Several years ago, I submitted a brief, which I had written, in a New York case. When a co-defendant’s counsel filed the same brief, without acknowledging that it was plagiarised, I was annoyed. It seemed to me that such plagiarism clearly has professional and general ethical implications, especially if the plagiarists charged clients for writing something that they stole from another person.[1]
Legal culture does to some extent encourage plagiarism. Law students work as research assistants for professors and often write segments of legal treatises and hornbooks that are published under their professors’ names. Presumably the law students are satisfied that their work was used and that they received strong recommendations in future job searches. When bright young law school graduates accept judicial clerkships, they understand that their writing for draft opinions or memoranda will be “cannibalized” by their judges at will. Similarly, young law firm associates know that much of their writing may be used in briefs without attribution or signature lines on the brief. This practice goes too far, in my view, when partners require associates to draft articles for publication without making them authors, and with at most an anemic note of gratitude for “assistance.”
When courts use lawyers’ arguments and their actual language advanced in briefs, lawyers rarely complain. At least there are no complaints from the plagiarized lawyers who prevailed.
Sometimes the plagiarized argument reveals the source of a court’s error. In an opinion issued over Justice Sotomayor’s name, the Supreme Court adopted wholesale an argument advanced by the Solicitor General. The origin of the argument was unmistakable because the claim was so egregiously wrong. In its amicus brief, the Solicitor General argued that statistical significance was unnecessary for reaching a conclusion of causation between the use of Zicam and anosmia. In support of its argument, the Solicitor General’s amicus brief cited three cases: Best, Westberry, and Ferebee.[2] The three cited cases all involved disputes over specific causation, whereas the case sub judice purported to involve an issue of general causation. (The Court correctly decided that the corporate disclosure issue under the securities laws did not actually require general causation.) Nevertheless, the Solicitor General’s sloppy legal scholarship was incorporated into the Supreme Court’s opinion. Justice Sotomayor repeated the citation to the first two cases, dropped the reference to Ferebee, but curiously added an even more bizarre third case to the argument by citing the infamous Wells case.[3] Remarkably, as notorious and poorly reasoned as the Wells case was,[4] it involved plaintiffs’ expert witnesses’ reliance upon at least one poorly conducted study that reported nominal statistical significance. And thus the Supreme Court produced the following text, with three inapposite cases:
“We note that courts frequently permit expert testimony on causation based on evidence other than statistical significance. See, e.g., Best v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., 563 F. 3d 171, 178 (6th Cir 2009); Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F. 3d 257, 263–264 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing cases); Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 788 F. 2d 741, 744–745 (11th Cir. 1986). We need not consider whether the expert testimony was properly admitted in those cases, and we do not attempt to define here what constitutes reliable evidence of causation.”[5]
I suspect that a law clerk acted as an intermediary, or a vcctor, in the plagiarism by incorporating the Solicitor General’s argument into a draft or a memorandum, which became part of the opinion that none of the justices considered carefully. At least, the three cases cited by the Solicitor General and the cases cited by Justice Sotomayor actually existed.
The introduction of large language models in artificial intelligence (A.I.) has taken plagiarism to a new level.[6] Lawyers can now prompt a machine to review the case law on a specified issue and to create an output of analysis in favor of an identified litigation position. And then the lawyers can submit the output to a court as their own work, and charge their clients for the brief writing. The submission of a brief or memorandum to a court, however, implies that the facts are supported, and that the legal precedents cited exist and are pertinent authorities for the court to consider.
The problem with the use of AI, however, is that AI “hallucinates” non-existent cases, all with citations, case specifics, and sometimes fanciful quotes that seem pertinent. It sucks to be a bot, but it is even worse for lawyers who take AI output, and present it as their own, without further research, in hopes of persuading a court.
Last week, Special Master Magistrate Judge Michael R. Wilner (retired) imposed a monetary sanction of $31,100 against the lawfirm K&L Gates for failing to fact check a brief prepared in substantial part by AI, as well as failing to disclose its use of AI, or to correct errors after notified of the Special Master’s concerns.[7] The Special Master noted that “no reasonably competent attorney should out-source research and writing to this technology – particularly without any attempt to verify the accuracy of that material.”[8] Ouch. K&L Gates is not the first firm, and it sadly will not be the last firm to be sanctioned for the improvident use of AI, and the submission of fraudulent authorities to a court.[9]
The Special Master’s outrage was generated by his discovery that one third of the legal citations were incorrect, and that two of them were non-existent. Several quotations from cases presented in support of the plaintiffs’ argument were entirely bogus.[10] Although the Special Master freely described the lawyers’ actions as “misconduct,” he concluded that disciplinary sanctions against the lawyers involved was unwarranted.[11]
The Special Master’s opinion elided the ethical significance of the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ conduct. The opinion never mentions the Rules of Professional Responsibility; nor does it suggest that a reference to the California State Bar’s Office of Chief Trial Counsel was in order. Plagiarism is, after all, research misconduct in most other professional domains. Under the regulations of the Office of Research Integrity (ORI), plagiarism is “the appropriation of another person’s ideas, processes, results, or words without giving appropriate credit.”[12] An AI model may not be eligible for copyright, or the moral rights of authors, but it seems that the spirit of the prohibition against plagiarism requires disclosure and credit to AI, however bogus AI’s contribution may have been.
Although I tend to think of plagiarism in briefs and other court submissions as a violation of a lawyers’ professional responsibility, the issue actually is not clear cut. Plagiarism would seem to violate core professional responsibilities of honesty and integrity. In disparaging plagiarism, courts have occasionally invoked Model Rule 8.4(c), which prohibits engaging in “dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”[13] Legal commentators have divided over the propriety of recycling legal arguments and verbatim language without acknowledgments.[14] Context also matters. The legal analysis in a routine motion in a mass tort litigation, say for dismissal for lack of diversity, or for change of venue, probably should not be re-invented. Copying another lawyer’s appellate brief and and its consideration of a legal issue, without acknowledgment, seems ethically dodgy.
Of course, copying, whether permissible or not, does not mean that lawyers are freed from their ethical responsibility of ensuring that citations and interpretations of authorities are correct. Without having taken steps to ensure the relevance and correctness of cited authorities, lawyers cannot represent to the court that their argument has a good-faith basis in law and fact.
Hallucinations versus Delusions
Philosophy professor Hilarius Bookbinder (not Søren Kierkegaard) points out that describing bogus AI output as “hallucinations” is euphemistic and erroneous. When AI makes stuff up, the output is not really an hallucination, but delusional.[15]
Bookbinder channels the insight of William James, who gave extensive consideration to the phenomenon of hallucinations, and ultimately characterized them as correct reports of altered consciousness.[16] In a footnote to The Principles of Psychology, James offered the following helpful distinction:
“Illusions and hallucinations must both be distinguished from delusions. A delusion is a false opinion about a matter of fact, which need not necessarily involve, though it often does involve, false perceptions of sensible things. We may, for example, have religions delusions, medical delusions, delusions about our own importance, about other peoples’ characters, etc., ad libitum.”[17]
Bookbinder has a point about how we talk about large language models of AI. In James’ parlance, AI does not really hallucinate, but it clearly suffers delusions; or perhaps it simply fabricates unwittingly. This feature, or flaw, of AI makes lawyers’ uncritical reliance upon AI for legal research and writing not only unethical, not merely for plagiarizing, but for violating their professional duties of competence and candor to the tribunal. Outsourcing thinking to a machine seems unbecoming for a profession that is built upon careful, independent analysis.
Hallucinations and delusions are both distinguishable from a third phenomenon, bullshit – or willful indifference to the truth.[18] For bull shitters, the assertion is more important than the truth value of the statement. When Felonious Trump claimed a Civil War battle took place on one of his golf courses, and even went so far as to identify the site with a plague. Several historians pushed back, and pointed out, his mistake, to which Trump asked “How would they know that?” Were they there?”[19] Trumpian lies and bullshit have now begun to infiltrate into the judicial system, so we must sort delusions, bullshit, and lies among the pathology of lawyering. We can probably say fairly that AI lacks the intentionality to deceive, or the psychopathology that confuses assertion with fact.
There may well be conduct worse than plagiarizing a bot, but that is hardly a recommendation.
[1] Schachtman, “Copycat – Further Thoughts on Plagiarism in the Law,” Tortini (Oct. 24, 2010); “Plagiarism in the Law,” Tortini (Oct. 16, 2010).
[2] Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 2010 WL 4624148, at *14-16 (Nov. 12, 2010) (“Best v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., 563 F.3d 171, 178 (6th Cir. 2009) (“an ‘overwhelming majority of the courts of appeals’ agree” that differential diagnosis, a process for medical diagnosis that does not entail statistical significance tests, informs causation) (quoting Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 263 (4th Cir. 1999)),” and “Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1536 (D.C. Cir.) (‘[P]roducts liability law does not preclude recovery until a “statistically significant” number of people have been injured’.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984)).
[3] Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga. 1985), aff’d in relevant part, 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.950 (1986).
[4] See, e.g., James L. Mills and Duane Alexander, “Teratogens and ‘Litogens’,” 15 New Engl. J. Med. 1234 (1986); Samuel R. Gross, “Expert Evidence,” 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 1113, 1121-24 (1991) (“Unfortunately, Judge Shoob’s decision is absolutely wrong. There is no scientifically credible evidence that Ortho-Gynol Contraceptive Jelly ever causes birth defects.”). See also Editorial, “Federal Judges v. Science,” N.Y. Times, December 27, 1986, at A22 (unsigned editorial) (“That Judge Shoob and the appellate judges ignored the best scientific evidence is an intellectual embarrassment.”); David E. Bernstein, “Junk Science in the Courtroom,” Wall St. J. at A 15 (Mar. 24,1993) (pointing to Wells as a prominent example of how the federal judiciary had embarrassed American judicial system with its careless, non-evidence based approach to scientific evidence); Bert Black, Francisco J. Ayala & Carol Saffran-Brinks, “Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge,” 72 Texas L. Rev. 715, 733-34 (1994) (lawyers and leading scientist noting that the district judge “found that the scientific studies relied upon by the plaintiffs’ expert were inconclusive, but nonetheless held his testimony sufficient to support a plaintiffs’ verdict. *** [T]he court explicitly based its decision on the demeanor, tone, motives, biases, and interests that might have influenced each expert’s opinion. Scientific validity apparently did not matter at all.”) (internal citations omitted); Troyen A. Brennan, “Untangling Causation Issues in Law and Medicine: Hazardous Substance Litigation,” 107 Ann. Intern. Med. 741, 744-45 (1987) (describing the result in Wells as arising from the difficulties created by the Ferebee case; “[t]he Wells case can be characterized as the court embracing the hypothesis when the epidemiologic study fails to show any effect”). Kenneth R. Foster, David E. Bernstein, and Peter W. Huber, eds., Phantom Risk: Scientific Inference and the Law 28-29, 138-39 (MIT Press 1993) (criticizing Wells decision); Hans Zeisel & David Kaye, Prove It With Figures: Empirical Methods in Law and Litigation § 6.5, at 93(1997) (noting the multiple comparisons in studies of birth defects among women who used spermicides, based upon the many reported categories of birth malformations, and the large potential for even more unreported categories); id. at § 6.5 n.3, at 271 (characterizing Wells as “notorious,” and noting that the case became a “lightning rod for the legal system’s ability to handle expert evidence.”).
[5] Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S.Ct. 1309, 1319 (2011).
[6] Schachtman, “Artificial Intelligence May Be Worse Than None At All,” Tortini (Feb. 2, 2025); “Hallucinations in Law and in Government,” Tortini (Feb. 19, 2025).
[7] Lacey v. State Farm General Insurance Co., Case 2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA, doc. 119 (C.D. Calif. May 6, 2025).
[8] Id. at 7. The Special Master ducked the more interesting counter-factual question: what if AI had generated a perfect brief, with exactly the right citations, properly cited, with all inferences and conclusions proper and correct? Would the outsourcing of human intelligence be acceptable to us, with all the requisite disclosures? See Hilarius Bookbinder, “Why AI is Destroying Academic Integrity: It’s because students prefer The Experience Machine,” Scriptorium Philosophia (Jan. 02, 2025).
[9] See note 1, supra. See also Mata v. Avianca, 678 F. Supp. 3d 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (ordering sanctions against lawyers who submitted briefs with six fabricated judicial opinions and fake quotes); Gauthier v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., civil action no. 1:23-CV-281 (E.D. Tex Nov. 25, 2024) (imposing sanctions for citing non-existing cases with fabricated quotations). Canadian lawyers have also been seduced by the prospect of outsourcing their thinking, researching, analyzing, and writing to a bot. Ko v. Li, CV-25-00736891-00ES, 2025 Ontario Super. Ct. Justice 2766 (May 1, 2025) (ordering lawyer to show cause why she should not be held in contempt). See Bernise Carolino, “Ko v. Li, Ontario Superior Court, 2 nonexistent case citations, attorney referred for potential contempt proceedings,” Canadian Lawyering (May 13, 2025).
[10] Kat Black, “‘A Collective Debacle’: Ellis George and K&L Gates Ordered to Pay $31,000 after Using AI to Write Brief in Insurance Case,” Legal Intelligencer (May 13, 2025).
[11] Lacey, supra, at 7; Eugene Volokh, “AI Hallucination in Filings Involving 14th-Largest U.S. Law Firm Lead to $31K in Sanctions,” The Volokh Conspiracy, Reason (May 13, 2025).
[12] 42 CFR 93.103 (c) Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Research Integrity. See, e.g., Sena Chang, “Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth ’03 ‘plagiarized’ small portions of his senior thesis, experts say. But how serious is it?” Daily Princetonian (May 10, 2025).
[13] See In re Mundie, 453 Fed.Appx. 9 (2d Cir. 2011) (publicly reprimanding lawyer for various acts, including copying extensively from another lawyer’s brief in a different case). See also In re Summit Financial, Inc., 2021 WL 5173331 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2021); Lohan v. Perez, 924 F.Supp. 2d 447 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). Compare New York City Bar Formal Opinion 2018-3 (disapproving “extensive” copying, while noting that copying source material without attribution is not “per se” an ethical violation) with North Carolina State Bar Formal Ethics Opinion 2008-14 (acknowledging that lawyers may copy language used in other briefs without attribution).
[14] Dennis A. Rendleman, “Copy That!: What is plagiarism in the practice of law?,” YourABA (Mar. 2020) (arguing that unacknowledged copying in legal filings is different from such conduct in scholarly publications); Andrew M. Carter, “The Case for Plagiarism,” 9 U. Calif. Irvine L. Rev. 531 (2019); Carol M. Bast & Linda B. Samuels, “Plagiarism and legal scholarship in the age of information sharing: the need for intellectual honesty,” 57 Catholic Univ. L. Rev. 777 (2008); Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, “The Problems of Plagiarism as an Ethics Offense,” ABA Criminal Justice 56 (Summer 2011).
[15] Hilarius Bookbinder, “Hallucination, bullshit, confabulation: AI and the outsourcing of thinking,” Scriptorium Philosophia (May 15, 2025).
[16] William James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. 2 (ch. 18-19) (1918).
[17] Id. at ch. 19, n. 41.
[18] Harry Frankfurt, On Bullshit 63 (2005) (“Bullshit is unavoidable whenever circumstances require someone to talk without knowing what he is talking about. Thus the production of bullshit is stimulated whenever a person’s obligations or opportunities to speak about some topic exceed his knowledge of the facts that are relevant to that topic.”).
[19] Joyce Chen, “Donald Trump’s Golf Course Plaque Honors Fake Civil War Battle,” Rollingstone (Aug. 17, 2017); Nicholas Fandos, “In Renovation of Golf Club, Donald Trump Also Dressed Up History,” N.Y. Times (Nov. 24, 2015).