4  Inquiring minds will want to know whether “Show Me” connotes incredulity or illiteracy.

One relevant difference between Missouri and many other states, and all the federal courts, is that some courts in Missouri engage in a particularly edentulous form of judicial gatekeeping of expert witness opinion testimony. The talc claims that resulted in large verdicts in Missouri never got off the dime (or got a dime) in New Jersey because plaintiffs’ expert witnesses’ opinions were excluded from courtrooms in the Garden State.

The resulting trials in Missouri have showcased some curious, doubtful rhetoric from legal counsel for the lawsuit industry. In his closing argument in Giannecchini v. Johnson & Johnson, the plaintiff’s lawyer accused Johnson & Johnson of having “rigged” regulatory agencies to ignore the dangers of talc.5 The argument was apparently effective and it has been repeated in another Missouri trial, in Swann v. Johnson & Johnson6, now underway. The plaintiffs’ opening “statement” in Swann was marked by overwrought, hyperbolic rhetoric.7

And the first trial days in Swann were dedicated by plaintiff’s counsel to showing, not that talc actually causes ovarian cancer, but to showing that the defendants engaged in lobbying with respect to the carcinogenic classification of talc by regulatory agencies.8 According to the coverage in legal news media, the first testimony offered was offered to show that after the National Toxicology Program (NTP) nominated talc for inclusion in its list of potential carcinogens, industry trade groups, such as the Cosmetic, Toiletry and Fragrance Association, “shut down serious regulator concerns through intensive lobbying efforts.”9

This is a remarkable digression from the truth finding function of an American jury trial for several reasons. First, the “shutting down” of regulator concern was not, in the media reports, associated with any fraudulent misrepresentations of the scientific record. By casting the lobbying in an unflattering light, the plaintiff was able to undermine the truth value of agencies’ refusal to characterize talc as an ovarian carcinogen. The media coverage did not suggest that the lobbying involved the presentation of sham evidence or arguments that might have misled agencies about the correctness of their position.

Second, if the industry lobbying had badly misled the National Toxicology Program, or other government body, then there would no doubt be a conclusive case for causation today. The fact of the matter, however, is that there is no conclusive case for the claim that talc causes ovarian cancer. Late last year, the “Sister Study,” which explored whether there was any association between perineal talc use and ovarian cancer, was published in Epidemiology.10 The Sister Study (2003–2009) followed a cohort of 50,884 women whose sisters had been diagnosed with breast cancer. Talc use was ascertained at baseline, before diagnosis of subsequent disease and before any chance for selective recall. The cohort was followed for a median of 6.6 years, in which time there were 154 cases of ovarian cancer, available for analysis using Cox’s proportional hazards model. Perineal talc use at baseline was not associated with later ovarian cancer. The authors reported a hazard ratio of 0.73, less than expected, with a 95% confidence interval of 0.44, 1.2. Such a powerful study, showing the absence of any large or even modest association, would hardly be feasible if the science were so clear in the year 2000 that no reasonable scientist would have advocated against the NTP’s proposed classification.

Third, the lawsuit industry’s focus on lobbying activities in the Giannecchini and the Swann cases raises serious issues of infringing upon the defendants’ first amendment rights. The defendants’ advocacy for non-sham, non-fraudulent scientific positions is protected by the federal constitution, under what has come to be known as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.

The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine of Immunity

One of the first agenda items for the first United States Congress was the drafting of a “Bill of Rights” to be submitted to the individual States for ratification. The First amendment (originally the third until the first two were dropped) sets forth a basic “right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”11 In the context of lobbying legislatures and regulatory agencies, the Supreme Court has long regarded lobbying and advocacy for and against legislation and regulation as core political speech that is protected by the right to petition the government.12

Part of this constitutional guarantee is a freedom to associate with others to lobby for redress.13 The constitutional protection is not lost by an economic or self-interested motivation in the lobbying or advocacy.14  This constitutional protection of advocacy positions results in an immunity from civil liability for speech, association, and conduct undertaken to advance advocacy positions before legislatures, agencies, and courts.15 This immunity, over half a century old, has come to be known as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.

Although the original Noerr-Pennington doctrine cases specifically addressed claims of antitrust liability, later cases have held that the immunity applies with equal force in tort cases. State courts, regardless of their state constitutions, are of course obliged to grant and protect the federal Noerr-Pennington immunity.16

The unconstitutional infringement of defendants’ first amendment rights is hardly an innovation in Giannecchini and Swann cases. For decades, the lawsuit industry, which jealously guards its own first amendment rights, has overzealously pressed conspiracy and tort claims against manufacturing industry for trying to influence legislation and regulation. In Senart v. Mobay Chem. Corp., 597 F. Supp. 502 (D. Minn. 1984), plaintiffs alleged that they were harmed by exposure to toluene diisocyanate (TDI), a feedstock chemical used in making polyurethane foam. The plaintiffs sued TDI manufacturers, on conspiracy claims that the manufacturers had jointly influenced the Occupational and Safety Health Administration (OSHA) to reject a recommendation from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) for lower permissible exposure standards for TDI. Senart, 597 F. Supp. at 504. The plaintiffs’ conspiracy complaint was based upon allegations that the manufacturing defendants knew of a body of scientific evidence which suggested that workers could suffer harm at exposure levels below the prevailing … standard,” and and that they “conspired to ‘obfuscate and confuse’ scientific findings which supported a more stringent standard.” Id. Plaintiffs also alleged that the TDI manufacturers knew that a more stringent TDI exposure standard would harm their businesses. Id.

The trial court dismissed the conspiracy count in Senart. “[E]ven accepting plaintiffs’ allegations as true, defendants concerted action sought only permissible ends and acted through permissible means.” Id. at 505-6 (footnote omitted). The defendants work in concert through their trade association to persuade OSHA to reject the NIOSH proposal was clearly protected by the first amendment. Id. at 506 (internal citations omitted).

Following Senart, federal courts in later products cases have applied he Noerr-Pennington doctrine to bar tort claims. In a 1996 class action, a district court held that the immunity barred a class action filed by relatives of gunshot victims against gun manufacturers. Hamilton v. ACCU-TEK 935 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). The court, in Hamilton, found the plaintiffs’ negligence and product liability claims untenable:

Defendants’ efforts to affect federal firearm policies through lobbying activities are prime examples of the types of activity the First Amendment, through its rights of free speech and petition, sought to protect… . A core principle of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is that lobbying alone cannot form the basis of liability… .”

Id. at 1321. The court in Hamilton dismissed the product liability claims. See also Tuosto v. Philip Morris USA Inc., No. 05 Civ. 9384 (PKL), 2007 WL 2398507, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2007) (noting that the immunity “applied to bar liability in state common law tort claims, including negligence and products liability claims, for statements made in the course of petitioning the government”).

The lawsuit industry is one of the largest rent-seeking groups in the United States. Our courts need to apply constitutional standards in a symmetrical fashion, with an understanding that what is spoken in the halls of legislatures and agencies is protected at least as much as speech in the courtroom, and that the constitutional rights of manufacturing industry should not be subordinated to the rights of the lawsuit industry. Maybe lawyers need to figure out how to “show” the constitution in pictograms, without all the 18th century eloquence.


1 Carl v. Johnson & Johnson, No. ATL-L-6546-14, 2016 WL 4580145 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div., Atl. Cty., Sept. 2, 2016).See New Jersey Kemps Ovarian Cancer – Talc Cases” (Sept. 16, 2016).

2Talc Litigation – Stop the Madness” (Nov. 10, 2016) (describing large verdict for plaintiff in Giannecchini v. Johnson & Johnson); see also Myron Levin, “Johnson & Johnson Hammered Again in Talc-Ovarian Cancer Verdict of $70 Million,” Law360 (Oct. 27, 2016); Brandon Lowrey, “J & J, Talc Co. Hit With $70M Baby Powder Cancer Verdict,” Law360 (Oct. 2016).

3 SeeThe Show-Me State,” last visited Feb. 21, 2017.

4 SeeState of Missouri – 2016 General Election – November 8, 2016,” last visited Feb. 21, 2017. I leave it to the reader to assess whether the state nickname describes incredulity or illiteracy.

5 Myron Levin, “Johnson & Johnson Hammered Again in Talc-Ovarian Cancer Verdict of $70 Million,” Law360 (Oct. 27, 2016); Brandon Lowrey, “J & J, Talc Co. Hit With $70M Baby Powder Cancer Verdict,” Law360 (Oct. 2016).

6 Swann v. Johnson & Johnson, case number 1422-CC09326-01, in the 22nd Judicial Circuit of Missouri.

7 Cara Salvatore, “J&J Hid Talc Risk For ‘Love Of Money’, Jury Hears,” Law360 (Feb. 9, 2017).

8 Cara Salvatore, “Talc Lobbyists Stymied Carcinogen Classification, Jury Hears,” Law360 (Feb. 10, 2017).

9 Id.

10 Nicole L. Gonzalez, Katie M. O’Brien, Aimee A. D’Aloisio, Dale P. Sandler, and Clarice R. Weinberg, “Douching, Talc Use, and Risk of Ovarian Cancer,” 27 Epidemiology 797 (2016).

11 U.S. Const. amend. I.

12 California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) (disallowing a cause of action “predicated upon mere attempts to influence the Legislative branch for the passage of laws or the Executive branch for their enforcement.”); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967) (characterizing the right to petition as “among the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights”). United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-70 (1965); Doe v. McMillan, 566 F.2d 713, 718 (D.C.Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 969 (1978) (holding that the first amendment constitutional right to petition the legislature “extends to administrative agencies and the courts”).

13 N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963) (protecting the right “to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas”); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (“[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association … .”). The right of association to further lobbying activities has been described as having a “preferred place” along with other first amendment freedoms, such that the Court will not tolerate “dubious intrusions.” Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).

14 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976); Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 1980) (“The right to freely associate is not limited to those associations which are ‘political in the customary sense’, but includes those which ‘pertain to the social, legal, and economic benefit of the members’.”) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965)); International Union v. National Right to Work Legal Defense & Education Foundation, Inc., 590 F.2d 1139, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“Even economically motivated expression or association is not disqualified from protection under the first amendment.”); Greminger v. Seaborne, 584 F.2d 275, 278 (8th Cir. 1978) (observing that the constitutionally protected [f]reedom of association includes membership in unions or other organizations concerned with ‘business and economic causes’.”); Senart v. Mobay Chem. Corp., 597 F. Supp. 502, 506 (D.Minn. 1984) (“Selfish motivations do not lessen one’s right to present views to the government.”).

15 Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).

16 Fraser v. Bovino, 317 N.J. Super 23, 37 (App. Div. 1998) (recognizing “the fundamental values that undergird a citizen’s right to communicate on issues of public import”); Village Supermarket, Inc. v. Mayfair, 269 N.J. Super. 224, 229-32 (Law Div. 1995) (refusing to interpret New Jersey tort law to permit claims based on lobbying activity protected by the First Amendment); ARTS4ALL Ltd. v. Hancock, 810 N.Y.S.2d 15, 16 (App. Div. 2006) (denying employee’s motion for summary judgment on claim for breach of no-disparagement clause in severance agreement, holding that employer’s statements to government officials were protected by Noerr-Pennington doctrine); Concourse Nursing Home v. Engelstein, 692 N.Y.S. 2d 888, 891 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (holding law firm was immune from business tort claims for successful lobbying efforts); I.G. Second Generation Partners v. Reade, 793 N.Y.S.2d 379, 381 (App. Div. 2005) (holding that NoerrPennington immunity barred claim for tortious interference); Diaz v. Southwest Wheel, 736 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tx. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that Noerr-Pennington immunity barred conspiracy claims against tire manufacturer, which as a member of a trade association, opposed the recall on defective tire rims and restrictions on multi-piece wheels).

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