TORTINI

For your delectation and delight, desultory dicta on the law of delicts.

Putting the Liability Spotlight on Employers

November 30th, 2015

In 2013, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that employers could be directly liable to employees for injuries that become manifest outside the time limits (300 weeks) of the Commonwealth’s workman’s compensation statute. Tooey v. AK Steel Corp., 81 A.3d 851 (Pa. 2013). The implications for so-called long latency, toxic tort claims were obvious, and the generated some commentary. SeePennsylvania Workers Regain Their Right of Action in Tort against Employers for Latent Occupational Diseases” (Feb. 14, 2014); “The Erosion of Employer Immunity in Tort Litigation” (Jan. 20, 2015).

The Legal Intelligencer has now reported the first “cashing in” or “cashing out” on the change in Pennsylvania law. Plaintiff’s lawyer, Benjamin Shein, took an employer to trial on claims that the employer was responsible for alleged asbestos exposure that caused John F. Busbey to develop mesothelioma. Bobbie R. Bailey of Leader & Berkon, in Los Angeles, defended. The case was tried before Philadelphia Judge Lisette Shirdan-Harris and a jury. After a three week trial, on November 10, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, against the employer defendant, in the amount of 1.7 million dollars. Busbey v. ESAB Group, Phila. Court of Common Pleas, No. 120503046. Max Mitchell, “Employer Found Liable In Asbestos Verdict: Busbey v. ESAB Group $1.7 Million Verdict,” The Legal Intelligencer (Dec. 1, 2015).

For witnesses, Shein called frequent litigation-industry testifiers, Dr. Steven Markowitz on occupational disease, and Dr. Daniel Dupont, a local pulmonary physician. Shein also called one of the pink panther historians, Gerald Markowitz. SeeNarratives & Historians for Hire” (Dec. 15, 2010). The employer defendant called an industrial hygienist, Delno D. Malzahn.

According Ben Shein, the verdict represented the first trial win in Pennsylvania for an asbestos claim against an employer, since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Tooey in 2013. From the Legal Intelligencer’s account, and the line-up of litigation industry witnesses, the plaintiff’s trial evidence on exposure and standard of care seems shaky, and the winner may not be discernible until the appellate review is concluded.

In Illinois, an intermediate appellate court held out the prospect of a legal change similar to Tooey. In 2014, the Illinois Court of Appeals held that workman compensation petitioners, whose claims fell outside the Illinois statute were not barred by the exclusive remedy provisions that gave employers immunity from civil suit. Folta v. Ferro Engineering, 2014 IL App (1st) 123219. See Patrick W. Stufflebeam, “Folta v. Ferro Engineering: A Shift in Illinois Workers’ Compensation Protection for Illinois Employers in Asbestos Cases,” News & Press: IDC Quarterly (Mar. 11, 2015).

The Illinois Supreme Court allowed an appeal, as well as extensive amicus briefings from the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association, the Asbestos Disease Awareness Organization, the Illinois AFL-CIO, the Illinois Self-Insurers’ Association, the Illinois Defense Trial Counsel, a joint brief from insurers,[1] and a joint brief from various manufacturing companies.[2]

Earlier this month, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed and held that even though claims fell outside the Illinois workman’s compensation statute, those claims were still barred by the Act’s exclusive remedy provisions that gave employers immunity from civil suit. Folta v. Ferro Engineering, 2015 IL 118070 (November 4, 2015).


[1] the American Insurance Association, Property Casualty Insurers Association of America, and the Travelers Indemnity Company.

[2] Caterpillar Inc., Aurora Pump Company, Innophos, Inc., Rockwell Automation, Inc., United States Steel Corporation, F.H. Leinweber Company, Inc., Driv-Lok, Inc., Ford Motor Company, and ExxonMobil Oil Corporation.

The Unreasonable Success of Asbestos Litigation

July 25th, 2015

In asbestos litigation, the plaintiffs’ bar has apparently invented a perpetual motion machine that feeds on outrage that will never run out. Still, lawyers who have not filled their wallets with legal fees from asbestos cases sometimes attempt to replicate the machine. For the most part, the imitators have failed.

What accounts for the unreasonable success of asbestos litigation? Unlike pharmaceutical litigation, exposure does not require a prescription. Although asbestos insulators and applicators experienced the most exposure, other trades and occupations worked with, or near, asbestos materials. Anecdotal testimony of exposure suffices in almost every case. Add para-occupational exposure, and the sky’s the limit for the class of potential plaintiffs. See Lester Brickman, “Fraud and Abuse in Mesothelioma Litigation,” 88 Tulane L. Rev. 1071 (2014); Peggy Ableman, “The Garlock Decision Should be Required Reading for All Trial Court Judges in Asbestos Cases,” 37 Am. J. Trial Advocacy 479, 488 (2014).

Then there is the range of diseases and disorders attributable to asbestos. Excessive exposure to asbestos minerals cause non-malignant pleural plaques and thickening, as well as lung fibrosis, asbestosis. Some asbestos minerals cause mesothelioma, and despite a differential in potency among some of the minerals (between amosite and crocidolite), the general and specific causation of mesothelioma is often uncontested. Furthermore, lung cancer in the presence of asbestosis may be the result of interaction of asbestos exposure and cigarette smoking. Plaintiffs’ counsel and The Lobby have expanded the list of attributable diseases to include non-pulmonary cancers, only to find some defendants willing to pay money on these claims as well.

In addition to the ease of claiming, or manufacturing, exposure, and the willing cooperation of the occupational medical community in supporting medical causation, asbestos litigation is a lightning rod for moral outrage in the courtroom. Plaintiffs claim that “industry” knew about the hazards of asbestos, including its carcinogenicity, long before warnings appeared. Defending the knowledge claim requires nuanced explanation of shifting standards for establishing causality as epidemiology developed and was applied to putative asbestos-related cancer outcomes, as well as changing views about the latencies of asbestos-related diseases.

Every once in a while, plaintiffs’ and defense counsel[1], the media[2], the academy[3], and the insurance industry[4] ask whether “silica” is the next asbestos. Although the prospects have been, and remain, dim, plaintiffs’ counsel continue to try to build their litigation palace on sand, with predictably poor results. See Kimberley A. Strassel, “He Fought the Tort Bar — and Won,” Wall St. J. (May 4, 2009).

There are many serious disanalogies between asbestos and silica litigation. One glaring difference is the inability to summon any outrage over suppressed or nondisclosed knowledge of alleged silica cancer hazards. The silica cancer state of the art, written by those who are lionized in the asbestos litigation – Hueper, Schepers, and Hardy, along with NIOSH and the Surgeon General, all appropriately denied or doubted silica as a cause of lung cancer. See below. When the IARC shifted its views in the 1990s, under the weight of determined advocacy from some partisans in the occupational medicine community, and with the help from some rather biased reviews, industry promptly warned regardless of the lack of scientific support for the IARC’s conclusion. The manufacturing of faux consensus and certainty on silica and lung cancer is an important counter to the incessant media stories about the manufacturing of doubt on topics such as climate change.


[1] Robert D. Chesler, James Stewart, and Geoffrey T. Gibson, “Is Silica the Next Asbestos?” 176 N.J.L.J. 1 (June 28, 2004); Mark S. Raffman, “Where Will Silica Litigation Go?” 1 LJN Silica Legal News 1 (2005); Chris Michael Temple, “A Case for Why Silica Litigation Is Not the ‘Next Asbestos’,” LJN Product Liability Law & Strategy (2004).

[2] Jonathan D. Glater, “Suits on Silica Being Compared To Asbestos Cases,” N.Y. Times (Sept. 6, 2003).

[3] Michelle J. White, “Mass Tort Litigation: Asbestos,” in Jürgen Georg Backhaus, ed., Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 1 (2014); Melissa Shapiro, “Is Silica the Next Asbestos? An Analysis of the Silica Litigation and the Sudden Resurgence of Silica Lawsuit Filings,” 32 Pepperdine L. Rev. 4 (2005).

[4]Is silica the new asbestos?The Actuary (2005).


Historical Statements – – State-of-the-Art

Maxcy, ed., Rosenau Preventive Medicine and Hygiene 1051 (N.Y., 7th ed. 1951) (“Thus, there is no evidence that lung cancer is related in any way to silicosis.”)

May Mayers, “Industrial Cancer of the Lungs,” 4 Compensation Medicine 11, 12 (1952) (“Nevertheless, silicosis is not, apparently associated with, or productive of, lung cancer, whereas asbestosis very probably is.”) (Chief, Medical Unit, Division of Industrial Hygiene and Safety Standards, N.Y. Dep’t of Labor)

Geritt Schepers, “Occupational Chest Diseases,” Chap. 33, p. 455, ¶3, in A. Fleming, et al., eds., Modern Occupational Medicine (Phila. 2d ed. 1960) (“Lung cancer, of course, occurs in silicotics and is on the increase. Thus far, however, statistical studies have failed to reveal a relatively enhanced incidence of pulmonary neoplasia in silicotic subjects.”)

Spencer, Pathology of the Lung (1962) (“Silicosis and lung cancer inhaled silica, unlike asbestos, does not predispose to the development of lung cancer.”)

Wilhelm Hueper, Occupational and Environmental Cancers of the Respiratory System at 2-6 (N.Y. 1966) (“The bulk of the available epidemiologic evidence on the association of silicosis and lung cancer supports the view of a mere coincidental role of silicosis in this combination. *** From the evidence on hand, it appears that a well advanced silicosis does not seem to furnish a favorable soil for the development of cancer of the lung.”) (chief of the National Cancer Institute)

Harriet L. Hardy, “Current Concepts of Occupational Lung Disease of Interest to the Radiologist,” 2 Sem. Roentgenology 225, 231-32 (1967) (“cancer of the lung is not a risk for the silicotic. It is a serious risk following asbestos exposure and for hematite, feldspar, and uranium miners. This means that certain dusts and ionizing radiation alone or perhaps with cigarette smoke act as carcinogens.”)

Raymond Parkes, Occupational Lung Disorders 192 (London 1974) (“Bronchial carcinoma occasionally occurs in silicotic lungs but there is no evidence of a causal relationship between it and silicosis; indeed the incidence of lung cancer in miners with silicosis is significantly lower than in non-silicotic males.”)

Kaye Kilburn, Ruth Lilis, Edwin Holstein, “Silicosis,” in Maxcy-Rosenau, Public Health and Preventive Medicine, 11th ed., at 606 (N.Y. 1980) (“Lung cancer is apparently not a complication of silicosis.”)

Robert Jones, “Silicosis,” Chap. 16, in W. Rom, et al., eds., Environmental and Occupational Medicine 205 (Boston 1983) (“The weight of epidemiologic evidence is against the proposition that silicosis carries an increased risk of respiratory malignancy.”)

W. Keith C. Morgan & Anthony Seaton, eds., Occupational Lung Diseases 266 (1984) (“It is generally believed that silicosis does not predispose to lung cancer. * * * On balance, it seems unlikely that silicosis itself predisposes to lung cancer.”)

1 Anderson’s Pathology at 910b (1985) (“There is no evidence that silica increases the risk of lung cancer, nor does it enhance tobacco induced carcinogenesis.”)

U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, The Health Consequences of Smoking – Cancer and Chronic Lung Disease in the Workplace: A Report of the Surgeon General at 348, Chapter 8 “Silica‑Exposed Workers” (1985) (“the evidence does not currently establish whether silica exposure increases the risk of developing lung cancer in men.”)

J. Cotes & J. Steel, Work-Related Lung Disorders 156 (Oxford 1987) (“The inhalation of silica dust does not contribute to malignancy.”)

NIOSH Silicosis and Silicate Disease Committee, “Diseases Associated With Exposure to Silica and Non-fibrous Silicate Minerals,” 112 Arch. Path. & Lab. Med. 673, 707 (1988) (“Epidemiologic studies have been conducted in an effort to assess the role of silica exposure in the pathogenesis of lung cancer. *** Thus, the results are inconclusive … .”)

Arthur Frank, “Epidemiology of Lung Cancer, in J. Roth, et al., Thoracic Oncology, Chap. 2, at p. 8 (Table 2-1), 11 (Phila. 1989) (omitting silica from list of lung carcinogens) (“The question of the relationship of coal mining to the development of lung cancer has been frequently considered. Most evidence points to cigarette smoking among coal miners as the major causative factor in the development of lung cancer, and neither a recent84 nor a British study of lung cancer among coal miners has found any relationship to occupational exposure.”)

The Erosion of Employer Immunity in Tort Litigation

January 20th, 2015

The present workman’s compensation system in the United States has serious flaws. Scheduled awards are inadequate in some states, and their inadequacy fosters specious litigation against remote third parties who are not able to control the workplace use of hazardous materials. In many states, premiums are set on an industry-wide basis, and thus careless employers are not handed incentives to improve workplace hygiene. With awards low, and without the need to rate individual employers, compensation insurers do not adequately inspect and control individual employers’ conduct. Workman’s compensation statutes provide a lien against any third-party recovery, which means that employers (and their insurers) will be rewarded for their negligence if injured employees can frame liability suits against third-parties, such as suppliers of raw materials to the employers.

For the most part, organized labor and management reached their great compromise over occupational injury litigation back from about 1911 through the early 1930s. Before the passage of the various compensation acts, employees had common law negligence actions against employers for deviations from reasonable care. In some part of the country, juries were extremely sympathetic to injured workers, and equally hostile to employers. At the same time, employers had powerful defenses in the form of contributory negligence, which barred claims by workers who were the least bit careless for their own safety. The fellow-worker rule, assumption of risk, and statutes of limitations further diminished workers’ likelihood of success in pursuing tort claims. One option that was not on the table in the negotiations was to open up liability of remote vendors to employers as a way to mitigate the hardships of the common law tort system. Remote suppliers had even more potent defenses in the form of privity of contract, intervening and superseding negligence of the employers and employees, and all the other defenses that employers enjoyed. More important, however, the interlocutors realized that employers controlled the workplace, and had the greatest opportunity to prevent industrial injuries and occupational disease. When the workman’s compensation bargain was struck, labor knew that the scheduled awards would be workers’ sole or main source of compensation.

Worker’s compensation statutes made recovery for most injuries a certainty, with schedules of damages that were deeply discounted from what might be had in a jury trial. In return for well-nigh absolute liability, employers gained certainty of outcome, reduction of administrative costs, and immunity to tort liability for all but intentional harms. The remedial compensation statutes gave employers immunity, but they did not eradicate the basic common law bases for suits against employers. But for the worker’s compensation statutes, employees would have rights of action against employers. Gaps in the compensation acts translated into gaps in immunity, and reversion to the common law of negligence.

The predicate for the “deal” began to disintegrate after World War II. For one thing, changes in tort law diminished the defenses that employers had exercised so effectively before the deal. Contributory negligence gave way to comparative negligence.  Assumption of risk defenses were curtailed, and the fellow-servant rule was severely modified or abandoned.

Just when Labor might have been feeling consumed by buyer’s remorse over its deal, strict liability principles began to replace privity doctrines. In 1965, the American Law Institute adopted § 402A which provided for “Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer,” based upon concerns of unequal knowledge of defects and latent hazards of products sold to consumers. Liability followed for harm caused by a product irrespective of privity of contract or warranty, and even if “the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product.” Restatement (Second), Torts § 402A (2)(a),(b) (1965).

Section 402 became the vehicle for injured workers to ditch their capped damages in worker’s compensation court, and to put their cases back in front of juries, with the prospect of unlimited awards for non-economic damages. Although instigated by the perceived imbalance of knowledge between manufacturers and buyers with respect to design and manufacturing defects, strict liability doctrine quickly became a vehicle for redressing inadequacies in the workman’s compensation systems. What was problematic, however, was that there was often no inequality of knowledge between seller and purchaser, or hidden or latent hazard in the product or material.

There are exceptions to the exclusivity of workman’s compensation remedies against employers. One exception, available in most states, is for intentional torts committed by employers. The scienter requirement for intentional torts allowed only very few cases to proceed against employers in tort. A bigger gap in immunity, however, was opened in Pennsylvania, where workers regained their common law right to sue employers for negligence and other torts, for occupational diseases that manifest more than 300 weeks after last employment. Section 301(c)(2) of the Pennsylvania’s Workman’s Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 411(2) removes these delayed manifested occupational disease claims from the scope of Pennsylvania’s Act. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court filled in the obvious logical gap: if the Act did not apply, then the employer had no immunity against a common law cause of action, which was never abolished, and was unavailable only when there was a statutory remedy under the Act. Tooey v. AK Steel Corp., 81 A.3d 851 (2013); “Pennsylvania Workers Regain Their Right of Action in Tort against Employers for Latent Occupational Diseases” (Feb. 14, 2014). See also Gidley v. W.R. Grace Co., 717 P.2d 21(Mont. 1986)).

The Tooey decision has the potential to open an important door for plaintiffs and defendants alike. With employer immunity erased, the employer’s duty of reasonable care to protect the health and safety of its employees can once again be harnessed to improve the lot of workers, without concocting Rube-Goldberg theories of liability against remote suppliers and premise owners. Juries will see the entire evidentiary case, including the actions and omissions of employers, which will tend to exculpate remote suppliers. Employers will be given incentives to train employees in workplace safety, and to document their efforts. Employers will assert comparative negligence and assumption of risk defenses, which will give the lie to the plaintiffs’ claims of inadequate warnings from the remote suppliers.  Tooey, and the prospect of employer liability, has the potential to improve the truth finding ability of juries in tort cases.

Folta v. Ferro Engineering, 2014 IL App (1st) 123219.

In June of last year, the Illinois intermediate appellate court followed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s lead in Tooey, and decided to allow a direct action against an employer when the employee’s claim was not within the scope of the Illinois workers’ compensation act. Folta v. Ferro Eng’g , 14 N.E.3d 717, 729 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal allowed (Ill. S. Ct. Sept. 24, 2014). See Steven Sellers, “Workers’ Compensation System Threatened By Illinois Asbestos Decision, Companies Say,” 43 Product Safety & Liability Reporter (Jan. 8, 2015).

James Folta developed mesothelioma 41 years after leaving his employment with Ferro Engineering, a latency that put his claim outside the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act and Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act. The panel of the intermediate appellate court held that the same latency that denied Mr. Folta coverage, also worked to deny the employer immunity from common law suit. Mr. Folta’s asbestos exposure occurred at his Ferro workplace, from 1966 to 1970, during which time raw asbestos and many finished asbestos product suppliers provided warnings about the dangers of asbestos inhalation.

The BNA reporter, Mr. Sellers, quoted Mark Behrens, of Shook, Hardy & Bacon, as stating that:

“This case is part of an emerging national attack on state workers’ compensation systems by the personal injury bar.”

Id. Perhaps true, but the systems have been under critical attack from the public health community, legal reformers, labor, and industry, for some time. No one seems very happy with the system except employers in the specific moment and circumstance of asserting their immunity in tort actions. The regime of worker compensation immunity for employers has failed to foster worker safety and health, and it has worked to shift liability unfairly to remote suppliers who are generally not in a position to redress communication lapses in the workplace.

The Illinois Supreme Court has allowed Ferro Engineering to appeal the Folta case. Not surprisingly, the American Insurance Association, the Property Casualty Insurers Association of America and the Travelers Indemnity Company have filed an amicus brief in support of Ferro. Various companies — Caterpillar, Inc., Aurora Pump Co., Innophos, Inc., Rockwell Automation, Inc., United States Steel Corp., F.H. Leinweber Co., Inc., Driv-Lok, Inc., Ford Motor Co., and ExxonMobil Oil Corp. — have also banded together to file an amicus brief in support of Ferro. Ironically, many of these companies would benefit from abandoning employer immunity in occupational disease litigation. Taking the short view, the defense amicus brief argues that the Illinois Appellate Court’s decision distorts the “delicate balancing of competing interests,” and will lead to a flood of asbestos litigation in Illinois. The defense amicus further argues that the intermediate appellate court’s decision is “the first step towards unraveling the quid pro quo embodied in the acts.”

The problem with the defense position is that there already a flood of asbestos litigation in Illinois and elsewhere, and the problem lies not in damming the flood, but ensuring its equitable resolution. Divining what a legislature intended is always a risky business, but it seems unlikely it had any clear understanding of diseases with latencies in excess of 25 years. And while the Ferro decision has the potential to unravel the defense’s understanding of employer immunity in long-latency occupational disease cases, the real issue is whether bringing the employer to the table in civil litigation over occupational diseases will result in more equitable allocation of responsibility for the harms alleged. Even a “wrong” decision by the Illinois Supreme Court will have the advantage of inciting the Illinois legislature to clarify what it meant, and perhaps to recalibrate tort law to acknowledge the primary role of employers in providing safe workplaces.

Big Blue & The Sophisticated User and Intermediary Defenses

September 26th, 2014

Two particularly perfidious myths perpetrated by the asbestos litigation industry is that crocidolite was not used in the United States, and that chrysotile is as potent in causing mesothelioma as is crocidolite. Both myths are untrue, but they have become current articles of faith among the “The Lobby.” SeeSelikoff and the Mystery of the Disappearing Amphiboles” (Dec. 10, 2010).

Because of the flagrant falsehoods imbedded in the Lobby’s mythology, I am always fascinated to see incontrovertible evidence of the use of crocidolite. Crocidolite is a blue fiber, and Johns-Manville (JM) was the “Big Blue” of the North American asbestos industry. JM used crocidolite in several products, but perhaps best known is its incorporation of blue fiber into asbestos cement products, known as Transite. One of JM’s manufacturing facilities, where crocidolite was used, was in Stockton, California, a.k.a. Fat City.

The JM Stockton plant was the situs of a recent sophisticated intermediary case, which is set for argument soon before the California Supreme Court. Webb v. Special Electric Company, Inc., 214 Cal. App. 4th 595, 153 Cal. Rptr. 3d 882, 888 (2013). See Monica Williams Monroe “Is There a Duty to Warn Even the Most Sophisticated User?”(July 23, 2014); “California Supreme Court Set To Untangle Webb” (July 7, 2013). The JM Stockton facility was, at one time, the largest consumer of asbestos in California, for use in making Transite (asbestos-cement) pipe products. See Asbestos:  The Magic Mineral (JM Brochure). In 1982, JM sold the Stockton facility to the J-M Manufacturing Co., and the J-M A/C Pipe Corp., which were unaffiliated with JM. “Johns-Manville Sells Pipe Unit” N.Y. Times (Dec. 21, 1982)[1].

Back in April 2001, the Kazan firm obtained a substantial jury verdict against J-M A/C Pipe Company, on behalf an employer who had worked there since 1959. Hardcastle v. J-M A/C Pipe Corp., Alameda County Superior Court No. 830058-2 (Jury verdict, April 21, 2001). The employer claimed untruthfully that it had never been sued, and had to confront allegations that it had cheated on air quality testing. The jury found J-M A/C Pipe Co. liable for negligence, with actual malice.

Given the actual knowledge and sophistication of the employer, one would expect that there was no need for an outside vendor of asbestos to warn the employer of its hazards, especially not after the early 1960s. Such a defense appears to have been interposed in one unreported California case. Ransom v. Calaveras Asbestos Ltd., No. B207018 (Cal. App. 2d Dist., Div. 5) (Mar. 4, 2009) (unpublished). Plaintiff claimed that his lung cancer was related to occupational exposure at the Stockton plant. Dr. Samuel Hammar, a pathologist, testified conclusorily that “each and every occupational exposure to asbestos” was a substantial factor. Dr. B.S. Levy offered testimony on epidemiology of asbestos fiber types. Somehow the court got the idea that “there were no distinctions in the effect of the types of asbestos to which plaintiff was exposed.” Id. Mistakes were made, and not much seems to have come of the sophisticated intermediary defense.

The sophisticated user defense seems to have gone better in a jury trial that ended with a defense verdict last month. Plaintiffs sued Special Electric for having brokered South African crocidolite fiber to the Stockton facility, and for having caused plaintiff’s mesothelioma. SeeSpecial Electric Secures Defense Verdict In San Francisco Asbestos Trial” (Sept. 24, 2014). Plaintiffs called a physician, Barry Horn, M.D., and an industrial hygienist, William Ewing, CIH, as expert witnesses, to support their consumer expectations test for design defect. The defense called no witness, but defended on theory that the plaintiff, Mr. Dennis Hill, had been trained in, and aware of, the hazards of asbestos by the mid-1970s. Martha Joan Hill v. A.C.& S. Inc., et al., San Francisco County Superior Court (trial Sept. 2 through 10, with verdict returned Sept. 10, 2014) (Hon. Richard B. Ulmer, Dept. 624, and a jury).

It is a safe bet that Mr. Hill, and his union, had known about asbestos hazards for much longer than acknowledged. Mr. Hill’s demise is sad outcome to the crocidolite tragedy, for which his employer was and should have responsible. Almost as sad is forcing a remote supplier of crocidolite to defend itself for having brokered asbestos to the one of the world’s most knowledgeable users of the natural material.


[1] The Stockton plant was organized by the Machinists District Lodge 115, Local Lodge 1549, from 1958, on. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 906 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir. 1990). The sale of the facility took place on the heels of a violent strike, in which the union showed it, too, could act maliciously and violently.

Asbestos and Asbestos Litigation Are Forever

September 16th, 2014

When I first started practicing “asbestos law,” I routinely found copies of letters from JAG lawyers to shipyard workers, in their personnel files. The letters were notifying the workers that they had been diagnosed with asbestosis, usually by a local pulmonary physician who performed contract services for surveillance for the shipyard. The letters notified the workers that they might have rights under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act, but emphasized that the workers had remedies against the Navy’s vendors of asbestos-containing products, and that if they sued in tort, the Navy would have a lien against any recovery. In practice, the lien was so unwieldy, that most of the Philadelphia plaintiffs’ firms would forego filing the FECA claim altogether. Thus the Navy effectively limited its liability, and kept its munitions budgets intact, while dozens of its vendors went bankrupt.

In 2011, Kara Franke and Dennis Paustenbach published a review of historical documentation of the United States Navy’s knowledge of the hazards of asbestos use in its shipyards. Kara Franke & Dennis Paustenbach, “Government and Navy knowledge regarding health hazards of Asbestos: A state of the science evaluation (1900 to 1970),” 23(S3) Inhalation Toxicology 1 (2011). Earlier, in the 1980s, Dr. Samuel Forman published a history of Navy knowledge through World War II. Samuel A. Forman, “U.S. Navy Shipyard Occupational Medicine Through World War II,” 30 J. Occup. Med. 28 (1988). Both histories serve to add valuable context to the asbestos “state of the art” story, by showing that the United States had equal or greater knowledge of the hazards of asbestos at all relevant times, and that the government was in a vastly superior position to control asbestos exposures, outfit employees and servicemen with personal protective devices, and to communicate risk information.

The subject is well covered territory, but the article approaches its subject matter from the perspective of what was known by the United States Navy, which may well have been singlehandedly responsible for exposing the greatest number of men and women to asbestos in the United States.  Back in the 1980s, Dr. Sam Forman covered a similar theme, but only through War War II.  See also Samuel A. Forman, “U.S. Navy Shipyard Occupational Medicine Through World War II,” 30 J. Occup. Med. 28 (1988); Peter A. Nowinski, “Chronology of Asbestos Regulation in United States Workplaces,” in Karen Antman & Joseph Aisner, eds., Asbestos-Related Malignancy 99 (1986) (Nowinski represented the government in direct lawsuits against the United States for its role in creating the asbestos hazards of federal and contract shipyards).

In the early days of the asbestos litigation, defendants made several attempts to implead the government, or to sue for indemnification after settling. With some few exceptions, these efforts were largely unsuccessful. Susan L. Barna, “Abandoning Ship: Government Liability for Shipyard Asbestos Exposures,” 67 New York Univ. L. Rev. 1034 (1992); Statement of Linda G. Morra, Associate Director Human Resources Division, on behalf of the United States General Accounting Office, “The Status of Asbestos Claims Against The Federal Government”; before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations (June 30, 1988).

In many states, employer knowledge was inadmissible in strict liability cases, and plaintiffs’ counsel would withdraw their negligence claims when they saw that defense counsel were prepared to implicate the government and its extensive knowledge. Unfortunately, many defense counsel failed to appreciate the potential that intermediary knowledge had for defending against punitive damage claims, which were often still in the case. And in some states, employer knowledge remained a defense in products liability trials, even when summary judgments were not given. See, e.g., In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F.Supp. 1142 (N.D. Calif. 1982) (permitting defendants to assert that Navy was sophisticated user as an affirmative defense at trial).

In the Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, asbestos litigation, plaintiffs’ counsel soon learned that reverse-bifurcation fit their litigation model perfectly: quick, inexpensive trials without the bother of liability defenses. When defendants occasionally found a judge that would permit all-issue trials, and they presented “state-of-the-art” or sophisticated intermediary defenses, they often surprised themselves as well as plaintiffs’ counsel and judges with their success. See, e.g., O’Donnell v. The Celotex Corp., Phila. Cty. Ct.C.P., July 1982 Term, Case. No. 1619 (trial before Hon. Levan Gordon, and a jury; May 1989) (defense verdict in case in which plaintiffs presented negligence claims and defendants presented extensive evidence of federal government’s superior knowledge of hazard and control of workplace).

Finding admissible evidence of the government’s superior knowledge was not always an easy task. In the O’Donnell trial, defendants presented the testimony of Dr. Kindsvatter, an industrial hygienist with a doctoral degree, who had been the chief hygienist at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard for most of the post-World War II period. Counsel also had copies of Bureau of Medicine & Surgery bulletins, with ribbons and seal authentication. These bulletins announced the Navy’s adoption of threshold limit values for asbestos, and its mandate that the values be complied with in all shipyards.

More recently, additional resources have become available, courtesy of the internet. The Navy published a safety magazine, Safety Review, starting in 1944. Glimpses of Safety Review can be found on Google Books, and “snippets” of selected volumes 17-22 can be viewed at the Hathi Trust Digital Library[1]. Hard copies of the entire Safety Review can be found in a few university libraries, with the help of World Catalog.

More recently, Archive.org has made available selected documents from a collection of documents from the United States Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. This website provides a search engine and a browse by subject option. The collection on line is incomplete, but does include some issues of United States Navy Medicine, and United States Navy Medical News Letter. Here is how the webpage describes the fuller archives:

“A historical component has existed at the US Navy’s Bureau of Medicine and Surgery since May 1907 with the establishment of the Publications Office. In addition to producing The Naval Medical Bulletin, the Publications Office was responsible for producing occasional historical monographs, and maintaining a historical archive. Today the Office of Medical History’s mission has evolved to preserve and promote the history and heritage of the Navy Medical Department while serving the needs of our customers. The collection consists of publications, public records, manuscripts, personal papers, hospital plans, Navy Hygiene Museum records, biographical files, subject files, facility files, films, videos, photographs, prints, drawings, and artifacts. The OMH currently consists of over 100 collections covering over 1,000 linear feet and is staffed by a historian and an archivist.”

So apparently, more is available at the archive than is available on line. Perhaps in the fullness of time, when there is no more asbestos litigation, the archives will be fully digitized. Of course, the ship has sailed on most civilian and military asbestos exposure cases, but the web and the paper archive will contain a great number of documents that show the government’s superior knowledge with respect to the relevant hazards of asbestos, at various times.

[1] Curiously, the Hathi Trust website states that Safety Review is protected by copyright law: “Full view is not available for this item due to copyright © restrictions. Page numbers with matches are displayed without text snippets due to these restrictions. Snippets may be available for some items if you log in.” Of course, as a governmental work and publication, Safety Review is not subject to copyright protection.

Sand in My Shoe – CERTainly

June 17th, 2014

Late last week, the California Court of Appeals reversed a dismissal on the pleadings in a claimed silicosis case. Uriarte v. Scott Sales Co., NO. B244257, California Ct. App. (2d Dist. Div. June 13, 2014)(certified for publication).

The defendants supplied silica sand to plaintiff’s employer for use as sandblasting media. Plaintiff, Mr. Francisco Uriarte, alleging that he developed lung fibrosis from sandblasting, sued the defendants.  Rather than defending on the ground of adequate warning, common knowledge, employer knowledge, plaintiff’s knowledge, and the like, defendants moved to dismiss on the pleadings on the grounds of the component parts doctrine, by which a “manufacturer of a component part is not liable for injuries caused by the finished product into which the component has been incorporated unless the component itself was defective and caused harm.” Id.  The California Court of Appeals reversed, and held that the component parts doctrine does not apply.  Fairly predictable, and probably correct to leave the defendants to their important, substantive defenses.

The appeal, however, is noteworthy for another reason, which received no comment from the California appellate court. The Council for Education and Research on Toxics (“CERT”), along with a list of physicians and scientists, filed an amicus brief in support of reversal. The individual amici[1] and CERT sought an opportunity to participate as

“a public benefit organization whose charitable purposes are education and research regarding toxic substances… . The other amici are all physicians. epidemiologists, scientists, and scholars of science and the history of science and public health.”

Amicus Brief for CERT at 1 (Oct. 10, 2013).  This participation is their right, but the amici avow that:

“None of the amici has any financial or other similar interest in the outcome of this lawsuit.”

Id. at 1.  This claim is not so clear. The Appendix to the Amicus Brief provides background on the individual amici. Although it may well be correct that none has a financial interest in the Uriarte case itself, most of the amici have been active as testifying expert witnesses, exclusively or nearly so for claimants, in cases just like the appeal.  The individual amici have been financially compensated for their witnessing. The brief fails to mention the amici’s advocacy roles, their testifying for remuneration, or their positional, political, and professional conflicts of interest.

The appearance of impropriety, however, is much greater than suffering the court system to have expert witnesses become advocates in disguise as neutral scientists, in a silicosis case. The CERT organization, one of the amici, is a non-profit California corporation, EIN: 42-1571530, founded in 2003, with a business address at:

401 E Ocean Blvd., Ste. 800, Long Beach, California 90802-4967,

and a telephone number: 

1-877-TOX-TORT

The person answering a telephone call to this number identified “The Metzger Law Group,” which makes CERT seem like the alter ego of The Metzger Law Group.

CERT’s mission statement? Furthering scientific understanding of toxins. But lawyer Ralph Metzger is noted as the contact person for CERT!  That is the same Ralphael Metzger, with the same Metzger Law Group, at the same Long Beach, California, address, who is the attorney for Mr. Uriarte in this case. Metzger apparently controls CERT, and he appears to be involved in CERT as a corporate officer.

Representing a party, and being a corporate officer in an amicus that attempts to influence an appellate court as a neutral entity, would seem to offend fundamental fairness in the appellate process.  In Uriarte, there was probably no harm, but surely the participation of amici in appellate proceedings needs to be policed more vigilantly.


[1] Richard W. Clapp*, Ronald Crystal, David A. Eastman*, Arthur L. Frank*, Robert J. Harrison*, Ronald Melnick*, Lee Newman, Stephen M. Rappaport*, Joseph Ross, and Janet Weiss*.  An asterisk indicates that the amicus was also an amicus in a brief filed by CERT, in the Milward case. SeeCERT” (July 9, 2013).

British Labor Historians Belaboring American Labor History – Gauley Bridge

October 14th, 2013

Jock McCulloch and Geoffrey Tweedale are labor historians, which means mostly they write about the issues of interest to industrial workers, from an unremittingly pro-labor and anti-management perspective.  Recently, these British writers have weighed in on American labor history, and the role of Dr. Anthony Lanza in the litigation that followed the Gauley Bridge tunnel construction.  See Jock McCulloch and Geoffrey Tweedale, “Anthony J. Lanza, Silicosis and the Gauley Bridge ‘Nine’,” 26 Social History of Medicine (2013), in press [cited as M&T]

Here is the authors’ abstract:

“Gauley Bridge was the scene of America’s biggest industrial disaster, in which hundreds of workers died from silicosis in the aftermath of the drilling in 1930–31 of a hydro-electric tunnel at Hawk’s Nest. This article scrutinises for the first time the role of Dr A. J. Lanza (a medical director of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company) in hiding the extent of acute silicosis amongst the tunnellers. Lanza and his allies in the medical profession were able to impose their own interpretation on events at Gauley Bridge. Their analysis of nine autopsies ignored the evidence of acute silicosis, in favour of one which emphasised tuberculosis, racial susceptibility, syphilis, the supposed negligence of the workforce and alleged racketeering by lawyers. The result was that acute silicosis largely disappeared from medical discourse and Gauley Bridge was denied a place in America’s national consciousness.”

McCulloch & Tweedale’s investigation into Lanza’s role in the litigation is interesting, but hardly surprising.  He was, after all, a medical director of a large insurance company, and no doubt that the Gauley Bridge litigation, which started in 1932, threatened Met Life’s interests and his own.  These British authors, however, do a much less convincing job of investigating the bias of the physicians who testified for some of the Gauley Bridge victims, and of the plaintiffs’ lawyers, who had a substantial interest in passing off tuberculosis, pneumonia, and other respiratory illnesses as silicosis.

Was Gauley Bridge Denied A Place in America’s National Consciousness?

McCulloch and Tweedale claim that the Gauley Bridge disaster hardly registered in the nation’s memory.  Their claim is demonstrably false. M&T at 2. These authors appear to make their claim to advance a conspiratorial labor view of history that fails to account for evidence from many other walks of life. They write:

“The neglect of Hawk’s Nest—which is indicative of the way that risks in the workplace and silicosis in particular have been underplayed or ignored by historians and social scientists—is unfortunate.”

M&T at 3.  While their suggestion that Hawk’s Nest, another name for the Gauley Bridge locale, has been ignored by social historians until recently has some plausibility, their implication of more widespread neglect cannot be sustained. Furthermore, their suggestion that Gauley Bridge fits into their Marxist paradigm of corporate corruption of science (citing similar works by Michaels, Castleman, Rosner, et al.) ignores the robust debate from all sectors of society, including the scientific community, organized labor, political actors, industry, government, and academia.

The Gauley Bridge disaster, and disaster it was, was memorialized in song, in literature, and most important, in a refined understanding of how extreme silica exposures can lead to rapid onset of silicosis.  These “non-labor” sources are generally ignored in the authors’ “tunnel vision.” McCulloch and Tweedale’s indictment against Lanza asserts that Lanza:

“did not seek to find a truthful explanation for the premature deaths of these men(and countless others), but instead hijacked the medical agenda to serve powerful business interests. In doing so, they certainly proved to be accomplices, but hardly unknowing ones.”

M&T at 3-4.

The historical evidence may support Lanza’s work behind the scenes in the Gauley Bridge trials, but the authors broad, overwrought implications are non-sequiturs:

“As a result, for almost half a century Hawk’s Nest was denied a place in the national consciousness and silicosis was elided as a major public health issue in the USA.”

M&T at 4.

In Song

In 1936, Josh White wrote and sang a labor protest song, “Silicosis is Killing Me”:

I said silicosis, you made a mighty bad break of me.
Awww, silicosis made a mighty bad break of me.
You robbed me of my youth and health;
All you brought poor me was misery.

Now silicosis, you’re a dirty robber and a thief.
Awww silicosis, dirty robber and a thief.
Robbed me of my right to live and all you brought poor me was grief.

I was there digging that tunnel for six bits a day;
I was there digging that tunnel for six bits a day;
Didn’t know I was digging my own grave, silicosis eating my lungs away.

I says mama, mama, mama, cool my fevered head.

I says mama, mama, come and cool my fevered head.
I’m going to meet my Jesus, God knows I’ll soon be dead.

Six bits I got for digging, digging that tunnel hole.

Six bits I got for digging, digging that tunnel hole.
Takes me away from my baby, it sure done wrecked my soul.

Now tell all my buddies, tell all my friends you see;

Now tell all my buddies, tell all my friends you see.
I’m going way up yonder, please don’t grieve for me.

In Cinema

Silicosis was addressed in the emerging art form of cinema, but perhaps most notably in The Citadel (1938), which featured Robert Donat as a physician trying to treat and prevent silicosis.  The movie was nominated for an Academy Award, for best picture in 1939; King Vidor was nominated for his directing of the movie.

Perhaps less artistic, but no less compelling than King Vidor, in 1937, Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins declared war on silicosis, toured mines, convened national conferences on the problem, and issued a film entitled, “Stop Silicosis.”

 

Secretary Perkins as she appeared in “Stop Silicosis.”

 

In Media

The Gauley Bridge disaster and aftermath were covered widely in newspapers and  magazines through the mid- to late-1930s.  McCulloch and Tweedale concede the existence “extensive national media coverage.” M&T at 14.  They complain, however, that “press interest subsided.” Id.  Before we advert to conspiracy theories and suggestions of mass attention deficit disorder, we need only remind ourselves that soon after the Congressional hearings, and the National Silicosis Conference, of the 1930s, Hirohito and Hitler occupied center stage.  Press interest is, almost by definition, ephemeral.

In Legislative Action

In 1936, Congress reacted angrily to the media coverage of the Gauley Bridge tunnel workers’ developing and dying of acute silicosis.

A contemporaneous account described the congressional hearings and quoted from the Committee’s official report:

“In a two hundred printed page report the Committee on Labor of the House of Representatives at Washington furnishes the ‘Hearings’ on House Joint Resolution 449 – the legislative vehicle which rudely trundled into the light of publicity the secrets of the silicosis tragedy at Gauley Bridge, West Virginia.  This Committee of the Congress presents the testimony of many specialists, including several from the United States Bureau of Mines and the Public Health Service, as well as of special investigators and several surviving victims of the occupational disease from this now notorious tunnel operation. The official report of the investigation

concludes:

‘That the whole driving of the tunnel was begun, continued, and completed with grave and inhuman disregard of any consideration for the health, lives, and future of the employees.

That as a result many workmen became infected with silicosis; that many died of the disease and many not yet dead are doomed to die from the ravages of the disease as a result of their employment and the negligence of the employing contractor. That such negligence was either willful or the result of inexcusable and indefensible ignorance there can be no doubt on the face of the evidence presented to the committee.’

The record presents a story of a condition that is hardly conceivable in a democratic government in the present century. It would be more representative of the middle ages. It is the story of a tragedy worthy of the pen of a Victor Hugo–the

story of men in the darkest days of the depression, with work hard to secure, driven by despair and the stark fear of hunger to work for a mere existence wage under almost intolerable conditions.”

26 Am. Labor Legis. Rev. 66 (1936)

Francis Perkins, Roosevelt’s Secretary of Labor, in 1938 convened a National Silicosis Conference, which brought together organized labor, industry, government, and academics to address the outstanding safety and health issues in industries that gave rise to unsafe silica exposures among their workers.  The National Silicosis Conference published its proceedings in a series of reports, which in turn were memorialized in textbooks of the time.  See, e.g., Jewett V. Reed & A.K. Harcourt, The Essentials of Occupational Disease 162 & n. 15 (1941) (citing National Silicosis Conference, Report on Medical Control. United States Dep’t of Labor Bull. No. 21, Part 1 (1938)).

LITIGATION:  plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose

Jock McCulloch and Geoffrey Tweedale deplore Dr. Lanza’s participation in the silicosis litigation that followed the Gauley Bridge disaster.  They go to great lengths to suggest that Lanza suppressed the diagnostic entity of “acute silicosis,” and that he was motivated by race prejudice against the African American tunnel workers and bias in favor of the insurance company for which he worked.

Their narrative of the Gauley Bridge litigation, however, is selective and fatally incomplete.  They report that the first case to go to trial in 1933, Raymond Johnson v. Rinehart & Dennis Company, resulted in a hung jury, and they offer multiple hearsay to suggest that the defense bribed several members of the jury.  Perhaps there is something to the innuendo, but these historians ignore the contemporaneous accounts that described the circus atmosphere created by the histrionics of the plaintiffs’ counsel.  Newsweek described the “legal pyrotechnics”:  the plaintiffs’ lawyers

“threw handfuls of white silica dust into the air to show jurors how it hung like an ectoplasmic pall.  The plaintiffs’ legal team arranged a court room procession of doomed silicosis sufferers — the parade of the living dead.”

“Silicosis Tunneling Through an Atmosphere of Deadly Dust” Newsweek 33, 34 (Jan. 25, 1936).  Rinehart & Dennis settled 200 cases in the aftermath of the hung jury.  The plaintiffs’ lawyers filed additional cases, but McCulloch and Tweedale fail to report that the next jury, sitting in Charleston, rejected the worker’s claim. Id.

In 1949, the U. S. Supreme Court, following the lead of the New York Court of Appeals, declared it to be a matter of common knowledge that breathing silica dust “is injurious to the lungs and dangerous to health,” a fact the plaintiff’s employer “was bound to know.” Urie v. Thomas, 337 U.S. 163, 180 (1949), citing Sadowski v. Long Island R.R., 292 N.Y. 448, 456 (1944).

In Occupational Medicine

Before the Gauley Bridge disaster, acute silicosis was not a well-defined diagnostic condition.  A paper published in the Journal of the American Medical Association, in 1932, states that “acute silicosis” did not gain recognition until 1929.  Earle M. Chapman, “Acute Silicosis,” 98 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 1439 (1932).  The author described cases arising out of the abrasive soap manufacturing industry, where silica exposures were confounded by exposure to alkali soap powder.

Two papers in 1933, in the American Journal of Public Health, gave tentative recognition to acute silicosis, and cautiously labeled the condition, “so-called acute silicosis.”  Homer L. Sampson, “The Roentgenogram in So-Called ‘Acute’ Silicosis, 23 Am. J. Pub. Health 1237 (1933); and Leroy U. Gardner, “Pathology of So-Called Acute Silicosis,” 23 Am. J. Pub. Health 1237 (1933).

Unfortunately for McCulloch and Tweedale’s thesis, the recognition of acute silicosis, and the assessment of the prevalence of all varieties of silicosis, were confounded by the wide-spread prevalence of tuberculosis (TB).  The radiographic appearance of TB often consists of  nodular opacities, which physicians, using early, unsophisticated chest radiography, could easily confuse with silicosis.  Often workers had both TB and silicosis, and the severity of the patients’ conditions could not easily be attributed to one or the other condition.

Reading the medical literature of the day is a healthful antidote to the glib generalizations that unfairly import present-day knowledge into the discussion of silicosis in the 1930s.  In 1934, Dr. John Hawes, in the New England Journal of Medicine, noted that:

“Our ideas concerning silicosis have undergone radical changes during the past ten to fifteen years.”

John B. Hawes, II & Moses Stone, “The Effect of Acute Respiratory Tract Infections Upon Latent Silicosis,” 211 New Engl. J. Med. 1147, 1147 (1934).  Tuberculosis and tuberculosilicosis were major confounders in the clinical, diagnostic picture confronted by physicians in the 1930s and 1940s. See, e.g., Louis Benson, “Tuberculosilicosis,” 223 New Engl. J. Med. 398 (1940);  H. K. Taylor & H. Alexander, “Silicosis and Silico-Tuberculosis,” 111 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 400 (1938); G. Ornstein & D. Olmar, “Tuberculosis and Silicosis,” 2 Quarterly Bulletin Seaview Hospital 28 (1936).

An editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine, in 1936, presented a balanced view of the issues, and noted that both labor and management had important work to do to bring the safety issues under control.  Editorial, “The Problem of Silicosis,” 214 New Engl. J. Med. 794 (1936).

Effective therapies for TB became available in the 1950s.  During the 1930s, silicotuberculosis was often called “complicated” silicosis; i.e., silicosis was complicated by mycobacterial infection.  In the 1950s, with the advent of antiobiotic therapies for TB, “complicated silicosis” changed meaning to refer to advanced chronic silicosis in which small silicotic nodules had coalesced into large nodules.

Even after antibiotics became available for TB, silicosis was hardly forgotten.  Of course, the medical profession and the citizenry had other pressing issues in the 1950s: polio, an emerging epidemic of tobacco-related lung cancer, the threat of war and nuclear holocaust.  Still, silicosis remained part of the larger discussion of occupational and environmental hazards.  See, e.g., Harriet L. Hardy, “Medical Progress: Occupational Medicine,” 247 New Engl. J. Med. 473 (1951).  See also Schachtman, “Conspiracy Theories: Historians, In and Out of Court” (2013) (discussing the quantitation of publication rates about silicosis in both PubMed and in Google labs, both of which show continuing interest in, and publication about, silicosis throughout the 1950s and 1960s, into the OSHA era).

The Gauley Bridge litigation was a short-lived side show in the history of silicosis. Contrary to the McCulloch and Tweedale’s narrative, however, acute or rapid-onset silicosis became a well-accepted diagnostic entity.  See, e.g., Lewis Gregory Cole & William Gregory Cole, Pneumoconiosis (Silicosis) – The Story of Dusty Lungs – A Preliminary Report (N.Y. 1940); Jewett V. Reed & A.K. Harcourt, The Essentials of Occupational Disease 164 (1941); Rutherford T. Johnstone, Occupational Medicine and Industrial Hygiene 337 (1948); Donald Hunter, Diseases of the Occupations 837, 849 (1955).

Prevalent Racketeering

McCulloch and Tweedale concede that accurate diagnoses of silicosis require a chest X-ray (which labor radicals and plaintiffs’ lawyers in the 1930s disputed), as well as well as careful clinical examination and full occupational and personal medical histories. M&T at 5.  Although they note the diagnostic difficulties, the authors miss the lack of specialization and experience among many general practice physicians to make an accurate diagnosis of silicosis.  They acknowledge that the use of X-rays in diagnosis was still contested in the early 1930s.  M&T at 11.  The situation in the 1930s was thus ripe for specious claiming.

What McCulloch and Tweedale also seem to miss in their focus on a few compelling Gauley Bridge cases is that the diagnostic difficulties and confounders were a prescription for fraud and scamming on the wider stage.  In deploring management’s lobbying for workmen compensation laws, they ignore that many labor unions concurred.  In the context of silicosis hazards, plaintiffs faced serious legal hurdles against their employers, in the form of limitations, assumption of risk, fellow worker, and contributory negligence defenses.

In 1936, in the pages of the New England Journal of Medicine, Dr. Hawes commented upon the widespread scamming and racketeering that accompanied the serious silicosis cases in West Virginia.

“Very few physicians are aware of the extent to which claims for alleged injury and disease due to dust are being brought before courts and industrial accident boards in this country. The situation in this regard amounts to a ‘racket’ compared with which others, notorious in New York, Chicago and elsewhere, fade into insignificance.   Unscrupulous lawyers have their ‘runners’ on the lookout for any employee who is exposed to dust in the course of his work, no matter what the nature of the dust nor however harmless it may be, who happens to come down with a cough or a cold or indeed with almost any other illness and then and there try to persuade him to bring suit. Unfortunately, in too many instances, physicians partly through ignorance and partly through an honest desire to help their patients and perhaps on the general theory of ‘soaking the insurance company’ are willing to testify that the dust to which this individual had been exposed was entirely responsible for his condition. In nearly 100 per cent of such cases the doctor takesat its face value the word of the worker and his friends as to the dust hazard without any real knowledge of the situation obtained from a personal inspection of the plant or at least by interviewing those in a position to know.”

John B. Hayes, II, MD, “Silicosis,” 215 New Engl. J. Med. 143 (1936).

Although the medical understanding of silicosis has advanced tremendously, the racketeering, alas, is still with us to this day.  See In re Silica Products Liab. Lit., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (Jack, J.) (describing the attorneys’ manufacturing fraudulent silicosis claims in MDL 1553).  Of course, there are real silicosis cases, but overwhelmingly they are “simple” silicosis cases, typically unaccompanied by impairment or disability.  Tuberculosis is now rarely a confounder, but histoplasmosis and coccidioidomycosis are important confounders of simple silicosis in some areas of the United States.

The Charge of Racism

McCulloch and Tweedale point out that Lanza formed an opinion that black workers were more prone to TB and silica-related disease because of their race and prevalent syphilis.  To be sure, there was (and still is) much race, ethnic, and religious prejudice in the United States.  Lanza’s views on race, however, are irrelevant to the ultimate acceptance of acute or rapid-onset silicosis as an occupational hazard of extremely high-levels of occupational silica exposure.  The race theory appeared to play no role in the civil litigation in West Virginia, and it receives no mention in the many textbooks that describe and accept acute silicosis as a diagnostic entity. As for the continuing existence of race prejudice, McCulloch and Tweedale might have noted that Dr. Gerrit Schepers, who testified for plaintiffs in asbestos and silica cases in the United States for decades, described young black African children as “pickaninnies.”  See Gerrit Schepers, “Discussion,” 132 Annals N. Y. Acad. Sci. 246, 247 (1965). It is a relatively easy, ad hominem game to play, to dismiss a scientist’s views because of his irrational race prejudices. Lanza may have been influenced by his racial theories in acting behind the scenes of the Gauley Bridge litigation, but McCulloch and Tweedale would be hard pressed to find them articulated in Lanza’s textbooks or articles.

The Rosner-Markowitz Hypothesis

The authors note that Lanza, with Metropolitan Life, helped to form the Air Hygiene Foundation (later the IHF), and they insinuate that these organizations were involved in various nefarious actions:

“The AHF (later named the Industrial Hygiene Foundation) was an enduring and powerful industry group, which helped defuse the silicosis crisis by helping companies defend compensation claims, by conducting industry-sponsored industrial hygiene studies and by assuaging public fears. This organisation, in effect, took the dust problem away from the trade unions and the public and sequestered it inside laboratories and private gatherings, where health issues could be mediated by experts and government, safe from untoward publicity. Industry lobbying was able to influence the shaping of state compensation laws for silicosis, which protected big business.”

M&T at 15-16.  These insinuations are borrowed, with attribution, from fellow labor historians, David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz.  The claims are a mixed lot.  For instance, why would not an industry work to help companies defend compensation claims?  Organized labor worked to help its members prosecute claims.  Surely McCulloch and Tweedale do not believe that every claim made was valid or that every defense frivolous.

Assuming that the AHF/IHF had some role in pressing for state workman compensation laws, then it was aligned with many labor unions that pushed for similar reforms.  As noted above, plaintiffs were often at a serious disadvantage in litigation against employers, and they frequently were turned out of court on grounds of limitations, contributory negligence, fellow-worker rule, or assumption of risk.  Plaintiffs needed certainty in coverage for occupational disease, not a jury lottery system, and employers needed some reasonable limits on the extent of liability.  Workman’s compensation was a compromise, bound not to satisfy everyone.

As for helping companies institute industrial hygiene measures and conduct hygiene studies, the AHF/IHF was helping industry live up to its obligations to provide a safe workplace.  The United States government, under the Presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, was involved in similar measures in the 1930s.  See, e.g., United States Dep’t of Labor, Silicosis Prevention:  Dust Control in Foundries (1939).

McCulloch and Tweedale’s accusation that the AHF/IHF “in effect, took the dust problem away from the trade unions and the public and sequestered it inside laboratories and private gatherings, where health issues could be mediated by experts and government, safe from untoward publicity,” is, of course, borrowed directly from the writings of Rosner and Markowitz.  The accusation does not gain any credibility from being repeated.  Involving scientists and competent laboratories that would study the issues and publish their results was a responsible step for industry to take.  Much of the early political rhetoric about silicosis was driven by personal, subjective anecdotes and uncontrolled observations.  The involvement of scientists was a step followed by labor unions, as in the example of the asbestos insulation workers union hiring Dr. Irving Selikoff in the 1950s to investigate their concerns about occupational cancer risk.

There was much to be gained by de-escalating the emotion and vitriol of the labor-management conflicts of the 1930s, although the de-escalation was unsatisfactory to radicals on both sides.  The fact is that the labor unions remained interested in, and concerned about, silicosis, both before and after World War II.  Labor unions had their own private gatherings, and engaged in rent-seeking from state and federal agencies, as did industry.  After the passage of the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, labor’s interests generally prevailed at the agency level.

“The result was that acute silicosis largely disappeared from medical discourse and Gauley Bridge was denied a place in America’s national consciousness.” M&T at Abstract.  This causal conclusion is demonstrably wrong.  If you like conspiracy theories, McCulloch and Tweedale’s history might well be self-referentially labeled, Deceit and Denial, after the work of their American counterparts, Rosner and Markowitz.

Sand in My Shoes

October 4th, 2012

Sharon L. Caffrey, Kenneth M. Argentieri and Julie S. Greenberg, of Duane Morris LLP, have written a piece for Law360, in which they suggest that the recent violations of the OSHA silica permissible exposure limit (PEL) by the fracking industry may lead to new silicosis claims.  “Another Wave Of Silicosis Claims May Be On The Horizon” (Oct. 3, 2012)

Silicosis has been a preventable disorder for over half a century. There will, however, always be silicosis cases because there will always be people who do not follow basic industrial hygiene principles.  Negligent employers will overexpose their workers.  Negligent workers will ignore workplace safety rules.

But silicosis cases do not translate into valid claims.  The essence of silicosis products liability claims is a failure to warn, and there is no basis in this millennium (and for the last few decades of the last millennium) for maintaining  failure-to-warn claim against silica sand suppliers.

Caffrey and colleagues discuss the fraudulent claiming activity that resulted in Judge Jacks’ rebuke to the tort litigation industry in MDL 1553.  In re Silica Products Liab. Lit., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D. Tex. 2005). Judge Jack’s excellent gatekeeping and her opinion on litigation-sponsored medical screenings helped suppress an outbreak of silicosis litigation, but Her Honor actually worried that the bogus cases would obscure the real cases.  There are, however, no real cases of failure to warn in the context of silicosis claims.  In 1949, the U. S. Supreme Court, following the lead of the New York Court of Appeals, declared it to be a matter of common knowledge that breathing silica dust “is injurious to the lungs and dangerous to health,” a fact the plaintiff’s employer “was bound to know.” Urie v. Thomas, 337 U.S. 163, 180 (1949), citing Sadowski v. Long Island R.R., 292 N.Y. 448, 456 (1944). Selling sand no more requires a warning than selling a set of kitchen knives.

Today, warnings in connection with bulk sales of silica should be nothing more than regulatory and litigation eye candy – supererogatory acts intended to ward off plaintiffs’ lawyers.  For the last two decades, the warnings have been frequent, intense, detailed, and lengthy.  Material Safety Data Sheets are often 10 to 15 pages long.  The silica exposures above PEL in the fracking industry, reported recent by NIOSH, took place at worksites managed by Halliburton, Schlumberger, Baker Hughes, and similar companies.  These companies have the knowledge and resources to provide a safe workplace.  They have had common law duties to control silica exposures for over a century.  Most states introduced regulations that mandated limits in silica exposure by the 1950s.  Government contractors had similar duties under the Walsh-Healey Act, and virtually all employers have been under a federal mandate to provide a safe workplace for the use of silica sand, since the effective date of the federal Occupational Health & Safety Act of 1970.

Caffrey and colleagues correctly note that OSHA has issued a Hazard Alert about exposures above the Permissible Exposure Limit in the fracking industry.  OSHA Hazard Alert for Crystalline Silica Exposures from Shale Gas Fracturing (June 22, 2012).  The lawyers’ discussion of the claim proliferation in MDL 1553 suggests that they were thinking of civil actions against suppliers.  There may be claims in the future, but the only legitimate claims will be workman’s compensation claims.  The recommendations made should help employers protect their employees from silicosis; better yet, the employers could just follow the law that has been in place for over 40 years.

International Labor Organization – What Really Matters in Occupational Safety

May 20th, 2012

Created in 1919, the International Labour Organization (ILO) is now part of the United Nations.  The ILO, with its motto, “Promoting Jobs, Protecting People,” exists as a forum for governments, employers, and workers, to shape policies and programs to advance safe, dignified work.

The ILO has been involved in many aspects of protecting workers against the dust diseases of the lungs.  Every United States lawyer who litigates pneumoconiosis claims is, of necessity, familiar with the ILO’s system for standardizing the classification and interpretation of plain film chest radiographs for the pneumoconioses.  Last year, in conjunction with the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), the ILO reissued its long-awaited guidelines for digital radiographs.  Guidelines for the use of the ILO International Classification of Radiographs of Pneumoconioses, revised edition 2011 (Nov. 17, 2011).

The ILO system for classifying chest radiographs is used around the world for health surveillance, epidemiologic studies, and in some places, for assessing extent of pneumoconiotic disease and compensation for silicosis, asbestos-related diseases and coal workers’ pneumoconiosis. See ILO fact sheet about the 2011 edition of the classification system.

The ILO standard radiographic images are now available in DICOM Format on DVD from the ILO.  In January 2012, NIOSH published a “Notice of Proposed Rulemaking – Amendments to Specifications for Medical Examinations of Underground Coal Miners” to modify regulations of the Coal Worker’s Health Surveillance Program (CWHSP), to retain the use of plain film, while permitting the use of digital radiography for the assessment of coal worker’s pneumoconiosis.

* * *

The ILO has done important work in other areas as well.  If you are looking for a single publication that captures the key principles of providing a safe workplace, you would be hard pressed to find a better source than the ILO’s text on occupational safety and health. Benjamin Alli, Fundamental principles of occupational health and safety (2d ed. 2008).    The first edition, from 2001, is available for free from the ILO’s website. Benjamin Alli, Fundamental principles of occupational health and safety (1st ed. 2001).

The ILO describes the text as

“useful for legislators and labour inspectors, those involved in policy-making (governments, and employers’ and workers’ organizations) and those within enterprises who are concerned with the practical implementation of measures to promote and protect the safety and health of workers (managers, supervisors, workers’ representatives), as well as academic institutions.”

What is remarkable about the ILO text is the even-handedness in which it describes the respective responsibilities of the employers and workers for the promotion and preservation of workers’ health.  The duties of employers are described as including the duty to:

  • “inform  the  workers  of  all  the known hazards associated with their work, the health risks involved and the relevant preventive and protective measures;
  • take appropriate  measures  to eliminate or minimize the risks resulting from exposure to those hazards;
  • provide  workers  with  suitable protective equipment, clothing and  other  facilities  where  adequate protection against risk of accident or injury to health, including  exposure  to  adverse conditions, cannot be ensured by other means… .”

Id. at page 95.   In practical terms, the ILO specifies the “work practices and organizational methods” to reduce or eliminate safety and health hazards.  Personal protective equipment, such as respirators, is a last resort:

“When none of the above approaches is feasible, or when the degree of safety achieved is considered inadequate, the only solution is to provide exposed persons with suitable personal protective equipment and protective clothing. This is the final line of defence and should be used only as a last resort, since it entails reliance on active cooperation and compliance by the workers. Moreover, such equipment may be heavy, cumbersome and uncomfortable, and may restrict movement.

Employers should consult workers or their representatives on suitable personal protective equipment and clothing, having regard to the type of work and risks. Furthermore, when hazards cannot be otherwise prevented or controlled,  employers should provide and maintain such equipment and clothing as are reasonably necessary, without cost to the workers. The employer should provide the workers with the appropriate means to enable them to use the individual protective equipment. Indeed, the employer has a duty to ensure its proper use. Protective equipment and clothing should comply with the standards set by the competent authority and take ergonomic principles into account. Workers have the obligation to make proper use of and take good care of the personal protective equipment and protective clothing provided for their use.”

Id. at 97.

Remarkably, what is absent from the ILO text is any rhetoric or rationale in support of warnings on products from remote vendors.  Judges and legislators might well take note that the dissemination of information about hazards in a workplace is so dependent upon employers in the first instance, and workers in the next, that it will be a rare case when a supplier of a raw material or commodity will actually have the opportunity to play a substantial role in causing a chronic over-exposure occupational disease.  The focus of the American law on warnings from a remote supplier is an anomaly created by the legislative immunity accorded employers in the tort system.

The New York Times Goes to War Against Generic Drug Manufacturers

March 25th, 2012

Last week marked the launch of a New York Times rhetorically fevered, legally sophomoric campaign against generic drug preemption.  Saturday saw an editorial, “A Bizarre Outcome on Generic Drugs,” New York Times (March 24, 2012), which screamed, “Bizarre”!  “Outrageous”!

The New York Times editorialists have their knickers in a knot over the inability of people, who are allegedly harmed by adverse drug reactions from generic medications, to sue the generic manufacturers.  The editorial follows a front-page article, from earlier last week, which decried the inability to sue generic drug sellers. See Katie Thomas, “Generic Drugs Proving Resistant to Damage Suits,” New York Times (Mar. 21, 2012).

The Times‘ writers think that it is “bizarre” and “outrageous” that these people are out of court due to federal preemption of state court tort laws that might have provided a remedy.

In particular, the Times suggests that the law is irrational for allowing Ms. Diana Levine to recover against Wyeth for the loss of her arm to gangrene after receiving Phenergan by intravenous push, while another plaintiff, Ms. Schork, cannot recover for a similar injury, from a generic manufacturer of promethazine, the same medication.  Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).  See also Brief of Petitioner Wyeth, in Wyeth v. Levine (May 2008).

Of course, both Ms. Levine and Ms. Schork received compensation from their healthcare providers, who deviated from their standard of care when they carelessly injected the medication into arteries, contrary to clear instructions.   At the time that Levine received her treatment, the Phenergan package insert contained four separate warnings about the risk of gangrene from improper injection of the medication into an artery.  For instance, the “Adverse Reactions” section of the Phenergan label indicated: “INTRA-ARTERIAL INJECTION [CAN] RESULT IN GANGRENE OF THE AFFECTED EXTREMITY.”

As any tort practitioner knows, a plaintiff can almost always second guess the adequacy of a warning, but the Levine case did not involve any real failure to warn, or failure to warn adequately.  Healthcare providers and the FDA are well aware of the dangers of intra-arterial injection of Phenergan, but plaintiffs’ counsel can always play the hindsight bias game, and ask for something more.

What distorts tort law and creates irrational, disparate outcomes often has more to do with who has the deep pocket.  The Physician’s Assistant who screwed up and caused Ms. Levine’s gangrene settled, but Ms. Levine was left free to pursue the manufacturer despite the negligence of the P.A.  According to the Times article, Ms. Schork, who was injured from a careless injection of the generic version, pursued a similar strategy, and obtained a “limited settlement” from her healthcare provider (amount not specified).

Many states have caps on medical malpractice awards, and often plaintiffs’ counsel are reluctant to push hard against healthcare providers who will be viewed as sympathetic by juries.  Punitive damages are virtually impossible to obtain against physicians, physician assistants, and nurses, but are commonplace against large pharmaceutical companies.  So tort law creates a perverse set of incentives to ignore the truly culpable parties, or “to go lightly” on them, and to pursue the manufacturing defendant on the vagaries of “adequacy” of warning. The incentives are so corrupting that in some states, the healthcare providers, afraid of insurance premium hikes, turn to plaintiffs’ counsel to offer support against the manufacturing defendant.

What is bizarre and outrageous is that anyone would have a remedy against the manufacturer in the facts of the Levine case, or in similar cases.

The Times notes that federal preemption of state tort law in lawsuits against generics follows from the generic manufacturers’ lack of control over package insert labels.  Shilling for the lawsuit industry, the Times fails to mention that it is the original sponsor of the medication, the proprietary pharmaceutical manufacturer, which prepared the new drug application, and which has had the longest experience with post-marketing surveillance of the medication.

Professor Deborah Mayo asks whether anyone is responsible for updating the label after a medication has lost its patent protection.  SeeGeneric Drugs Resistant to Lawsuits” (Mar. 22, 2012)

If the question is raised in the context of the sponsor’s continued sale of the medication, then the sponsor still must fulfill its product stewardship.  The FDA has a considerable interest in maintaining consistency across labels, and the agency has generally been reluctant to permit one manufacturer of a drug, or in a class of drugs, to deviate substantially from what the agency believes is the appropriate level of warning in the context of the indicated use.  Of course, in the case of Phenergan, none of these considerations was really involved, because the FDA was well aware of the danger of gangrene from arterial injection, and the FDA-approved label contained multiple references to the hazard.

Tort law is the wrong hobby horse to ride into battle for an equality of results.  Two patients may have equally careless healthcare providers, but one of them gets lucky and accidentally manages to inject the IV into a vein.  The other is unfortunate, and suffers grievous injury because her physician negligently injected the medication into an artery.  Tort law provides a remedy only against the careless provider whose negligence causes harm.  The other negligent provider goes free, to inflict malpractice on another victim.

Or consider two equally meritorious plaintiffs who sue two companies under almost identical facts.  One of the companies is insolvent. One of the plaintiffs will thus go uncompensated.

Or suppose we have two plaintiffs, each of whom receives a particular medication from his physician and is harmed by a well-recognized adverse drug reaction.  Although well understood by the medical professional, further assume that the harm is not adequately addressed in the package insert. One plaintiff’s physician acknowledges that he was well aware of the reaction; the other plaintiff’s physician is incompetent and says he never heard of the problem.  The learned intermediary doctrine will properly cut off the claim of the knowledgeable physician; the plaintiff whose physician was incompetent may still have a claim against the manufacturer.  Lucky plaintiff to have had such an ill-trained physician.

Similarly, if a plaintiff’s physician testifies that he never reads package inserts, then the plaintiff may lose any remedy because regardless whether the warning label was adequate or not, the prescribing physician’s carelessness prevented the actual labeling, and any hypothetical proposed labeling, from influencing his prescribing practice.

The Times quotes Michael Johnson, a lawyer who represented Gladys Mensing, whose case gave rise to the Supreme Court’s ruling on generic preemption: “Your pharmacists aren’t telling you, hey, when we fill this with your generic, you are giving up all or your legal remedies.”  Well, if you have a well-trained physician, who is aware of the risks of a medication, as he or she should be, you may have given up the rights you had if your physician was an ignoramus, willfully ignorant of the medication’s unavoidable risks.   Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).

The point is that tort law is not, and has never been, a system of generating equal outcomes; nor is tort law a system of insuring people against bad results.  Generic medications cost less.  People who are looking to buy lawsuits may choose to buy proprietary pharmaceutical manufacturers’ drugs.  People who are looking to buy good healthcare may choose to select their healthcare providers more carefully, and look to a system that better places the cost of harm on those parties that can best avoid the bad outcome.  In the Levine and Schork cases, the most efficient, and the fairest, cost and risk avoiders were the women’s healthcare providers.

Is it absurd for recovery to be limited against generics when allowed against proprietary pharmaceutical manufacturers?  Yes, because the proprietary manufacturers should have similar protection from the welter of state tort laws.  The irrational result in Levine is not to be imitated.